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branches ::: Aristotle

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Gutenberg - Aristotle


Logic (Organon)
  On Interpretation
  Prior Analytics
  Posterior Analytics
  Sophistical Refutations

Natural philosophy (physics)
  On the Heavens
  On Generation and Corruption
  On the Universe*
  On the Soul
  Sense and Sensibilia
  On Memory
  On Sleep
  On Dreams
  On Divination in Sleep
  On Length and Shortness of Life
  On Youth
  Old Age
  Life and Death
  and Respiration
  On Breath*
  De Anima
   History of Animals
   Parts of Animals
   Movement of Animals
   Progression of Animals
   Generation of Animals
  On Colors*
  On Things Heard*
  On Plants*
  On Marvellous Things Heard*
  On Indivisible Lines
  The Situations and Names of Winds
  On Melissus
  and Gorgias*


Ethics - Politics
  Nicomachean Ethics
  Magna Moralia
  Eudemian Ethics
  On Virtues and Vices*
  Constitution of the Athenians

Rhetoric - Poetics
  Rhetoric to Alexander*


The Organon ::: (Greek: , meaning "instrument, tool, organ") is the standard collection of Aristotle's six works on logic. The name Organon was given by Aristotle's followers, the Peripatetics.
  Categories ::: The Categories (Greek Katgoriai; Latin Categoriae or Praedicamenta) is a text from Aristotle's Organon that enumerates all the possible kinds of things that can be the subject or the predicate of a proposition. They are "perhaps the single most heavily discussed of all Aristotelian notions".[1] The work is brief enough to be divided, not into books as is usual with Aristotle's works, but into fifteen chapters.
    The Categories places every object of human apprehension under one of ten categories (known to medieval writers as the Latin term praedicamenta). Aristotle intended them to enumerate everything that can be expressed without composition or structure, thus anything that can be either the subject or the predicate of a proposition.

  On Interpretation ::: De Interpretatione or On Interpretation (Greek: , Peri Hermeneias) is the second text from Aristotle's Organon and is among the earliest surviving philosophical works in the Western tradition to deal with the relationship between language and logic in a comprehensive, explicit, and formal way. The work is usually known by its Latin title.
    The work begins by analyzing simple categoric propositions, and draws a series of basic conclusions on the routine issues of classifying and defining basic linguistic forms, such as simple terms and propositions, nouns and verbs, negation, the quantity of simple propositions (primitive roots of the quantifiers in modern symbolic logic), investigations on the excluded middle (what to Aristotle is not applicable to future tense propositions-the problem of future contingents), and on modal propositions.
     The first five chapters deal with the terms that form propositions. Chapters 6 and 7 deal with the relationship between affirmative, negative, universal and particular propositions. These relationships are the basis of the well-known Square of opposition. The distinction between universal and particular propositions is the basis of modern quantification theory. The last three chapters deal with modalities. Chapter 9 is famous for the discussion of the sea-battle. (If it is true that there will be a sea-battle tomorrow, then it is true today that there will be a sea-battle. Thus a sea-battle is apparently unavoidable, and thus necessary. Another interpretation would be: that we cannot know that which has not yet come to pass. In other words: if there is a sea battle tomorrow then it is true today that tomorrow there will be a sea battle. So, only if we can know whether or not there will be a sea battle tomorrow then can we know if there will be a sea battle).

  Prior Analytics ::: The Prior Analytics (Greek:
; Latin: Analytica Priora) is Aristotle's work on deductive reasoning, which is known as his syllogistic. It was composed around 350 BCE [1]. Being one of the six extant Aristotelian writings on logic and scientific method, it is part of what later Peripatetics called the Organon. Modern work on Aristotle's logic builds on the tradition started in 1951 with the establishment by Jan ukasiewicz of a revolutionary paradigm. His approach was replaced in the early 1970s in a series of papers by John Corcoran and Timothy Smiley[2] -which inform modern translations of Prior Analytics by Robin Smith in 1989 and Gisela Striker in 2009. -- The term "analytics" comes from the Greek words
(analytos "solvable") and (analyo "to solve", literally "to loose"). However, in Aristotle's corpus, there are distinguishable differences in the meaning of and its cognates. There is also the possibility that Aristotle may have borrowed his use of the word "analysis" from his teacher Plato. On the other hand, the meaning that best fits the Analytics is one derived from the study of Geometry and this meaning is very close to what Aristotle calls episteme, knowing the reasoned facts. Therefore, Analysis is the process of finding the reasoned facts. -- Aristotle's Prior Analytics represents the first time in history when Logic is scientifically investigated. On those grounds alone, Aristotle could be considered the Father of Logic for as he himself says in Sophistical Refutations, "... When it comes to this subject, it is not the case that part had been worked out before in advance and part had not; instead, nothing existed at all." -- A problem in meaning arises in the study of Prior Analytics for the word "syllogism" as used by Aristotle in general does not carry the same narrow connotation as it does at present; Aristotle defines this term in a way that would apply to a wide range of valid arguments. Some scholars prefer to use the word "deduction" instead as the meaning given by Aristotle to the Greek word
syllogismos. At present, "syllogism" is used exclusively as the method used to reach a conclusion which is really the narrow sense in which it is used in the Prior Analytics dealing as it does with a much narrower class of arguments closely resembling the "syllogisms" of traditional logic texts: two premises followed by a conclusion each of which is a categorial sentence containing all together three terms, two extremes which appear in the conclusion and one middle term which appears in both premises but not in the conclusion. In the Analytics then, Prior Analytics is the first theoretical part dealing with the science of deduction and the Posterior Analytics is the second demonstratively practical part. Prior Analytics gives an account of deductions in general narrowed down to three basic syllogisms while Posterior Analytics deals with demonstration.[6] -- In the Prior Analytics, Aristotle defines syllogism as "... A deduction in a discourse in which, certain things being supposed, something different from the things supposed results of necessity because these things are so." In modern times, this definition has led to a debate as to how the word "syllogism" should be interpreted. Scholars Jan Lukasiewicz, Jzef Maria Bocheski and Gnther Patzig have sided with the Protasis-Apodosis dichotomy while John Corcoran prefers to consider a syllogism as simply a deduction.[7] -- In the third century AD, Alexander of Aphrodisias's commentary on the Prior Analytics is the oldest extant and one of the best of the ancient tradition and is available in the English language.[8] -- In the sixth century, Boethius composed the first known Latin translation of the Prior Analytics. No Westerner between Boethius and Bernard of Utrecht is known to have read the Prior Analytics.[9] The so-called Anonymus Aurelianensis III from the second half of the twelfth century is the first extant Latin commentary, or rather fragment of a commentary.[10]

  Posterior Analytics ::: The Posterior Analytics (Greek:
; Latin: Analytica Posteriora) is a text from Aristotle's Organon that deals with demonstration, definition, and scientific knowledge. The demonstration is distinguished as a syllogism productive of scientific knowledge, while the definition marked as the statement of a thing's nature, ... a statement of the meaning of the name, or of an equivalent nominal formula.

  Topics ::: The Topics (Greek: ; Latin: Topica) is the name given to one of Aristotle's six works on logic collectively known as the Organon. The treatise presents the art of dialectic - the invention and discovery of arguments in which the propositions rest upon commonly held opinions or endoxa ( in Greek).[1] Topoi () are "places" from which such arguments can be discovered or invented.

  Sophistical Refutations ::: Sophistical Refutations (Greek: ; Latin: De Sophisticis Elenchis) is a text in Aristotle's Organon in which he identified thirteen fallacies.[note 1] According to Aristotle, this is the first work to treat the subject of deductive reasoning. (Soph. Ref., 34, 183b34 ff.). The fallacies Aristotle identifies are the following:

    Fallacies in the language (in dictione)

      Figure of speech or form of expression

    Fallacies not in the language (extra dictionem)

      Secundum quid
      Irrelevant conclusion
      Begging the question
      False cause
      Affirming the consequent
      Fallacy of many questions

Aristotle's Books

Aristotle wrote an estimated 200 works, most in the form of notes and manuscript drafts touching on reasoning, rhetoric, politics, ethics, science and psychology. They consist of dialogues, records of scientific observations and systematic works. His student Theophrastus reportedly looked after Aristotle's writings and later passed them to his own student Neleus, who stored them in a vault to protect them from moisture until they were taken to Rome and used by scholars there. Of Aristotle's estimated 200 works, only 31 are still in circulation. Most date to Aristotle's time at the Lyceum.

Poetics ::: Poetics is a scientific study of writing and poetry where Aristotle observes, analyzes and defines mostly tragedy and epic poetry. Compared to philosophy, which presents ideas, poetry is an imitative use of language, rhythm and harmony that represents objects and events in the world, Aristotle posited. His book explores the foundation of storymaking, including character development, plot and storyline.

'Nicomachean Ethics' and 'Eudemian Ethics' ::: In Nichomachean Ethics, which is believed to have been named in tri bute to Aristotle's son, Nicomachus, Aristotle prescribed a moral code of conduct for what he called "good living." He asserted that good living to some degree defied the more restrictive laws of logic, since the real world poses circumstances that can present a conflict of personal values. That said, it was up to the individual to reason cautiously while developing his or her own judgment. Eudemian Ethics is another of Aristotle's major treatises on the behavior and judgment that constitute "good living."

On happiness ::: In his treatises on ethics, Aristotle aimed to discover the best way to live life and give it meaning - "the supreme good for man," in his words - which he determined was the pursuit of happiness. Our happiness is not a state but but an activity, and it's determined by our ability to live a life that enables us to use and develop our reason. While bad luck can affect happiness, a truly happy person, he believed, learns to cultivate habits and behaviors that help him (or her) to keep bad luck in perspective.

The golden mean ::: Aristotle also defined what he called the "golden mean." Living a moral life, Aristotle believed, was the ultimate goal. Doing so means approaching every ethical dilemma by finding a mean between living to excess and living deficiently, taking into account an individual's needs and circumstances.

Metaphysics ::: In his book Metaphysics, Aristotle clarified the distinction between matter and form. To Aristotle, matter was the physical substance of things, while form was the unique nature of a thing that gave it its identity.

Politics ::: In Politics, Aristotle examined human behavior in the context of society and government. Aristotle believed the purpose of government was make it possible for citizens to achieve virtue and happiness. Intended to help guide statesmen and rulers, Politics explores, among other themes, how and why cities come into being; the roles of citizens and politicians; wealth and the class system; the purpose of the political system; types of governments and democracies; and the roles of slavery and women in the household and society.

Rhetoric ::: Aristotle observes and analyzes public speaking with scientific rigor in order to teach readers how to be more effective speakers. Aristotle believed rhetoric was essential in politics and law and helped defend truth and justice. Good rhetoric, Aristotle believed, could educate people and encourage them to consider both sides of a debate. Aristotle's work explored how to construct an argument and maximize its effect, as well as fallacious reasoning to avoid (like generalizing from a single example).

'Prior Analytics' ::: In Prior Analytics, Aristotle explains the syllogism as "a discourse in which, certain things having been supposed, something different from the things supposed results of necessity because these things are so." Aristotle defined the main components of reasoning in terms of inclusive and exclusive relationships. These sorts of relationships were visually grafted in the future through the use of Venn diagrams.

Other Works on Logic ::: Besides Prior Analytics, Aristotle's other major writings on logic include Categories, On Interpretation and Posterior Analytics. In these works, Aristotle discusses his system for reasoning and for developing sound arguments.
Works on Science

Aristotle composed works on astronomy, including On the Heavens, and earth sciences, including Meteorology. By meteorology, Aristotle didn't simply mean the study of weather. His more expansive definition of meteorology included "all the affectations we may call common to air and water, and the kinds and parts of the earth and the affectations of its parts." In Meteorology, Aristotle identified the water cycle and discussed topics ranging from natural disasters to astrological events. Although many of his views on the Earth were controversial at the time, they were re-adopted and popularized during the late Middle Ages.

Works on Psychology
On the Soul ::: Aristotle examines human psychology. Aristotle's writings about how people perceive the world continue to underlie many principles of modern psychology.

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Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) made his contiibution by insisting that only the concrete and individual could be real.

Aristotle: A Greek philosopher who lived from 384 BC to 322 BC. Aristotle wrote on numerous subjects including poetry, physics, music, politics and biology. He was the student of Plato. Alongside Plato and Socrates, Aristotle is considered an important figure to the founding of Western knowledge.

Aristotle and Plato believed in angels (Aristotle called them intelligences). Socrates, who

Aristotle ::: Aristotle was a famous Greek thinker (died in 322 B.C.E.), a student of Plato, whose interpretation of what constitutes reality (metaphysics, ontology) and of how reality is organized was widely influential both in ancient times and in the “medieval” period of Judaism and Christianity, influenced by the “classical” period of Islamic learning. See e.g., scholasticism.

Aristotle. Basic Works. (ed.) R. McKeon. New York:

Aristotle divides the sciences into the theoretical, the practical and the productive, the aim of the first being disinterested knowledge, of the second the guidance of conduct, and of the third the guidance of the arts. The science now called logic, by him known as "analytic", is a discipline preliminary to all the others, since its purpose is to set forth the conditions that must be observed by all thinking which has truth as its aim. Science, in the strict sense of the word, is demonstrated knowledge of the causes of things. Such demonstrated knowledge is obtained by syllogistic deduction from premises in themselves certain. Thus the procedure of science differs from dialectic, which employs probable premises, and from eristic, which aims not at truth but at victory in disputation. The center, therefore, of Aristotle's logic is the syllogism, or that form of reasoning whereby, given two propositions, a third follows necessarily from them. The basis of syllogistic inference is the presence of a term common to both premises (the middle term) so related as subj ect or predicate to each of the other two terms that a conclusion may be drawn regarding the relation of these two terms to one another. Aristotle was the first to formulate the theory of the syllogism, and his minute analysis of its various forms was definitive, so far as the subject-predicate relation is concerned; so that to this part of deductive logic but little has been added since his day. Alongside of deductive reasoning Aristotle recognizes the necessity of induction, or the process whereby premises, particularly first premises, are established. This involves passing from the particulars of sense experience (the things more knowable to us) to the universal and necessary principles involved in sense experience (the things more knowable in themselves). Aristotle attaches most importance, in this search for premises, to the consideration of prevailing beliefs (endoxa) and the examination of the difficulties (aporiai) that have been encountered in the solution of the problem in hand. At some stage in the survey of the field and the theories previously advanced the universal connection sought for is apprehended; and apprehended, Aristotle eventually says, by the intuitive reason, or nous. Thus knowledge ultimately rests upon an indubitable intellectual apprehension; yet for the proper employment of the intuitive reason a wide empirical acquaintance with the subject-matter is indispensable.

Aristotle, medieval: Contrary to the esteem in which the Fathers held Platonic and especially Neo-Platonic philosophy, Aristotle plays hardly any role in early Patristic and Scholastic writings. Augustine seems not to have known much about him and admired him more as logician whereas he held Plato to be the much greater philosopher. The Middle Ages knew, until the end of the 12th and the beginning of the 13th century, only the logical texts, mostly in the translations made by Boethius of the texts and of the introduction by Porphyrius (Isagoge). During the latter third of the 12th, mostly however at the beginning of the 13th century appeared translations partly from Arabian texts and commentaries, partly from the Greek originals. Finally, Aquinas had William of Moerbeke translate the whole work of Aristotle, who soon came to be known as the Philosopher. Scholastic Aristotelianism is, however, not a simple revival of the Peripatetic views; Thomas is said to have "Christianized" the Philosopher as Augustine had done with Plato. Aristotle was differently interpreted by Aquinas and by the Latin Averroists (q.v. Averroism), especially in regard to the "unity of intellect" and the eternity of the created world. -- R.A.

Aristotle's Dictum (or the Dictum de Omni et Nullo): The maxim that whatever may be predicated (i.e. affirmed or denied) of a whole may be predicated of any part of that whole; traditionally attributed to Aristotle, though perhaps on insufficient grounds. See Joseph, Introduction to Logic, p. 296, note. See also Dictum de Omni et Nullo. -- G.R.M.

Aristotle's Experiment: An experiment frequently referred to by Aristotle in which an object held between two crossed fingers of the same hand is felt as two objects. De Somniis 460b 20; Metaphysics 1011a 33; Problems 958b 14, 959a, 15, 965a 36. -- G.R.M.

Aristotle's Illusion: See Aristotle's Experiment. Arithmetic, foundations of: Arithmetic (i.e., the mathematical theory of the non-negative integers, 0, 1, 2, . . .) may be based on the five following postulates, which are due to Peano (and Dedekind, from whom Peano's ideas were partly derived): N(0) N(x) ⊃x N(S(x)). N(x) ⊃x [N(y) ⊃y [[S(x) = S(y)] ⊃x [x = y]]]. N(x) ⊃x ∼[S(x) = 0]. F(0)[N(x)F(x) ⊃x F(S(x))] ⊃F [N(x) ⊃x F(x)] The undefined terms are here 0, N, S, which may be interpreted as denoting, respectively, the non-negative integer 0, the propositional function to be a non-negative integer, and the function +1 (so that S(x) is x+l). The underlying logic may be taken to be the functional calculus of second order (Logic, formal, § 6), with the addition of notations for descriptions and for functions from individuals to individuals, and the individual constant 0, together with appropriate modifications and additions to the primitive formulas and primitive rules of inference (the axiom of infinity is not needed because the Peano postulates take its place). By adding the five postulates of Peano as primitive formulas to this underlying logic, a logistic system is obtained which is adequate to extant elementary number theory (arithmetic) and to all methods of proof which have found actual employment in elementary number theory (and are normally considered to belong to elementary number theory). But of course, the system, if consistent, is incomplete in the sense of Gödel's theorem (Logic, formal, § 6).


2. In its rational aspect, as developed especially by Plato and Aristotle, aristocracy is the rule of the best few, in a true, purposeful, law-abiding and constitutional sense. As a political ideal, it is a form of government by morally and intellectually superior men for the common good or in the general interests of the governed, but without participation of the latter. Owing to the difficulty of distinguishing the best men for directing the life of the community, and of setting in motion the process of training and selecting such models of human perfection, aristocracy becomes practically the rule of those who are thought to be the best. [Plato himself proposed his ideal State as "a model fixed in the heavens" for human imitation but not attainment; and in the Laws he offered a combination of monarchy and democracy as the best working form of government.] Though aristocracy is a type of government external to the governed, it is opposed to oligarchy (despotic) and to timocracy (militaristic). With monarchy and democracy, it exhausts the classification of the main forms of rational government.

(3) From 450 to the 18th century: During this period there is a general decline until the Carlovingian renaissance. Great names are not lacking, such as those of Pseudo-Denis the Areopagite, John Damascene, Boethius and Isidore of Seville. however, the originality and spiritual elevation of an Augustine are not to be found. The period is generally characterized by the elaboration and systematization of truths already formulated. Platonic and Neo-Platonic influences predominate, though Aristotle's logic holds an honored place throughout this pre-Scholastic era. Cf. Migne's Patrologiae Latinae -- H.Gu.

Abduction: (Gr. apagoge) In Aristotle's logic a syllogism whose major premiss is certain but whose minor premiss is only probable. -- G.R.M.

Accidentalism: The theory that some events are undetermined, or that the incidence of series of determined events is unpredictable (Aristotle, Cournot). In Epicureanism (q.v.) such indeterminism was applied to mental events and specifically to acts of will. The doctrine then assumes the special form: Some acts of will are unmotivated. See Indeterminism. A striking example of a more general accidentalism is Charles Peirce's Tychism (q.v.). See Chance, Contingency. -- C.A.B.

acroamatical ::: a. --> Communicated orally; oral; -- applied to the esoteric teachings of Aristotle, those intended for his genuine disciples, in distinction from his exoteric doctrines, which were adapted to outsiders or the public generally. Hence: Abstruse; profound.

Acroamatic: Communicated orally. Applied especialy to Aristotle's more private teachings to his select advanced students. Hence, esoteric, abstruse. -- C.A.B.

Activism: (Lat. activus, from agere, to act) The philosophical theory which considers activity, particularly spiritual activity, to be the essence of reality. The concept of pure act (actus purus) traceable to Aristotle's conception of divinity, was influential in Scholastic thought, and persists m Leibniz, Fichte and modern idealism. -- L.W.

Activism: The philosophical theory which considers activity, particularly spiritual activity, to be the essence of reality. The concept of pure act (actus purus) traceable to Aristotle’s conception of divinity, was influential in Scholastic thought, and persists in Leibniz, Fichte and modern idealism.

Actual: In Husserl: see Actuality. Actual: (Lat. actus, act) 1. real or factual (opposed to unreal and apparent) 2. quality which anything possesses of having realized its potentialities or possibilities (opposed to possible and potential). In Aristotle: see Energeia. Actuality: In Husserl: 1. (Ger. Wirklichkeit) Effective individual existence in space and time, as contrasted with mere possibility. 2. (Ger. Aktualität) The character of a conscious process as lived in by the ego, as contrasted with the "inactuality" of conscious processes more or less far from the ego. To say the ego lives in a particular conscious process is to say the ego is busied with the object intended in that process. Attending is a special form of being busied. -- D.C.

Albertus, Magnus: St., O.P. (1193-1280) Count of Bollstädt, Bishop of Ratisbon, Doctor Universalis, was born at Lauingen, Bavaria, studied at Padua and Bologna, entered the Dominican Order in 1223. He taught theology at the Univ. of Paris from 1245-48, when he was sent to Cologne to organize a new course of studies for his Order; St. Thomas Aquinas was his student and assistant at this time. Later his time was given over to administrative duties and he was made Bishop of Ratisbon in 1260. In 1262 he gave up his bishopric and returned to a life of writing, teaching and controversy. Of very broad interests in science, philosophy and theology, Albert popularized a great part of the corpus of Aristotelian and Arabic philosophic writings in the 13th century. His thought incorporates elements of Augustinism, Aristotelianism, Neoplatonism, Avicennism, Boethianism into a vast synthesis which is not without internal inconsistencies. Due to the lack of critical editions of his works, a true estimate of the value of his philosophy is impossible at present. However, he must have had some influence on St. Thomas, and there was a lively Albertinian school lasting into the Renaissance. Chief works: Summa de Creaturis, Comment, in IV Lib. Sent., Philos, Commentaries on nearly all works of Aristotle, De Causis, De intellectu et intellig., Summa Theologiae (Opera Omnia, ed. Borgnet, 38 vol., Paris, 1890-99). -- V.J.B.

Alexandrists: A term applied to a group of Aristotelians in Italy during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Besides the Scholastic followers of Aristotle there were some Greeks, whose teaching was tinged with Platonism. Another group, the Averroists, followed Aristotle as interpreted by Ibn Rushd, while a third school interpreted Aristotle in the light of the commentaries of Alexander of Aphrodisias, hence were called Alexandrists. Against the Averroists who attributed a vague sort of immortality to the active intellect, common to all men, the Alexandrists, led by Pomponazzi, asserted the mortality of the individual human soul after its separation from universal reason. -- J.J.R.

Al Farabi: Died 950, introduced Aristotelian logic into the world of Islam. He was known to posterity as the "second Aristotle". He continued the encyclopedic tradition inaugurated by Al Kindi. His metaphysical speculation influenced Avicenna who found in the works of his predecessor the fundamental notion of a distinction between existence and essence, the latter not implying necessarily in a contingent being the former which therefore has to be given by God. He also emphasizes the Aristotelian notion of the "first mover". The concretization of the universal nature in particular things points to a creative power which has endowed being with such a nature. Al Farabi's philosophy is dependent in certain parts on Neo-Platonism. Creation is emanation. There is an anima mundi the images of which become corporeal beings. Logic is considered as the preamble to all science. Physics comprises all factual knowledge, including psychology; metaphysics and ethics are the other parts of philosophy. Cl. Baeumker, Alfarabi, Ueber den Vrsprung der Wissensehaften, Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Philos. d. MA. 1916. Vol. XIX. M. Horten, Das Buch der Ringsteine Farabis. ibid. 1906. Vol. V. -- R.A. Al

Almost all Jewish philosophers with the exception of Gabirol, ha-Levi, and Gersonides produce proofs for the existence of God. These proofs are based primarily on principles of physics. In the case of the Western philosophers, they are Aristotelian, while in the case of the Eastern, they are a combination of Aristotelian and those of the Mutazilites. The Eastern philosophers, such as Saadia and others and also Bahya of the Western prove the existence of God indirectly, namely that the world was created and consequently there is a creator. The leading Western thinkers, such as Ibn Daud (q.v.) and Maimonides employ the Aristotelian argument from motion, even to positing hypothetically the eternity of the world. Ha-LevI considers the conception of the existence of God an intuition with which man is endowed by God Himself. Crescas, who criticized Aristotle's conception of space and the infinite, in his proof for the existence of God, proves it by positing the need of a being necessarily existent, for it is absurd to posit a world of possibles.

Alteration: (Lat. alter, other) In Aristotle's philosophy change of quality, as distinguished from change of quantity (growth and diminution) and from change of place (locomotion). -- G.R.M.

anagnorisis: Translates to' recognition'. It is the instant when one or more characters, often the protagonist, recognises the truth. See Aristotle

Analytic: (Gr. analytike) Aristotle's name for the technique of logical analysis. The Prior Analytics contains his analysis of the syllogism, the Posterior Analytics his analysis of the conditions of scientific or demonstrable knowledge. -- G.R.M.

animism ::: "Animism" has been applied to many different philosophical systems. This includes Aristotle's view of the relation of soul and body held also by the stoics and scholastics. On the other hand, monadology (Leibniz) has also been described as animistic. The name is most commonly applied to vitalism, which makes life, or life and mind, the directive principle in evolution and growth, holding that life is not merely mechanical but that there is a directive force that guides energy without altering its amount. An entirely different class of ideas, also termed animistic, is the belief in the world soul, held by Plato, Schelling and others. Lastly, in discussions of religion, "animism" refers to the belief in indwelling souls or spirits, particularly so-called "primitive" religions that consider everything inhabited by spirits.

antonomasia ::: n. --> The use of some epithet or the name of some office, dignity, or the like, instead of the proper name of the person; as when his majesty is used for a king, or when, instead of Aristotle, we say, the philosopher; or, conversely, the use of a proper name instead of an appellative, as when a wise man is called a Solomon, or an eminent orator a Cicero.

Apagoge: (Gr. apagoge) In Aristotle's logic (1) a syllogism whose major premiss is certain but whose minor premiss is only probable; abduction; (2) a method of indirect demonstration whereby the validity of a conclusion is established by assuming its contradictory and showing that impossible or unacceptable consequences follow; the reductio ad impossibile. -- G.R.M.

Apeiros (Greek) The boundless, infinite; frontierless expansion. Used by Anaximander and Anaximenes, and by Plato in Philebus; the equivalent term apeiria was used by Anaxagoras and Aristotle. Corresponds to ’eyn soph, and according to Porphyry to the Pythagorean monad (one), the “cause of all unity and measure of all things” (SD 1:353, 426; FSO 71).

Arabic Philosophy: The contact of the Arabs with Greek civilization and philosophy took place partly in Syria, where Christian Arabic philosophy developed, partly in other countries, Asia Minor, Persia, Egypt and Spain. The effect of this contact was not a simple reception of Greek philosophy, but the gradual growth of an original mode of thought, determined chiefly by the religious and philosophical tendencies alive in the Arab world. Eastern influences had produced a mystical trend, not unlike Neo-Platonism; the already existing "metaphysics of light", noticeable in the religious conception of the Qoran, also helped to assimilate Plotinlan ideas. On the other hand, Aristotelian philosophy became important, although more, at least in the beginning, as logic and methodology. The interest in science and medicine contributed to the spread of Aristotelian philosophy. The history of philosophy in the Arab world is determined by the increasing opposition of Orthodoxy against a more liberal theology and philosophy. Arab thought became influential in the Western world partly through European scholars who went to Spain and elsewhere for study, mostly however through the Latin translations which became more and more numerous at the end of the 12th and during the 13th centuries. Among the Christian Arabs Costa ben Luca (864-923) has to be mentioned whose De Differentia spiritus et animae was translated by Johannes Hispanus (12th century). The first period of Islamic philosophy is occupied mainly with translation of Greek texts, some of which were translated later into Latin. The Liber de causis (mentioned first by Alanus ab Insulis) is such a translation of an Arab text; it was believed to be by Aristotle, but is in truth, as Aquinas recognized, a version of the Stoicheiosis theologike by Proclus. The so-called Theologia Aristotelis is an excerpt of Plotinus Enn. IV-VI, written 840 by a Syrian. The fundamental trends of Arab philosophy are indeed Neo-Platonic, and the Aristotelian texts were mostly interpreted in this spirit. Furthermore, there is also a tendency to reconcile the Greek philosophers with theological notions, at least so long as the orthodox theologians could find no reason for opposition. In spite of this, some of the philosophers did not escape persecution. The Peripatetic element is more pronounced in the writings of later times when the technique of paraphrasis and commentary on Aristotelian texts had developed. Beside the philosophy dependent more or less on Greek, and partially even Christian influences, there is a mystical theology and philosophy whose sources are the Qoran, Indian and, most of all, Persian systems. The knowledge of the "Hermetic" writings too was of some importance.

Arche: (Gr. arche) The first in a series; that from which a thing either is or comes to be; origin; principle; first cause (Aristotle). -- G.R.M.

aristotelian ::: a. --> Of or pertaining to Aristotle, the famous Greek philosopher (384-322 b. c.). ::: n. --> A follower of Aristotle; a Peripatetic. See Peripatetic.

Aristotelianism. In this group there are two broad currents of thought. The first attempted to harmonize Aristotle with St. Augustine and the Church's dogmas. This line was founded by St. Albert the Great (+1280), who amassed the then known Aristotelian literature but failed to construct any coherent synthesis. His pupil, St. Thomas Aquinas (+1274) succeeded to a remarkable degree. From the standpoint of clarity and formularization, St. Thomas marks the apex of medieval Scholasticism. Pupils and adherents worthy of note among Albert's, Hugo and Ulrich of Strassburg, this latter (+c. 1277), together with Dietrich of Freiberg (+c. 1310) revealing marked Neo-platonic tendencies; among Thomas', Aegidius of Lessines (+1304), Herveus Natalis (Herve Nedelec, +1318), John (de Regina) of Naples (+c. 1336), Aegidius Romanus (+1316), Godfrey of Fontaines ( + 1306 or 1309), quite independent in his allegiance, and the great Dante Alighieri (+1321).

Aristotelianism ::: The philosophical tradition that takes its defining inspiration from the work of Aristotle and the Peripatetic school. Sometimes contrasted by critics with the rationalism and idealism of Plato, Aristotelianism is understood by its proponents as critically developing Plato's theories. Most particularly, Aristotelianism brings Plato's ideals down to Earth as goals and goods internal to natural species that are realized in activity. This is the characteristically Aristotelian idea of teleology.

Aristotelianism: The philosophy of Aristotle, (384-322 B.C.). Aristotle was born in the Greek colony of Stagira, in Macedon, the son of Nicomachus, the physician of King Amyntas of Macedon. In his eighteenth year Aristotle became a pupil of Plato at Athens and remained for nearly twenty years a member of the Academy. After the death of Plato he resided for some time at Atarneus, in the Troad, and at Mitylene, on the island of Lesbos, with friends of the Academy; then for several years he acted as tutor to the young Alexander of Macedon. In 335 he returned to Athens, where he spent the following twelve years as head of a school which he set up in the Lyceum. The school also came to be known as the Peripatetic, and its members Peripatetics, probably because of the peripatos, or covered walk, in which Aristotle lectured. As a result of the outburst of anti-Macedonian feeling at Athens in 323 after the death of Alexander, Aristotle retired to Chalcis, m Euboea, where he died a year later.

aristotelianism ::: --> The philosophy of Aristotle, otherwise called the Peripatetic philosophy.

aristotelic ::: a. --> Pertaining to Aristotle or to his philosophy. html{color:

Art: (Gr. techne) (See Aesthetics) In Aristotle the science or knowledge of the principles involved in the production of beautiful or useful objects. As a branch of knowledge art is distinguished both from theoretical science and from practical wisdom; as a process of production it is contrasted with nature. -- G.R.M.

Association, Laws of: The psychological laws in accordance with which association takes place. The classical enumeration of the laws of association is contained in Aristotle's De Memoria et Reminiscentia, II, 451, b 18-20 which lists similarity, contrast and contiguity as the methods of reviving memories. Hume (A Treatise on Human Nature, Part I, § 4 and An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, §3) slightly revised the Aristotelian list by enumerating as the sole principles of association, resemblance, contiguity in time or place and causality; contrast was considered by Hume, "a mixture of causation and resemblance." -- L.W.

Aufklärung: In general, this German word and its English equivalent Enlightenment denote the self-emancipation of man from mere authority, prejudice, convention and tradition, with an insistence on freer thinking about problems uncritically referred to these other agencies. According to Kant's famous definition "Enlightenment is the liberation of man from his self-caused state of minority, which is the incapacity of using one's understanding without the direction of another. This state of minority is caused when its source lies not in the lack of understanding, but in the lack of determination and courage to use it without the assistance of another" (Was ist Aufklärung? 1784). In its historical perspective, the Aufklärung refers to the cultural atmosphere and contrlbutions of the 18th century, especially in Germany, France and England [which affected also American thought with B. Franklin, T. Paine and the leaders of the Revolution]. It crystallized tendencies emphasized by the Renaissance, and quickened by modern scepticism and empiricism, and by the great scientific discoveries of the 17th century. This movement, which was represented by men of varying tendencies, gave an impetus to general learning, a more popular philosophy, empirical science, scriptural criticism, social and political thought. More especially, the word Aufklärung is applied to the German contributions to 18th century culture. In philosophy, its principal representatives are G. E. Lessing (1729-81) who believed in free speech and in a methodical criticism of religion, without being a free-thinker; H. S. Reimarus (1694-1768) who expounded a naturalistic philosophy and denied the supernatural origin of Christianity; Moses Mendelssohn (1729-86) who endeavoured to mitigate prejudices and developed a popular common-sense philosophy; Chr. Wolff (1679-1754), J. A. Eberhard (1739-1809) who followed the Leibnizian rationalism and criticized unsuccessfully Kant and Fichte; and J. G. Herder (1744-1803) who was best as an interpreter of others, but whose intuitional suggestions have borne fruit in the organic correlation of the sciences, and in questions of language in relation to human nature and to national character. The works of Kant and Goethe mark the culmination of the German Enlightenment. Cf. J. G. Hibben, Philosophy of the Enlightenment, 1910. --T.G. Augustinianism: The thought of St. Augustine of Hippo, and of his followers. Born in 354 at Tagaste in N. Africa, A. studied rhetoric in Carthage, taught that subject there and in Rome and Milan. Attracted successively to Manicheanism, Scepticism, and Neo-Platontsm, A. eventually found intellectual and moral peace with his conversion to Christianity in his thirty-fourth year. Returning to Africa, he established numerous monasteries, became a priest in 391, Bishop of Hippo in 395. Augustine wrote much: On Free Choice, Confessions, Literal Commentary on Genesis, On the Trinity, and City of God, are his most noted works. He died in 430.   St. Augustine's characteristic method, an inward empiricism which has little in common with later variants, starts from things without, proceeds within to the self, and moves upwards to God. These three poles of the Augustinian dialectic are polarized by his doctrine of moderate illuminism. An ontological illumination is required to explain the metaphysical structure of things. The truth of judgment demands a noetic illumination. A moral illumination is necessary in the order of willing; and so, too, an lllumination of art in the aesthetic order. Other illuminations which transcend the natural order do not come within the scope of philosophy; they provide the wisdoms of theology and mysticism. Every being is illuminated ontologically by number, form, unity and its derivatives, and order. A thing is what it is, in so far as it is more or less flooded by the light of these ontological constituents.   Sensation is necessary in order to know material substances. There is certainly an action of the external object on the body and a corresponding passion of the body, but, as the soul is superior to the body and can suffer nothing from its inferior, sensation must be an action, not a passion, of the soul. Sensation takes place only when the observing soul, dynamically on guard throughout the body, is vitally attentive to the changes suffered by the body. However, an adequate basis for the knowledge of intellectual truth is not found in sensation alone. In order to know, for example, that a body is multiple, the idea of unity must be present already, otherwise its multiplicity could not be recognized. If numbers are not drawn in by the bodily senses which perceive only the contingent and passing, is the mind the source of the unchanging and necessary truth of numbers? The mind of man is also contingent and mutable, and cannot give what it does not possess. As ideas are not innate, nor remembered from a previous existence of the soul, they can be accounted for only by an immutable source higher than the soul. In so far as man is endowed with an intellect, he is a being naturally illuminated by God, Who may be compared to an intelligible sun. The human intellect does not create the laws of thought; it finds them and submits to them. The immediate intuition of these normative rules does not carry any content, thus any trace of ontologism is avoided.   Things have forms because they have numbers, and they have being in so far as they possess form. The sufficient explanation of all formable, and hence changeable, things is an immutable and eternal form which is unrestricted in time and space. The forms or ideas of all things actually existing in the world are in the things themselves (as rationes seminales) and in the Divine Mind (as rationes aeternae). Nothing could exist without unity, for to be is no other than to be one. There is a unity proper to each level of being, a unity of the material individual and species, of the soul, and of that union of souls in the love of the same good, which union constitutes the city. Order, also, is ontologically imbibed by all beings. To tend to being is to tend to order; order secures being, disorder leads to non-being. Order is the distribution which allots things equal and unequal each to its own place and integrates an ensemble of parts in accordance with an end. Hence, peace is defined as the tranquillity of order. Just as things have their being from their forms, the order of parts, and their numerical relations, so too their beauty is not something superadded, but the shining out of all their intelligible co-ingredients.   S. Aurelii Augustini, Opera Omnia, Migne, PL 32-47; (a critical edition of some works will be found in the Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, Vienna). Gilson, E., Introd. a l'etude de s. Augustin, (Paris, 1931) contains very good bibliography up to 1927, pp. 309-331. Pope, H., St. Augustine of Hippo, (London, 1937). Chapman, E., St. Augustine's Philos. of Beauty, (N. Y., 1939). Figgis, J. N., The Political Aspects of St. Augustine's "City of God", (London, 1921). --E.C. Authenticity: In a general sense, genuineness, truth according to its title. It involves sometimes a direct and personal characteristic (Whitehead speaks of "authentic feelings").   This word also refers to problems of fundamental criticism involving title, tradition, authorship and evidence. These problems are vital in theology, and basic in scholarship with regard to the interpretation of texts and doctrines. --T.G. Authoritarianism: That theory of knowledge which maintains that the truth of any proposition is determined by the fact of its having been asserted by a certain esteemed individual or group of individuals. Cf. H. Newman, Grammar of Assent; C. S. Peirce, "Fixation of Belief," in Chance, Love and Logic, ed. M. R. Cohen. --A.C.B. Autistic thinking: Absorption in fanciful or wishful thinking without proper control by objective or factual material; day dreaming; undisciplined imagination. --A.C.B. Automaton Theory: Theory that a living organism may be considered a mere machine. See Automatism. Automatism: (Gr. automatos, self-moving) (a) In metaphysics: Theory that animal and human organisms are automata, that is to say, are machines governed by the laws of physics and mechanics. Automatism, as propounded by Descartes, considered the lower animals to be pure automata (Letter to Henry More, 1649) and man a machine controlled by a rational soul (Treatise on Man). Pure automatism for man as well as animals is advocated by La Mettrie (Man, a Machine, 1748). During the Nineteenth century, automatism, combined with epiphenomenalism, was advanced by Hodgson, Huxley and Clifford. (Cf. W. James, The Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, ch. V.) Behaviorism, of the extreme sort, is the most recent version of automatism (See Behaviorism).   (b) In psychology: Psychological automatism is the performance of apparently purposeful actions, like automatic writing without the superintendence of the conscious mind. L. C. Rosenfield, From Beast Machine to Man Machine, N. Y., 1941. --L.W. Automatism, Conscious: The automatism of Hodgson, Huxley, and Clifford which considers man a machine to which mind or consciousness is superadded; the mind of man is, however, causally ineffectual. See Automatism; Epiphenomenalism. --L.W. Autonomy: (Gr. autonomia, independence) Freedom consisting in self-determination and independence of all external constraint. See Freedom. Kant defines autonomy of the will as subjection of the will to its own law, the categorical imperative, in contrast to heteronomy, its subjection to a law or end outside the rational will. (Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, § 2.) --L.W. Autonomy of ethics: A doctrine, usually propounded by intuitionists, that ethics is not a part of, and cannot be derived from, either metaphysics or any of the natural or social sciences. See Intuitionism, Metaphysical ethics, Naturalistic ethics. --W.K.F. Autonomy of the will: (in Kant's ethics) The freedom of the rational will to legislate to itself, which constitutes the basis for the autonomy of the moral law. --P.A.S. Autonymy: In the terminology introduced by Carnap, a word (phrase, symbol, expression) is autonymous if it is used as a name for itself --for the geometric shape, sound, etc. which it exemplifies, or for the word as a historical and grammatical unit. Autonymy is thus the same as the Scholastic suppositio matertalis (q. v.), although the viewpoint is different. --A.C. Autotelic: (from Gr. autos, self, and telos, end) Said of any absorbing activity engaged in for its own sake (cf. German Selbstzweck), such as higher mathematics, chess, etc. In aesthetics, applied to creative art and play which lack any conscious reference to the accomplishment of something useful. In the view of some, it may constitute something beneficent in itself of which the person following his art impulse (q.v.) or playing is unaware, thus approaching a heterotelic (q.v.) conception. --K.F.L. Avenarius, Richard: (1843-1896) German philosopher who expressed his thought in an elaborate and novel terminology in the hope of constructing a symbolic language for philosophy, like that of mathematics --the consequence of his Spinoza studies. As the most influential apostle of pure experience, the posltivistic motive reaches in him an extreme position. Insisting on the biologic and economic function of thought, he thought the true method of science is to cure speculative excesses by a return to pure experience devoid of all assumptions. Philosophy is the scientific effort to exclude from knowledge all ideas not included in the given. Its task is to expel all extraneous elements in the given. His uncritical use of the category of the given and the nominalistic view that logical relations are created rather than discovered by thought, leads him to banish not only animism but also all of the categories, substance, causality, etc., as inventions of the mind. Explaining the evolution and devolution of the problematization and deproblematization of numerous ideas, and aiming to give the natural history of problems, Avenarius sought to show physiologically, psychologically and historically under what conditions they emerge, are challenged and are solved. He hypothesized a System C, a bodily and central nervous system upon which consciousness depends. R-values are the stimuli received from the world of objects. E-values are the statements of experience. The brain changes that continually oscillate about an ideal point of balance are termed Vitalerhaltungsmaximum. The E-values are differentiated into elements, to which the sense-perceptions or the content of experience belong, and characters, to which belongs everything which psychology describes as feelings and attitudes. Avenarius describes in symbolic form a series of states from balance to balance, termed vital series, all describing a series of changes in System C. Inequalities in the vital balance give rise to vital differences. According to his theory there are two vital series. It assumes a series of brain changes because parallel series of conscious states can be observed. The independent vital series are physical, and the dependent vital series are psychological. The two together are practically covariants. In the case of a process as a dependent vital series three stages can be noted: first, the appearance of the problem, expressed as strain, restlessness, desire, fear, doubt, pain, repentance, delusion; the second, the continued effort and struggle to solve the problem; and finally, the appearance of the solution, characterized by abating anxiety, a feeling of triumph and enjoyment.   Corresponding to these three stages of the dependent series are three stages of the independent series: the appearance of the vital difference and a departure from balance in the System C, the continuance with an approximate vital difference, and lastly, the reduction of the vital difference to zero, the return to stability. By making room for dependent and independent experiences, he showed that physics regards experience as independent of the experiencing indlvidual, and psychology views experience as dependent upon the individual. He greatly influenced Mach and James (q.v.). See Avenarius, Empirio-criticism, Experience, pure. Main works: Kritik der reinen Erfahrung; Der menschliche Weltbegriff. --H.H. Averroes: (Mohammed ibn Roshd) Known to the Scholastics as The Commentator, and mentioned as the author of il gran commento by Dante (Inf. IV. 68) he was born 1126 at Cordova (Spain), studied theology, law, medicine, mathematics, and philosophy, became after having been judge in Sevilla and Cordova, physician to the khalifah Jaqub Jusuf, and charged with writing a commentary on the works of Aristotle. Al-mansur, Jusuf's successor, deprived him of his place because of accusations of unorthodoxy. He died 1198 in Morocco. Averroes is not so much an original philosopher as the author of a minute commentary on the whole works of Aristotle. His procedure was imitated later by Aquinas. In his interpretation of Aristotelian metaphysics Averroes teaches the coeternity of a universe created ex nihilo. This doctrine formed together with the notion of a numerical unity of the active intellect became one of the controversial points in the discussions between the followers of Albert-Thomas and the Latin Averroists. Averroes assumed that man possesses only a disposition for receiving the intellect coming from without; he identifies this disposition with the possible intellect which thus is not truly intellectual by nature. The notion of one intellect common to all men does away with the doctrine of personal immortality. Another doctrine which probably was emphasized more by the Latin Averroists (and by the adversaries among Averroes' contemporaries) is the famous statement about "two-fold truth", viz. that a proposition may be theologically true and philosophically false and vice versa. Averroes taught that religion expresses the (higher) philosophical truth by means of religious imagery; the "two-truth notion" came apparently into the Latin text through a misinterpretation on the part of the translators. The works of Averroes were one of the main sources of medieval Aristotelianlsm, before and even after the original texts had been translated. The interpretation the Latin Averroists found in their texts of the "Commentator" spread in spite of opposition and condemnation. See Averroism, Latin. Averroes, Opera, Venetiis, 1553. M. Horten, Die Metaphysik des Averroes, 1912. P. Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant et l'Averroisme Latin, 2d ed., Louvain, 1911. --R.A. Averroism, Latin: The commentaries on Aristotle written by Averroes (Ibn Roshd) in the 12th century became known to the Western scholars in translations by Michael Scottus, Hermannus Alemannus, and others at the beginning of the 13th century. Many works of Aristotle were also known first by such translations from Arabian texts, though there existed translations from the Greek originals at the same time (Grabmann). The Averroistic interpretation of Aristotle was held to be the true one by many; but already Albert the Great pointed out several notions which he felt to be incompatible with the principles of Christian philosophy, although he relied for the rest on the "Commentator" and apparently hardly used any other text. Aquinas, basing his studies mostly on a translation from the Greek texts, procured for him by William of Moerbecke, criticized the Averroistic interpretation in many points. But the teachings of the Commentator became the foundation for a whole school of philosophers, represented first by the Faculty of Arts at Paris. The most prominent of these scholars was Siger of Brabant. The philosophy of these men was condemned on March 7th, 1277 by Stephen Tempier, Bishop of Paris, after a first condemnation of Aristotelianism in 1210 had gradually come to be neglected. The 219 theses condemned in 1277, however, contain also some of Aquinas which later were generally recognized an orthodox. The Averroistic propositions which aroused the criticism of the ecclesiastic authorities and which had been opposed with great energy by Albert and Thomas refer mostly to the following points: The co-eternity of the created word; the numerical identity of the intellect in all men, the so-called two-fold-truth theory stating that a proposition may be philosophically true although theologically false. Regarding the first point Thomas argued that there is no philosophical proof, either for the co-eternity or against it; creation is an article of faith. The unity of intellect was rejected as incompatible with the true notion of person and with personal immortality. It is doubtful whether Averroes himself held the two-truths theory; it was, however, taught by the Latin Averroists who, notwithstanding the opposition of the Church and the Thomistic philosophers, gained a great influence and soon dominated many universities, especially in Italy. Thomas and his followers were convinced that they interpreted Aristotle correctly and that the Averroists were wrong; one has, however, to admit that certain passages in Aristotle allow for the Averroistic interpretation, especially in regard to the theory of intellect.   Lit.: P. Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant et l'Averroisme Latin au XIIIe Siecle, 2d. ed. Louvain, 1911; M. Grabmann, Forschungen über die lateinischen Aristotelesübersetzungen des XIII. Jahrhunderts, Münster 1916 (Beitr. z. Gesch. Phil. d. MA. Vol. 17, H. 5-6). --R.A. Avesta: See Zendavesta. Avicehron: (or Avencebrol, Salomon ibn Gabirol) The first Jewish philosopher in Spain, born in Malaga 1020, died about 1070, poet, philosopher, and moralist. His main work, Fons vitae, became influential and was much quoted by the Scholastics. It has been preserved only in the Latin translation by Gundissalinus. His doctrine of a spiritual substance individualizing also the pure spirits or separate forms was opposed by Aquinas already in his first treatise De ente, but found favor with the medieval Augustinians also later in the 13th century. He also teaches the necessity of a mediator between God and the created world; such a mediator he finds in the Divine Will proceeding from God and creating, conserving, and moving the world. His cosmogony shows a definitely Neo-Platonic shade and assumes a series of emanations. Cl. Baeumker, Avencebrolis Fons vitae. Beitr. z. Gesch. d. Philos. d. MA. 1892-1895, Vol. I. Joh. Wittman, Die Stellung des hl. Thomas von Aquino zu Avencebrol, ibid. 1900. Vol. III. --R.A. Avicenna: (Abu Ali al Hosain ibn Abdallah ibn Sina) Born 980 in the country of Bocchara, began to write in young years, left more than 100 works, taught in Ispahan, was physician to several Persian princes, and died at Hamadan in 1037. His fame as physician survived his influence as philosopher in the Occident. His medical works were printed still in the 17th century. His philosophy is contained in 18 vols. of a comprehensive encyclopedia, following the tradition of Al Kindi and Al Farabi. Logic, Physics, Mathematics and Metaphysics form the parts of this work. His philosophy is Aristotelian with noticeable Neo-Platonic influences. His doctrine of the universal existing ante res in God, in rebus as the universal nature of the particulars, and post res in the human mind by way of abstraction became a fundamental thesis of medieval Aristotelianism. He sharply distinguished between the logical and the ontological universal, denying to the latter the true nature of form in the composite. The principle of individuation is matter, eternally existent. Latin translations attributed to Avicenna the notion that existence is an accident to essence (see e.g. Guilelmus Parisiensis, De Universo). The process adopted by Avicenna was one of paraphrasis of the Aristotelian texts with many original thoughts interspersed. His works were translated into Latin by Dominicus Gundissalinus (Gondisalvi) with the assistance of Avendeath ibn Daud. This translation started, when it became more generally known, the "revival of Aristotle" at the end of the 12th and the beginning of the 13th century. Albert the Great and Aquinas professed, notwithstanding their critical attitude, a great admiration for Avicenna whom the Arabs used to call the "third Aristotle". But in the Orient, Avicenna's influence declined soon, overcome by the opposition of the orthodox theologians. Avicenna, Opera, Venetiis, 1495; l508; 1546. M. Horten, Das Buch der Genesung der Seele, eine philosophische Enzyklopaedie Avicenna's; XIII. Teil: Die Metaphysik. Halle a. S. 1907-1909. R. de Vaux, Notes et textes sur l'Avicennisme Latin, Bibl. Thomiste XX, Paris, 1934. --R.A. Avidya: (Skr.) Nescience; ignorance; the state of mind unaware of true reality; an equivalent of maya (q.v.); also a condition of pure awareness prior to the universal process of evolution through gradual differentiation into the elements and factors of knowledge. --K.F.L. Avyakta: (Skr.) "Unmanifest", descriptive of or standing for brahman (q.v.) in one of its or "his" aspects, symbolizing the superabundance of the creative principle, or designating the condition of the universe not yet become phenomenal (aja, unborn). --K.F.L. Awareness: Consciousness considered in its aspect of act; an act of attentive awareness such as the sensing of a color patch or the feeling of pain is distinguished from the content attended to, the sensed color patch, the felt pain. The psychologlcal theory of intentional act was advanced by F. Brentano (Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte) and received its epistemological development by Meinong, Husserl, Moore, Laird and Broad. See Intentionalism. --L.W. Axiological: (Ger. axiologisch) In Husserl: Of or pertaining to value or theory of value (the latter term understood as including disvalue and value-indifference). --D.C. Axiological ethics: Any ethics which makes the theory of obligation entirely dependent on the theory of value, by making the determination of the rightness of an action wholly dependent on a consideration of the value or goodness of something, e.g. the action itself, its motive, or its consequences, actual or probable. Opposed to deontological ethics. See also teleological ethics. --W.K.F. Axiologic Realism: In metaphysics, theory that value as well as logic, qualities as well as relations, have their being and exist external to the mind and independently of it. Applicable to the philosophy of many though not all realists in the history of philosophy, from Plato to G. E. Moore, A. N. Whitehead, and N, Hartmann. --J.K.F. Axiology: (Gr. axios, of like value, worthy, and logos, account, reason, theory). Modern term for theory of value (the desired, preferred, good), investigation of its nature, criteria, and metaphysical status. Had its rise in Plato's theory of Forms or Ideas (Idea of the Good); was developed in Aristotle's Organon, Ethics, Poetics, and Metaphysics (Book Lambda). Stoics and Epicureans investigated the summum bonum. Christian philosophy (St. Thomas) built on Aristotle's identification of highest value with final cause in God as "a living being, eternal, most good."   In modern thought, apart from scholasticism and the system of Spinoza (Ethica, 1677), in which values are metaphysically grounded, the various values were investigated in separate sciences, until Kant's Critiques, in which the relations of knowledge to moral, aesthetic, and religious values were examined. In Hegel's idealism, morality, art, religion, and philosophy were made the capstone of his dialectic. R. H. Lotze "sought in that which should be the ground of that which is" (Metaphysik, 1879). Nineteenth century evolutionary theory, anthropology, sociology, psychology, and economics subjected value experience to empirical analysis, and stress was again laid on the diversity and relativity of value phenomena rather than on their unity and metaphysical nature. F. Nietzsche's Also Sprach Zarathustra (1883-1885) and Zur Genealogie der Moral (1887) aroused new interest in the nature of value. F. Brentano, Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis (1889), identified value with love.   In the twentieth century the term axiology was apparently first applied by Paul Lapie (Logique de la volonte, 1902) and E. von Hartmann (Grundriss der Axiologie, 1908). Stimulated by Ehrenfels (System der Werttheorie, 1897), Meinong (Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur Werttheorie, 1894-1899), and Simmel (Philosophie des Geldes, 1900). W. M. Urban wrote the first systematic treatment of axiology in English (Valuation, 1909), phenomenological in method under J. M. Baldwin's influence. Meanwhile H. Münsterberg wrote a neo-Fichtean system of values (The Eternal Values, 1909).   Among important recent contributions are: B. Bosanquet, The Principle of Individuality and Value (1912), a free reinterpretation of Hegelianism; W. R. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God (1918, 1921), defending a metaphysical theism; S. Alexander, Space, Time, and Deity (1920), realistic and naturalistic; N. Hartmann, Ethik (1926), detailed analysis of types and laws of value; R. B. Perry's magnum opus, General Theory of Value (1926), "its meaning and basic principles construed in terms of interest"; and J. Laird, The Idea of Value (1929), noteworthy for historical exposition. A naturalistic theory has been developed by J. Dewey (Theory of Valuation, 1939), for which "not only is science itself a value . . . but it is the supreme means of the valid determination of all valuations." A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (1936) expounds the view of logical positivism that value is "nonsense." J. Hessen, Wertphilosophie (1937), provides an account of recent German axiology from a neo-scholastic standpoint.   The problems of axiology fall into four main groups, namely, those concerning (1) the nature of value, (2) the types of value, (3) the criterion of value, and (4) the metaphysical status of value.   (1) The nature of value experience. Is valuation fulfillment of desire (voluntarism: Spinoza, Ehrenfels), pleasure (hedonism: Epicurus, Bentham, Meinong), interest (Perry), preference (Martineau), pure rational will (formalism: Stoics, Kant, Royce), apprehension of tertiary qualities (Santayana), synoptic experience of the unity of personality (personalism: T. H. Green, Bowne), any experience that contributes to enhanced life (evolutionism: Nietzsche), or "the relation of things as means to the end or consequence actually reached" (pragmatism, instrumentalism: Dewey).   (2) The types of value. Most axiologists distinguish between intrinsic (consummatory) values (ends), prized for their own sake, and instrumental (contributory) values (means), which are causes (whether as economic goods or as natural events) of intrinsic values. Most intrinsic values are also instrumental to further value experience; some instrumental values are neutral or even disvaluable intrinsically. Commonly recognized as intrinsic values are the (morally) good, the true, the beautiful, and the holy. Values of play, of work, of association, and of bodily well-being are also acknowledged. Some (with Montague) question whether the true is properly to be regarded as a value, since some truth is disvaluable, some neutral; but love of truth, regardless of consequences, seems to establish the value of truth. There is disagreement about whether the holy (religious value) is a unique type (Schleiermacher, Otto), or an attitude toward other values (Kant, Höffding), or a combination of the two (Hocking). There is also disagreement about whether the variety of values is irreducible (pluralism) or whether all values are rationally related in a hierarchy or system (Plato, Hegel, Sorley), in which values interpenetrate or coalesce into a total experience.   (3) The criterion of value. The standard for testing values is influenced by both psychological and logical theory. Hedonists find the standard in the quantity of pleasure derived by the individual (Aristippus) or society (Bentham). Intuitionists appeal to an ultimate insight into preference (Martineau, Brentano). Some idealists recognize an objective system of rational norms or ideals as criterion (Plato, Windelband), while others lay more stress on rational wholeness and coherence (Hegel, Bosanquet, Paton) or inclusiveness (T. H. Green). Naturalists find biological survival or adjustment (Dewey) to be the standard. Despite differences, there is much in common in the results of the application of these criteria.   (4) The metaphysical status of value. What is the relation of values to the facts investigated by natural science (Koehler), of Sein to Sollen (Lotze, Rickert), of human experience of value to reality independent of man (Hegel, Pringle-Pattlson, Spaulding)? There are three main answers:   subjectivism (value is entirely dependent on and relative to human experience of it: so most hedonists, naturalists, positivists);   logical objectivism (values are logical essences or subsistences, independent of their being known, yet with no existential status or action in reality);   metaphysical objectivism (values   --or norms or ideals   --are integral, objective, and active constituents of the metaphysically real: so theists, absolutists, and certain realists and naturalists like S. Alexander and Wieman). --E.S.B. Axiom: See Mathematics. Axiomatic method: That method of constructing a deductive system consisting of deducing by specified rules all statements of the system save a given few from those given few, which are regarded as axioms or postulates of the system. See Mathematics. --C.A.B. Ayam atma brahma: (Skr.) "This self is brahman", famous quotation from Brhadaranyaka Upanishad 2.5.19, one of many alluding to the central theme of the Upanishads, i.e., the identity of the human and divine or cosmic. --K.F.L.

Augustinianism. Alexander of Hales (+1245) is the founder of this line and the first great Scholastic to utilize all of Aristotle's works, whose terminology and concepts he adopted rather than the spirit. Others worthy of mention are John de la Rochelle (+1145), Adam of Marsh (+1258) and Thomas of York (+1260). The Metaphysica of this latter constitutes a milestone in philsophy's fight for autonomy. The outstanding representative of this group is Bonaventure (+1274), who combined great constructive ability with profound psychological and mystical insight. Prominent among his pupils were Matthew of Aquasparta (+1302), John Peckham (+1292), William de la Mare (+1298) and Walter of Brügge (+1306). Also prominent in this line are Roger of Marston, Richard of Middleton (+1308), a forerunner of Duns Scotus, William of Ware, Duns Scotus' master, and Peter Johannis Olivi (+1298). Among the Dominicans who belonged to this group should be mentioned Roland of Cremona, Peter of Tarantaise (+1276), Richard Fitzacre (+1248) and Robert Kilwardby (+1279). Among the secular clergy, although more independent in their allegiance, we may place here Gerard of Abbeville and Henri of Ghent (1293).

Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) made his contiibution by insisting that only the concrete and individual could be real.

Aristotle: A Greek philosopher who lived from 384 BC to 322 BC. Aristotle wrote on numerous subjects including poetry, physics, music, politics and biology. He was the student of Plato. Alongside Plato and Socrates, Aristotle is considered an important figure to the founding of Western knowledge.

Aristotle and Plato believed in angels (Aristotle called them intelligences). Socrates, who

Aristotle ::: Aristotle was a famous Greek thinker (died in 322 B.C.E.), a student of Plato, whose interpretation of what constitutes reality (metaphysics, ontology) and of how reality is organized was widely influential both in ancient times and in the “medieval” period of Judaism and Christianity, influenced by the “classical” period of Islamic learning. See e.g., scholasticism.

Aristotle. Basic Works. (ed.) R. McKeon. New York:

Aristotle divides the sciences into the theoretical, the practical and the productive, the aim of the first being disinterested knowledge, of the second the guidance of conduct, and of the third the guidance of the arts. The science now called logic, by him known as "analytic", is a discipline preliminary to all the others, since its purpose is to set forth the conditions that must be observed by all thinking which has truth as its aim. Science, in the strict sense of the word, is demonstrated knowledge of the causes of things. Such demonstrated knowledge is obtained by syllogistic deduction from premises in themselves certain. Thus the procedure of science differs from dialectic, which employs probable premises, and from eristic, which aims not at truth but at victory in disputation. The center, therefore, of Aristotle's logic is the syllogism, or that form of reasoning whereby, given two propositions, a third follows necessarily from them. The basis of syllogistic inference is the presence of a term common to both premises (the middle term) so related as subj ect or predicate to each of the other two terms that a conclusion may be drawn regarding the relation of these two terms to one another. Aristotle was the first to formulate the theory of the syllogism, and his minute analysis of its various forms was definitive, so far as the subject-predicate relation is concerned; so that to this part of deductive logic but little has been added since his day. Alongside of deductive reasoning Aristotle recognizes the necessity of induction, or the process whereby premises, particularly first premises, are established. This involves passing from the particulars of sense experience (the things more knowable to us) to the universal and necessary principles involved in sense experience (the things more knowable in themselves). Aristotle attaches most importance, in this search for premises, to the consideration of prevailing beliefs (endoxa) and the examination of the difficulties (aporiai) that have been encountered in the solution of the problem in hand. At some stage in the survey of the field and the theories previously advanced the universal connection sought for is apprehended; and apprehended, Aristotle eventually says, by the intuitive reason, or nous. Thus knowledge ultimately rests upon an indubitable intellectual apprehension; yet for the proper employment of the intuitive reason a wide empirical acquaintance with the subject-matter is indispensable.

  Aristotle, Greek (385B.C.): “We should conduct ourselves towards others as we would have them act towards us.”

Aristotle, medieval: Contrary to the esteem in which the Fathers held Platonic and especially Neo-Platonic philosophy, Aristotle plays hardly any role in early Patristic and Scholastic writings. Augustine seems not to have known much about him and admired him more as logician whereas he held Plato to be the much greater philosopher. The Middle Ages knew, until the end of the 12th and the beginning of the 13th century, only the logical texts, mostly in the translations made by Boethius of the texts and of the introduction by Porphyrius (Isagoge). During the latter third of the 12th, mostly however at the beginning of the 13th century appeared translations partly from Arabian texts and commentaries, partly from the Greek originals. Finally, Aquinas had William of Moerbeke translate the whole work of Aristotle, who soon came to be known as the Philosopher. Scholastic Aristotelianism is, however, not a simple revival of the Peripatetic views; Thomas is said to have "Christianized" the Philosopher as Augustine had done with Plato. Aristotle was differently interpreted by Aquinas and by the Latin Averroists (q.v. Averroism), especially in regard to the "unity of intellect" and the eternity of the created world. -- R.A.

Aristotle's Dictum (or the Dictum de Omni et Nullo): The maxim that whatever may be predicated (i.e. affirmed or denied) of a whole may be predicated of any part of that whole; traditionally attributed to Aristotle, though perhaps on insufficient grounds. See Joseph, Introduction to Logic, p. 296, note. See also Dictum de Omni et Nullo. -- G.R.M.

Aristotle's Experiment: An experiment frequently referred to by Aristotle in which an object held between two crossed fingers of the same hand is felt as two objects. De Somniis 460b 20; Metaphysics 1011a 33; Problems 958b 14, 959a, 15, 965a 36. -- G.R.M.

Aristotle's Illusion: See Aristotle's Experiment. Arithmetic, foundations of: Arithmetic (i.e., the mathematical theory of the non-negative integers, 0, 1, 2, . . .) may be based on the five following postulates, which are due to Peano (and Dedekind, from whom Peano's ideas were partly derived): N(0) N(x) ⊃x N(S(x)). N(x) ⊃x [N(y) ⊃y [[S(x) = S(y)] ⊃x [x = y]]]. N(x) ⊃x ∼[S(x) = 0]. F(0)[N(x)F(x) ⊃x F(S(x))] ⊃F [N(x) ⊃x F(x)] The undefined terms are here 0, N, S, which may be interpreted as denoting, respectively, the non-negative integer 0, the propositional function to be a non-negative integer, and the function +1 (so that S(x) is x+l). The underlying logic may be taken to be the functional calculus of second order (Logic, formal, § 6), with the addition of notations for descriptions and for functions from individuals to individuals, and the individual constant 0, together with appropriate modifications and additions to the primitive formulas and primitive rules of inference (the axiom of infinity is not needed because the Peano postulates take its place). By adding the five postulates of Peano as primitive formulas to this underlying logic, a logistic system is obtained which is adequate to extant elementary number theory (arithmetic) and to all methods of proof which have found actual employment in elementary number theory (and are normally considered to belong to elementary number theory). But of course, the system, if consistent, is incomplete in the sense of Gödel's theorem (Logic, formal, § 6).

Becoming: (Medieval) Any kind of change is actualization of potencies. It is often called, following Aristotle, a "movement", because moving is a striking instance of becoming, and because the thing "moves" from the lower level of potentiality to the higher of actuality. Actualization is achieved only by a factor which is act itself. The act is in this sense prior to the potency not only in nature but also in time. See Being, Dialectic, Hegel. -- R.A.

Being: In early Greek philosophy is opposed either to change, or Becoming, or to Non-Being. According to Parmenides and his disciples of the Eleatic School, everything real belongs to the category of Being, as the only possible object of thought. Essentially the same reasoning applies also to material reality in which there is nothing but Being, one and continuous, all-inclusive and eternal. Consequently, he concluded, the coming into being and passing away constituting change are illusory, for that which is-not cannot be, and that which is cannot cease to be. In rejecting Eleitic monism, the materialists (Leukippus, Democritus) asserted that the very existence of things, their corporeal nature, insofar as it is subject to change and motion, necessarily presupposes the other than Being, that is, Non-Being, or Void. Thus, instead of regarding space as a continuum, they saw in it the very source of discontinuity and the foundation of the atomic structure of substance. Plato accepted the first part of Parmenides' argument. namely, that referring to thought as distinct from matter, and maintained that, though Becoming is indeed an apparent characteristic of everything sensory, the true and ultimate reality, that of Ideas, is changeless and of the nature of Being. Aristotle achieved a compromise among all these notions and contended that, though Being, as the essence of things, is eternal in itself, nevertheless it manifests itself only in change, insofar as "ideas" or "forms" have no existence independent of, or transcendent to, the reality of things and minds. The medieval thinkers never revived the controversy as a whole, though at times they emphasized Being, as in Neo-Platonism, at times Becoming, as in Aristotelianism. With the rise of new interest in nature, beginning with F. Bacon, Hobbes and Locke, the problem grew once more in importance, especially to the rationalists, opponents of empiricism. Spinoza regarded change as a characteristic of modal existence and assumed in this connection a position distantly similar to that of Pinto. Hegel formed a new answer to the problem in declaring that nature, striving to exclude contradictions, has to "negate" them: Being and Non-Being are "moments" of the same cosmic process which, at its foundation, arises out of Being containing Non-Being within itself and leading, factually and logically, to their synthetic union in Becoming. -- R.B.W.

Besides the universal intelligible being of things, Aristotle was also primarily concerned with an investigation of the being of things from the standpoint of their generation and existence. But only individual things are generated and exist. Hence, for him, substance was primarily the individual: a "this" which, in contrast with the universal or secondary substance, is not communicable to many. The Aristotelian meaning of substance may be developed from four points of view: Grammar: The nature of substance as the ultimate subject of predication is expressed by common usage in its employment of the noun (or substantive) as the subject of a sentence to signify an individual thing which "is neither present in nor predicable of a subject." Thus substance is grammatically distinguished from its (adjectival) properties and modifications which "are present in and predicable of a subject."   Secondary substance is expressed by the universal term, and by its definition which are "not present in a subject but predicable of it." See Categoriae,) ch. 5. Physics: Independence of being emerges as a fundamental characteristic of substance in the analysis of change. Thus we have:   Substantial change: Socrates comes to be. (Change simply).   Accidental change; in a certain respect only: Socrates comes to be 6 feet tall. (Quantitative). Socrates comes to be musical (Qualitative). Socrates comes to be in Corinth (Local).     As substantial change is prior to the others and may occur independently of them, so the individual substance is prior in being to the accidents; i.e., the accidents cannot exist independently of their subject (Socrates), but can be only in him or in another primary substance, while the reverse is not necessarily the case. Logic: Out of this analysis of change there also emerges a division of being into the schema of categories, with the distinction between the category of substance and the several accidental categories, such as quantity, quality, place, relation, etc. In a corresponding manner, the category of substance is first; i.e., prior to the others in being, and independent of them. Metaphysics: The character of substance as that which is present in an individual as the cause of its being and unity is developed in Aristotle's metaphysical writings, see especiallv Bk. Z, ch. 17, 1041b. Primary substnnce is not the matter alone, nor the universal form common to many, but the individual unity of matter and form. For example, each thing is composed of parts or elements, as an organism is composed of cells, yet it is not merely its elements, but has a being and unity over and above the sum of its parts. This something more which causes the cells to be this organism rather than a malignant growth, is an example of what is meant by substance in its proper sense of first substance (substantia prima). Substance in its secondary sense (substantia secunda) is the universal form (idea or species) which is individuated in each thing.

B. In ontology, power is often synonymous with potency (q.v.) Aristotle, who is mainly responsible for the development of this notion (Metaph. IV (5) 12.), distinguishes three aspects of it as a source of change, as a capacity of performing, and as a state in virtue of which things are unchangeable by themselves. Hobbes accepts only the first of these meanings, namely that power is the source of motion. Various questions are involved in the analysis of the notion of power, as, for example, whether power is an accident or a perfection of substance, and whether it is distinct from it.

Boethius: (470-525) An influential commentator on Aristotle and Cicero, who, in his own thinking, reflected a strong influence of Neo-Platonism and Augustinianism. De Consolatione Philosophiae (Migne PL, 63-4, 69-70). -- R.B.W.

(b) Physics: In Greek philosophy, the ultimate principles of nature and change were contraries: e.g. love-strife; motion-rest; potentiality-actuality. All motion is between contraries. See Heraclitus, Empedodes, Aristotle. -- L.M.H.

Brain: According to Aristotle, it is a cooling organ of the body. Early in the history of philosophy, it was regarded as closely connected with consciousness and with activities of the soul. Descartes contended that mind-body relations are centered in the pineal gland located between the two hemispheres of the brain. Cabanis, a sensualistic materialist, believed that the brain produces consciousness in a manner similar to that in which the liver produces the bile. Many have sought to identify it with the seat of the soul. Today consciousness is recognized to be a much more complex phenomenon controlled by the entire nervous system, rather than by any part of the brain, and influenced by the bodily metabolism in general. -- R.B.W.

Capacity:Any ability, potentiality, power or talent possessed by anything, either to act or to suffer. It may be innate or acquired, dormant or active. The topic of capacity figures, in the main, in two branches of philosophy: (a) in metaphysics, as in Aristotle's discussion of potentiality and actuality, (b) in ethics, where an agent's capacities are usually regarded as having some bearing on the question as to what his duties are. -- W.K.F.

Categorical (Judgment): (Gr. kategorikos, affirmative, predicative) Aristotle: Affirmative explicit; direct. Commentators on Aristotle emphasized the opposition between categorical and conditional propositions, although Aristotle did not stress this connotation of the term. -- G.R.M.

Category: (Gr. kategoria) In Aristotle's logic (1) the predicate of a proposition; (2) one of the ultimate modes of being that may be asserted in predication, viz.: substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, passion. -- G.R.M.

Category of Unity: Kant: The first of three a priori, quantitative (so-called "mathematical") categories (the others being "plurality" and "totality") from which is derived the synthetic principle, "All intuitions (appearances) are extensive magnitudes." By means of this principle Kant seeks to define the object of experience a priori with reference to its spatial features. See Crit. of pure Reason, B106, B202ff. -- O.F.K Catharsis: (Gr. katharsis) Purification; purgation; specifically the purging of the emotions of pity and fear effected by tragedy (Aristotle). -- G.R.M.

Catharsis [from Greek katharsis cleansing from katharos pure] Cleansing, purgation; used by Aristotle for the cleansing of the emotions of the audience through experiencing a work of art, such as a drama. Also the preliminary discipline in the ancient Mysteries, where the lower nature of the aspirant is purified, fitting him or her for higher training, knowledge, and initiation. The three lowest degrees “consisted of teachings alone, which formed the preparation, the discipline, mental and spiritual and psychic and physical; what the Greeks called the katharsis or ‘cleansing’; and when the disciple was considered sufficiently cleansed, purified, disciplined, quiet mentally, tranquil spiritually, then he was taken into the fourth degree” (Fund 608). See also INITIATION; MYSTERIES.

Cause: (Lat. causa) Anything responsible for change, motion or action. In the history of philosophy numerous interpretations were given to the term. Aristotle distinguished among the material cause, or that out of which something arises, the formal cause, that is, the pattern or essence determining the creation of a thing, the efficient cause, or the force or agent producing an effect; and the final cause, or purpose. Many thinkers spoke also of the first cause, usually conceived as God. During the Renaissance, with the development of scientific interest in nature, cause was usually conceived as an object. Today, it is generally interpteted as energy or action, whether or not connected with matter. According to Newton, "to the same natural effects we must, as far as possible, assign the same causes." But J. S. Mill contended, in his doctrine of the plurality of causes, that an effect, or a kind of effect (e.g. heat or death) may be produced by various causes. The first clear formulation of the principle was given by Leukippus "Nothing happens without a ground but everything through a cause and of necessity." -- R.B.W.

Chance events, according to Aristotle, are occurrences purposive in appearance but not actually the result of either conscious or unconscious teleology. -- G.R.M.

Change, Philosophy of: (a) Any philosophical doctrine dealing with the subject of change, e.g., Aristotle's philosophy of change, (b) any philosophy which makes change an essential or pervasive character of reality, e.g., the philosophies of Heraclitus and Bergson. -- W.K.F.

Characterology: This name originally was used for types; thus in Aristotle and Theophrastus, and even much later, e.g. in La Bruyere. Gradually it came to signify something individual; a development paralleled by the replacement of "typical" figures on the stage by individualities. There is no agreement, even today, on the definition; confusion reigns especially because of an insufficient distinction between character, personality, and person. But all agree that character manifests itself in the behavior of a person. One can distinguish a merely descriptive approach, one of classification, and one of interpretation. The general viewpoints of interpretation influence also description and classification, since they determine what is considered "important" and lay down the rules by which to distinguish and to classify. One narrow interpretation looks at character mainly as the result of inborn properties, rooted in organic constitution; character is considered, therefore, as essentially unchangeable and predetermined. The attempts at establishing correlations between character and body-build (Kretschmer a.o.) are a special form of such narrow interpretation. It makes but little difference if, besides inborn properties, the influence of environmental factors is acknowledged. The rationalistic interpretation looks at character mainly as the result of convictions. These convictions are seen as purely intellectual in extreme rationalism (virtue is knowledge, Socrates), or as referring to the value-aspect of reality which is conceived as apprehended by other than merely intellectual operations. Thus, Spranger gives a classification according to the "central values" dominating a man's behavior. (Allport has devised practical methods of character study on this basis.) Since the idea a person has of values and their order may change, character is conceived as essentially mutable, even if far going changes may be unfrequent. Character-education is the practical application of the principles of characterology and thus depends on the general idea an author holds in regard to human nature. Character is probably best defined as the individual's way of preferring or rejecting values. It depends on the innate capacities of value-apprehension and on the way these values are presented to the individual. Therefore the enormous influence of social factors. -- R.A.

Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticisms of His Predecessors;

Clement of Alexandria: (150-217) An early Christian thinker and theologian who attempted to raise the attitude of faith to the level of knowledge; he was influenced by Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and Philo Judaeus. -- R.B.W.

Cohen, Hermann: (1842-1918) and Paul Natorp (1854-1924) were the chief leaders of the "Marburg School" which formed a definite branch of the Neo-Kantian movement. Whereas the original founders of this movement, O. Liebmann and Fr. A. Lange, had reacted to scientific empiricism by again calling attention to the a priori elements of cognition, the Marburg school contended that all cognition was exclusively a priori. They definitely rejected not only the notion of "things-in-themselves" but even that of anything immediately "given" in experience. There is no other reality than one posited by thought and this holds good equally for the object, the subject and God. Nor is thought in its effort to "determine the object = x" limited by any empirical data but solely by the laws of thought. Since in Ethics Kant himself had already endeavored to eliminate all empirical elements, the Marburg school was perhaps closer to him in this field than in epistemology. The sole goal of conduct is fulfillment of duty, i.e., the achievement of a society organized according to moral principles and satisfying the postulates of personal dignity. The Marburg school was probably the most influential philosophic trend in Germany in the last 25 years before the First World War. The most outstanding present-day champion of their tradition is Ernst Cassirer (born 1874). Cohen and Natorp tried to re-interpret Plato as well as Kant. Following up a suggestion first made by Lotze they contended that the Ideas ought to be understood as laws or methods of thought and that the current view ascribing any kind of existence to them was based on a misunderstanding of Aristotle's. -- H.G.

Common Sense: In Aristotle's psychology the faculty by which the common sensibles are perceived. It is probable also that Aristotle attributes to this faculty the functions of perceiving what we perceive and of uniting the data of different senses into a single object. -- G.R.M.

Common Sensibles: (Lat. sensibilia communia) In the psychology of Aristotle the qualities of a sense object that may be apprehended by several senses; e.g. motion (or rest), number, shape, size; in distinction from the proper sensibles, or qualities that can be apprehended by only one sense, such as color, taste, smell. -- G.R.M.

Conjugation: (Lat. con + jungere, yoke together) Grammar: The inflections of a verb. Biology: The union of male and female plant or animal. Logic: Joining the extreme terms of a syllogism by the middle term; joining dissimilar things by their common characteristics or by analogy. Ethics: Conjugations or pairings of the passions: love and hate, desire and avoidance, pleasure and sadness, etc. Synonymous with connexio. Metaphysics: In Aristotle, De Gen. et Corr., the pairings of opposites in the simple bodies: dry and hot (fire), hot and moist (air), moist and cold (water), cold and dry (earth).

Contextual definition: See incomplete symbol. Contiguity, Association by: A type of association, recognized by Aristotle, whereby one of two states of mind, which have been coexistent or successive, tends to recall the other. This type of association has sometimes been considered the basic type to which all others are reducible. See Association, laws of. -- L.W.

Continence: In Aristotle's ethics the moral condition of a person able to control his bodily desires by reason. Aristotle distinguishes continence from temperance in that the former implies a conflict between bodily desires and rational choice, whereas in the temperate man there is no such conflict. -- G.R.M.

Contraries: (a) Logic: (i) Terms: According to Aristotle, Categ. 1lb-18, contrariety is one of the four kinds of opposition between concepts: contradictory, privative, contrary, relative. Those terms are contrary "which, in the same genus, are separated by the greatest possible difference" ib. 6a-17. Thus pairs of contraries belong to the same genus, or contrary sub-genera, or are themselves sub-genera, ib. 14a-18.

Contrast, Association by: (Lat. contrastare, to stand opposed to) Association in accordance with the principle proposed by Aristotle but rejected by Hartley, J. S. Mill and other associationists that contrasting qualities tend to reinstate one another in consciousness. See Association, Laws of. -- L.W.

Corrective Justice: Justice as exhibited in the rectification of wrongs committed by membeis of a community in their transactions with each other; distinguished from distributive justice (q.v.) (Aristotle's Ethics). -- G.R.M.

Crescas, Don Hasdai: (1340-1410) Jewish philosopher and theologian. He was the first European thinker to criticize Aristotelian cosmology and establish the probability of the existence of an infinite magnitude and of infinite space, thus paving the way for the modern conception of the universe. He also took exception to the entire trend of the philosophy of Maimonides, namely its extreme rationalism, and endeavored to inject the emotional element into religious contemplation, and make love an attribute of God and the source of His creative activity. He also expressed original views on the problems of freedom and creation. He undoubtedly exerted influence on Spinoza who quotes him by name in the formulation of some of his theories. See Jewish Philosophy. Cf. H. A. Wolfson, Crescas' Critique of Aristotle, 1929. -- M.W.

(c) The result of this elaborate critique of Platonism is sometimes called the Aristotelian-Thomistic synthesis. It is better, however, to call it simply a Thornistic synthesis, not only because St. Thomas criticized Aristotle on several occasions, but also because the real and historical meaning of Aristotle as a philosopher in the fourth century B.C. is still very much in dispute. In any case it ought to be pretty much beyond dispute that St. Thomas was quite aware that Aristotle was not the author of all the doctrines which he attributed to him.

Denotation: The subjects (i.e., those entities which possess attributes) of which a term may be predicated, e.g., the term "man" denotes Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, etc. (J. S. Mill) "Denotation" in this sense should be distinguished from "extension" in the sense in which that signifies the subclasses of the class determined by the term. The former indicates the various individual instances in which a common nature is manifested; the latter signifies the variety of kinds over which the predication of a term may extend. (H. W. B. Joseph.) -- C.A.B.

Dialectic: (Gr. dia + legein, discourse) The beginning of dialectic Aristotle is said to have attributed to Zeno of Elea. But as the art of debate by question and answer, its beginning is usually associated with the Socrates of the Platonic dialogues. As conceived by Plato himself, dialectic is the science of first principles which differs from other sciences by dispensing with hypotheses and is, consequently, "the copingstone of the sciences" -- the highest, because the clearest and hence the ultimate, sort of knowledge. Aristotle distinguishes between dialectical reasoning, which proceeds syllogistically from opinions generally accepted, and demonstrative reasoning, which begins with primary and true premises; but he holds that dialectical reasoning, in contrast with eristic, is "a process of criticism wherein lies the path to the principles of all inquiries." In modern philosophy, dialectic has two special meanings. Kant uses it as the name of that part of his Kritik der reinen Vernunft which deals critically with the special difficulties (antinomies, paralogisms and Ideas) arising out of the futile attempt (transcendental illusion) to apply the categories of the Understanding beyond the only realm to which they can apply, namely, the realm of objects in space and time (Phenomena). For Hegel, dialectic is primarily the distinguishing characteristic of speculative thought -- thought, that is, which exhibits the structure of its subject-matter (the universal, system) through the construction of synthetic categories (synthesis) which resolve (sublate) the opposition between other conflicting categories (theses and antitheses) of the same subject-matter. -- G.W.C.

Dianoetic Virtues: (Gr. aretai dianoetikai) In Aristotle's ethics the virtues or excellences of the dianoia; intellectual virtues. The dianoetic virtues are distinguished from the moral virtues in having for their end the explicit apprehension of rational principles, whereas the moral virtues are concerned with the rational control of the sensitive and appetitive life. See Aristotelianism; Dianoia; Nous; Phronesis. -- G.R.M.

Dianoia: (Gr. dianoia) The faculty or exercise of thinking, as exhibited especially in the discriminating and conjoining or disjoining of concepts; the discursive understanding (Aristotle). -- G.R.M.

Dianoia (Greek) [from dianoia thought] Used by Plato and Aristotle often in contrast with soma (body); synonymous with logos, it is divine ideation and the root of all thought.

Dictum de omni et nullo: The leading principles of the syllogisms in Barbara and Celarent, variously formulated, and attributed to Aristotle. "Whatever is affirmed (denied) of an entire class or kind may be affirmed (denied) of any part." The four moods of the first figure were held to be directly validated by this dictum, and this was given as the motive for the traditional reductions of the last three syllogistic figures to the first. See also Aristotle's dictum. -- A.C.

Diorism: The Greek term in Plato's usage signifies division, distinction; in that of Aristotle, distinction, definition, which is also the meaning today. In mathematics, a statement of the conditions needed in order to solve a problem. -- J.J.R.

Distributive Justice: Justice as exhibited in the distribution of honor, money, rights and privileges among the members of a community; characterized by Aristotle as requiring equality of proportion between persons and rewards. See Corrective Justice. -- G.R.M.

Dunamis (Greek) Potency; used by Aristotle in contrast to energeia (act), for the invisible aspect of the universe as opposed to the visible or manifest; equivalent to Plato’s noeton (intelligible) and aistheton (sensible) (FSO 194).

Dyadic Relation: A two-termed relation (q.v.). Dynamic Vitalism: See Vitalism. Dynamis: (Gr. dynamis) In Aristotle's philosophy (1) a source of change or power to effect change; faculty; (2) more generally the capacity a thing has of passing to a different state; potentiality. See Aristotelianism; Energeia. -- G.R.M.

Economics: (Lat. aeconomicus, domestic economy, from oikos, house, + nomos, law) That branch of social science which is concerned with the exchange of goods. Employed by Xenophon, Aristotle and Cicero to describe treatises on the proper conduct of the household. In more recent times, combined with politics as political economy, the study of the laws and system of society. Now, more specially, the study of the production, distribution and consumption of material wealth and skills. -- J.K.F.

Effectiveness: See Logistic system, and Logic, formal, § 1. Effluvium: See Effluxes, Theory of. Effluxes, Theory of: (Lat. efflux, from effluere, to flow out) Theory of early Greek thinkers that perception is mediated by effluvia or simulacra projected by physical objects and impinging upon the organs of sense. Thus Empedocles developed the theory of effluxes in conjunction with the principle that "like perceives only like" (similia similibus percipiuntur); an element in the external world can only be perceived by the same element in the body. (See Aristotle, De Gen. et Corr. I, 8, 324b26; Theophrastus, De Sens. 7.) Democritus' theory of images is a form of the theory of effluxes. -- L.W.

Elenchus: (Gr. elenchos) A syllogism establishing the contradictory of a proposition attacked; a refutation. (Aristotle.) -- G.R.M.

Energeia: (Gr. energeia, actuality) In Aristotle's philosophy (1) the mode of existence of that which possesses to the full its specific essence; actuality; entelechy; -- opposed to dynamis, or potentiality; (2) the activity that transforms potentiality into actuality. -- G-R.M.

Energy: (Gr. energos, at work) The power by which things act to change other things. Potentiality in the physical. Employed by Aristotle as a synonym for actuality or reality. (a) In physics: the capacity for performing work. In modern physics, the equivalent of mass. (b) In i axiology: value at the physical level- -- J.K.F.

Entelechy [from Greek entelecheia from en telos echein to be complete] In Aristotelian philosophy, actuality as opposed to potentiality: water is potentially solid, liquid, or gas, but actually only one of these at a time. Soul is spoken of by Aristotle as the entelecheia of body — the subsisting principle of the body’s existence, and therefore the real although unseen actuality of the body’s being, irrespective of emanated monads from the fundamental spirit-substance (svabhavat), when the latter is considered as their collective unity. It is the principle or substantive element of a being or thing, which produces or makes the actuality of such being or thing, considered apart from or irrespective of dependent or derivative powers or qualities.

Entelechy: (Gr. entelecheia) In Aristotle's philosophy (1) the mode of being of a thing whose essence is completely realized; actuality; energeia; -- opposed to dynamis, or potentiality; (2) the form or essence. -- G.R.M.

Enthymeme: (Gr. enthymema) In Aristotle's logic a rhetorical syllogism, usually consisting of probable premisses, and used for persuasion as distinct from instruction. In later logic a syllogism of which one premiss or the conclusion is not explicitly stated. -- G.R.M.

Epagoge: (Gr. epagoge) In Aristotle's logic the process of establishing a general proposition by induction (seeing the in the particular). -- C.R.M.

Epicheirema: (Gr. epicheirema) In Aristotle's logic a dialectical as distinct from an apodictic or an eristic syllogism.

Eristic: (Gr. eristike) In Aristotle's logic the art of specious reasoning, or of reasoning from specious premises, for the purpose of victory in argument; -- opposed to apodictic and to dialectical reasoning. See Apodiclic; Dialectic.

Erotema: (Gr. erotema) A question in Aristotle's logic a premise stated in interrogative form for acceptance or rejection by the respondent; hence, any premise used in dialectical reasoning. -- G.R.M.

Esoteric [from Greek esoterikos pertaining to the inner] Applied to the advanced instructions given to qualified candidates in Mysteries or schools of philosophy, first used popularly in Greece by Aristotle. Jesus in the Bible had teachings for his disciples in private, and others for the public, precisely as all other ancient religious and philosophical teachers always had. Esoteric teachings both were and are such as could not be understood or profitably received by those not previously prepared by study and probation. Exoteric or outer teachings were often given in symbolic language which revealed the esoteric meaning only to those who were in possession of the keys to interpretation.

Esthetic: See Aesthetic. Eternal object: A. N. Whitehead's term essentially synonymous with Plato's "Idea" or Aristotle's "form"; a potential form determining and limiting the qualitative characteristics of actuality, a universal attributed to reality -- R.B.W.

Ethos: (Gr. ethos) Character; moral purpose; distinguished by Aristotle from thought or intelligence as a source of dramatic action; hence that element in a dramatic composition which portrays character as distinct from the portrayal of thought or suffering. -- G.R.M.

Eudaemonia: (Gr. eudaimonia) Happiness, or well-being, acclaimed by Aristotle as the universally recognized chief good, and described by him as consisting in the activ exrcise (energeia) of the soul's powers in accordance with reason. See Aristotelianism. -- G.R.M.

Eudœmonism: The Theory, first proposed in Western philosophy by Aristotle, that the aim of the good life is happiness or well-being.

Evolutionism: This is the view that the universe and life in all of its manifestations and nature in all of their aspects are the product of development. Apart from the religious ideas of initial creation by fiat, this doctrine finds variety of species to be the result of change and modification and growth and adaptation rather than from some form of special creation of each of the myriads of organic types and even of much in the inorganic realm. Contrary to the popular notion, evolution is not a product of modern thought. There has been an evolution of evolutionary hypotheses from earliest Indian and Greek speculation down to the latest pronouncement of scientific theory. Thales believed all life to have had a marine origin and Anaximander, Anaximenes, Empedocles, the Atomists and Aristotle all spoke in terms of development and served to lay a foundation for a true theory of evolution. It is in the work of Charles Darwin, however, that clarity and proof is presented for the explanation of his notion of natural selection and for the crystallization of evolution as a prime factor in man's explanation of all phases of his mundane existence. The chief criticism leveled at the evolutionists, aside from the attacks of the religionists, is based upon their tendency to forget that not all evolution means progress. See Charles Darwin, Herbert Spencer, Thomas Hemy Huxley, Natural Selection, Evolutionary Ethics. Cf. A. Lalande, L'Idee de dissolution opposee a celle de l'evolution (1899), revised ed. (1930): Les Illusions evolutionistes. -- L.E.D.

Existence: (Lat. existere: to emerge) The mode of being which consists in interaction with other things. For Aristotle, matter clothed with form. Essences subjected to accidentst the state of things beyond their causes. The state of being actual, the condition of objectivity. In epistemology: that which is experienced. In psychology: the presence of a given datum in the physical universe at some date and place. Sometimes identified with truth or reality. Opposite of essence. See Actuality. -- J.K.F.

Existential Psychology: A school of introspective psychology represented in America by E. B. Titchener (1867-1927) which conceived the task of psychology to be the description, analysis and classification of the experiences of an individual mind considered as existences. Also called Existentialism. A characteristic doctrine of the school is the denial of imageless thought. -- L.M . Existential quantifier: See Quantifier. Exoteric: External; belonging to or suited for those who are not initiates or experts. The exoterikoi logoi referred to in Aristotle are popular arguments or treatises, as contrasted with strictly scientific expositions. -- G.R.M.

exoterics ::: n. pl. --> The public lectures or published writings of Aristotle. See Esoterics.

Exoteric ::: This word, when applied particularly to the great philosophical and religious systems of belief, does notmean false. The word merely means teachings of which the keys have not been openly given. The wordseems to have originated in the Peripatetic School of Greece, and to have been born in the mind ofAristotle. Its contrast is "esoteric."Exotericism -- that is to say, the outward and popular formulation of religious and philosophic doctrines-- reveils the truth; the self-assurance of ignorance, alas, always reviles the truth; whereas esotericismreveals the truth.

Figure (syllogistic): The moods of the categorical syllogism (see Logic, formal, § 5) are divided into four figures, according as the middle term is subject in the major premiss and predicate in the minor premiss (first figure), or predicate in both premisses (second figure), or subject in both premisses (third figure), or predicate in the major premiss and subject in the minor premiss (fourth figure). Aristotle recognized only three figures, including the moods of the fourth figure among those of the first. The separation of the fourth figure from the first (ascribed to Galen) is accompanied by a redefinition of "major" and "minor" -- so that the major premiss is that involving the predicate of the conclusion, and the minor premiss is that involving the subject of the conclusion. -- A.C.

Filioque: See Trinitarianism. Final Causes, the doctrine of: The view that things and events in the world can be explained, and ultimately can best be explained, by reference to some end or purpose or good or final cause to which they are conducive. Held, e.g., by Aristotle and Leibniz. -- W.K.F.

First Mover: See Prime Mover. First Philosophy: (Gr. prote philosophia) The name given by Aristotle (1) to the study of the principles, first causes and essential attributes of being as such; and (2) more particularly to the study of transcendent immutable i being; theology. -- G.R.M.

Form Aristotle’s three hypostases of objectivization are privation, form, and matter, compared to Father-Mother-Son, in which however is included life. Privation does not signify emptiness or nothingness, for the term means that which precedes form and actively manifested life as the root cause and source of the latter; and because it is formless it is called privation as having no form implying limitation or constriction. Form also is equivalent to vehicle, and so to body or imbodiment, and to the Sanskrit rupa, as seen in the distinction between rupa and arupa worlds.

  “Founder of the religion variously called Mazdaism, Magism, Parseeism, Fire-Worship, and Zoroastrianism. The age of the last Zoroaster (for it is a generic name) is not known, and perhaps for that very reason. Zanthus of Lydia, the earliest Greek writer who mentions this great lawgiver and religious reformer, places him about six hundred years before the Trojan War. But where is the historian who can now tell when the latter took place? Aristotle and also Eudoxus assign him a date of no less than 6,000 years before the days of Plato, and Aristotle was not one to make a statement without a good reason for it. Berosus makes him a king of Babylon some 2,200 years b.c.; but then, how can one tell what were the original figures of Berosus, before his MSS. passed through the hands of Eusebius, whose fingers were so deft at altering figures, whether in Egyptian synchronistic tables or in Chaldean chronology? Haug refers Zoroaster to at least 1,000 years b.c.; and Bunsen . . . finds that Zarathustra Spitama lived under the King Vistaspa about 3,000 years b.c., and describes him as ‘one of the mightiest intellects and one of the greatest men of all time. . . . the Occult records claim to have the correct dates of each of the thirteen Zoroasters mentioned in the Dabistan. Their doctrines, and especially those of the last (divine) Zoroaster, spread from Bactria to the Medes; thence, under the name of Magism, incorporated by the Adept-Astronomers in Chaldea, they greatly influenced the mystic teachings of the Mosaic doctrines, even before, perhaps, they had culminated into what is now known as the modern religion of the Parsis. Like Manu and Vyasa in India, Zarathustra is a generic name for great reformers and law-givers. The hierarchy began with the divine Zarathustra in the Vendidad, and ended with the great, but mortal man, bearing that title, and now lost to history. . . . the last Zoroaster was the founder of the Fire-temple of Azareksh, many ages before the historical era. Had not Alexander destroyed so many sacred and precious works of the Mazdeans, truth and philosophy would have been more inclined to agree with history, in bestowing upon that Greek Vandal the title of ‘the Great’ ” (TG 384-5).

Fusion, Psychic: See Psychic Fusion. Future: That part of time which includes all the events which will happen; these events may be conceived as determined in advance, though unknown, or as an indefinite potentiality, not fixed in advance, but subject to chance, free choice, statistical determination, or Divine interference. In Aristotle, assertions about the future are always contingent or non-apodeictic. -- R.B.W.

Genesis: (Gr. genesis) Coming into being, particularly the coming into being of a substance through the taking on of form by matter (Aristotle.). The biblical account of creation (Book of Genesis). -- G.R.M.

Genus: (Gr. genos) In Aristotle's logic: (1) that part of the essence of anything which belongs also to other things differing from it in species, (2) a class of objects possessing an identical character and consisting of two or more subclasses or species. See Species. -- G.R.M.

Good, Highest: (sometimes the greatest, or supreme, good. Lat. summum bonum) That good which transcends yet includes all the others. According to Augustine, Varro was able to enumerate 288 definitions. For Plato, the supreme Idea, the totality of being. For Aristotle, eudemonism (q.v.), which consists in the harmonious satisfaction of all rational powers. For the Epicureans, pleasure. For Aquinas, obedience to and oneness with God. The all-inclusive object of desire. -- J.K.F.

Greece. Homeric thought centered in Moira (Fate), an impersonal, immaterial power that distributes to gods and men their respective stations. While the main stream of pre-Socratic thought was naturalistic, it was not materialistic. The primordial Being of things, the Physis, is both extended and spiritual (hylozoism). Soul and Mind are invariably identified with Physis. Empedocles' distinction between inertia and force (Love and Hate) was followed by Anaxagoras' introduction of Mind (Nous) as the first cause of order and the principle of spontaneity or life in things. Socrates emphasized the ideological principle and introduced the category of Value as primary both in Nature and Man. He challenged the completeness of the mechanical explanation of natural events. Plato's theory of Ideas (as traditionally interpreted by historians) is at once a metaphysics, epistemology, and axiology. Ideas, forming a hierarchy and systematically united in the Good, are timeless essences comprising the realm of true Being. They are archetypes and causes of things in the realm of Non-Being (Space). Aristotle, while moving in the direction of common-sense realism, was also idealistic. Forms or species are secondary substances, and collectively form the dynamic and rational structure of the World. Active reason (Nous Poietikos), possessed by all rational creatures, is immaterial and eternal. Mind is the final cause of all motion. God is pure Mind, self-contained, self-centered, and metaphysically remote from the spatial World. The Stoics united idealism and hylozoistic naturalism in their doctrine of dynamic rational cosmic law (Logos), World Soul, Pneuma, and Providence (Pronoia).

H. A. Wolfson, Crescas' Critique of Aristotle, Cambridge, 1929.

H. B. Curry, Consistency and completeness of the theory of combinators, ibid , pp. 54-61. Comedy: In Aristotle (Poetics), a play in which chief characters behave worse than men do in daily life, as contrasted with tragedy, where the main characters act more nobly. In Plato's Symposium, Socrates argues at the end that a writer of good comedies is able to write good tragedies. See Comic. Metaphysically, comedy in Hegel consists of regarding reality as exhausted in a single category. Cf. Bergson, Le rire (Laughter). Commentator, The: Name usually used for Averroes by the medieval authors of the 13th century and later. In the writings of the grammarians (modistae, dealing with modis significandi) often used for Petrus Heliae. -- R.A.

Hence in its widest sense Scholasticism embraces all the intellectual activities, artistic, philosophical and theological, carried on in the medieval schools. Any attempt to define its narrower meaning in the field of philosophy raises serious difficulties, for in this case, though the term's comprehension is lessened, it still has to cover many centuries of many-faced thought. However, it is still possible to list several characteristics sufficient to differentiate Scholastic from non-Scholastic philosophy. While ancient philosophy was the philosophy of a people and modern thought that of individuals, Scholasticism was the philosophy of a Christian society which transcended the characteristics of individuals, nations and peoples. It was the corporate product of social thought, and as such its reasoning respected authority in the forms of tradition and revealed religion. Tradition consisted primarily in the systems of Plato and Aristotle as sifted, adapted and absorbed through many centuries. It was natural that religion, which played a paramount role in the culture of the middle ages, should bring influence to bear on the medieval, rational view of life. Revelation was held to be at once a norm and an aid to reason. Since the philosophers of the period were primarily scientific theologians, their rational interests were dominated by religious preoccupations. Hence, while in general they preserved the formal distinctions between reason and faith, and maintained the relatively autonomous character of philosophy, the choice of problems and the resources of science were controlled by theology. The most constant characteristic of Scholasticism was its method. This was formed naturally by a series of historical circumstances,   The need of a medium of communication, of a consistent body of technical language tooled to convey the recently revealed meanings of religion, God, man and the material universe led the early Christian thinkers to adopt the means most viable, most widely extant, and nearest at hand, viz. Greek scientific terminology. This, at first purely utilitarian, employment of Greek thought soon developed under Justin, Clement of Alexandria, Origin, and St. Augustine into the "Egyptian-spoils" theory; Greek thought and secular learning were held to be propaedeutic to Christianity on the principle: "Whatever things were rightly said among all men are the property of us Christians." (Justin, Second Apology, ch. XIII). Thus was established the first characteristic of the Scholastic method: philosophy is directly and immediately subordinate to theology.   Because of this subordinate position of philosophy and because of the sacred, exclusive and total nature of revealed wisdom, the interest of early Christian thinkers was focused much more on the form of Greek thought than on its content and, it might be added, much less of this content was absorbed by early Christian thought than is generally supposed. As practical consequences of this specialized interest there followed two important factors in the formation of Scholastic philosophy:     Greek logic en bloc was taken over by Christians;     from the beginning of the Christian era to the end of the XII century, no provision was made in Catholic centers of learning for the formal teaching of philosophy. There was a faculty to teach logic as part of the trivium and a faculty of theology.   For these two reasons, what philosophy there was during this long period of twelve centuries, was dominated first, as has been seen, by theology and, second, by logic. In this latter point is found rooted the second characteristic of the Scholastic method: its preoccupation with logic, deduction, system, and its literary form of syllogistic argumentation.   The third characteristic of the Scholastic method follows directly from the previous elements already indicated. It adds, however, a property of its own gained from the fact that philosophy during the medieval period became an important instrument of pedogogy. It existed in and for the schools. This new element coupled with the domination of logic, the tradition-mindedness and social-consciousness of the medieval Christians, produced opposition of authorities for or against a given problem and, finally, disputation, where a given doctrine is syllogistically defended against the adversaries' objections. This third element of the Scholastic method is its most original characteristic and accounts more than any other single factor for the forms of the works left us from this period. These are to be found as commentaries on single or collected texts; summae, where the method is dialectical or disputational in character.   The main sources of Greek thought are relatively few in number: all that was known of Plato was the Timaeus in the translation and commentary of Chalcidius. Augustine, the pseudo-Areopagite, and the Liber de Causis were the principal fonts of Neoplatonic literature. Parts of Aristotle's logical works (Categoriae and de Interpre.) and the Isagoge of Porphyry were known through the translations of Boethius. Not until 1128 did the Scholastics come to know the rest of Aristotle's logical works. The golden age of Scholasticism was heralded in the late XIIth century by the translations of the rest of his works (Physics, Ethics, Metaphysics, De Anima, etc.) from the Arabic by Gerard of Cremona, John of Spain, Gundisalvi, Michael Scot, and Hermann the German, from the Greek by Robert Grosseteste, William of Moerbeke, and Henry of Brabant. At the same time the Judae-Arabian speculation of Alkindi, Alfarabi, Avencebrol, Avicenna, Averroes, and Maimonides together with the Neoplatonic works of Proclus were made available in translation. At this same period the Scholastic attention to logic was turned to metaphysics, even psychological and ethical problems and the long-discussed question of the universals were approached from this new angle. Philosophy at last achieved a certain degree of autonomy and slowly forced the recently founded universities to accord it a separate faculty.

Hexis: (Gr. hexis) In Aristotle's philosophy a state or condition of a thing; particularly an acquired disposition or habit, not easily changed, and affecting the welfare of its possessor, such as the moral virtues and the intellectual skills. -- G.R.M.

Historically, one may say that, in general, Greek ethics was teleological, though there are deontological strains in Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. In Christian moralists one finds both kinds of ethics, according as the emphasis is on the will of God as the source of duties (the ordinary view) or on the goodness of God as somehow the end of human life (Augustine and Aquinas), theology and revelation taking a central role in either case. In modern philosophical ethics, again, both kinds of ethics are present, with the opposition between them coming out into the open. Starting in the 17th and 18th centuries in Britain are both "intuitionism" (Cambridge Platonists, Clarke, Butler, Price, Reid, Whewell, McCosh, etc.) and utilitarianism (q.v.), with British ethics largely a matter of controversy between the two, a controversy in which the teleological side has lately been taken by Cambridge and the deontological side by Oxford. Again, in Germany, England, and elsewhere there have been, on the one hand, the formalistic deontologism of Kant and his followers, and, on the other, the axiological or teleological ethics of the Hegelian self-realizationists and the Wertethik of Scheler and N. Hartmann.

Homoeomeries: (Gr. homoiomere) In Aristotle's philosophy those bodies that are divisible into parts qualitatively identical with one another and with the whole, such as the metals and the tissues of living organisms; in distinction from bodies whose parts are qualitatively unlike one another and the whole, such as the head of an animal or the leaf of a plant. -- G.R.M.

H. Siebeck, Gesch. der Psychol. (goes from Aristotle to Aquinas);

Hyperbole: (Gr. hyperbole, over-shooting, excess) In rhetoric, that figure of speech according to which expressions gain their effect through exaggeration. The representation of things as greater or less than they really are, not intended to be accepted literally. Aristotle relates, for example, that when the winner of a mule-race paid enough money to a poet who was not anxious to praise half-asses, the poet wrote. "Hail, daughters of storm-footed steeds" (Rhetoric, III. ii. 14). -- J.K.F.

Idea, as Plato pointed out, means primarily a prototype existing in the cosmic mind and manifested in forms by the action of cosmic energy, guided by ideation, working in matter. Therefore it must be regarded as innate, and our thoughts are mental manifestations of ideas. With Plato and Aristotle (when not using the word to denote species), ideas were the fundamental roots of manifested things, as viewed under the aspect of consciousness rather than under that of matter. Hence the faculty of ideation, considered cosmically, is originative and creative of what lies latent in ideation itself, and can be so in the human being, since each individual is a microcosm. This is quite different from the faculty of making mental images of sensory experiences, these images being really what the Greeks called phantasmata. Yet even this is a degree of the original process and may be called, perhaps, astral ideation.

III. Golden Age (13 cent.). The sudden elevation of and interest in philosophy during this period can be attributed to the discovery and translation of Aristotelian literature from Arabian, Jewish and original sources, together with the organization of the University of Paris and the founding of the Franciscan and Dominican Orders. Names important in the introduction and early use of Aristotle are Dominic Gundisalvi, William of Auvergne (+ 1149), Alexander Neckam (+1217), Michael Scot (+c. 1234) and Robert Grosseteste (+ 1253). The last three were instrumental in interesting Scholastic thought in the natural sciences, while the last (Robert), if not the author of, was, at least, responsible for the first Summa philosophiae of Scholasticism. Scholastic philosophy has now reached the systematizing and formularizing stage and so on the introduction of Aristotle's works breaks up into two camps: Augustinianism, comprising those who favor the master theses of Augustine and look upon Aristotle with varying degrees of hostility; Aristotelianism, comprising those who favor Aristotle, without altogether abandoning the Augustinian framework.

In aesthetics: Purification of and liberation from passions in art (Aristotle). First idea of the distinction between form and sentiment. -- L.V.

In Aristotle's philosophy: (1) the internal source of change or rest in an object as such, in distinction from art, which is an external source of change. Natural beings are those that have such an internal source of change. Though both matter and form are involved in the changes of a natural being, its nature is ordinarily identified with the form, as the active and intelligible factor. (2) The sum total of all natural beings. See Aristotelianism. -- G.R.M.

Incontinence: (Gr. akrasia) Moral condition of a person unable to control his bodily desires by rational principles. The incontinent man is distinguished from the licentious in that in the one case there is a conflict between bodily desires and rational choice and in the other case not (Aristotle). -- G.R.M.

In Cournot, following Aristotle, the co-incidence of two causally determined series of events. In Peirce (q.v.), a vera causa and metaphysically grounded category. See Tychism.

Inductive Method, Induction In logic, the process of reasoning from the parts to the whole, from the particular to the general, or from the individual to the universal; contrasted with the deductive method, which reasons from the whole to the parts, from the general to the particular, from the universal to the individual. It is associated with Aristotle as contrasted with Plato, also with Francis Bacon and modern science in general. Science endeavors to establish general laws by reasoning from particular observations; but it is necessary to assume that what is true in an individual case will be true in the general case of which it is only an instance. The hypotheses thus framed are necessarily and naturally regarded as provisional, subject to modification in the light of subsequent, more extended observations of nature. This method endeavors to come to an understanding of nature by a continued process of trial and error, the formulation of its laws becoming ever wider. But an essential part of this method itself is deductive, since we continually reason back from the provisional hypotheses we have laid down to the new facts which we seek to discover in support or in refutation of them. For this reason, the method of science has often been called a deductive-inductive method. Indeed, pure induction is probably inconceivable, since we cannot enter upon a mental process unless we first entertain some general ideas. Induction and deduction are interdependent functions of the ratiocinative mind.

Infima species: The lowest species of a classification. In Aristotle, the individual. -- R.B.W.

In metaphysics, one of Aristotle's 10 categories, Hume's ground for causality ("custom of the mind") and Peirce's leading principle or basis of natural law. -- L.W.

In scholasticism: Four causes are distinguished, in accordance with Aristotle. Efficient cause, by which any change is brought about in the order new being arises -- prime matter in regard to substantial second matter in regard to accidental forms (Cf. Form, Matter) -- formal cause, the act by which a material substratum is determined towards a new being -- substantial or accidental -- final cause, that because of which something is or becomes. All things tend towards an end by a "natural appetite". -- R.A.

In scholasticism: The English term translates three Latin terms which, in Scholasticism, have different significations. Ens as a noun is the most general and most simple predicate; as a participle it is an essential predicate only in regard to God in Whom existence and essence are one, or Whose essence implies existence. Esse, though used sometimes in a wider sense, usually means existence which is defined as the actus essendi, or the reality of some essence. Esse quid or essentia designates the specific nature of some being or thing, the "being thus" or the quiddity. Ens is divided into real and mental being (ens rationis). Though the latter also has properties, it is said to have essence only in an improper way. Another division is into actual and potential being. Ens is called the first of all concepts, in respect to ontology and to psychology; the latter statement of Aristotle appears to be confirmed by developmental psychology. Thing (res) and ens are synonymous, a res may be a res extra mentem or only rationis. Every ens is: something, i.e. has quiddity, one, true, i.e. corresponds to its proper nature, and good. These terms, naming aspects which are only virtually distinct from ens, are said to be convertible with ens and with each other. Ens is an analogical term, i.e. it is not predicated in the same manner of every kind of being, according to Aquinas. In Scotism ens, however, is considered as univocal and as applying to God in the same sense as to created beings, though they be distinguished as entia ab alto from God, the ens a se. See Act, Analogy, Potency, Transcendentals. -- R.A.

In Scholasticism: the operation by which the mind becomes cognizant of the universal (q.v.) as represented by the individuals. Aristotle and Thomas ascribe this operation to the active intellect (q.v.) which "illuminates" the image (phantasm) and disengages from it the universal nature to be received and made intelligible by the possible intellect. -- R.A.

In the Ethics these basic principles are applied to the solution of the question of human good. The good for man is an actualization, or active exercise, of those faculties distinctive of man, that is the faculties of the rational, as distinct from the vegetative and sensitive souls. But human excellence thus defined shows itself in two forms, In the habitual subordination of sensitive and appetitive tendencies to rational rule and principle, and in the exercise of reason in the search for and contemplation of truth. The former type of excellence is expressed in the moral virtues, the latter in the dianoetic or intellectual virtues. A memorable feature of Aristotle's treatment of the moral virtues is his theory that each of them may be regarded as a mean between excess and defect; courage, for example, is a mean between cowardice and rashness, liberality a mean between stinginess and prodigality. In the Politics Aristotle sets forth the importance of the political community as the source and sustainer of the typically human life. But for Aristotle the highest good for man is found not in the political life, nor in any other form of practical activity, but in theoretical inquiry and contemplation of truth. This alone brings complete and continuous happiness, because it is the activity of the highest part of man's complex nature, and of that part which is least dependent upon externals, viz. the intuitive reason, or nous. In the contemplation of the first principles of knowledge and being man participates in that activity of pure thought which constitutes the eternal perfection of the divine nature.

In the theory of value the first question concerns the meaning of value-terms and the status of goodness. As to meaning the main point is whether goodness is definable or not, and if so, how. As to status the main point is whether goodness is subjective or objective, relative or absolute. Various positions are possible. Recent emotive meaning theories e.g. that of A. J. Ayer, hold that "good" and other value-terms have only an emotive meaning, Intuitionists and non-naturalists often hold that goodness is an indefinable intrinsic (and therefore objective or absolute) property, e.g., Plato, G. E. Moore, W. D. Ross, J. Laird, Meinong, N. Hartman. Metaphysical and naturalistic moralists usually hold that goodness can be defined in metaphysical or in psychological terms, generally interpreting "x is good" to mean that a certain attitude is taken toward x by some mind or group of minds. For some of them value is objective or absolute in the sense of having the same locus for everyone, e.g., Aristotle in his definition of the good as that at which all things aim, (Ethics, bk. I). For others the locus of value varies from individual to individual or from group to group, i.e. different things will be good for different individuals or groups, e.g., Hobbes, Westermarck, William James, R. B. Perry.

It is in his biology that the distinctive concepts of Aristotle show to best advantage. The conception of process as the actualization of determinate potentiality is well adapted to the comprehension of biological phenomena, where the immanent teleology of structure and function is almost a part of the observed facts. It is here also that the persistence of the form, or species, through a succession of individuals is most strikingly evident. His psychology is scarcely separable from his biology, since for Aristotle (as for Greek thought generally) the soul is the principle of life; it is "the primary actualization of a natural organic body." But souls differ from one another in the variety and complexity of the functions they exercise, and this difference in turn corresponds to differences in the organic structures involved. Fundamental to all other physical activities are the functions of nutrition, growth and reproduction, which are possessed by all living beings, plants as well as animals. Next come sensation, desire, and locomotion, exhibited in animals in varying degrees. Above all are deliberative choice and theoretical inquiry, the exercise of which makes the rational soul, peculiar to man among the animals. Aristotle devotes special attention to the various activities of the rational soul. Sense perception is the faculty of receiving the sensible form of outward objects without their matter. Besides the five senses Aristotle posits a "common sense," which enables the rational soul to unite the data of the separate senses into a single object, and which also accounts for the soul's awareness of these very activities of perception and of its other states. Reason is the faculty of apprehending the universals and first principles involved in all knowledge, and while helpless without sense perception it is not limited to the concrete and sensuous, but can grasp the universal and the ideal. The reason thus described as apprehending the intelligible world is in one difficult passage characterized as passive reason, requiring for its actualization a higher informing reason as the source of all intelligibility in things and of realized intelligence in man.

IV. First Decline. (14-16 cent.) St. Thomas' position in many points had been so radical a departure from the traditional thought of Christendom that many masters in the late XIII and early XIV centuries were led to reexamine philosophy in the light of Aristotle's works. This gave rise to a critical and independent spirit which multiplied systems and prepared for the individualism of the Renaissance. Noteworthy in this movement are James of Metz, Durand de St. Pourcain (+1334), Peter Aureoli (+1322) and Henry of Harclay (+1317). The greatest figure, however, is William of Occam (+1349), founder of modern thought, who renewed the Nominalism of the XI and XII cent., restricted the realm of reason but made it quite independent in its field. In reaction to this critical and independent movement, many thinkers gathered about the two great minds of the past century. Thomas and Duns Scotus, contenting themselves with merely reproducing their masters' positions. Thus Scholasticism broke up into three camps: Thomism, Scotism and Nominalism or Terminism; the first two stagnant, the third free-lance.

Kindi: Of the tribe of Kindah, lived in Basra and Bagdad where he died 873. He is the first of the great Arabian followers of Aristotle whose influence is noticeable in Al Kindi's scientific and psychological doctrines. He wrote on geometry, astronomy, astrology, arithmetic, music (which he developed on arithmetical principles), physics, medicine, psychology, meteorology, politics. He distinguishes the active intellect from the passive which is actualized by the former. Discursive reasoning and demonstration he considers as achievements of a third and a fourth intellect. In ontology he seems to hypostasize the categories, of which he knows five: matter, form, motion, place, time, and which he calls primary substances. Al Kindi inaugurated the encyclopedic form of philosophical treatises, worked out more than a century later by Avicenna (q.v.). He also was the first to meet the violent hostility of the orthodox theologians but escaped persecution. A. Nagy, Die philos. Abhandlungen des Jacqub ben Ishaq al-Kindi, Beitr, z. Gesch. d. Phil. d. MA. 1897, Vol. II. -- R.A.

Kinesis: (Gr. kinesis) Motion; change. In Aristotle's philosophy three kinds of kinesis are distinguished: quantitative change, i.e. increase and diminution; change of quality; and change of place, or locomotion. Among the forms of kinesis Aristotle also sometimes reckons the two forms of substantial change, viz. generation, or coming-to-be, and destruction, or passing-away. See Aristotelianism. -- G.R.M.

Legal Philosophy: Deals with the philosophic principles of law and justice. The origin is to be found in ancient philosophy. The Greek Sophists criticized existing laws and customs by questioning their validity: All human rules are artificial, created by enactment or convention, as opposed to natural law, based on nature. The theory of a law of nature was further developed by Aristotle and the Stoics. According to the Stoics the natural law is based upon the eternal law of the universe; this itself is an outgrowth of universal reason, as man's mind is an offshoot of the latter. The idea of a law of nature as being innate in man was particularly stressed and popularized by Cicero who identified it with "right reason" and already contrasted it with written law that might be unjust or even tyrannical. Through Saint Augustine these ideas were transmitted to medieval philosophy and by Thomas Aquinas built into his philosophical system. Thomas considers the eternal law the reason existing in the divine mind and controlling the universe. Natural law, innate in man participates in that eternal law. A new impetus was given to Legal Philosophy by the Renaissance. Natural Jurisprudence, properly so-called, originated in the XVII. century. Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes, Benedictus Spinoza, John Locke, Samuel Pufendorf were the most important representatives of that line of thought. Grotius, continuing the Scholastic tradition, particularly stressed the absoluteness of natural hw (it would exist even if God did not exist) and, following Jean Bodin, the sovereignty of the people. The idea of the social contract traced all political bodies back to a voluntary compact by which every individual gave up his right to self-government, or rather transferred it to the government, abandoning a state of nature which according to Hobbes must have been a state of perpetual war. The theory of the social compact more and more accepts the character of a "fiction" or of a regulative idea (Kant). In this sense the theory means that we ought to judge acts of government by their correspondence to the general will (Rousseau) and to the interests of the individuals who by transferring their rights to the commonwealth intended to establish their real liberty. Natural law by putting the emphasis on natural rights, takes on a revolutionary character. It played a part in shaping the bills of rights, the constitutions of the American colonies and of the Union, as well as of the French declaration of the rights of men and of citizens. Natural jurisprudence in the teachings of Christian Wolff and Thomasius undergoes a kind of petrification in the vain attempt to outline an elaborate system of natural law not only in the field of international or public law, but also in the detailed regulations of the law of property, of contract, etc. This sort of dogmatic approach towards the problems of law evoked the opposition of the Historic School (Gustav Hugo and Savigny) which stressed the natural growth of laws ind customs, originating from the mysterious "spirit of the people". On the other hand Immanuel Kant tried to overcome the old natural law by the idea of a "law of reason", meaning an a priori element in all existing or positive law. In his definition of law ("the ensemble of conditions according to which everyone's will may coexist with the will of every other in accordance with a general rule of liberty"), however, as in his legal philosophy in general, he still shares the attitude of the natural law doctrine, confusing positive law with the idea of just law. This is also true of Hegel whose panlogism seemed to lead in this very direction. Under the influence of epistemological positivism (Comte, Mill) in the later half of the nineteenth century, legal philosophy, especially in Germany, confined itself to a "general theory of law". Similarily John Austin in England considered philosophy of law concerned only with positive law, "as it necessarily is", not as it ought to be. Its main task was to analyze certain notions which pervade the science of law (Analytical Jurisprudence). In recent times the same tendency to reduce legal philosophy to logical or at least methodological tasks was further developed in attempting a pure science of law (Kelsen, Roguin). Owing to the influence of Darwinism and natural science in general the evolutionist and biological viewpoint was accepted in legal philosophy: comparative jurisprudence, sociology of law, the Freirecht movement in Germany, the study of the living law, "Realism" in American legal philosophy, all represent a tendency against rationalism. On the other hand there is a revival of older tendencies: Hegelianism, natural law -- especially in Catholic philosophy -- and Kantianism (beginning with Rudolf Stammler). From here other trends arose: the critical attitude leads to relativism (f.i. Gustav Radbruch); the antimetaphysical tendency towards positivism -- though different from epistemological positivism -- and to a pure theory of law. Different schools of recent philosophy have found their applications or repercussions in legal philosophy: Phenomenology, for example, tried to intuit the essences of legal institutions, thus coming back to a formalist position, not too far from the real meaning of analytical jurisprudence. Neo-positivism, though so far not yet explicitly applied to legal philosophy, seems to lead in the same direction. -- W.E.

Leibniz's philosophy was the dawning consciousness of the modern world (Dewey). So gradual and continuous, like the development of a monad, so all-inclusive was the growth of his mind, that his philosophy, as he himself says, "connects Plato with Democritus, Aristotle with Descartes, the Scholastics with the moderns, theology and morals with reason." The reform (if all science was to be effected by the use of two instruments, a universal scientific language and a calculus of reasoning. He advocated a universal language of ideographic symbols in which complex concepts would be expressed by combinations of symbols representing simple concepts or by new symbols defined as equivalent to such a complex. He believed that analysis would enable us to limit the number of undefined concepts to a few simple primitives in terms of which all other concepts could be defined. This is the essential notion back of modern logistic treatments.

Lemma: (Gr. lemma) In Aristotle's logic a premiss of a syllogism. -- G.R.M.

lyceum ::: n. --> A place of exercise with covered walks, in the suburbs of Athens, where Aristotle taught philosophy.

A house or apartment appropriated to instruction by lectures or disquisitions.
A higher school, in Europe, which prepares youths for the university.
An association for debate and literary improvement.

Main works: Commentaries on Aristotle's De Caelo, Physica, De Anima, and Categoriae.

Major premiss: See figure (syllogistic). Major term: (Gr. meizon horos) That one of the three terms in a syllogism which appears as predicate of the conclusion; so called by Aristotle because in the first, or perfect, figure of the syllogism it is commonly the term of greatest extension, the middle term being included in it, and the minor term in turn coming under the middle term. See Aristotelianism; Logic, formal, § 5. -- G.R.M.

Mean: In general, that which in some way mediates or occupies a middle position among various things or between two extremes. Hence (especially in the plural) that through which an end is attained; in mathematics the word is used for any one of various notions of average; in ethics it represents moderation, temperance, prudence, the middle way. In mathematics:   The arithmetic mean of two quantities is half their sum; the arithmetic mean of n quantities is the sum of the n quantities, divided by n. In the case of a function f(x) (say from real numbers to real numbers) the mean value of the function for the values x1, x2, . . . , xn of x is the arithmetic mean of f(x1), f(x2), . . . , f(xn). This notion is extended to the case of infinite sets of values of x by means of integration; thus the mean value of f(x) for values of x between a and b is ∫f(x)dx, with a and b as the limits of integration, divided by the difference between a and b.   The geometric mean of or between, or the mean proportional between, two quantities is the (positive) square root of their product. Thus if b is the geometric mean between a and c, c is as many times greater (or less) than b as b is than a. The geometric mean of n quantities is the nth root of their product.   The harmonic mean of two quantities is defined as the reciprocal of the arithmetic mean of their reciprocals. Hence the harmonic mean of a and b is 2ab/(a + b).   The weighted mean or weighted average of a set of n quantities, each of which is associated with a certain number as weight, is obtained by multiplying each quantity by the associated weight, adding these products together, and then dividing by the sum of the weights. As under A, this may be extended to the case of an infinite set of quantities by means of integration. (The weights have the role of estimates of relative importance of the various quantities, and if all the weights are equal the weighted mean reduces to the simple arithmetic mean.)   In statistics, given a population (i.e., an aggregate of observed or observable quantities) and a variable x having the population as its range, we have:     The mean value of x is the weighted mean of the values of x, with the probability (frequency ratio) of each value taken as its weight. In the case of a finite population this is the same as the simple arithmetic mean of the population, provided that, in calculating the arithmetic mean, each value of x is counted as many times over as it occurs in the set of observations constituting the population.     In like manner, the mean value of a function f(x) of x is the weighted mean of the values of f(x), where the probability of each value of x is taken as the weight of the corresponding value of f(x).     The mode of the population is the most probable (most frequent) value of x, provided there is one such.     The median of the population is so chosen that the probability that x be less than the median (or the probability that x be greater than the median) is ½ (or as near ½ as possible). In the case of a finite population, if the values of x are arranged in order of magnitude     --repeating any one value of x as many times over as it occurs in the set of observations constituting the population     --then the middle term of this series, or the arithmetic mean of the two middle terms, is the median.     --A.C. In cosmology, the fundamental means (arithmetic, geometric, and harmonic) were used by the Greeks in describing or actualizing the process of becoming in nature. The Pythagoreans and the Platonists in particular made considerable use of these means (see the Philebus and the Timaeus more especially). These ratios are among the basic elements used by Plato in his doctrine of the mixtures. With the appearance of the qualitative physics of Aristotle, the means lost their cosmological importance and were thereafter used chiefly in mathematics. The modern mathematical theories of the universe make use of the whole range of means analyzed by the calculus of probability, the theory of errors, the calculus of variations, and the statistical methods. In ethics, the 'Doctrine of the Mean' is the moral theory of moderation, the development of the virtues, the determination of the wise course in action, the practice of temperance and prudence, the choice of the middle way between extreme or conflicting decisions. It has been developed principally by the Chinese, the Indians and the Greeks; it was used with caution by the Christian moralists on account of their rigorous application of the moral law.   In Chinese philosophy, the Doctrine of the Mean or of the Middle Way (the Chung Yung, literally 'Equilibrium and Harmony') involves the absence of immoderate pleasure, anger, sorrow or joy, and a conscious state in which those feelings have been stirred and act in their proper degree. This doctrine has been developed by Tzu Shu (V. C. B.C.), a grandson of Confucius who had already described the virtues of the 'superior man' according to his aphorism "Perfect is the virtue which is according to the mean". In matters of action, the superior man stands erect in the middle and strives to follow a course which does not incline on either side.   In Buddhist philosophy, the System of the Middle Way or Madhyamaka is ascribed more particularly to Nagarjuna (II c. A.D.). The Buddha had given his revelation as a mean or middle way, because he repudiated the two extremes of an exaggerated ascetlsm and of an easy secular life. This principle is also applied to knowledge and action in general, with the purpose of striking a happy medium between contradictory judgments and motives. The final objective is the realization of the nirvana or the complete absence of desire by the gradual destruction of feelings and thoughts. But while orthodox Buddhism teaches the unreality of the individual (who is merely a mass of causes and effects following one another in unbroken succession), the Madhyamaka denies also the existence of these causes and effects in themselves. For this system, "Everything is void", with the legitimate conclusion that "Absolute truth is silence". Thus the perfect mean is realized.   In Greek Ethics, the doctrine of the Right (Mean has been developed by Plato (Philebus) and Aristotle (Nic. Ethics II. 6-8) principally, on the Pythagorean analogy between the sound mind, the healthy body and the tuned string, which has inspired most of the Greek Moralists. Though it is known as the "Aristotelian Principle of the Mean", it is essentially a Platonic doctrine which is preformed in the Republic and the Statesman and expounded in the Philebus, where we are told that all good things in life belong to the class of the mixed (26 D). This doctrine states that in the application of intelligence to any kind of activity, the supreme wisdom is to know just where to stop, and to stop just there and nowhere else. Hence, the "right-mean" does not concern the quantitative measurement of magnitudes, but simply the qualitative comparison of values with respect to a standard which is the appropriate (prepon), the seasonable (kairos), the morally necessary (deon), or generally the moderate (metrion). The difference between these two kinds of metretics (metretike) is that the former is extrinsic and relative, while the latter is intrinsic and absolute. This explains the Platonic division of the sciences into two classes: those involving reference to relative quantities (mathematical or natural), and those requiring absolute values (ethics and aesthetics). The Aristotelian analysis of the "right mean" considers moral goodness as a fixed and habitual proportion in our appetitions and tempers, which can be reached by training them until they exhibit just the balance required by the right rule. This process of becoming good develops certain habits of virtues consisting in reasonable moderation where both excess and defect are avoided: the virtue of temperance (sophrosyne) is a typical example. In this sense, virtue occupies a middle position between extremes, and is said to be a mean; but it is not a static notion, as it leads to the development of a stable being, when man learns not to over-reach himself. This qualitative conception of the mean involves an adaptation of the agent, his conduct and his environment, similar to the harmony displayed in a work of art. Hence the aesthetic aspect of virtue, which is often overstressed by ancient and neo-pagan writers, at the expense of morality proper.   The ethical idea of the mean, stripped of the qualifications added to it by its Christian interpreters, has influenced many positivistic systems of ethics, and especially pragmatism and behaviourism (e.g., A. Huxley's rule of Balanced Excesses). It is maintained that it is also involved in the dialectical systems, such as Hegelianism, where it would have an application in the whole dialectical process as such: thus, it would correspond to the synthetic phase which blends together the thesis and the antithesis by the meeting of the opposites. --T.G. Mean, Doctrine of the: In Aristotle's ethics, the doctrine that each of the moral virtues is an intermediate state between extremes of excess and defect. -- O.R.M.

Medieval Period. Medieval Christian thought, axiomatically idealistic, united the personalism of Israel and the speculative idealism of neo-Platonism and Aristotle. Similarly, Islamic thought, centering at Bagdad and Cordova, attached Mohammedan religious idealism to neo-Platonism and Aristotelianism.

Methodology: The systematic analysis and organization of the rational and experimental principles and processes which must guide a scientific inquiry, or which constitute the structure of the special sciences more particularly. Methodology, which is also called scientific method, and more seldom methodeutic, refers not only to the whole of a constituted science, but also to individual problems or groups of problems within a science. As such it is usually considered as a branch of logic; in fact, it is the application of the principles and processes of logic to the special objects of the various sciences; while science in general is accounted for by the combination of deduction and induction as such. Thus, methodology is a generic term exemplified in the specific method of each science. Hence its full significance can be understood only by analyzing the structure of the special sciences. In determining that structure, one must consider the proper object of the special science, the manner in which it develops, the type of statements or generalizations it involves, its philosophical foundations or assumptions, and its relation with the other sciences, and eventually its applications. The last two points mentioned are particularly important: methods of education, for example, will vary considerably according to their inspiration and aim. Because of the differences between the objects of the various sciences, they reveal the following principal methodological patterns, which are not necessarily exclusive of one another, and which are used sometimes in partial combination. It may be added that their choice and combination depend also in a large degree on psychological motives. In the last resort, methodology results from the adjustment of our mental powers to the love and pursuit of truth. There are various rational methods used by the speculative sciences, including theology which adds certain qualifications to their use. More especially, philosophy has inspired the following procedures:   The Soctattc method of analysis by questioning and dividing until the essences are reached;   the synthetic method developed by Plato, Aristotle and the Medieval thinkers, which involves a demonstrative exposition of the causal relation between thought and being;   the ascetic method of intellectual and moral purification leading to an illumination of the mind, as proposed by Plotinus, Augustine and the mystics;   the psychological method of inquiry into the origin of ideas, which was used by Descartes and his followers, and also by the British empiricists;   the critical or transcendental method, as used by Kant, and involving an analysis of the conditions and limits of knowledge;   the dialectical method proceeding by thesis, antithesis and synthesis, which is promoted by Hegelianlsm and Dialectical Materialism;   the intuitive method, as used by Bergson, which involves the immediate perception of reality, by a blending of consciousness with the process of change;   the reflexive method of metaphysical introspection aiming at the development of the immanent realities and values leading man to God;   the eclectic method (historical-critical) of purposive and effective selection as proposed by Cicero, Suarez and Cousin; and   the positivistic method of Comte, Spencer and the logical empiricists, which attempts to apply to philosophy the strict procedures of the positive sciences. The axiomatic or hypothetico-deductive method as used by the theoretical and especially the mathematical sciences. It involves such problems as the selection, independence and simplification of primitive terms and axioms, the formalization of definitions and proofs, the consistency and completeness of the constructed theory, and the final interpretation. The nomological or inductive method as used by the experimental sciences, aims at the discovery of regularities between phenomena and their relevant laws. It involves the critical and careful application of the various steps of induction: observation and analytical classification; selection of similarities; hypothesis of cause or law; verification by the experimental canons; deduction, demonstration and explanation; systematic organization of results; statement of laws and construction of the relevant theory. The descriptive method as used by the natural and social sciences, involves observational, classificatory and statistical procedures (see art. on statistics) and their interpretation. The historical method as used by the sciences dealing with the past, involves the collation, selection, classification and interpretation of archeological facts and exhibits, records, documents, archives, reports and testimonies. The psychological method, as used by all the sciences dealing with human behaviour and development. It involves not only introspective analysis, but also experimental procedures, such as those referring to the relations between stimuli and sensations, to the accuracy of perceptions (specific measurements of intensity), to gradation (least noticeable differences), to error methods (average error in right and wrong cases), and to physiological and educational processes.

Middle Term: (Gr. mesos horos) That one of the three terms in a syllogism which appears in both premisses; so called by Aristotle because in the first, or perfect, figure of the syllogism it is commonly intermediate in extension between the Major Term and the Minor Term. See Aristotelianism; Major Term; Minor Term. See Logic, formal, § 5. -- G.R.M.

Mind-body relation: Relation obtaining between the individual mind and its body. Theories of the mind-body relation are monistic or dualistic according as they identify or separate the mind and the body. Monistic theories include: the theory of mind as bodily function, advanced by Aristotle and adhered to by thinkers as divergent as Hobbes, Hegel, and the Behaviorists, the theory of body as mental appearance held by Berkeley, Leibniz, Schopenhauer and certain other idealists, the two-aspect theory of Spinoza and of recent neutral monism which considers mind and body as manifestations of a third reality which is neither mental nor bodily. The principal dualistic theories are: two sided interacti'onism of Descartes, Locke, James and others. See Interactionism. psycho-physical parallelism. See Parallelism, Psycho-physical. Epephenomenalism. See Epephenomenalism.

Minor premiss: See figure (syllogistic). Minor Term: (Gr. elatton horos) That one of the three terms in a syllogism that appears as subject of the conclusion; so called by Aristotle because it is commonly the term of least extension. See Aristotelianism; Major Term; Middle Term; Logic, formal, § 5. -- C.R.M.

Monadology: (also Monadism) The doctrine of monads, the theory that the universe is a composite of elementary units. A monad may also be a metaphysical unit. The notion of monad can be found in Pythagoras, Ecphantus, Aristotle, Euclid, Augustine, et al. Plato refers to his ideas as monads. Nicolaus Cusanus regards individual things as units which mirror the world. Giordano Bruno seems to have been the first to have used the term in its modern connotation. God is called monas monadum; each monad, combining matter and form, is both corporeal and spiritual, a microcosm of the whole. But the real founder of monadology is Leibniz. To him, the monads are the real atoms of nature, the elements of things. The monad is a simple substance, completely different from a material atom. It has neither extension, nor shape, nor divisibility. Nor is it perishable. Monads begin to exist or cease to exist by a decree of God. They are distinguished from one another in character, they "have no windows" through which anything can enter in or go out, that is, the substance of the monad must be conceived as force, as that which contains in itself the principle of its changes. The universe is the aggregate, the ideal bond of the monads, constituting a harmonious unity, pre-established by God who is the highest in the hierarchy of monads. This bond of all things to each, enables every simple substance to have relations which express all the others, every monad being a perpetual living mirror of the universe. The simple substance or monad, therefore, contains a plurality of modifications and relations even though it has no parts but is unity. The highest monad, God, appears to be hoth the creator and the unified totality and harmony of self-active and self-subsistent monnds. -- J.M.

Moral Virtues: (Gr. aretai ethikai) In Aristotle's philosophy those virtues, or excellences, which consist in the habitual control of conduct by rational principle; as distinct from the intellectual virtues, whose end is the knowledge of principles. See Artstotelianism; Dianoetic Virtues. -- G.R.M.

Most of the basic problems and theories of cosmology seem to have been discussed by the pre-Socratic philosophers. Their views are modified and expanded in the Timaeus of Plato, and rehearsed and systematized in Aristotle's Physics. Despite multiple divergencies, all these Greek philosophers seem to be largely agreed that the universe is limited in space, has neither a beginning nor end in time, is dominated by a set of unalterable laws, and has a definite and recurring rhythm. The cosmology of the Middle Ages diverges from the Greek primarily through the introduction of the concepts of divine creation and annihilation, miracle and providence. In consonance with the tendencies of the new science, the cosmologies of Descartes, Leibniz and Newton bring the medieval views into closer harmony with those of the Greeks. The problems of cosmology were held to be intrinsically insoluble by Kant. After Kant there was a tendency to merge the issues of cosmology with those of metaphysics. The post-Kantians attempted to deal with both in terms of more basic principles and a more flexible dialectic, their opponents rejected both as without significance or value. The most radical modern cosmology is that of Peirce with its three cosmic principles of chance, law and continuity; the most recent is that of Whitehead, which finds its main inspiration in Plato's Timaeus.

Motion: (Lat. moveo, move) Difference in space. Change of place. Erected into a universal principle by Heraclitus. Denied as a possibility by Parmenides and Zeno. Subdivided by Aristotle into alteration or change in shape, and augmentation or diminution or change in size. In realism: exclusively a property of actuality. -- J.K.F.

Multiplicative axiom: See choice, axiom of. Multiplicity: The doctrine of the plurality of beings, or the manifoldness of the real, denied by the Eleatics, who contended that the multiplicity of things was but an illusion of the senses, was defended by Aristotle who maintained that the term, being, is only a common predicate of many things which become out of that which is relatively not-being by making the transition from the potential to the actual. -- J.J.R.

Natural Theology: In general, natural theology is a term used to distinguish any theology based upon the fundamental premise of the ability of man to construct his theory of God and of the world out of the framework of his own reason and of reasonable probability from the so-called "revealed theology" which presupposes that God and divine purposes are not open to unaided human understanding but rest upon a supernatural and not wholly understandable basis. See Deism; Renaissance. During the 17th and 18th centuries there were attempts to set up a "natural religion" to which men might easily give their assent and to offset the extravagant claims of the supernaturalists and their harsh charges against doubters. The classical attempt to make out a case for the sweet reasonableness of a divine purpose at work in the world of nature was given by Paley in his Natural Theology (1802). Traditional Catholicism, especially that of the late middle Ages developed a kind of natural theology based upon the metaphysics of Aristotle. Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz developed a more definite type of natural theology in their several constructions of what now may well be called philosophical theology wherein reason is made the guide. Natural theology has raised its head in recent times in attempts to combat the extravagant declarations of theologians of human pessimism. The term, however, is unfortunate because it is being widely acknowledged that so-called "revealed theology" is natural (recent psychological and social studies) and that natural theology need not deny to reason its possible character as the bearer of an immanent divine revelation. -- V.F.

Nature Philosophers: Name given to pre-Socratic "physiologers" and to Renaissance philosophers who revived the study of physical processes. Early in the 16th century, as a result of the discovery of new lands, the revival of maritime trade, and the Reformation, there appeared in Europe a renewed interest in nature. Rationalism grown around the authorities of the Bible and Aristotle was challenged and the right to investigate phenomena was claimed. Interest in nature was directed at first toward the starry heaven and resulted in important discoveries of Copernicus, Galileo and Kepler. The scientific spirit of observation and research had not yet matured, however, and the philosophers of that time blended their interest in facts with much loose speculation. Among the nature philosophers of that period three deserve to be mentioned specifically, Telesio, Bruno and Carnpanella, all natives of Southern Italy. Despite his assertions that thought should be guided by the observation of the external world, Bernardino Telesio (1508-1588) confined his works to reflections on the nature of things. Particularly significant are two of his doctrines, first, that the universe must be described in terms of matter and force, the latter classified as heat and cold, and second, that mind is akin to matter. Giordano Bruno (1548-1600), a Dominican monk and a victim of the Inquisition, was greatly influenced by the Copernican conception of the universe regarded by him as a harmonious unity of which the earth was but a small and not too important part. The concept of unity was not a condition of human search for truth but a real principle underlying all things and expressing the harmonious order of Divine wisdom. Deity, in his view, was the soul of nature, operating both in the human minds and in the motion of bodies. Consequently, both living beings and material objects must be regarded as animated. Tomaso Campanella (1568-1639), another Dominican monk, was also persecuted for his teachings and spent 27 years in prison. He contended that observations of nature were not dependent on the authority of reason and can be refuted only by other observations. His interests lay largely along the lines previously suggested by Telesio, and much of his thought was devoted to problems of mind, consciousness and knowledge. He believed that all nature was permeated by latent awareness, and may therefore be regarded as an animist or perhaps pantheist. Today, he is best known for his City of the Sun, an account of an imaginary ideal state in which existed neither property nor nobility and in which all affair were administered scientifically. -- R.B.W.

Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu: (Lat.) Nothing is in the intellect which was not first in sense. All the materials, or content, of higher, intellectual cognition are derived from the activity of lower, sense cognition. A principle subscribed to by Aristotle, St. Thomas and Locke; opposed by Plato, St. Augustine and Leibniz (who qualified the proposition by adding: nisi intellectus ipse, i.e. except for what is already present as part of the innate nature of the intellect, thus making it possible for Kant to suggest that certain forms of sensibility and reason are prior to sense experience). -- V.J.B.

Nominalism: (Lat. nominalis, belonging to a name) In scholastic philosophy, the theory that abstract or general terms, or universals, represent no objective real existents, but are mere words or names, mere vocal utterances, "flatus vocis". Reality is admitted only to actual physical particulars. Universals exist only post res. Opposite of Realism (q.v.) which maintains that universals exist ante res. First suggested by Boethius in his 6th century Latin translation of the Introduction to the Categories (of Aristotle) by Porphyry (A.D. 233-304). Porphyry had raised the question of how Aristotle was to be interpreted on this score, and had decided the question in favor of what was later called nominalism. The doctrine did not receive any prominence until applied to the Sacrament of the Eucharist by Berengar in the 11th century. Berengar was the first scholastic to insist upon the evidence of his senses when examining the nature of the Eucharist. Shortly after, Roscellinus, who had broadened the doctrine to the denial of the reality of all universals and the assertion of the sole reality of physical particulars, was forced by the Council of Soissons to recant. Thereafter, despite Abelard's unsuccessful attempt to reconcile the doctrine with realism by finding a half-way position between the two, nominalism was not again explicitly held until William of Occam (1280-1349) revived it and attempted to defend it within the limits allowed by Church dogma. In the first frankly nominalistic system Occam distinguished between the real and the grammatical meanings of terms or universal. He assigned a real status to universals in the mind, and thus was the first to see that nominalism can have a subjective as well as an objective aspect. He maintained that to our intellects, however, everything real must be some particular individual thing. After Occam, nominalism as an explicitly held doctrine disappeared until recently, when it has been restated in certain branches of Logical Positivism. -- J.K.F.

Nominalists, Nominalism [from Latin nomen name] In the 11th century, Scholastic controversy arose between the Nominalists and Realists, as to whether substantive reality should be ascribed to particulars or to universals. The Nominalists held that nothing exists but individuals, and that universals are mere names invented to express the qualities of particular things. Thus the conception “man” is a mere abstract idea, a figment of the mind, devised to express certain qualities which we have abstracted from our experience of individual men, but having no existence except as a name. The Realists, on the contrary, maintained that universals alone have substantive reality, and that they exist independently of, and prior to, the individuals, which are derivative from them or expressive of them. The controversy dates back to Aristotle’s question as to whether genera, species, and abstract nouns are real or only convenient abstractions and ways of speaking.

Non sequitur is any fallacy which has not even the deceptive appearance of valid reasoning, or in which there is a complete lack of connection between the premisses advanced and the conclusion drawn. By some, however, non sequitur is identified with Aristotle's fallacy of the consequent, which includes the two fallacies of denial of the antecedent (q. v.) and affirmation of the consequent (q. v.). -- A.C.

Note that according to Aristotle, the substance of a thing is always intelligible. Thus there are sensible substances, but the substance of these things is itself neither sensible nor capable of being apprehended by the senses alone, but only when the activity of the intellect is added. In later scholastic philosophy this point was missed, so the Aristotelian doctrine of substance quite naturally ceased to be any longer intelligible.

Nous: (Gr. nous) Mind, especially the highest part of mind, viz. reason; the faculty of intellectual (as distinct from sensible) apprehension and of intuitive thought. In its restricted sense nous denotes the faculty of apprehending the first principles of science, the forms, and the eternal intelligible substances, and is thus distinguished from discursive thought. In this sense nous is regarded as the essence of the divine being. In man Aristotle distinguishes between the nous pathetikos, or passive reason, and a higher active reason, called by the commentators nous poietikos, which alone is truly divine and eternal, and which is related to the nous pathetikos as form to matter. See Aristotelianism. -- G.RM.

Ontology: The theory of being as being. For Aristotle, the First Philosophy, the science of the essence of things. The science of fundamental principles; the doctrine of the categories. Ultimate philosophy; rational cosmology. Synonymous with metaphysics.

Parva Naturalia: The name traditionally given to a series of short treatises by Aristotle on psychological and biological topics: viz. De Sensu et Sensibili, De Memoria et Reminiscentia, De Somno, De Somniis, De Divinatione per Somnium, De Longitudine et Brevitate Vitae, De Vita et Morte, De Respiratione. -- G.R.M.

peripatetic ::: a. --> Walking about; itinerant.
Of or pertaining to the philosophy taught by Aristotle (who gave his instructions while walking in the Lyceum at Athens), or to his followers. ::: n. --> One who walks about; a pedestrian; an itinerant.

Peripatetics [from Greek peri about + patein to pace, walk] The followers of Aristotle (384-322 BC), either because he paced up and down when he lectured as commonly supposed, or from the peripatos or covered walk of the Lyceum. The chief representatives of the school are Theophrastus of Lesbos (372-287 BC), who with Eudemus of Rhodes, Aristoxemus of Tarentum, and Dicaearchus of Messene, were the personal disciples of Aristotle; Strato of Lampsacus (succeeded Theophrastus 288 BC); Andronicus of Rhodes (head of the school at Rome 58 BC); Alexander of Aphrodisias (commentator of Aristotle, 2nd and 3rd century AD).

Peripatetics: See Aristotelianism. Peripety: (Gr. peripeteia) A sudden reversal of condition or fortunes, considered by Aristotle as an essential element in the plot of a tragedy. -- G.R.M.

Philo of Alexandria: (30 B.C.- 50 A.D.) Jewish theologian and Neo-Platonic philosopher. He held that Greek thought borrowed largely from Mosaic teachings and therefore justified his use of Greek philosophy for the purpose of interpreting Scripture in a spiritual sense. For Philo, the renunciation of self and, through the divine Logos in all men, the achievement of immediate contact with the Supreme Being, is the highest blessedness for man. -- M.F Philosopheme: (Gr. philosophema) An apodictic syllogism (Aristotle). -- G.R.M.

Philosopher, The: Generally used name for Aristotle by medieval authors after the "reception of Aristotle" from the early 13th century onwards. In earlier writers the name may refer to any head of a school, e.g. to Abelard in the writings of his pupils. -- R.A.

Phoronomy: Noun derived from the Greek, phorein, used by Plato and Aristotle in the sense of motion, and nomos, law; signifies kinematics, or absolute mechanics, which deals with motion from the purely theoretical point of view. According to Kant it is that part of natural philosophy which regards motion as a pure quantum, without considering any of the qualities of the moving body. -- J.J.R.

Phronesis: (Gr. phronesis) Practical wisdom, or knowledge of the proper ends of conduct and of the means of attaining them; distinguished by Aristotle both from theoretical knowledge or science, and from technical skill. See Aristotelianism. -- G.R.M.

Plato ::: Ancient Greek philosopher (4th century B.C.E.), student of Socrates and teacher of Aristotle, whose identification of reality with the non-material world of ideas (“the ideal world”) played an enormous role in subsequent philosophy and religion (see neo-Platonism). Father of “Platonism” and the Platonic Academy as a philosophical institution in Athens.

Platonic Realism: See Realism. Platonism: The philosophy of Plato marks one of the high points in the development of Greek philosophical genius Platomsm is characterised by a partial contempt for sense knowledge and empirical studies, by a high regard for mathematics and its method, by a longing for another and better world, by a frankly spiritualistic view of life, by its use of a method of discussion involving an accumulation of ever more profound insights rather than the formal logic of Aristotle, and, above all, by an unswerving faith in the capacity of the human mind to attain absolute truth and to use this truth in the rational direction of human life and affairs.

Plato's theory of knowledge can hardly be discussed apart from his theory of reality. Through sense perception man comes to know the changeable world of bodies. This is the realm of opinion (doxa), such cognition may be more or less clear but it never rises to the level of true knowledge, for its objects are impermanent and do not provide a stable foundation for science. It is through intellectual, or rational, cognition that man discovers another world, that of immutable essences, intelligible realities, Forms or Ideas. This is the level of scientific knowledge (episteme); it is reached in mathematics and especially in philosophy (Repub. VI, 510). The world of intelligible Ideas contains the ultimate realities from which the world of sensible things has been patterned. Plato experienced much difficulty in regard to the sort of existence to be attributed to his Ideas. Obviously it is not the crude existence of physical things, nor can it be merely the mental existence of logical constructs. Interpretations have varied from the theory of the Christian Fathers (which was certainly not that of Plato himself) viz , that the Ideas are exemplary Causes in God's Mind, to the suggestion of Aristotle (Metaphysics, I) that they are realized, in a sense, in the world of individual things, but are apprehended only by the intellect The Ideas appear, however, particularly in the dialogues of the middle period, to be objective essences, independent of human minds, providing not only the foundation for the truth of human knowledge but afso the ontological bases for the shadowy things of the sense world. Within the world of Forms, there is a certain hierarchy. At the top, the most noble of all, is the Idea of the Good (Repub. VII), it dominates the other Ideas and they participate in it. Beauty, symmetry and truth are high-ranking Ideas; at times they are placed almost on a par with the Good (Philebus 65; also Sympos. and Phaedrus passim). There are, below, these, other Ideas, such as those of the major virtues (wisdom, temperance, courage, justice and piety) and mathematical terms and relations, such as equality, likeness, unlikeness and proportion. Each type or class of being is represented by its perfect Form in the sphere of Ideas, there is an ideal Form of man, dog, willow tree, of every kind of natural object and even of artificial things like beds (Repub. 596). The relationship of the "many" objects, belonging to a certain class of things in the sense world, to the "One", i.e. the single Idea which is their archetype, is another great source of difficulty to Plato. Three solutions, which are not mutually exclusive, are suggested in the dialogues (1) that the many participate imperfectly in the perfect nature of their Idea, (2) that the many are made in imitation of the One, and (3) that the many are composed of a mixture of the Limit (Idea) with the Unlimited (matter).

Pleasure and pain: In philosophy these terms appear mostly in ethical discussions, where they have each two meanings not always clearly distinguished. "Pleasure" is used sometimes to refer to a certain hedonic quality of experiences, viz. pleasantness, and sometimes as a name for experiences which have that quality (here "pleasures" are "pleasant experiences" and "pleasure" is the entire class of such experiences). Mutatis mutandis, the same is true of "pain". Philosophers have given various accounts of the nature of pleasure and pain. E.g., Aristotle says that pleasure is a perfection supervening on ccrtain activities, pain the opposite. Spinoza defines pleasure as the feeling with which one passes from a lesser state of perfection to a greater, pain is the feeling with which one makes the reverse transition. Again, philosophers have raised various questions about pleasure and pain. Can they be identified with good and evil? Are our actions always determined by our own pleasure and pain actual or prospective? Can pleasures and pains be distinguished quantitatively, qualitatively? See Bentham, Epicureanism. -- W.K.F.

Poiesis: (Gr poiesis) Activity of creating or making, artistic production (Aristotle). -- G.R.M.

Political Philosophy: That branch of philosophy which deals with political life, especially with the essence, origin and value of the state. In ancient philosophy politics also embraced what we call ethics. The first and most important ancient works on Political Philosophy were Plato's Politeia (Republic) and Aristotle's Politics. The Politeia outlines the structure and functions of the ideal state. It became the pattern for all the Utopias (see Utopia) of later times. Aristotle, who considers man fundamentally a social creature i.e. a political animal, created the basis for modern theories of government, especially by his distinction of the different forms of government. Early Christianity had a rather negative attitude towards the state which found expression in St. Augustine's De Civitate Dei. The influence of this work, in which the earthly state was declared to be civitas diaboli, a state of the devil, was predominant throughout the Middle Ages. In the discussion of the relation between church and empire, the main topic of medieval political philosophy, certain authors foreshadowed modern political theories. Thomas Aquinas stressed the popular origin of royal power and the right of the people to restrict or abolish that power in case of abuse; William of Ockham and Marsiglio of Padua held similar views. Dante Alighieri was one of the first to recognize the intrinsic value of the state; he considered the world monarchy to be the only means whereby peace, justice and liberty could be secured. But it was not until the Renaissance that, due to the rediscovery of the individual and his rights and to the formation of territorial states, political philosophy began to play a major role. Niccolo Machiavelli and Jean Bodin laid the foundation for the new theories of the state by stressing its independence from any external power and its indivisible sovereignty. The theory of popular rights and of the right of resistance against tyranny was especially advocated by the "Monarchomachi" (Huguenots, such as Beza, Hotman, Languet, Danaeus, Catholics such as Boucher, Rossaeus, Mariana). Most of them used the theory of an original contract (see Social Contract) to justify limitations of monarchical power. Later, the idea of a Natural Law, independent from divine revelation (Hugo Grotius and his followers), served as an argument for liberal -- sometimes revolutionary -- tendencies. With the exception of Hobbes, who used the contract theory in his plea for absolutism, almost all the publicists of the 16th and 17th century built their liberal theories upon the idea of an original covenant by which individuals joined together and by mutual consent formed a state and placed a fiduciary trust in the supreme power (Roger Williams and John Locke). It was this contract which the Pilgrim Fathers translated into actual facts, after their arrival in America, in November, 1620, long before John Locke had developed his theorv. In the course of the 17th century in England the contract theory was generally substituted for the theory of the divine rights of kings. It was supported by the assumption of an original "State of Nature" in which all men enjoyed equal reciprocal rights. The most ardent defender of the social contract theory in the 18th century was J. J. Rousseau who deeply influenced the philosophy of the French revolution. In Rousseau's conception the idea of the sovereignty of the people took on a more democratic aspect than in 17th century English political philosophy which had been almost exclusively aristocratic in its spirit. This tendency found expression in his concept of the "general will" in the moulding of which each individual has his share. Immanuel Kant who made these concepts the basis of his political philosophy, recognized more clearly than Rousseau the fictitious character of the social contract and treated it as a "regulative idea", meant to serve as a criterion in the evaluation of any act of the state. For Hegel the state is an end in itself, the supreme realization of reason and morality. In marked opposition to this point of view, Marx and Engels, though strongly influenced by Hegel, visualized a society in which the state would gradually fade away. Most of the 19th century publicists, however, upheld the juristic theory of the state. To them the state was the only source of law and at the same time invested with absolute sovereignty: there are no limits to the legal omnipotence of the state except those which are self imposed. In opposition to this doctrine of unified state authority, a pluralistic theory of sovereignty has been advanced recently by certain authors, laying emphasis upon corporate personalities and professional groups (Duguit, Krabbe, Laski). Outspoken anti-stateism was advocated by anarchists such as Kropotkin, etc., by syndicalists and Guild socialists. -- W.E.

Pompanazzi, Pietro or Pereto: (1462-1524) Was born in Mantua, in Italy, and studied medicine and philosophy at Padua. He taught philosophy at Padua, Ferrara and Bologna. He is best known for his Tractatus de immortalitate animae (ed. C. G. Bardili, Tübingen, 1791) in which he denied that Aristotle taught the personal immortality of the human soul. His interpretation of Aristotle follows that of the Greek commentntor, Alexander of Aphrodisias (3rd c. A.D.) and is also closelv related to the Averroistic tradition. -- V.J.B.

Posidonius of Rhodes: (c. 135-50 B.C.) An eclectic philosopher of the Stoic School, who incorporated into his thought many doctrines of Plato and Aristotle. -- R.B.W.

Possible: (Gr. endechomenon) According to Aristotle that which happens usually but not necessanly, hence distinguished both from the necessary and from the impossible. -- G.R.M.

Postpredicament: Noun generally applied since the time of Abelard to any particular one of the five conceptions, or relations, examined in detail in the tenth and following chapters of the treatise on the Categories, or Predicaments, ascribed to Aristotle, which, however, was very probably written by others after his death. -- J.J.R.

Praedicamenta: (Scholastic) The ten praedicaments are, according to Aristotle (Met. V.) and the Schoolmen substance, quantity, quality, relation, habitus, when, where, location, action, passion. -- R.A.

Pragmatism: (Gr. pragma, things done) Owes its inception as a movement of philosophy to C. S. Peirce and William James, but approximations to it can be found in many earlier thinkers, including (according to Peirce and James) Socrates and Aristotle, Berkeley and Hume. Concerning a closer precursor, Shadworth Hodgson, James says that he "keeps insisting that realities are only what they are 'known as' ". Kant actually uses the word "pragmatic" to characterize "counsels of prudence" as distinct from "rules of skill" and "commands of morality" (Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, p. 40). His principle of the primacy of practical reason is also an anticipation of pragmatism. It was reflection on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason which originally led Peirce to formulate the view that the muddles of metaphysics can be cleared up if one attends to the practical consequences of ideas. The pragmatic maxim was first stated by Peirce in 1878 (Popular Science Monthly) "Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object". A clearer formulation by the same author reads: "In order to ascertain the meaning of an intellectual conception one should consider what practical consequences might conceivably result by necessity from the truth of that conception, and the sum of these consequences will constitute the entire meaning of the conception". This is often expressed briefly, viz.: The meaning of a proposition is its logical (or physical) consequences. The principle is not merely logical. It is also admonitory in Baconian style "Pragmatism is the principle that everv theoretical judgment expressible in a sentence in the indicative mood is a confused form of thought whose onlv meaning, if it has any, lies in its tendency to enforce a corresponding practical maxim expressible as a conditional sentence having its apodosis in the impentive mood". (Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, edited by Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, 5.18.) Although Peirce's maxim has been an inspiration not only to later pragmatists, but to operationalists as well, Peirce felt that it might easily be misapplied, so as to eliminate important doctrines of science -- doctrines, presumably, which hive no ascertainable practical consequences.

Predicables: (Lat. praedicabilia) In Aristotle's logic the five types of predicates that may be affirmed or denied of a subject in a logical proposition, viz. definition, genus, differentia, property, and accident. The list of predicables as formulated by Porphyry and later logicians omits definition and includes species. See Definition: Genus; Species; Differentia; Property; Accident. -- G.R.M.

Prime Matter: See Matter. Prime Mover: In Aristotle's philosophy that which is the first cause of all change and, being first, is not subject to change by any prior agent. See Aristotelianism. -- G.R.M.

Prime mover: In Aristotle’s philosophy that which is the first cause of all change and, being first, is not subject to change by any prior agent.

Principle: (Lat. principe, from principium, a beginning) A fundamental cause or universal truth, that which is inherent in anything. That which ultimately accounts for being. According to Aristotle, the primary source of all being, actuality and knowledge. (a) In ontology: first principles are the categories or postulates of ontology. (b) In epistemology: as the essence of being, the ground of all knowledge. Syn. with essence, universal, cause. -- J.K.F.

Privation: (Lat. privatis) In Aristotle's philosophy the condition of a substance that lacks a certain quality which it is capable of possessing and normally does possess. -- G.R.M Proaeresis: (Gr. proairesis) Reflective choice, especially of means to an end, deliberate desire (Aristotle). -- G.K.M.

Property: (Gr. idion; Lat. proprium) In Aristotle's logic (1) an attribute common to all members of a species and peculiar to them; (2) an attribute of the above sort not belonging to the essence of the species, but necessarily following from it. -- G.R.M.

Protasis: (Gr. protasis, placed first) In Aristotle's logic a proposition, more particularly a proposition used as a premiss in a syllogism. -- G.R.M.

Psychology: (Gr. psyche, mind or soul + logos, law) The science of the mind, its functions, structure and behavioral effects. In Aristotle, the science of mind, (De Anima), emphasizes mental functionsl; the Scholastics employed a faculty psychology. In Hume and the Mills, study of the data of conscious experience, termed association psychology. In Freud, the study of the unconscious (depth psychology). In behaviorism, the physiological study of physical and chemical responses. In Gestalt psychology, the study of organized psychic activity, .revealing the mind's tendency toward the completion of patterns. Since Kant, psychology has been able to establish itself as an empirical, natural science without a priori metaphysical or theological commitments. The German romanticists (q.v.) and Hegel, who had developed a metaphysical psychology, had turned to cultural history to illustrate their theories of how the mind, conceived as an absolute, must manifest itself. Empirically they have suggested a possible field of exploration for the psychologist, namely, the study of mind in its cultural effects, viz. works of art, science, religion, social organization, etc. which are customarily studied by anthropologists in the case of "primitive" peoples. But it would be as difficult to separate anthropology from social psychology as to sharply distinguish so-called "primitive" peoples from "civilized" ones.

Quantity: In Aristotle and Kant (q.v.), one of the categories (q.v.) of judgment. See Quality. Quaternio terminorum: In the categorical syllogism (logic, formal, § 5), the major and minor premisses must have a term in common, the middle term. Violation of this rule is the fallacy of quaternio terminorum, or of four terms. It is most apt to arise through equivocation (q.v.), an ambiguous word or phrase playing the role of the middle term, with one meaning in the major premiss and another meaning in the minor premiss; and in this case the fallacy is called the fallacy of ambiguous middle. -- A.C.

realism ::: n. --> As opposed to nominalism, the doctrine that genera and species are real things or entities, existing independently of our conceptions. According to realism the Universal exists ante rem (Plato), or in re (Aristotle).
As opposed to idealism, the doctrine that in sense perception there is an immediate cognition of the external object, and our knowledge of it is not mediate and representative.
Fidelity to nature or to real life; representation without

Realism: Theory of the reality of abstract or general terms, or umversals, which are held to have an equal and sometimes a superior reality to actual physical particulars. Umversals exist before things, ante res. Opposed to nominalism (q.v.) according to which universals have a being only after things, post res. Realism means (a) in ontology that no derogation of the reality of universals is valid, the realm of essences, or possible umversals, being as real as, if not more real than, the realm of existence, or actuality; (b) in epistemology: that sense experience reports a true and uninterrupted, if limited, account of objects; that it is possible to have faithful and direct knowledge of the actual world. While realism was implicit in Egyptian religion, where truth was through deification distinguished from particular truths, and further suggested in certain aspects of Ionian philosophy, it was first explicitly set forth by Plato in his doctrine of the ideas and developed by Aristotle in his doctrine of the forms. According to Plato, the ideas have a status of possibility which makes them independent both of the mind by which they may be known and of the actual world of particulars in which they may take place. Aristotle amended this, so that his forms have a being only in things, in rebus. Realism in its Platonic version was the leading philosophy of the Christian Middle Ages until Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) officially adopted the Aristotelian version. It has been given a new impetus in recent times by Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) in America and by G. E. Moore (1873-) in England. Moore's realism has been responsible for many of his contemporaries in both English-speaking countries. Roughly speaking, the American realists, Montague, Perry, and others, in The New Realism (1912) have directed their attention to the epistemological side, while the English have constructed ontological systems. The most comprehensive realistic systems of the modern period are Process and Reality by A. N. Whitehead (1861-) and Space, Time and Deity by S. Alexander: (1859-1939). The German, Nicolai Hartmann, should also be mentioned, and there are others. -- J.K.F.

Ross, (William) David: (1877-1940) Is principally known as an Aristotelian scholar. He served first as joint editor, later as editor of the Oxford translation of Aristotle. In this series he himself translated the Metaphysics and the Nicomachean Ethics. In addition he published critical texts with commentaries of the Metaphysics and the Physics, and also an edition of Theophrastus's Metaphysics. Besides enjoying a reputation as Aristotelian interpreter, Sir David has gained repute as a writer on morality and ethics. -- C.K.D.

satisfiability ::: In mathematical logic, satisfiability and validity are elementary concepts of semantics. A formula is satisfiable if it is possible to find an interpretation (model) that makes the formula true.[282] A formula is valid if all interpretations make the formula true. The opposites of these concepts are unsatisfiability and invalidity, that is, a formula is unsatisfiable if none of the interpretations make the formula true, and invalid if some such interpretation makes the formula false. These four concepts are related to each other in a manner exactly analogous to Aristotle's square of opposition.

Scepticism, Fourteenth Century: At the beginning of the 14th century, Duns Scotus adopted a position which is not formally sceptical, though his critical attitude to earlier scholasticism may contain the germs of the scepticism of his century. Among Scotistic pre-sceptical tendencies may be mentioned the stress on self-knowledge rather than the knowledge of extra-mental reality, psychological voluntarism which eventuallj made the assent of judgment a matter of will rather than of intellect, and a theory of the reality of universal essences which led to a despair of the intellect's capacity to know such objects and thus spawned Ockhamism. Before 1317, Henry of Harclay noticed that, since the two terms of efficient causal connection are mutually distinct and absolute things, God, by his omnipotent will, can cause anything which naturally (naturaliter) is caused by a finite agent. He inferred from this that neither the present nor past existence of a finite external agent is necessarily involved in cognition (Pelstex p. 346). Later Petrus Aureoli and Ockham made the sime observation (Michalski, p. 94), and Ockham concluded that natural knowledge of substance and causal connection is possible only on the assumption that nature is pursuing a uniform, uninterrupted course at the moment of intuitive cognition. Without this assumption, observed sequences might well be the occasion of direct divine causal action rather than evidence of natural causation. It is possible that these sceptical views were suggested by reading the arguments of certain Moslem theologians (Al Gazali and the Mutakallimun), as well as by a consideration of miracles. The most influential sceptical author of the fourteenth century was Nicholas of Autrecourt (fl. 1340). Influenced perhaps by the Scotist conception of logical demonstration, Nicholas held that the law of noncontradiction is the ultimate and sole source of certainty. In logical inference, certainty is guaranteed because the consequent is identical with part or all of the antecedent. No logical connection can be established, therefore, between the existence or non-existence of one thing and the existence or non-existence of another and different thing. The inference from cause to effect or conversely is thus not a matter of certainty. The existence of substance, spiritual or physical, is neither known nor probable. We are unable to infer the existence of intellect or will from acts of intellection or volition, and sensible experience provides no evidence of external substances. The only certitudes properly so-called are those of immediate experience and those of principles known ex terminis together with conclusions immediately dependent on them. This thoroughgoing scepticism appears to have had considerable influence in its time, for we find many philosophers expressing, expounding, or criticizing it. John Buridan has a detailed criticism in his commentary on Aristotle's Physics (in 1 I, q. 4), Fitz-Ralph, Jacques d'Eltville, and Pierre d'Ailly maintain views similar to Nicholas', with some modifications, and there is at least one exposition of Nicholas' views in an anonymous commentary on the Sentences (British Museum, Ms. Harley 3243). These sceptical views were usually accompanied by a kind of probabilism. The condemnation of Nicholas in 1347 put a damper on the sceptical movement, and there is probably no continuity from these thinkers to the French sceptics of the 16th century. Despite this lack of direct influence, the sceptical arguments of 14th century thinkers bear marked resemblances to those employed by the French Occasionalists, Berkeley and Hume.

Schema: (Gr. schema) Figure, external form or structural plan, specifically, in Aristotle's logic, a syllogistic figure. -- G.R.M.

Similitude) (Scholastic): Similitudo may be called anything which stands for another so that the second may be known by the first. Aquinas uses the term as a translation of symbol in Aristotle. It does not necessarily imply any resemblance. -- R.A.

Sophia: (Gr. sophia) Theoretical as distinguished from practical wisdom, specifically, in Aristotle, knowledge of first principles, or first philosophy. -- G.R.M.

Sophism: An eristic or contentious syllogism, distinguished from paralogism by the intent to deceive (Aristotle). -- G.R.M.

Sophistic: (Gr. sophistike) The art of specious reasoning pursued for pay, according to Aristotle, thus distinguished from eristic, whose end is simply victory in disputation. -- G.R.M.

Sophistici Elenchi: (Gr sophistikoi elenchoi) The last of the logical treatises of Aristotle, dealing with fallacies in argumentation. -- G.R.M.

Soul: (Gr. psyche) In Aristotle the vital principle; the formal cause, essence, or entelechy of a natural organic body. -- G.R.M.

Space: In Aristotle, the container of all objects. In the Cambridge Platonists, the sensorium of God. In Kant: the a priori form of intuition of external phenomena. In modern math., name for certain abstract invariant gioups or set's. See Space-Time. -- P.P.W.

stagirite ::: n. --> A native of, or resident in, Stagira, in ancient Macedonia; especially, Aristotle.

Stoicheia (Greek) [plural of stoichos a row of steps, succession of similar things] First principles, elements as used by Plato and Aristotle; employed by Greek physicists for the first and simplest component parts; likewise the elements of a science, or the points, lines, and surfaces in geometry, or the signs of the zodiac in astrology. It corresponds quite loosely with the planes, degrees, or stages in a cosmic hierarchy — the degrees or divisions of the one undivided divine element. Yet the reference here is not to boundless infinitude, but to the summit of a cosmic hierarchy or universe.

St. Thomas was a teacher and a writer for some twenty years (1254-1273). Among his works are: Scriptum in IV Libros Sententiarum (1254-1256), Summa Contra Gentiles (c. 1260), Summa Theologica (1265-1272); commentaries on Boethius. (De Trinitate, c. 1257-1258), on Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite (De Divinis Nominibus, c. 1261), on the anonymous and important Liber de Causis (1268), and especially on Aristotle's works (1261-1272), Physics, Metaphysics, Nicomachean Ethics, Politics, On the Soul, Posterior Analytics, On Interpretation, On the Heavens, On Generation and Corruption; Quaestiones Disputatae, which includes questions on such large subjects as De Veritate (1256-1259); De Potentia (1259-1263); De Malo (1263-1268); De Spiritualibus Creaturis, De Anima (1269-1270); small treatises or Opuscula, among which especially noteworthy are the De Ente et Essentia (1256); De Aeternitate Mundi (1270), De Unitate Intellecus (1270), De Substantiis Separatis (1272). While it is extremely difficult to grasp in its entirety the personality behind this complex theological and philosophical activity, some points are quite clear and beyond dispute. During the first five years of his activity as a thinker and a teacher, St. Thomas seems to have formulated his most fundamental ideas in their definite form, to have clarified his historical conceptions of Greek and Arabian philosophers, and to have made more precise and even corrected his doctrinal positions, (cf., e.g., the change on the question of creation between In II Sent., d.l, q.l, a.3, and the later De Potentia, q. III, a.4). This is natural enough, though we cannot pretend to explain why he should have come to think as he did. The more he grew, and that very rapidly, towards maturity, the more his thought became inextricably involved in the defense of Aristotle (beginning with c. 1260), his texts and his ideas, against the Averroists, who were then beginning to become prominent in the faculty of arts at the University of Paris; against the traditional Augustinianism of a man like St. Bonaventure; as well as against that more subtle Augustinianism which could breathe some of the spirit of Augustine, speak the language of Aristotle, but expound, with increasing faithfulness and therefore more imminent disaster, Christian ideas through the Neoplatonic techniques of Avicenna. This last group includes such different thinkers as St. Albert the Great, Henry of Ghent, the many disciples of St. Bonaventure, including, some think, Duns Scotus himself, and Meister Eckhart of Hochheim.

Substitution, rule of: See logic, formal, § 1. Substratum: (Gr. hypokeimenon) That in which an attribute inheres, or of which it is predicated; substance; subject. In Aristotle's philosophy hypokeimenon sometimes means matter as underlying form, sometimes the concrete thing as possessing attributes, sometimes the logicnl subject of predication. -- G.R.M.

Syllogism ::: Aristotle’s theory of reasoning where two true statements are followed by a single logical conclusion.

Syncretism: (Gr. syn., with; and either kretidzein, or kerannynai, to mix incompatible elements) A movement to bring about a harmony of positions in philosophy or theology which are somewhat opposed or different. Earliest usage (Plutarch) in connection with the Neo-Platonic effort to unify various pagan religions in the 2nd and 4th centuries A.D. Next used in Renaissance (Bessarion) in reference to the proposed union of the Eastern and Western Citholic Churches, also denoted the contemporary movement to harmonize the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle; again in 17th century used by Georg Calixt in regard to proposed union of the Lutheran with other Protestant bodies and also with Catholicism. -- V.J.B.

Telos: (Gr. telos) The end term of a process, specifically, in Aristotle, the purpose or final cause. See Aristotelianism. -- G.R.M.

The Academy continued as a school of philosophy until closed by Justinian in 529 A.D. The early scholars (Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, Crates) were not great philosophers, they adopted a Pythagorean interpretation of the Ideas and concentrated on practical, moral problems. Following the Older Academy (347-247 B.C.), the Middle and New Academies (Arcesilaus and Carneades were the principal teachers) became scepticil and eclectic. Aristotle (384-322 B.C. ) studied with Plato for twenty years and embodied many Platonic views in his own philosophy. Platonism was very highly regarded by the Christian Fathers (Ambrose, Augustine, John Damascene and Anselm of Canterbury, for instance) and it continued as the approved philosophy of the Christian Church until the 12th century. From the 3rd century on, Neo-Platonism (see Plotinism) developed the other-worldly mystical side of Plato's thought. The School of Chartres (Bernard, Thierry, Wm. of Conches, Gilbert of Poitiers) in the 12th century was a center of Christian Platonism, interested chiefly in the cosmological theory of the Timaeus. The Renaissance witnessed a revival of Platonism in the Florentine Academy (Marsilio Ficino and the two Pico della Mirandolas). In England, the Cambridge Platonists (H. More, Th. Gale, J. Norris) in the 17th century started an interest in Plato, which has not yet died out in the English Universities. Today, the ethical writings of A. E. Taylor, the theoiy of essences developed by G. Santayana, and the metaphysics of A. N. Whitehead, most nearly approach a contemporary Platonism. -- V.J.B.

The causes which it is the aim of scientific inquiry to discover are of four sorts: the material cause (that of which a thing is made), the efficient cause (that by which it comes into being), the formal cause (its essence or nature, i.e. what it is), and the final cause (its end, or that for which it exists). In natural objects, as distinct from the products of art, the last three causes coincide; for the end of a natural object is the realization of its essence, and likewise it is this identical essence embodied in another individual that is the efficient cause in its production. Thus for Aristotle every object in the sense world is a union of two ultimate principles: the material constituents, or matter (hyle), and the form, structure, or essence which makes of these constituents the determinate kind of being it is. Nor is this union an external or arbitrary one; for the matter is in every case to be regarded as possessing the capacity for the form, as being potentially the formed matter. Likewise the form has being only in the succession of its material embodiments. Thus Aristotle opposes what he considers to be the Platonic doctrine that real being belongs only to the forms or universals, whose existence is independent of the objects that imperfectly manifest them. On the other hand, against the earlier nature-philosophies that found their explanatory principles in matter, to the neglect of form, Aristotle affirms that matter must be conceived as a locus of determinate potentialities that become actualized only through the activity of forms.

The early Gnostics also considered ten to contain the knowledge of the universe, both metaphysical and material. The Pythagorean dekad “representing the Universe and its evolution out of Silence and the unknown Depths of the Spiritual Soul, or anima mundi, presented two sides or aspects to the student. It could be, and was at first so used and applied to the Macrocosm, after which it descended to the Microcosm, or Man. There was, then, the purely intellectual and metaphysical, or the ‘inner Science,’ and the as purely materialistic or ‘surface science,’ both of which could be expounded by and contained in the Decade. It could be studied, in short, from the Universals of Plato, and the inductive method of Aristotle. The former started from a divine comprehension, when the plurality proceeded from unity, or the digits of the decade appeared, but to be finally re-absorbed, lost in the infinite Circle. The latter depended on sensuous perception alone, when the Decade could be regarded either as the unity that multiplies, or matter which differentiates, its study being limited to the plane surface; to the Cross, or the Seven which proceeds from the ten — or the perfect number, on Earth as in heaven” (SD 2:573).

The early Greek notion of the universe as ordered by destiny or fate was gradually refined until the time of Plato and Aristotle who conceived the world as ordered by an intelligent principle (nous) of divine justice or harmony; Plato, Philebus, 30: ". . . there is in the universe a cause of no mean power, which orders and arranges . . ."; and Aristotle, Physics, 252a-12: "nature is everywhere the cause of order". This cosmic view was an essential element of the Stoic metaphysics, and was later incorporated into medieval philosophy and theology as the divine governance or ordering of creation, i.e. providence.

The extant works of Aristotle cover almost all thc sciences known in his time. They are charactenzed by subtlety of analysis, sober and dispassionate judgment, and a wide mastery of empirical facts; collectively they constitute one of the most amazing achievements ever credited to a single mind. They may conveniently be arranged in seven groups: the Organon, or logical treatises, viz. Categories, De Interpretione, Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, Topics, and Sophistici Elenchi; the writings on physical science, viz. Physics, De Coelo, De Generatione et Corruptione, and Meteorologica; the biological works, viz. Historia Animalium, De Partibus Animalium. De Motu and De Incessu Animalium, and De Generatione Animalium; the treatises on psychology, viz. De Anima and a collection of shorter works known as the Parva Naturalia; the Metaphysics; the treatises on ethics and politics, viz. Nicomachean Ethics, Eudemian Ethics, Politics, Constitution of Athens; and two works dealing with the literary arts, Rhetoric and Poetics. A large number of other works in these several fields are usually included in the Aristotelian corpus, though they are now generally believed not to have been written by Aristotle. It is probable also that portions of the works above listed are the work, not of Aristotle, but of his contemporaries or successors in the Lyceum.

Theism: (Gr. theos, god) Is in general that type of religion or religious philosophy (see Religion, Philosophy of) which incorporates a conception of God as a unitary being; thus may be considered equivalent to monotheism. The speculation as to the relation of God to world gave rise to three great forms: God identified with world in pantheism (rare with emphasis on God); God, once having created the world, relatively disinterested in it, in deism (mainly an 18th cent, phenomenon); God working in and through the world, in theism proper. Accordingly, God either coincides with the world, is external to it (deus ex machina), or is immanent. The more personal, human-like God, the more theological the theism, the more appealing to a personal adjustment in prayer, worship, etc., which presuppose either that God, being like man, may be swayed in his decision, has no definite plan, or subsists in the very stuff man is made of (humanistic theism). Immanence of God entails agency in the world, presence, revelation, involvement in the historic process, it has been justified by Hindu and Semitic thinkers, Christian apologetics, ancient and modern metaphysical idealists, and by natural science philosophers. Transcendency of God removes him from human affairs, renders fellowship and communication in Church ways ineffectual, yet preserves God's majesty and absoluteness such as is postulated by philosophies which introduce the concept of God for want of a terser term for the ultimate, principal reality. Like Descartes and Spinoza, they allow the personal in God to fade and approach the age-old Indian pantheism evident in much of Vedic and post-Vedic philosophy in which the personal pronoun may be the only distinguishing mark between metaphysical logic and theology, similarly as in Hegel. The endowment postulated of God lends character to a theistic system of philosophy. Much of Hindu and Greek philosophy stresses the knowledge and ration aspect of the deity, thus producing an epistemological theism; Aristotle, in conceiving him as the prime mover, started a teleological one; mysticism is psychologically oriented in its theism, God being a feeling reality approachable in appropriate emotional states. The theism of religious faith is unquestioning and pragmatic in its attitude toward God; theology has often felt the need of offering proofs for the existence of God (see God) thus tending toward an ontological theism; metaphysics incorporates occasionally the concept of God as a thought necessity, advocating a logical theism. Kant's critique showed the respective fields of pure philosophic enquiry and theistic speculations with their past in historic creeds. Theism is left a possibility in agnosticism (q.v.). -- K.F.L.

Theophrastus: (370-287 B.C.), the most important disciple and friend of Aristotle, left voluminous writings of which only fragments are extant; they dealt with many topics of philosophy and science (notably, botany) and defended his master's philosophy against rival schools of thought, particularly against Stoics. Cf. Characters of Theophrastus. -- R.R.V.

The original Avesta consisted of 21 Nasks of which very few remain intact. Tabari (9th century Iranian historian) writes: “Thirty years after the reign of Kay Goshtasp, Zartusht Spitaman produced a book which was written in gold on 12,000 cowhides. Kay Goshtasp ordered that this book be kept in Dejh-Nebeshtak and be guarded by the Hierbads (the learned) away from the reach of the profane.” (Persian translation of Tarikh-e-Tabari, Tabari Hisrory, Book 11, p. 477) The Pahlavi Dinkard (of the 9th century) states that two complete copies of the Avesta existed: the one kept in the Dezh-Nebeshtak of Persopolis and the other in Ganj-e-Shizegan, which most likely was in the town of Shiz of Azarpategan. When Alexander burned down Persopolis, the copy there was destroyed; but the one in Shizegan was translated into Greek and sent to Aristotle, Alexander’s tutor. This translation has been lost. Bal’ami, historian and the minister of the Samanid kings (early 10th century), writes that Alexander “gathered Iranian philosophers and had their writings translated into Greek and sent them to Aristotle and other Greek philosophers. He destroyed the cities of Babel, Eragh and Pars, killed all men of eminence, and burned down all King Dara’s (Darius) libraries.” (Tarikh-e-Balami, Book 11, p. 699)

Theory: (Gr. theoria, viewing) The hypothetical universal aspect of anything. For Plato, a contemplated truth. For Aristotle, pure knowledge as opposed to the practical. An abstraction from practice. The principle from which practice proceeds. Opposite of practice. -- J.K.F. Hypothesis. More loosely: supposition, whatever is problematic, verifiable but not verified. (As opposed to practice) systematically organized knowledge of relatively high generality. (See "the theory of light"). (As opposed to laws and observations): explanation. The deduction of the axioms and theorems of one system from assertions (not necessarily verified) from another system and of a relatively less problematic and more intelligible nature. (Note: Since criteria of what is 'intelligible' and 'problematic' are subjective and liable to fluctuation, any definition of the term is bound to be provisional. It might be advisable to distinguish between laws (general statements in a system), principles (axioms), and theories (methods for deriving the axioms by means of appropriate definitions employing terms from other systems). -- M.B.

The phenomenon of acquired association has long been recognized by philosophers. Plato cites examples of association by contiguity and similarity (Phaedo, 73-6) and Aristotle in his treatment of memory enumerated similarity, contrast and contiguity as relations which mediate recollection. (De Mem. II 6-11 (451 b)). Hobbes also was aware of the psychological importance of the phenomenon of association and anticipated Locke's distinct!p/n between chance and controlled association (Leviathan (1651), ch. 3; Human Nature (1650), ch. 4). But it was Locke who introduced the phrase "association of ideas" and gave impetus to modern association psychology.

The philosophy of Aristotle was continued after his death by other members of the Peripatetic school, the most important of whom were Theophrastus, Eudemus of Rhodes, and Strato of Lampsacus. In the Alexandrian Age, particularly after the editing of Aristotle's works by Andronicus of Rhodes (about 50 B.C.), Aristotelianism was the subject of numerous expositions and commentaries, such as those of Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, John Philoponus, and Simplicius. With the closing of the philosophical schools in the sixth century the knowledge of Aristotle, except for fragments of the logical doctrine, almost disappeared in the west. It was preserved, however, by Arabian and Syrian scholars; from whom, with the revival of learning in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, it passed again to western Europe and became in Thomas Aquinas the philosophical basis of Christian theology. For the next few centuries the prestige of Aristotle was immense; he was "the philosopher," "the master of those who know." With the rise of modern science his authority has greatly declined. Yet Aristotelianism is still a force in modern thought: in Neo-Scholasticism; in recent psychology, whose behavioristic tendencies are in part a revival of Aristotelian modes of thought; in the various forms of vitalism in contemporary biology; in the dynamism of such thinkers as Bergson; and in the more catholic naturalism which has succeeded the mechanistic materialism of the last century, and which, whether by appeal to a doctrine of levels or by emphasis on immanent teleology, seems to be striving along Aristotelian lines for a conception of nature broad enough to include the religious, moral and artistic consciousness. Finally, a very large part of our technical vocabulary, both in science and in philosophy, is but the translation into modern tongues of the terms used by Aristotle, and carries with it, for better or worse, the distinctions worked out in his subtle mind. -- G.R.M.

The relation of God to the world includes, as we have seen, a number of problems. The general conception of the world with almost all Jewish philosophers is mainly Aristotelian. All, not excluding Saadia, who was to a considerable degree under the influence of the Mutazilites, all except Aristotle's theory of matter and form, i.e., that all bodies are composed of two elements, the substratum or the hyle and the particular form with which it is endewed. They all speak of primal matter which was the first creation, and all accept his view of the four elements, i.e., fire, air, water, and earth which are the components of all things in the lower world. They also accept his cosmogony, namely, the division of the universe of the upper world of the spheres and the lower or sublunar world, and also posit the influence of the spheres upon the course of events in this world. On the other hand, all oppose his view of the eternity of the world and champion creation de novo with slight variations.

The second broad current of thought is Latin Averroism. This movement, accepting Averroes' interpretation of Aristotle and his doctrine of separated orders of truth, gave birth to the two-truth theory which eventually led to rationalism and which together with nominalism brought about the first decline of Scholasticism. The main proponents of this period were Siger of Brabant (+1282), Boece of Dacie and perhaps Bernier of Nivelles.

The second question in value-theory is the question "What things are good? What is good, what is the highest good, etc.;" On this question perhaps the main issue historically is between those who say that the good is pleasure, satisfaction, or some state of feeling, and those who say that the good is virtue, a state of will, or knowledge, a state of the intellect. Holding the good to be pleasure or satisfaction are some of the Sophists, the hedonists (the Cyrenaic, the Epicureans, Hobbes, Hume, Bentham, Mill, Sidgwick, Spencer, Schlick). Holding virtue or knowledge or both to be good or supremely good are Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, the Neo-Platonists, Augustine, Aquinas, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, G. E. Moore, H. Rashdall, J. Laird, W. D. Ross, N. Hartmann.

Thesis: (Gr. thesis) In Aristotle's logic (1) an undemonstrated proposition used as a premiss in a syllogism, sometimes distinguished from axiom in that it need not be self-evident or intrinsically necessary; (2) any proposition contrary to general opinion but capable of being supported by reasoning. See Antithesis, Dialectic, Synthesis. -- G.R.M.

The system of Aristotle as contrasted with that of Plato, is more scientific, and its tendency is to dispense with the immanence of the divine. The growing naturalistic tendency culminated with Strabo, who professed to need no divine in nature at all. Peripatetic applies to the commentators and exegetists of Aristotle who followed upon Andronicus’ editing of Aristotle’s works in the 1st century BC — although soon after his death the Peripatetic school, like all the other offshoots, merged into what is termed Neoplatonism.

Though Socrates, Plato and Aristotle had propounded doctrines of virtues, they were concerned essentially with Good rather than with rightness of action as such. The Stoics were the first to develop and popularize the notion that man has a duty to live virtuously, reasonably and fittingly, regardless of considerations of human happiness. Certain elements in Rabbinical legalism and the Christian Gospel strained in the same direction, notably the concept of the supreme and absolute law of God. But it was Kant who pressed the logic of duty to its final conclusion. The supreme law of duty, the categorical imperative (q.v.), is revealed intuitively by the pure rational will and strives to determine the moral agent to obey only that law which can be willed universally without contradiction, regardless of consequences.

Three senses of "Ockhamism" may be distinguished: Logical, indicating usage of the terminology and technique of logical analysis developed by Ockham in his Summa totius logicae; in particular, use of the concept of supposition (suppositio) in the significative analysis of terms. Epistemological, indicating the thesis that universality is attributable only to terms and propositions, and not to things as existing apart from discourse. Theological, indicating the thesis that no tneological doctrines, such as those of God's existence or of the immortality of the soul, are evident or demonstrable philosophically, so that religious doctrine rests solely on faith, without metaphysical or scientific support. It is in this sense that Luther is often called an Ockhamist.   Bibliography:   B. Geyer,   Ueberwegs Grundriss d. Gesch. d. Phil., Bd. II (11th ed., Berlin 1928), pp. 571-612 and 781-786; N. Abbagnano,   Guglielmo di Ockham (Lanciano, Italy, 1931); E. A. Moody,   The Logic of William of Ockham (N. Y. & London, 1935); F. Ehrle,   Peter von Candia (Muenster, 1925); G. Ritter,   Studien zur Spaetscholastik, I-II (Heidelberg, 1921-1922).     --E.A.M. Om, aum: (Skr.) Mystic, holy syllable as a symbol for the indefinable Absolute. See Aksara, Vac, Sabda. --K.F.L. Omniscience: In philosophy and theology it means the complete and perfect knowledge of God, of Himself and of all other beings, past, present, and future, or merely possible, as well as all their activities, real or possible, including the future free actions of human beings. --J.J.R. One: Philosophically, not a number but equivalent to unit, unity, individuality, in contradistinction from multiplicity and the mani-foldness of sensory experience. In metaphysics, the Supreme Idea (Plato), the absolute first principle (Neo-platonism), the universe (Parmenides), Being as such and divine in nature (Plotinus), God (Nicolaus Cusanus), the soul (Lotze). Religious philosophy and mysticism, beginning with Indian philosophy (s.v.), has favored the designation of the One for the metaphysical world-ground, the ultimate icility, the world-soul, the principle of the world conceived as reason, nous, or more personally. The One may be conceived as an independent whole or as a sum, as analytic or synthetic, as principle or ontologically. Except by mysticism, it is rarely declared a fact of sensory experience, while its transcendent or transcendental, abstract nature is stressed, e.g., in epistemology where the "I" or self is considered the unitary background of personal experience, the identity of self-consciousness, or the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifoldness of ideas (Kant). --K.F.L. One-one: A relation R is one-many if for every y in the converse domain there is a unique x such that xRy. A relation R is many-one if for every x in the domain there is a unique y such that xRy. (See the article relation.) A relation is one-one, or one-to-one, if it is at the same time one-many and many-one. A one-one relation is said to be, or to determine, a one-to-one correspondence between its domain and its converse domain. --A.C. On-handedness: (Ger. Vorhandenheit) Things exist in the mode of thereness, lying- passively in a neutral space. A "deficient" form of a more basic relationship, termed at-handedness (Zuhandenheit). (Heidegger.) --H.H. Ontological argument: Name by which later authors, especially Kant, designate the alleged proof for God's existence devised by Anselm of Canterbury. Under the name of God, so the argument runs, everyone understands that greater than which nothing can be thought. Since anything being the greatest and lacking existence is less then the greatest having also existence, the former is not really the greater. The greatest, therefore, has to exist. Anselm has been reproached, already by his contemporary Gaunilo, for unduly passing from the field of logical to the field of ontological or existential reasoning. This criticism has been repeated by many authors, among them Aquinas. The argument has, however, been used, if in a somewhat modified form, by Duns Scotus, Descartes, and Leibniz. --R.A. Ontological Object: (Gr. onta, existing things + logos, science) The real or existing object of an act of knowledge as distinguished from the epistemological object. See Epistemological Object. --L.W. Ontologism: (Gr. on, being) In contrast to psychologism, is called any speculative system which starts philosophizing by positing absolute being, or deriving the existence of entities independently of experience merely on the basis of their being thought, or assuming that we have immediate and certain knowledge of the ground of being or God. Generally speaking any rationalistic, a priori metaphysical doctrine, specifically the philosophies of Rosmini-Serbati and Vincenzo Gioberti. As a philosophic method censored by skeptics and criticists alike, as a scholastic doctrine formerly strongly supported, revived in Italy and Belgium in the 19th century, but no longer countenanced. --K.F.L. Ontology: (Gr. on, being + logos, logic) The theory of being qua being. For Aristotle, the First Philosophy, the science of the essence of things. Introduced as a term into philosophy by Wolff. The science of fundamental principles, the doctrine of the categories. Ultimate philosophy; rational cosmology. Syn. with metaphysics. See Cosmology, First Principles, Metaphysics, Theology. --J.K.F. Operation: "(Lit. operari, to work) Any act, mental or physical, constituting a phase of the reflective process, and performed with a view to acquiring1 knowledge or information about a certain subject-nntter. --A.C.B.   In logic, see Operationism.   In philosophy of science, see Pragmatism, Scientific Empiricism. Operationism: The doctrine that the meaning of a concept is given by a set of operations.   1. The operational meaning of a term (word or symbol) is given by a semantical rule relating the term to some concrete process, object or event, or to a class of such processes, objectj or events.   2. Sentences formed by combining operationally defined terms into propositions are operationally meaningful when the assertions are testable by means of performable operations. Thus, under operational rules, terms have semantical significance, propositions have empirical significance.   Operationism makes explicit the distinction between formal (q.v.) and empirical sentences. Formal propositions are signs arranged according to syntactical rules but lacking operational reference. Such propositions, common in mathematics, logic and syntax, derive their sanction from convention, whereas an empirical proposition is acceptable (1) when its structure obeys syntactical rules and (2) when there exists a concrete procedure (a set of operations) for determining its truth or falsity (cf. Verification). Propositions purporting to be empirical are sometimes amenable to no operational test because they contain terms obeying no definite semantical rules. These sentences are sometimes called pseudo-propositions and are said to be operationally meaningless. They may, however, be 'meaningful" in other ways, e.g. emotionally or aesthetically (cf. Meaning).   Unlike a formal statement, the "truth" of an empirical sentence is never absolute and its operational confirmation serves only to increase the degree of its validity. Similarly, the semantical rule comprising the operational definition of a term has never absolute precision. Ordinarily a term denotes a class of operations and the precision of its definition depends upon how definite are the rules governing inclusion in the class.   The difference between Operationism and Logical Positivism (q.v.) is one of emphasis. Operationism's stress of empirical matters derives from the fact that it was first employed to purge physics of such concepts as absolute space and absolute time, when the theory of relativity had forced upon physicists the view that space and time are most profitably defined in terms of the operations by which they are measured. Although different methods of measuring length at first give rise to different concepts of length, wherever the equivalence of certain of these measures can be established by other operations, the concepts may legitimately be combined.   In psychology the operational criterion of meaningfulness is commonly associated with a behavioristic point of view. See Behaviorism. Since only those propositions which are testable by public and repeatable operations are admissible in science, the definition of such concepti as mind and sensation must rest upon observable aspects of the organism or its behavior. Operational psychology deals with experience only as it is indicated by the operation of differential behavior, including verbal report. Discriminations, or the concrete differential reactions of organisms to internal or external environmental states, are by some authors regarded as the most basic of all operations.   For a discussion of the role of operational definition in phvsics. see P. W. Bridgman, The Logic of Modern Physics, (New York, 1928) and The Nature of Physical Theory (Princeton, 1936). "The extension of operationism to psychology is discussed by C. C. Pratt in The Logic of Modem Psychology (New York. 1939.)   For a discussion and annotated bibliography relating to Operationism and Logical Positivism, see S. S. Stevens, Psychology and the Science of Science, Psychol. Bull., 36, 1939, 221-263. --S.S.S. Ophelimity: Noun derived from the Greek, ophelimos useful, employed by Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923) in economics as the equivalent of utility, or the capacity to provide satisfaction. --J.J.R. Opinion: (Lat. opinio, from opinor, to think) An hypothesis or proposition entertained on rational grounds but concerning which doubt can reasonably exist. A belief. See Hypothesis, Certainty, Knowledge. --J.K.F- Opposition: (Lat. oppositus, pp. of oppono, to oppose) Positive actual contradiction. One of Aristotle's Post-predicaments. In logic any contrariety or contradiction, illustrated by the "Square of Opposition". Syn. with: conflict. See Logic, formal, § 4. --J.K.F. Optimism: (Lat. optimus, the best) The view inspired by wishful thinking, success, faith, or philosophic reflection, that the world as it exists is not so bad or even the best possible, life is good, and man's destiny is bright. Philosophically most persuasively propounded by Leibniz in his Theodicee, according to which God in his wisdom would have created a better world had he known or willed such a one to exist. Not even he could remove moral wrong and evil unless he destroyed the power of self-determination and hence the basis of morality. All systems of ethics that recognize a supreme good (Plato and many idealists), subscribe to the doctrines of progressivism (Turgot, Herder, Comte, and others), regard evil as a fragmentary view (Josiah Royce et al.) or illusory, or believe in indemnification (Henry David Thoreau) or melioration (Emerson), are inclined optimistically. Practically all theologies advocating a plan of creation and salvation, are optimistic though they make the good or the better dependent on moral effort, right thinking, or belief, promising it in a future existence. Metaphysical speculation is optimistic if it provides for perfection, evolution to something higher, more valuable, or makes room for harmonies or a teleology. See Pessimism. --K.F.L. Order: A class is said to be partially ordered by a dyadic relation R if it coincides with the field of R, and R is transitive and reflexive, and xRy and yRx never both hold when x and y are different. If in addition R is connected, the class is said to be ordered (or simply ordered) by R, and R is called an ordering relation.   Whitehcid and Russell apply the term serial relation to relations which are transitive, irreflexive, and connected (and, in consequence, also asymmetric). However, the use of serial relations in this sense, instead ordering relations as just defined, is awkward in connection with the notion of order for unit classes.   Examples: The relation not greater than among leal numbers is an ordering relation. The relation less than among real numbers is a serial relation. The real numbers are simply ordered by the former relation. In the algebra of classes (logic formal, § 7), the classes are partially ordered by the relation of class inclusion.   For explanation of the terminology used in making the above definitions, see the articles connexity, reflexivity, relation, symmetry, transitivity. --A.C. Order type: See relation-number. Ordinal number: A class b is well-ordered by a dyadic relation R if it is ordered by R (see order) and, for every class a such that a ⊂ b, there is a member x of a, such that xRy holds for every member y of a; and R is then called a well-ordering relation. The ordinal number of a class b well-ordered by a relation R, or of a well-ordering relation R, is defined to be the relation-number (q. v.) of R.   The ordinal numbers of finite classes (well-ordered by appropriate relations) are called finite ordinal numbers. These are 0, 1, 2, ... (to be distinguished, of course, from the finite cardinal numbers 0, 1, 2, . . .).   The first non-finite (transfinite or infinite) ordinal number is the ordinal number of the class of finite ordinal numbers, well-ordered in their natural order, 0, 1, 2, . . .; it is usually denoted by the small Greek letter omega. --A.C.   G. Cantor, Contributions to the Founding of the Theory of Transfinite Numbers, translated and with an introduction by P. E. B. Jourdain, Chicago and London, 1915. (new ed. 1941); Whitehead and Russell, Princtpia Mathematica. vol. 3. Orexis: (Gr. orexis) Striving; desire; the conative aspect of mind, as distinguished from the cognitive and emotional (Aristotle). --G.R.M.. Organicism: A theory of biology that life consists in the organization or dynamic system of the organism. Opposed to mechanism and vitalism. --J.K.F. Organism: An individual animal or plant, biologically interpreted. A. N. Whitehead uses the term to include also physical bodies and to signify anything material spreading through space and enduring in time. --R.B.W. Organismic Psychology: (Lat. organum, from Gr. organon, an instrument) A system of theoretical psychology which construes the structure of the mind in organic rather than atomistic terms. See Gestalt Psychology; Psychological Atomism. --L.W. Organization: (Lat. organum, from Gr. organon, work) A structured whole. The systematic unity of parts in a purposive whole. A dynamic system. Order in something actual. --J.K.F. Organon: (Gr. organon) The title traditionally given to the body of Aristotle's logical treatises. The designation appears to have originated among the Peripatetics after Aristotle's time, and expresses their view that logic is not a part of philosophy (as the Stoics maintained) but rather the instrument (organon) of philosophical inquiry. See Aristotelianism. --G.R.M.   In Kant. A system of principles by which pure knowledge may be acquired and established.   Cf. Fr. Bacon's Novum Organum. --O.F.K. Oriental Philosophy: A general designation used loosely to cover philosophic tradition exclusive of that grown on Greek soil and including the beginnings of philosophical speculation in Egypt, Arabia, Iran, India, and China, the elaborate systems of India, Greater India, China, and Japan, and sometimes also the religion-bound thought of all these countries with that of the complex cultures of Asia Minor, extending far into antiquity. Oriental philosophy, though by no means presenting a homogeneous picture, nevertheless shares one characteristic, i.e., the practical outlook on life (ethics linked with metaphysics) and the absence of clear-cut distinctions between pure speculation and religious motivation, and on lower levels between folklore, folk-etymology, practical wisdom, pre-scientiiic speculation, even magic, and flashes of philosophic insight. Bonds with Western, particularly Greek philosophy have no doubt existed even in ancient times. Mutual influences have often been conjectured on the basis of striking similarities, but their scientific establishment is often difficult or even impossible. Comparative philosophy (see especially the work of Masson-Oursel) provides a useful method. Yet a thorough treatment of Oriental Philosophy is possible only when the many languages in which it is deposited have been more thoroughly studied, the psychological and historical elements involved in the various cultures better investigated, and translations of the relevant documents prepared not merely from a philological point of view or out of missionary zeal, but by competent philosophers who also have some linguistic training. Much has been accomplished in this direction in Indian and Chinese Philosophy (q.v.). A great deal remains to be done however before a definitive history of Oriental Philosophy may be written. See also Arabian, and Persian Philosophy. --K.F.L. Origen: (185-254) The principal founder of Christian theology who tried to enrich the ecclesiastic thought of his day by reconciling it with the treasures of Greek philosophy. Cf. Migne PL. --R.B.W. Ormazd: (New Persian) Same as Ahura Mazdah (q.v.), the good principle in Zoroastrianism, and opposed to Ahriman (q.v.). --K.F.L. Orphic Literature: The mystic writings, extant only in fragments, of a Greek religious-philosophical movement of the 6th century B.C., allegedly started by the mythical Orpheus. In their mysteries, in which mythology and rational thinking mingled, the Orphics concerned themselves with cosmogony, theogony, man's original creation and his destiny after death which they sought to influence to the better by pure living and austerity. They taught a symbolism in which, e.g., the relationship of the One to the many was clearly enunciated, and believed in the soul as involved in reincarnation. Pythagoras, Empedocles, and Plato were influenced by them. --K.F.L. Ortega y Gasset, Jose: Born in Madrid, May 9, 1883. At present in Buenos Aires, Argentine. Son of Ortega y Munillo, the famous Spanish journalist. Studied at the College of Jesuits in Miraflores and at the Central University of Madrid. In the latter he presented his Doctor's dissertation, El Milenario, in 1904, thereby obtaining his Ph.D. degree. After studies in Leipzig, Berlin, Marburg, under the special influence of Hermann Cohen, the great exponent of Kant, who taught him the love for the scientific method and awoke in him the interest in educational philosophy, Ortega came to Spain where, after the death of Nicolas Salmeron, he occupied the professorship of metaphysics at the Central University of Madrid. The following may be considered the most important works of Ortega y Gasset:     Meditaciones del Quijote, 1914;   El Espectador, I-VIII, 1916-1935;   El Tema de Nuestro Tiempo, 1921;   España Invertebrada, 1922;   Kant, 1924;   La Deshumanizacion del Arte, 1925;   Espiritu de la Letra, 1927;   La Rebelion de las Masas, 1929;   Goethe desde Adentio, 1934;   Estudios sobre el Amor, 1939;   Ensimismamiento y Alteracion, 1939;   El Libro de las Misiones, 1940;   Ideas y Creencias, 1940;     and others.   Although brought up in the Marburg school of thought, Ortega is not exactly a neo-Kantian. At the basis of his Weltanschauung one finds a denial of the fundamental presuppositions which characterized European Rationalism. It is life and not thought which is primary. Things have a sense and a value which must be affirmed independently. Things, however, are to be conceived as the totality of situations which constitute the circumstances of a man's life. Hence, Ortega's first philosophical principle: "I am myself plus my circumstances". Life as a problem, however, is but one of the poles of his formula. Reason is the other. The two together function, not by dialectical opposition, but by necessary coexistence. Life, according to Ortega, does not consist in being, but rather, in coming to be, and as such it is of the nature of direction, program building, purpose to be achieved, value to be realized. In this sense the future as a time dimension acquires new dignity, and even the present and the past become articulate and meaning-full only in relation to the future. Even History demands a new point of departure and becomes militant with new visions. --J.A.F. Orthodoxy: Beliefs which are declared by a group to be true and normative. Heresy is a departure from and relative to a given orthodoxy. --V.S. Orthos Logos: See Right Reason. Ostensible Object: (Lat. ostendere, to show) The object envisaged by cognitive act irrespective of its actual existence. See Epistemological Object. --L.W. Ostensive: (Lat. ostendere, to show) Property of a concept or predicate by virtue of which it refers to and is clarified by reference to its instances. --A.C.B. Ostwald, Wilhelm: (1853-1932) German chemist. Winner of the Nobel prize for chemistry in 1909. In Die Uberwindung des wissenschaftlichen Materialistmus and in Naturphilosophie, his two best known works in the field of philosophy, he advocates a dynamic theory in opposition to materialism and mechanism. All properties of matter, and the psychic as well, are special forms of energy. --L.E.D. Oupnekhat: Anquetil Duperron's Latin translation of the Persian translation of 50 Upanishads (q.v.), a work praised by Schopenhauer as giving him complete consolation. --K.F.L. Outness: A term employed by Berkeley to express the experience of externality, that is the ideas of space and things placed at a distance. Hume used it in the sense of distance Hamilton understood it as the state of being outside of consciousness in a really existing world of material things. --J.J.R. Overindividual: Term used by H. Münsterberg to translate the German überindividuell. The term is applied to any cognitive or value object which transcends the individual subject. --L.W. P

To be an Aristotelian under such extremely complicated circumstances was the problem that St. Thomas set himself. What he did reduced itself fundamentally to three points: (a) He showed the Platonic orientation of St. Augustine's thought, the limitations that St. Augustine himself placed on his Platonism, and he inferred from this that St. Augustine could not be made the patron of the highly elaborated and sophisticated Platonism that an Ibn Gebirol expounded in his Fons Vitae or an Avicenna in his commentaries on the metaphysics and psychology of Aristotle. (b) Having singled out Plato as the thinker to search out behind St. Augustine, and having really eliminated St. Augustine from the Platonic controversies of the thirteenth century, St. Thomas is then concerned to diagnose the Platonic inspiration of the various commentators of Aristotle, and to separate what is to him the authentic Aristotle from those Platonic aberrations. In this sense, the philosophical activity of St. Thomas in the thirteenth century can be understood as a systematic critique and elimination of Platonism in metaphysics, psychology and epistemology. The Platonic World of Ideas is translated into a theory of substantial principles in a world of stable and intelligible individuals; the Platonic man, who was scarcely more than an incarcerated spirit, became a rational animal, containing within his being an interior economy which presented in a rational system his mysterious nature as a reality existing on the confines of two worlds, spirit and matter; the Platonic theory of knowledge (at least in the version of the Meno rather than that of the later dialogues where the doctrine of division is more prominent), which was regularly beset with the difficulty of accounting for the origin and the truth of knowledge, was translated into a theory of abstraction in which sensible experience enters as a necessary moment into the explanation of the origin, the growth and the use of knowledge, and in which the intelligible structure of sensible being becomes the measure of the truth of knowledge and of knowing.

topic ::: n. --> One of the various general forms of argument employed in probable as distinguished from demonstrative reasoning, -- denominated by Aristotle to`poi (literally, places), as being the places or sources from which arguments may be derived, or to which they may be referred; also, a prepared form of argument, applicable to a great variety of cases, with a supply of which the ancient rhetoricians and orators provided themselves; a commonplace of argument or oratory.
A treatise on forms of argument; a system or scheme of forms

Topics: (Gr. Topika) The title of a treatise by Aristotle on dialectical reasoning, so named because the material is grouped into convenient topoi, or common-places of argument, useful in examining an opponent's assertions. See Dialectic. -- G.R.M.

Tritheism: Name given to the opinions of John Philoponus, the noted commentator on Aristotle, Conon, Bishop of Tarsus, and Eugeius, Bishop of Seleucia in Isauria, leaders of a group of Monophysites of the sixth century, which were understood in the sense that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are three partial substances and distinct individuals, consequently three Gods. Any similar doctrine is usually called Tritheism. -- J.J.R.

Unity of Science, Unified Science: See Scientific Empiricism IIB. Universal: (Lat. universalia, a universal) That term which can be applied throughout the universe. A possibility of discrete being. According to Plato, an idea (which see). According to Aristotle, that which by its nature is fit to be predicated of many. For medieval realists, an entity whose being is independent of its mental apprehension or actual exemplification. (See: Realism). For medieval nominalists, a general notion or concept having no reality of its own in the realm of being (see Nominalism). In psychology: a concept. See Concept, General, Possibility. Opposite of: particular. -- J.K.F.

Universals A philosophical and logical term, used in opposition to particulars. For example, matter may be called a universal, and material bodies may be called particulars; or life may be a universal, and living beings particulars. The universal is sometimes defined as that which is left when all particularities or differences have ceased to be. The question arises as to which shall be considered real. If the particulars are realities, then the universals become mere abstract ideas: thus mankind would be merely an indefinite number of human beings. But if the universal is real, then we regard particular humans as being each a manifestation on respective lower planes of man, the Heavenly Man or Qabbalistic ’Adam Qadmon. Again, if living beings are real, then life becomes an abstraction. But if life is a real entity in itself, then living beings are its particular manifestations. The philosophy which starts with universals and proceeds to particulars is called deductive: it is that of theosophy and of Pythagoras and Plato. The inductive philosophy of Aristotle and Francis Bacon proceeds from particulars to universals. Space, motion, duration, intelligence, etc., in themselves abstract realities, are regarded by theosophy as universals, whereas from the opposite viewpoint they appear as only abstractions from experience. The deductive method has its uses in applied science, but in fact it tacitly assumes certain universals and reasons back to them from particulars.

Virtue: (Gr. arete) In Aristotle's philosophy that state of a thing which constitutes its peculiar excellence and enables it to perform its function well; particularly, in man, the activity of reason and of rationally ordered habits.

Wesen: (Ger. being, essence, nature) Designates essential being without which a thing has no reality. It has been conceived variously in the history of philosophy, as Ousia or constant being by Aristotle; as essenitia, real or nominal, or species, by the Schoolmen; as principle of all that which belongs to the possibility of a thing, by Kant; generally as that which is unconditionally necessary in the concept of a thing or is not dependent on external, causal, temporal or special circumstances. Its contrast is that which is unwesentlich (defined by Schuppe as that which has relation to or for something else), accidental, contingent. -- K.F.L.

What St. Thomas appears to have insisted on most in thus using Aristotle as a pillar of his own thought was the rehabilitation of man and the universe as stable realities and genuine causes. This insistence has been by some called his naturalism. Against the tendency of thirteenth century Augustinians to disparage the native ability of the human reason to know truth, St. Thomas insisted on the capacity of the reason to act as a genuine and sufficient cause of true knowledge within the natural order. Against the occasionalistic tendencies of Avicennian thought, which reduced both man and the world of change around him to the role of passive spectators of the sole activity of God (i.e., the intellectus agens), St. Thomas asserted the subordinate but autonomous causality of man in the production of knowledge and the genuine causality of sensible realities in the production of change. Ultimately, St. Thomas rests his defense of man and other beings as efficacious causes in their own order on the doctrine of creation; just as he shows that the occasionalism of Avicenna is ultimately based on the Neo-platonic doctrine of emanation.

With these principles of matter and form, and the parallel distinction between potential and actual existence, Aristotle claims to have solved the difficulties that earlier thinkers had found in the fact of change. The changes in nature are to be interpreted not as the passage from non-being to being, which would make them unintelligible, but as the process by which what is merely potential being passes over, through form, into actual being, or entelechy. The philosophy of nature which results from these basic concepts views nature as a dynamic realm in which change is real, spontaneous, continuous, and in the main directed. Matter, though indeed capable of form, possesses a residual inertia which on occasion produces accidental effects; so that alongside the teological causation of the forms Aristotle recognizes what he calls "necessity" in nature; but the products of the latter, since they are aberrations from form, cannot be made the object of scientific knowledge. Furthermore, the system of nature as developed by Aristotle is a graded series of existences, in which the simpler beings, though in themselves formed matter, function also as matter for higher forms. At the base of the series is prime matter, which as wholly unformed is mere potentiality, not actual being. The simplest formed matter is the so-called primary bodies -- earth, water, air and fire. From these as matter arise by the intervention of successively more complex forms the composite inorganic bodies, organic tissues, and the world of organisms, characterized by varying degrees of complexity in structure and function. In this realization of form in matter Aristotle distinguishes three sorts of change: qualitative change, or alteration; quantitative change, or growth and diminution; and change, of place, or locomotion, the last being primary, since it is presupposed in all the others. But Aristotle is far from suggesting a mechanical explanation of change, for not even locomotion can be explained by impact alone. The motion of the primary bodies is due to the fact that each has its natural place to which it moves when not opposed; earth to the center, then water, air, and fire to successive spheres about the center. The ceaseless motion of these primary bodies results from their ceaseless transformation into one another through the interaction of the forms of hot and cold, wet and dry. Thus qualitative differences of form underlie even the most elemental changes in the world of nature.

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   50 Philosophy Classics: List of Books Covered:
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   2. Aristotle - Nicomachean Ethics (4th century BC)
   3. AJ Ayer - Language
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1:The good is that at which all things aim. ~ Aristotle?,
2:Well begun is half done. ~ Aristotle,
3:Hope is a waking dream.
   ~ Aristotle,
4:Change in all things is sweet." ~ Aristotle,
5:What is a friend? A single soul dwelling in two bodies. ~ Aristotle,
6:A friend to all is a friend to none. ~ Aristotle,
7:Quality is not an act, it is a habit." ~ Aristotle,
8:The whole is more than the sum of its parts. ~ Aristotle,
9:Give me the child for the first seven years and I will give you the man. ~ Aristotle?
10:Knowing yourself is the beginning of all wisdom.
   ~ Aristotle,
11:Pleasure in the job puts perfection in the work.
   ~ Aristotle,
12:The more you know, the more you know you don't know.
   ~ Aristotle,
13:There is no great genius without some touch of madness.
   ~ Aristotle,
14:The roots of education are bitter, but the fruit is sweet.
   ~ Aristotle,
15:What we have to learn to do we learn by doing. . .
   ~ Aristotle, Ethics,
16:It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain a thought without accepting it. ~ Aristotle,
17:Think as the wise men think, but talk like the simple people do.
   ~ Aristotle,
18:What it lies in our power to do, it lies in our power not to do.
   ~ Aristotle,
19:Whoever is delighted in solitude is either a wild beast or a god.
   ~ Aristotle,
20: The worst form of inequality is trying to make unequal things equal ~ Aristotle,
21:Happiness is the settling of the soul into its most appropriate spot. ~ Aristotle,
22:Educating the mind without educating the heart is no education at all. ~ Aristotle,
23:It is during our darkest moments that we must focus to see the light." ~ Aristotle,
24:The one exclusive sign of thorough knowledge is the power of teaching.
   ~ Aristotle,
25:Where your talents and the needs of the world cross lies your calling.
   ~ Aristotle,
26:We are what we repeatedly do. Excellence, then, is not an act, but a habit.
   ~ Aristotle,
27:The essential principles of things are hidden from us.... ~ Saint Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima 1.1.15,
28:It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain a thought without accepting it.
   ~ Aristotle,
29:we do not have knowledge of a thing until we have grasped its why, that is to say, its cause.
   ~ Aristotle,
30:To attain any assured knowledge about the soul is one of the most difficult things in the world. ~ Aristotle,
31:Even when laws have been written down, they ought not always to remain unaltered. ~ Aristotle, Politics, II, 8,
32:The aim of art is to represent not the outward appearance of things, but their inward significance. ~ Aristotle,
33:Be a free thinker and don't accept everything you hear as truth. Be critical and evaluate what you believe in.
   ~ Aristotle,
34:I count him braver who overcomes his desires than him who conquers his enemies, for the hardest victory is over self. ~ Aristotle,
35:I count him braver who overcomes his desires than him who conquers his enemies; for the hardest victory is over self.
   ~ Aristotle,
36:As the eyes of bats are to the blaze of day, so is our intellect to the things which are by nature most evident. ~ Aristotle, Metaphysics II,
37:Those who think that Aristotle disagrees with Plato disagree with me, who make a concordant philosophy of both. ~ Giovanni Pico Della Mirandola, On Being and the One,
38:Philosophy is free thought applied to the conditions of possibility of politics and history, as we have known it since Plato's Republic and Aristotle's Ethics and Politics. ~ Paul Ricoeur,
39:Thus if every intellectual activity [διάνοια] is either practical or productive or speculative (θεωρητική), physics (φυσικὴ) will be a speculative [θεωρητική] science. ~ Aristotle,
40:The theoretical sciences are greatly to be preferred to the other sciences, and, this (metaphysics) is greatly to be preferred to the other theoretical sciences. ~ Aristotle, Metaphysics E 1.1026a22,
41:By far the greatest thing is to be a master of metaphor. It is the one thing that cannot be learned from others. It is a sign of genius, for a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of similarity among dissimilars.
   ~ Aristotle,
42:When the seventeenth century philosophers threw out the four causes, they not only cast aside Aristotle, they also disavowed the transformed senses of these principles and thereby began the elimination of intelligibility from the very notion of creation... ~ Kenneth Schmitz,
43:But not only are vices of the soul voluntary, but those of the body also for some men, whom we accordingly blame; while no one blames those who are ugly by nature, we blame those who are so owing to want of exercise and care. ~ Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book 3, Chapter 5,
44:There is a science that investigates being as being and the attributes that belong to this in virtue of its own nature. Now this is not the same as any of the so-called special sciences; for none of these others treats universally of being as being. ~ Aristotle, Metaphysics IV.1,
45:You could give Aristotle a tutorial. And you could thrill him to the core of his being. Aristotle was an encyclopedic polymath, an all time intellect. Yet not only can you know more than him about the world. You also can have a deeper understanding of how everything works. Such is the privilege of living after Newton, Darwin, Einstein, Planck, Watson, Crick and their colleagues. I'm not saying you're more intelligent than Aristotle, or wiser. For all I know, Aristotle's the cleverest person who ever lived. That's not the point. The point is only that science is cumulative, and we live later.
   ~ Richard Dawkins,
46:Arguably, the best advice for a serious student is to read a few hundred carefully selected books. An orgy of reading 30 or 40 first-rate books in a month ranks at the top of the usual list of human pleasures. If you wish, as an undergraduate, you could do it. You have time and energy, and with luck, you have the curiosity and courage to risk a month or two. Read Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Pascal, Voltaire, Berkeley, Hegel, Marx, and Kanetz. Or you could just play Frisbee on the Plaza of the Americas. Life is choice and there is much to learn. Not making a choice is a choice. ~ Dr Robert A Hatch, How to Study,
47:There is only one Ethics, as there is only one geometry. But the majority of men, it will be said, are ignorant of geometry. Yes, but as soon as they begin to apply themselves a little to that science, all are in agreement. Cultivators, workmen, artisans have not gone through courses in ethics; they have not read Cicero or Aristotle, but the moment they begin to think on the subject they become, without knowing it, the disciples of Cicero. The Indian dyer, the Tartar shepherd and the English sailor know what is just and what is injust. Confucius did not invent a system of ethics as one invents a system of physics. He had discovered it in the heart of all mankind. ~ Voltaire, the Eternal Wisdom
48:To The Works Of:
   Aristotle, Cassius J. Keyser, Eric T. Bell, G. W. Leibnitz, Eugen Bleuler, J. Locke, Niels Bohr, Jacques Loeb, George Boole, H. A. Lorentz, Max Born, Ernst Mach, Louis De Brogue, J. C. Maxwell, Georg Cantor, Adolf Meyer, Ernst Cassirer, Hermann Minkowsja, Charles M. Child, Isaac Newton, C. Darwin, Ivan Pavlov, Rene Descartes, Giuseppe Peano, P. A. M. Dirac, Max Planck, A. S. Eddington, Plato, Albert Einstein, H. Poincare, Euclid, M. Faraday, Sigmund Freud, Josiah Royce, Karl F. Gauss, G. Y. Rainich, G. B. Riemann, Bertrand Russell, Thomas Graham, Ernest Rutherford, Arthur Haas, E. Schrodinger, Wm. R. Hamilton, C. S. Sherrington, Henry Head, Socrates, Werner Heisenberg, Arnold Sommerfeld, C. Judson Herrick, Oswald Veblen, E. V. Huntington, Wm. Alanson White, Smith Ely Jeluffe, Alfred N. Whitehead, Ludwig Wittgenstein
   Which Have Creatly Influenced My Enquiry
   This System Is Dedicated ~ Alfred Korzybski, Science and Sanity,
49:reading :::
   50 Philosophy Classics: List of Books Covered:
   1. Hannah Arendt - The Human Condition (1958)
   2. Aristotle - Nicomachean Ethics (4th century BC)
   3. AJ Ayer - Language, Truth and Logic (1936)
   4. Julian Baggini - The Ego Trick (2011)
   5. Jean Baudrillard - Simulacra and Simulation (1981)
   6. Simone de Beauvoir - The Second Sex (1952)
   7. Jeremy Bentham - Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789)
   8. Henri Bergson - Creative Evolution (1911)
   9. David Bohm - Wholeness and the Implicate Order (1980)
   10. Noam Chomsky - Understanding Power (2002)
   11. Cicero - On Duties (44 BC)
   12. Confucius - Analects (5th century BC)
   13. Rene Descartes - Meditations (1641)
   14. Ralph Waldo Emerson - Fate (1860)
   15. Epicurus - Letters (3rd century BC)
   16. Michel Foucault - The Order of Things (1966)
   17. Harry Frankfurt - On Bullshit (2005)
   18. Sam Harris - Free Will (2012)
   19. GWF Hegel - Phenomenology of Spirit (1803)
   20. Martin Heidegger - Being and Time (1927)
   21. Heraclitus - Fragments
50:This last figure, the White Magician, symbolizes the self-transcending element in the scientist's motivational drive and emotional make-up; his humble immersion into the mysteries of nature, his quest for the harmony of the spheres, the origin of life, the equations of a unified field theory. The conquistadorial urge is derived from a sense of power, the participatory urge from a sense of oceanic wonder. 'Men were first led to the study of natural philosophy', wrote Aristotle, 'as indeed they are today, by wonder.' Maxwell's earliest memory was 'lying on the grass, looking at the sun, and wondering'. Einstein struck the same chord when he wrote that whoever is devoid of the capacity to wonder, 'whoever remains unmoved, whoever cannot contemplate or know the deep shudder of the soul in enchantment, might just as well be dead for he has already closed his eyes upon life'.

This oceanic feeling of wonder is the common source of religious mysticism, of pure science and art for art's sake; it is their common denominator and emotional bond. ~ Arthur Koestler,
51:science reading list :::
   1. and 2. The Voyage of the Beagle (1845) and The Origin of Species (1859) by Charles Darwin [tie
   3. Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica (Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy) by Isaac Newton (1687)
   4. Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems by Galileo Galilei (1632)
   5. De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium (On the Revolutions of Heavenly Spheres) by Nicolaus Copernicus (1543)
   6. Physica (Physics) by Aristotle (circa 330 B.C.)
   7. De Humani Corporis Fabrica (On the Fabric of the Human Body) by Andreas Vesalius (1543)
   8. Relativity: The Special and General Theory by Albert Einstein (1916)
   9. The Selfish Gene by Richard Dawkins (1976)
   10. One Two Three . . . Infinity by George Gamow (1947)
   11. The Double Helix by James D. Watson (1968)
   12. What Is Life? by Erwin Schrodinger (1944)
   13. The Cosmic Connection by Carl Sagan (1973)
   14. The Insect Societies by Edward O. Wilson (1971)
   15. The First Three Minutes by Steven Weinberg (1977)
   16. Silent Spring by Rachel Carson (1962)
   17. The Mismeasure of Man by Stephen Jay Gould (1981)
   18. The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat and Other Clinical Tales by Oliver Sacks (1985)
   19. The Journals of Lewis and Clark by Meriwether Lewis and William Clark (1814)
   20. The Feynman Lectures on Physics by Richard P Feynman, Robert B. Leighton, and Matthew Sands (1963)
   21. Sexual Behavior in the Human Male by Alfred C. Kinsey et al. (1948)
   22. Gorillas in the Mist by Dian Fossey (1983)
   23. Under a Lucky Star by Roy Chapman Andrews (1943)
   24. Micrographia by Robert Hooke (1665)
   25. Gaia by James Lovelock (1979)
   ~ Editors of Discovery Magazine, Website,
52:Reading list (1972 edition)[edit]
1. Homer - Iliad, Odyssey
2. The Old Testament
3. Aeschylus - Tragedies
4. Sophocles - Tragedies
5. Herodotus - Histories
6. Euripides - Tragedies
7. Thucydides - History of the Peloponnesian War
8. Hippocrates - Medical Writings
9. Aristophanes - Comedies
10. Plato - Dialogues
11. Aristotle - Works
12. Epicurus - Letter to Herodotus; Letter to Menoecus
13. Euclid - Elements
14.Archimedes - Works
15. Apollonius of Perga - Conic Sections
16. Cicero - Works
17. Lucretius - On the Nature of Things
18. Virgil - Works
19. Horace - Works
20. Livy - History of Rome
21. Ovid - Works
22. Plutarch - Parallel Lives; Moralia
23. Tacitus - Histories; Annals; Agricola Germania
24. Nicomachus of Gerasa - Introduction to Arithmetic
25. Epictetus - Discourses; Encheiridion
26. Ptolemy - Almagest
27. Lucian - Works
28. Marcus Aurelius - Meditations
29. Galen - On the Natural Faculties
30. The New Testament
31. Plotinus - The Enneads
32. St. Augustine - On the Teacher; Confessions; City of God; On Christian Doctrine
33. The Song of Roland
34. The Nibelungenlied
35. The Saga of Burnt Njal
36. St. Thomas Aquinas - Summa Theologica
37. Dante Alighieri - The Divine Comedy;The New Life; On Monarchy
38. Geoffrey Chaucer - Troilus and Criseyde; The Canterbury Tales
39. Leonardo da Vinci - Notebooks
40. Niccolò Machiavelli - The Prince; Discourses on the First Ten Books of Livy
41. Desiderius Erasmus - The Praise of Folly
42. Nicolaus Copernicus - On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres
43. Thomas More - Utopia
44. Martin Luther - Table Talk; Three Treatises
45. François Rabelais - Gargantua and Pantagruel
46. John Calvin - Institutes of the Christian Religion
47. Michel de Montaigne - Essays
48. William Gilbert - On the Loadstone and Magnetic Bodies
49. Miguel de Cervantes - Don Quixote
50. Edmund Spenser - Prothalamion; The Faerie Queene
51. Francis Bacon - Essays; Advancement of Learning; Novum Organum, New Atlantis
52. William Shakespeare - Poetry and Plays
53. Galileo Galilei - Starry Messenger; Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences
54. Johannes Kepler - Epitome of Copernican Astronomy; Concerning the Harmonies of the World
55. William Harvey - On the Motion of the Heart and Blood in Animals; On the Circulation of the Blood; On the Generation of Animals
56. Thomas Hobbes - Leviathan
57. René Descartes - Rules for the Direction of the Mind; Discourse on the Method; Geometry; Meditations on First Philosophy
58. John Milton - Works
59. Molière - Comedies
60. Blaise Pascal - The Provincial Letters; Pensees; Scientific Treatises
61. Christiaan Huygens - Treatise on Light
62. Benedict de Spinoza - Ethics
63. John Locke - Letter Concerning Toleration; Of Civil Government; Essay Concerning Human Understanding;Thoughts Concerning Education
64. Jean Baptiste Racine - Tragedies
65. Isaac Newton - Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy; Optics
66. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz - Discourse on Metaphysics; New Essays Concerning Human Understanding;Monadology
67.Daniel Defoe - Robinson Crusoe
68. Jonathan Swift - A Tale of a Tub; Journal to Stella; Gulliver's Travels; A Modest Proposal
69. William Congreve - The Way of the World
70. George Berkeley - Principles of Human Knowledge
71. Alexander Pope - Essay on Criticism; Rape of the Lock; Essay on Man
72. Charles de Secondat, baron de Montesquieu - Persian Letters; Spirit of Laws
73. Voltaire - Letters on the English; Candide; Philosophical Dictionary
74. Henry Fielding - Joseph Andrews; Tom Jones
75. Samuel Johnson - The Vanity of Human Wishes; Dictionary; Rasselas; The Lives of the Poets
   ~ Mortimer J Adler,


1:Well begun is half done. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
2:Everyone honors the wise. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
3:Beauty is the gift of God. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
4:Doubt is the beginning of wisdom. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
5:Happiness depends upon ourselves. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
6:Happiness is a state of activity. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
7:A man is the origin of his action. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
8:Happiness is the reward of virtue. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
9:All men by nature desire knowledge. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
10:He who hath many friends hath none. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
11:No one loves the man whom he fears. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
12:A friend to all is a friend to none. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
13:The law is reason free from passion. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
14:Quality is not an act, it is a habit. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
15:We must become just by doing just acts. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
16:Happiness belongs to the self-sufficient. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
17:The soul can not think without a picture. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
18:All virtue is summed up in dealing justly. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
19:All men seek one goal: success or happiness. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
20:Between friends there is no need of justice. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
21:Education is the best provision for old age. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
22:Happiness is prosperity combined with virtue. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
23:The antidote for fifty enemies is one friend. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
24:Love well, be loved and do something of value. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
25:Men are swayed more by fear than by reverence. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
26:Teaching is the highest form of understanding. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
27:Temperance is a mean with regard to pleasures. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
28:The energy of the mind is the essence of life. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
29:The whole is greater than the sum of its parts. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
30:What we have to learn to do, we learn by doing. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
31:Intuition is the source of scientific knowledge. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
32:Knowing yourself is the beginning of all wisdom. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
33:Philosophy is the science which considers truth. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
34:Pleasure in the job puts perfection in the work. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
35:He who has overcome his fears will truly be free. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
36:Liars when they speak the truth are not believed. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
37:A common danger unites even the bitterest enemies. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
38:Art is a higher type of knowledge than experience. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
39:A true friend is one soul divided into two people. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
40:Those that know, do. Those that understand, teach. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
41:Fear is pain arising from the anticipation of evil. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
42:Consider pleasures as they depart, not as they come. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
43:The ideal man takes joy in doing favours for others. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
44:The more you know, the more you know you don't know. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
45:The quality of life is determined by its activities. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
46:The soul becomes prudent by sitting and being quiet. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
47:Courage is a mean with regard to fear and confidence. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
48:Self-sufficiency is both a good and an absolute good. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
49:No excellent soul is exempt from a mixture of madness. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
50:We must as second best... take the least of the evils. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
51:Youth is easily deceived, because it is quick to hope. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
52:All human happiness and misery take the form of action. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
53:Before you heal the body, you must first heal the mind. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
54:A bad man can do a million times more harm than a beast. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
55:It is impossible even to think without a mental picture. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
56:Love is composed of a single soul inhabiting two bodies. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
57:Think as wise men do, but speak as the common people do. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
58:He who cannot be a good follower cannot be a good leader. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
59:It is in justice that the ordering of society is centred. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
60:There is a foolish corner in the brain of the wisest man. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
61:Friends are much better tried in bad fortune than in good. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
62:The greatest of all pleasures is the pleasure of learning. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
63:What lies in our power to do, lies in our power not to do. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
64:Equality consists in the same treatment of similar persons. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
65:Learning is not child's play; we cannot learn without pain. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
66:He who has never learned to obey cannot be a good commander. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
67:The excellence of a thing is related to its proper function. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
68:In all things of nature there is something of the marvellous. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
69:Pain upsets and destroys the nature of the person who feels it. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
70:The man who is content to live alone is either a beast or a god. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
71:Democracy is the form of government in which the free are rulers. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
72:Education is an ornament in prosperity and a refuge in adversity. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
73:The aim of the wise is not to secure pleasure, but to avoid pain. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
74:Art not only imitates nature, but also completes its deficiencies. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
75:Courage is the first virtue that makes all other virtues possible. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
76:The proof that you know something is that you are able to teach it. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
77:The worst form of inequality is to try to make unequal things equal. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
78:The virtue of justice consists in moderation, as regulated by wisdom. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
79:Character may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
80:Educating the mind without educating the heart is no education at all. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
81:No state will be well administered unless the middle class holds sway. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
82:The greatest virtues are those which are most useful to other persons. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
83:The light of the day is followed by night, as a shadow follows a body. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
84:The one exclusive sign of thorough knowledge is the power of teaching. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
85:The best political community is formed by citizens of the middle class. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
86:If one way be better than another, that you may be sure is Nature's way. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
87:Anyone who has no need of anybody but himself is either a beast or a God. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
88:It is not enough to win a war; it is more important to organize the peace. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
89:The word is a sign or symbol of the impressions or affections of the soul. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
90:A likely impossibility is always preferable to an unconvincing possibility. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
91:The only stable state is the one in which all men are equal before the law. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
92:A change in the shape of the body creates a change in the state of the soul. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
93:A true disciple shows his appreciation by reaching further than his teacher. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
94:Democracy is when the indigent, and not the men of property, are the rulers. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
95:Happiness is a certain activity of soul in conformity with perfect goodness. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
96:If you would understand anything, observe its beginning and its development. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
97:The educated differ from the uneducated as much as the living from the dead. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
98:The high-minded man must care more for the truth than for what people think. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
99:Without friends, no one would choose to live, though he had all other goods. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
100:No notice is taken of a little evil, but when it increases it strikes the eye. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
101:The least initial deviation from the truth is multiplied later a thousandfold. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
102:For the things, we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing them. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
103:It is better to rise from life as from a banquet - neither thirsty nor drunken. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
104:The least initial deviation from the truth is multiplied later a thousand-fold. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
105:Ancient laws remain in force long after the people have the power to change them. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
106:A tragedy is that moment where the hero comes face to face with his true identity. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
107:Obstinate people can be divided into the opinionated, the ignorant, and the boorish. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
108:Only an armed people can be truly free. Only an unarmed people can ever be enslaved. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
109:In general, what is written must be easy to read and easy to speak; which is the same. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
110:Speech is the representation of the mind, and writing is the representation of speech. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
111:Aristotle dines when it seems good to King Philip, but Diogenes when he himself pleases. ~ diogenes, @wisdomtrove
112:Art is identical with a state of capacity to make, involving a true course of reasoning. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
113:It was through the feeling of wonder that people now and at first began to philosophize. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
114:The specific excellence of verbal expression in poetry is to be clear without being low. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
115:With regard to excellence, it is not enough to know, but we must try to have and use it. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
116:It is impossible, or not easy, to alter by argument what has long been absorbed by habit. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
117:Learning is an ornament in prosperity, a refuge in adversity, and a provision in old age. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
118:It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain a thought without accepting it. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
119:Happiness is the meaning and the purpose of life, the whole aim and end of human existence. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
120:Poetry demands a man with a special gift for it, or else one with a touch of madness in him. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
121:All friendly feelings toward others come from the friendly feelings a person has for himself. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
122:It is not easy to determine the nature of music, or why anyone should have a knowledge of it. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
123:At his best man is the noblest of all animals; separated from law and justice he is the worst. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
124:Courage is the first of human qualities because it is the quality which guarantees the others. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
125:For though we love both the truth and our friends, piety requires us to honor the truth first. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
126:It is well to be up before daybreak, for such habits contribute to health, wealth, and wisdom. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
127:Life does not need pleasure to be added to it as an appendage, but contains pleasure in itself. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
128:For what is the best choice for each individual is the highest it is possible for him to achieve. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
129:Purpose is a desire for something in our own power, coupled with an investigation into its means. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
130:The best friend is he that, when he wishes a person's good, wishes it for that person's own sake. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
131:Justice is the loveliest and health is the best. but the sweetest to obtain is the heart's desire. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
132:The aim of art is not to represent the outward appearance of things, but their inner significance. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
133:Bring your desires down to your present means. Increase them only when your increased means permit. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
134:It is our choice of good or evil that determines our character, not our opinion about good or evil. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
135:No one would choose a friendless existence on condition of having all the other things in the world. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
136:Character is that which reveals moral purpose, exposing the class of things a man chooses and avoids. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
137:Democracy arose from men's thinking that if they are equal in any respect, they are equal absolutely. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
138:It is of the nature of desire not to be satisfied, and most men live only for the gratification of it. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
139:The ideal man bears the accidents of life with dignity and grace, making the best of the circumstances. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
140:Between husband and wife, friendship seems to exist by nature, for man is naturally disposed to pairing. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
141:It is easy to perform a good action, but not easy to acquire a settled habit of performing such actions. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
142:It is not once nor twice but times without number that the same ideas make their appearance in the world. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
143:It is the characteristic of the magnanimous man to ask no favor but to be ready to do kindness to others. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
144:Man is a goal seeking animal. His life only has meaning if he is reaching out and striving for his goals. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
145:Young people are in a condition like permanent intoxication, because youth is sweet and they are growing. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
146:Every science and every inquiry, and similarly every activity and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
147:Where perception is, there also are pain and pleasure, and where these are, there, of necessity, is desire. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
148:Art completes what nature cannot bring to finish. The artist gives us knowledge of nature's unrealized ends. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
149:Men regard it as their right to return evil for evil and, if they cannot, feel they have lost their liberty. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
150:True happiness flows from the possession of wisdom and virtue and not from the possession of external goods. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
151:Man, when perfected, is the best of animals, but when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
152:The fact that all animals and men pursue pleasure is some indication that it is in some way the highest good. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
153:It is simplicity that makes the uneducated more effective than the educated when addressing popular audiences. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
154:I have gained this from philosophy: that I do without being commanded what others do only from fear of the law. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
155:Music has a power of forming the character, and should therefore be introduced into the education of the young. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
156:The intelligence consists not only in the knowledge but also in the skill to apply the knowledge into practice. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
157:You will never do anything in this world without courage. It is the greatest quality of the mind next to honor. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
158:Man's best friend is one who wishes well to the object of his wish for his sake, even if no one is to know of it. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
159:Men create gods after their own image, not only with regard to their form, but with regard to their mode of life. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
160:The brave man, if he be compared with the coward, seems foolhardy; and, if with the foolhardy man, seems a coward. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
161:To enjoy the things we ought, and to hate the things we ought, has the greatest bearing on excellence of character. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
162:A line is not made up of points. … In the same way, time is not made up parts considered as indivisible &
163:I count him braver who overcomes his desires than him who conquers his enemies; for the hardest victory is over self. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
164:He is courageous who endures and fears the right thing, for the right motive, in the right way and at the right times. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
165:A speaker who is attempting to move people to thought or action must concern himself with Pathos (i.e., their emotion.) ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
166:Aristotle was once asked what those who tell lies gain by it. Said he - That when they speak truth they are not believed. ~ diogenes, @wisdomtrove
167:Meanness is more ingrained in man's nature than Prodigality; the mass of mankind are avaricious rather than open-handed. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
168:We become just by performing just actions, temperate by performing temperate actions, brave by performing brave actions. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
169:All human actions have one or more of these seven causes: chance, nature, compulsion, habit, reason, passion, and desire. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
170:One may go wrong in many different ways, but right only in one, which is why it is easy to fail and difficult to succeed. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
171:Poetry is finer and more philosophical than history; for poetry expresses the universal, and history only the particular. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
172:Purpose is held to be most closely connected with virtue, and to be a better token of our character than are even our acts. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
173:Wise people have an inward sense of what is beautiful, and the highest wisdom is to trust this intuition and be guided by it. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
174:Linnaeus and Cuvier have been my two gods, though in very different ways, but they were mere schoolboys to old Aristotle. ~ charles-darwin, @wisdomtrove
175:The most perfect political community is one in which the middle class is in control, and outnumbers both of the other classes. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
176:The senses are gateways to the intelligence. There is nothing in the intelligence which did not first pass through the senses. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
177:He who cannot see the truth for himself, nor, hearing it from others, store it away in his mind, that man is utterly worthless. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
178:A friend is a second self, so that our consciousness of a friend's existence makes us more fully conscious of our own existence. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
179:And happiness is thought to depend on leisure; for we are busy that we may have leisure, and make war that we may live in peace. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
180:It is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
181:The happy life is regarded as a life in conformity with virtue. It is a life which involves effort and is not spent in amusement. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
182:Excellence is an art won by training and habituation...   We are what we repeatedly do. Excellence, then, is not an act but a habit. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
183:In a democracy, the poor will have more power than the rich, because there are more of them, and the will of the majority is supreme. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
184:The man who is truly good and wise will bear with dignity whatever fortune sends, and will always make the best of his circumstances. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
185:All who have meditated on the art of governing mankind have been convinced that the fate of empires depends on the education of youth. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
186:Music directly represents the passions of the soul. If one listens to the wrong kind of music, he will become the wrong kind of person. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
187:We may have many acquaintances, but we can have but few friends; this made Aristotle say that he that hath many friends hath none. ~ samuel-johnson, @wisdomtrove
188:One who surpasses his fellow citizens in virtue is no longer a part of the city. Their law is not for him, since he is a law to himself. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
189:It is not enough to know about Virtue, then, but we must endeavour to possess it, and to use it, or to take any other steps that may make. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
190:Suffering becomes beautiful when anyone bears great calamities with cheerfulness, not through insensibility but through greatness of mind. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
191:Excellence or virtue in a man will be the disposition which renders him a good man and also which will cause him to perform his function well. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
192:Aristotle said that some people were only fit to be slaves. I do not contradict him. But I reject slavery because I see no men fit to be masters. ~ c-s-lewis, @wisdomtrove
193:A man who examines each subject from a philosophical standpoint cannot neglect them: he has to omit nothing, and state the truth about each topic. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
194:Cicero called Aristotle a river of flowing gold, and said of Plato's Dialogues, that if Jupiter were to speak, it would be in language like theirs. ~ plutarch, @wisdomtrove
195:Moral excellence comes about as a result of habit. We become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
196:One swallow does not make a summer, neither does one fine day; similarly, one day or brief time of happiness does not make a person entirely happy. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
197:These virtues are formed in man by his doing the actions ... The good of man is a working of the soul in the way of excellence in a complete life. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
198:A tragedy is a representation of an action that is whole and complete and of a certain magnitude. A whole is what has a beginning and middle and end. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
199:Teachers who educate children deserve more honour than parents who merely gave them birth; for bare life is furnished by the one, the other ensures a good life. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
200:The ideal Government of all reflective men, from Aristotle onward, is one which lets the individual alone - one which barely escapes being no government at all. ~ h-l-mencken, @wisdomtrove
201:A government which is composed of the middle class more nearly approximates to democracy than to oligarchy, and is the safest of the imperfect forms of government. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
202:And of course, the brain is not responsible for any of the sensations at all. The correct view is that the seat and source of sensation is the region of the heart. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
203:Perfect friendship is the friendship of men who are good, and alike in excellence; for these wish well alike to each other qua good, and they are good in themselves. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
204:Democracy arises out of the notion that those who are equal in any respect are equal in all respects; because men are equally free, they claim to be absolutely equal. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
205:For hym was levere have at his beddes heed Twenty bookes, clad in blak or reed, Of Aristotle and his philosophie, Than robes riche, or fithele, or gay sautrie. ~ geoffrey-chaucer, @wisdomtrove
206:One may perhaps be led to suppose that it is virtue that is the end of the statesman's life. Yet even virtue itself would seem to fall short of being an absolute end. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
207:The heart is the perfection of the whole organism. Therefore, the principles of the power of perception and the soul's ability to nourish itself must lie in the heart. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
208:The good for man is an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue, or if there are more kinds of virtue than one, in accordance with the best and most perfect kind. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
209:Every wicked man is in ignorance as to what he ought to do, and from what to abstain, and it is because of error such as this that men become unjust and, in a word, wicked. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
210:If liberty and equality, as is thought by some are chiefly to be found in democracy, they will be best attained when all persons alike share in the government to the utmost. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
211:In making a speech one must study three points: first, the means of producing persuasion; second, the language; third the proper arrangement of the various parts of the speech. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
212:No matter what Aristotle and the Philosophers say, nothing is equal to tobacco; it's the passion of the well-bred, and he who lives without tobacco lives a life not worth living. ~ moliere, @wisdomtrove
213:Nature does nothing in vain. Therefore, it is imperative for persons to act in accordance with their nature and develop their latent talents, in order to be content and complete. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
214:The seat of the soul and the control of voluntary movement - in fact, of nervous functions in general, - are to be sought in the heart. The brain is an organ of minor importance. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
215:Our tradition of political thought had its definite beginning in the teachings of Plato and Aristotle. I believe it came to a no less definite end in the theories of Karl Marx. ~ hannah-arendt, @wisdomtrove
216:Where some people are very wealthy and others have nothing, the result will be either extreme democracy or absolute oligarchy, or despotism will come from either of those excesses. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
217:Humour is the only test of gravity, and gravity of humour; for a subject which will not bear raillery is suspicious, and a jest which will not bear serious examination is false wit. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
218:The beauty of the soul shines out when a man bears with composure one heavy mischance after another, not because he does not feel them, but because he is a man of high and heroic temper. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
219:S. Lewis, Plato, Aristotle and many more names that I could add, including Einstein's, were individuals who were able to see the innate order in life, which others perceive as chaos. ~ frederick-lenz, @wisdomtrove
220:Bad people... are in conflict with themselves; they desire one thing and will another, like the incontinent who choose harmful pleasures instead of what they themselves believe to be good. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
221:But the greatest thing by far is to have a command of metaphor. This alone cannot be imparted by another; it is the mark of genius, for to make good metaphors implies an eye for resemblances. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
222:When…we, as individuals, obey laws that direct us to behave for the welfare of the community as a whole, we are indirectly helping to promote the pursuit of happiness by our fellow human beings. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
223:Men acquire a particular quality by constantly acting a particular way... you become just by performing just actions, temperate by performing temperate actions, brave by performing brave actions. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
224:Aristotle may be regarded as the cultural barometer of Western history. Whenever his influence dominated the scene, it paved the way for one of history's brilliant eras; whenever it fell, so did mankind. ~ ayn-rand, @wisdomtrove
225:The essential nature (concerning the soul) cannot be corporeal, yet it is also clear that this soul is present in a particular bodily part, and this one of the parts having control over the rest (heart). ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
226:First, have a definite, clear practical ideal; a goal, an objective. Second, have the necessary means to achieve your ends; wisdom, money, materials, and methods. Third, adjust all your means to that end. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
227:Of the tyrant, spies and informers are the principal instruments. War is his favourite occupation, for the sake of engrossing the attention of the people, and making himself necessary to them as their leader. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
228:If the average man is made in God's image, then a man such as Beethoven or Aristotle is plainly superior to God, and so God may be jealous of him, and eager to see his superiority perish with his bodily frame. ~ h-l-mencken, @wisdomtrove
229:Justice is complete virtue in the fullest sense, because it is the active exercise of complete virtue; and it is complete because its possessor can exercise it in relation to another person, and not only by himself. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
230:The real difference between democracy and oligarchy is poverty and wealth. Wherever men rule by reason of their wealth, whether they be few or many, that is an oligarchy, and where the poor rule, that is a democracy. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
231:It is also in the interests of a tyrant to make his subjects poor, so that he may be able to afford the cost of his bodyguard, while the people are so occupied with their daily tasks that they have no time for plotting. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
232:A state is not a mere society, having a common place, established for the prevention of mutual crime and for the sake of exchange... . Political society exists for the sake of noble actions, and not of mere companionship. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
233:The life of theoretical philosophy is the best and happiest a man can lead. Few men are capable of it and then only intermittently. For the rest, there is a second-best way of life, that of moral virtue and practical wisdom. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
234:In poverty and other misfortunes of life, true friends are a sure refuge. The young they keep out of mischief; to the old they are a comfort and aid in their weakness, and those in the prime of life they incite to noble deeds. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
235:Aristotle once said that wisdom (the ability to make good decisions) is a combination of experience plus reflection. The more time that you take to think about your experiences, the more vital lessons you will gain from them. ~ brian-tracy, @wisdomtrove
236:Anybody can become angry — that is easy, but to be angry with the right person and to the right degree and at the right time and for the right purpose, and in the right way — that is not within everybody's power and is not easy. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
237:Jealousy is both reasonable and belongs to reasonable men, while envy is base and belongs to the base, for the one makes himself get good things by jealousy, while the other does not allow his neighbour to have them through envy. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
238:It is just that we should be grateful, not only to those with whose views we may agree, but also to those who have expressed more superficial views; for these also contributed something, by developing before us the powers of thought. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
239:Now the goodness that we have to consider is clearly human goodness, since the good or happiness which we set out to seek was human good and human happiness. But human goodness means in our view excellence of soul, not excellence of body. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
240:The single harmony produced by all the heavenly bodies singing and dancing together springs from one source and ends by achieving one purpose, and has rightly bestowed the name not of "disordered" but of "ordered universe" upon the whole. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
241:The usual derivation of the word Metaphysics is not to be sustainedthe science is supposed to take its name from its superiority to physics. The truth is, that Aristotle's treatise on Morals is next in succession to his Book of Physics. ~ edgar-allan-poe, @wisdomtrove
242:The wise man does not expose himself needlessly to danger, since there are few things for which he cares sufficiently; but he is willing, in great crises, to give even his life - knowing that under certain conditions it is not worthwhile to live. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
243:Because the rich are generally few in number, while the poor are many, they appear to be antagonistic, and as the one or the other prevails they form the government. Hence arises the common opinion that there are two kinds of government - democracy and oligarchy. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
244:The longest tyranny that ever sway'd Was that wherein our ancestors betray'd Their free-born reason to the Stagirite [Aristotle], And made his torch their universal light. So truth, while only one suppli'd the state, Grew scarce, and dear, and yet sophisticate. ~ john-dryden, @wisdomtrove
245:the insight that peace is the end of war, and that therefore a war is the preparation for peace, is at least as old as Aristotle, and the pretense that the aim of an armament race is to guard the peace is even older, namely as old as the discovery of propaganda lies. ~ hannah-arendt, @wisdomtrove
246:Of old, the demagogue was also a general, and then democracies changed into tyrannies. Most of the ancient tyrants were originally demagogues. They are not so now, but they were then; and the reason is that they were generals and not orators, for oratory had not yet come into fashion. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
247:The aim of education is to make the pupil like and dislike what he ought... . The little human animal will not at first have the right responses. It must be trained to feel pleasure, liking, disgust, and hatred at those things which really are pleasant, likable, disgusting, and hateful. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
248:There is no absolute up or down, as Aristotle taught; no absolute position in space; but the position of a body is relative to that of other bodies. Everywhere there is incessant relative change in position throughout the universe, and the observer is always at the center of things. ~ giordano-bruno, @wisdomtrove
249:No space, no time, no gravity, no electromagnetism, no particles. Nothing. We are back where Plato, Aristotle and Parmenides struggled with the great questions: How Come the Universe, How Come Us, How Come Anything? But happily also we have around the answer to these questions. That's us. ~ john-wheeler, @wisdomtrove
250:Music directly imitates the passions or states of the soul... when one listens to music that imitates a certain passion, he becomes imbued with the same passion; and if over a long time he habitually listens to music that rouses ignoble passions, his whole character will be shaped to an ignoble form. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
251:Prophecy is rash, but it may be that the publication of D.T. Suzuki's first Essays in Zen Buddhism in 1927 will seem to future generations as great an intellectual event as William of Moerbeke's Latin translations of Aristotle in the thirteenth century or Marsiglio Ficino's of Plato in the fifteenth. ~ d-t-suzuki, @wisdomtrove
252:Happiness, whether consisting in pleasure or virtue, or both, is more often found with those who are highly cultivated in their minds and in their character, and have only a moderate share of external goods, than among those who possess external goods to a useless extent but are deficient in higher qualities. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
253:Happiness does not consist in amusement. In fact, it would be strange if our end were amusement, and if we were to labor and suffer hardships all our life long merely to amuse ourselves. The happy life is regarded as a life in conformity with virtue. It is a life which involves effort and is not spent in amusement. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
254:It is not necessary to ask whether soul and body are one, just as it is not necessary to ask whether the wax and its shape are one, nor generally whether the matter of each thing and that of which it is the matter are one. For even if one and being are spoken of in several ways, what is properly so spoken of is the actuality. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
255:If, then, God is always in that good state in which we sometimes are, this compels our wonder; and if in a better this compels it yet more. And God is in a better state. And life also belongs to God; for the actuality of thought is life, and God is that actuality; and God's self-dependent actuality is life most good and eternal. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
256:Was it Aristotle who said the human soul is composed of reason, will, and desire?No, that was Plato. Aristotle and Plato were as different as Mel Torm√© and Bing Crosby. In any case, things were a lot simpler in the old days,Komatsu said. Wouldn’t it be fun to imagine reason, will, and desire engaged in a fierce debate around a table? ~ haruki-murakami, @wisdomtrove
257:In a word, acts of any kind produce habits or characters of the same kind. Hence, we ought to make sure that our acts are of a certain kind; for the resulting character varies as they vary. It makes no small difference, therefore, whether a man be trained in his youth up in this way or that, but a great difference, or rather all the difference. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
258:Aristotle could have avoided the mistake of thinking that women have fewer teeth than men, by the simple device of asking Mrs. Aristotle to keep her mouth open while he counted. ~ bertrand-russell, @wisdomtrove
259:For both excessive and insufficient exercise destroy one's strength, and both eating and drinking too much or too little destroy health, whereas the right quantity produces, increases or preserves it. So it is the same with temperance, courage and the other virtues... This much then, is clear: in all our conduct, it is the mean that is to be commended. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
260:As Aristotle said, &
261:If they [Plato and Aristotle] wrote about politics it was as if to lay down rules for a madhouse. And if they pretended to treat it as something really important it was because they knew that the madmen they were talking to believed themselves to be kings and emperors. They humored these beliefs in order to calm down their madness with as little harm as possible. ~ blaise-pascal, @wisdomtrove
262:But, Jefferson worried that the people - and the argument goes back to Thucydides and Aristotle - are easily misled. He also stressed, passionately and repeatedly, that it was essential for the people to understand the risks and benefits of government, to educate themselves, and to involve themselves in the political process. Without that, he said, the wolves will take over. ~ carl-sagan, @wisdomtrove
263:The sense of tragedy - according to Aristotle - comes, ironically enough, not from the protagonist's weak points but from his good qualities. Do you know what I'm getting at? People are drawn deeper into tragedy not by their defects but by their virtues. ... [But] we accept irony through a device called metaphor. And through that we grow and become deeper human beings. ~ haruki-murakami, @wisdomtrove
264:I have rarely read anything which has interested me more, though I have not read as yet more than a quarter of the book proper. From quotations which I had seen, I had a high notion of Aristotle's merits, but I had not the most remote notion what a wonderful man he was. Linnaeus and Cuvier have been my two gods, though in very different ways, but they were mere schoolboys to old Aristotle. ~ charles-darwin, @wisdomtrove
265:The investigation of the truth is in one way hard, in another easy. An indication of this is found in the fact that no one is able to attain the truth adequately, while, on the other hand, no one fails entirely, but everyone says something true about the nature of all things, and while individually they contribute little or nothing to the truth, by the union of all a considerable amount is amassed. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
266:A young man is not a proper hearer of lectures on political science; for he is inexperienced in the actions that occur in life, but its discussions start from these and are about these; and, further, since he tends to follow his passions, his study will be vain and unprofitable, because the end that is aimed at is not knowledge but action. And it makes no difference whether he is young in years or youthful in character. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
267:All men by nature desire to know. An indication of this is the delight we take in our senses; for even apart from their usefulness they are loved for themselves; and above all others the sense of sight. For not only with a view to action, but even when we are not going to do anything, we prefer sight to almost everything else. The reason is that this, most of all the senses, makes us know and brings to light many differences between things. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
268:When Catholicism goes bad it becomes the world-old, world-wide religio of amulets and holy places and priestcraft. Protestantism,in its corresponding decay, becomes a vague mist of ethical platitudes. Catholicism is accused of being too much like all the other religions; Protestantism of being insufficiently like a religion at all. Hence Plato, with his transcendent Forms, is the doctor of Protestants; Aristotle, with his immanent Forms, the doctor of Catholics. ~ c-s-lewis, @wisdomtrove
269:Eratosthenes was the director of the great library of Alexandria, the Centre of science and learning in the ancient world. Aristotle had argued that humanity was divided into Greeks and everybody else, whom he called barbarians and that the Greeks should keep themselves racially pure. He thought it was fitting for the Greeks to enslave other peoples. But Erathosthenes criticized Aristotle for his blind chauvinism, he believed there was good and bad in every nation. ~ carl-sagan, @wisdomtrove
270:The bourgeois thinkers of the eighteenth century thus turned Aristotle's formula on its head: satisfactions which the Greek philosopher had identified with leisure were now transposed to the sphere of work, while tasks lacking in any financial reward were drained of all significance and left to the haphazard attentions of decadent dilettantes. It now seemed as impossible that one could be happy and unproductive as it had once seemed unlikely that one could work and be human. ~ alain-de-botton, @wisdomtrove
271:As everyone knows, the ancients before Aristotle did not consider the dream a product of the dreaming mind, but a divine inspiration, and in ancient times the two antagonistic streams, which one finds throughout in the estimates of dream life, were already noticeable. They distinguished between true and valuable dreams, sent to the dreamer to warn him or to foretell the future, and vain, fraudulent, and empty dreams, the object of which was to misguide or lead him to destruction. ~ sigmund-freud, @wisdomtrove
272:“Philosophy, beginning in wonder, as Plato and Aristotle said, is able to fancy everything different from what it is. It sees the familiar as if it were strange, and the strange as if it were familiar. It can take things up and lay them down again. It rouses us from our native dogmatic slumber and breaks up our caked prejudices.” ~ william-james, @wisdomtrove
273:The tyrant, who in order to hold his power, suppresses every superiority, does away with good men, forbids education and light, controls every movement of the citizens and, keeping them under a perpetual servitude, wants them to grow accustomed to baseness and cowardice, has his spies everywhere to listen to what is said in the meetings, and spreads dissension and calumny among the citizens and impoverishes them, is obliged to make war in order to keep his subjects occupied and impose on them permanent need of a chief. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
274:Is it not evident, in these last hundred years (when the Study of Philosophy has been the business of all the Virtuosi in Christendome) that almost a new Nature has been revealed to us? that more errours of the School have been detected, more useful Experiments in Philosophy have been made, more Noble Secrets in Opticks, Medicine, Anatomy, Astronomy, discover'd, than in all those credulous and doting Ages from Aristotle to us? So true it is that nothing spreads more fast than Science, when rightly and generally cultivated. ~ john-dryden, @wisdomtrove
275:The young have exalted notions, because they have not been humbled by life or learned its necessary limitations; moreover, their hopeful disposition makes them think themselves equal to great things—and that means having exalted notions. They would always rather do noble deeds than useful ones: Their lives are regulated more by moral feeling than by reasoning... . All their mistakes are in the direction of doing things excessively and vehemently. They overdo everything; they love too much, hate too much, and the same with everything else. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
276:[Thomas Henry] Huxley, I believe, was the greatest Englishman of the Nineteenth Century—perhaps the greatest Englishman of all time. When one thinks of him, one thinks inevitably of such men as Goethe and Aristotle. For in him there was that rich, incomparable blend of intelligence and character, of colossal knowledge and high adventurousness, of instinctive honesty and indomitable courage which appears in mankind only once in a blue moon. There have been far greater scientists, even in England, but there has never been a scientist who was a greater man. ~ h-l-mencken, @wisdomtrove
277:It must not be supposed that happiness will demand many or great possessions; for self-sufficiency does not depend on excessive abundance, nor does moral conduct, and it is possible to perform noble deeds even without being ruler of land and sea: one can do virtuous acts with quite moderate resources. This may be clearly observed in experience: private citizens do not seem to be less but more given to doing virtuous actions than princes and potentates. It is sufficient then if moderate resources are forthcoming; for a life of virtuous activity will be essentially a happy life. ~ aristotle, @wisdomtrove
278:His rare science and practical skill, and the added fame of second sight and extraordinary religious knowledge and gifts, drew to him queens, nobles, clergy, ship-masters and people about the ports through which he was wont to pass in his many voyages. The clergy interfered a little with the importation and publication of his religious works, but he seems to have kept the friendship of men in power. He was never married. He had great modesty and gentleness of bearing. His habits were simple; he lived on bread, milk and vegetables; he lived in a house situated in a large garden... He is described... as a man of a quiet, clerical habit, not averse to tea and coffee, and kind to children... A colossal soul, he lies vast abroad on his times, uncomprehended by them, and requires a long focal distance to be seen; suggests, as Aristotle, Bacon, Selden, & Humboldt, that a certain vastness of learning, or quasi omnipresence of the human soul in nature, is possible. Ralph Waldo Emerson in Ralph Waldo Emerson ~ emanuel-swedenborg, @wisdomtrove

*** NEWFULLDB 2.4M ***

1:A friend is another I. ~ Aristotle,
2:Happiness is activity. ~ Aristotle,
3:Greed has no boundaries ~ Aristotle,
4:Hope is a waking dream. ~ Aristotle,
5:Nature abhors a vacuum. ~ Aristotle,
6:Adventure is worthwhile. ~ Aristotle,
7:Beauty is a gift of God. ~ Aristotle,
8:Either a beast or a god. ~ Aristotle,
9:Evil draws men together. ~ Aristotle,
10:Evils draw men together. ~ Aristotle,
11:Friendship is communion. ~ Aristotle,
12:Moderation in all things ~ Aristotle,
13:Well begun is half done. ~ Aristotle,
14:Beauty is the gift of God ~ Aristotle,
15:Everyone honors the wise. ~ Aristotle,
16:Evil brings men together. ~ Aristotle,
17:Fortune favours the bold. ~ Aristotle,
18:To perceive is to suffer. ~ Aristotle,
19:Virtue lies in moderation ~ Aristotle,
20:A friend is a second self. ~ Aristotle,
21:Hope is a waking dream.
   ~ Aristotle,
22:Well begun is half done. ~ Aristotle,
23:Wit is cultured insolence. ~ Aristotle,
24:Wit is educated insolence. ~ Aristotle,
25:Law is mind without reason. ~ Aristotle,
26:Wit is well-bred insolence. ~ Aristotle,
27:All proofs rest on premises. ~ Aristotle,
28:All things are full of gods. ~ Aristotle,
29:Man by nature wants to know. ~ Aristotle,
30:Nature does nothing in vain. ~ Aristotle,
31:We Can't learn without pain. ~ Aristotle,
32:We can't learn without pain. ~ Aristotle,
33:We work to earn our leisure. ~ Aristotle,
34:Happiness is the highest good ~ Aristotle,
35:We are what we frequently do. ~ Aristotle,
36:We are what we repeatedly do. ~ Aristotle,
37:What we expect, that we find. ~ Aristotle,
38:All men are alike when asleep. ~ Aristotle,
39:Art takes nature as its model. ~ Aristotle,
40:Change in all things is sweet. ~ Aristotle,
41:Happiness is activity of soul. ~ Aristotle,
42:Happiness is a sort of action. ~ Aristotle,
43:It is no easy task to be good. ~ Aristotle,
44:Man by Nature desires to know. ~ Aristotle,
45:Nature does nothing uselessly. ~ Aristotle,
46:Philosophy begins with wonder. ~ Aristotle,
47:The hand is the tool of tools. ~ Aristotle,
48:The intention makes the crime. ~ Aristotle,
49:There is honor in being a dog. ~ Aristotle,
50:We are what we continually do. ~ Aristotle,
51:You are what you repeatedly do ~ Aristotle,
52:Bad men are full of repentance. ~ Aristotle,
53:Happiness depends on ourselves. ~ Aristotle,
54:Perception starts with the eye. ~ Aristotle,
55:What soon grows old? Gratitude. ~ Aristotle,
56:You are what you do repeatedly. ~ Aristotle,
57:By nature, all men long to know. ~ Aristotle,
58:Cruel is the strife of brothers. ~ Aristotle,
59:Doubt is the beginning of wisdom ~ Aristotle,
60:Happiness is self-connectedness. ~ Aristotle,
61:Memory is the scribe of the soul ~ Aristotle,
62:Philosophy can make people sick. ~ Aristotle,
63:That which is excellent endures. ~ Aristotle,
64:the actuality of thought is life ~ Aristotle,
65:The gods too are fond of a joke. ~ Aristotle,
66:The secret to humor is surprise. ~ Aristotle,
67:The soul is the form of the body ~ Aristotle,
68:Wickedness is nourished by lust. ~ Aristotle,
69:All men by nature desire to know. ~ Aristotle,
70:All men desire by nature to know. ~ Aristotle,
71:Authority is no source for Truth. ~ Aristotle,
72:Happiness depends upon ourselves. ~ Aristotle,
73:Happiness is a state of activity. ~ Aristotle,
74:Hope is the dream of a waking man ~ Aristotle,
75:Memory is the scribe of the soul. ~ Aristotle,
76:Nothing is what rocks dream about ~ Aristotle,
77:Peace is more difficult than war. ~ Aristotle,
78:Talent is culture with insolence. ~ Aristotle,
79:The actuality of thought is life. ~ Aristotle,
80:Those who act receive the prizes. ~ Aristotle,
81:Through discipline comes freedom. ~ Aristotle,
82:To Unlearn is as hard as to Learn ~ Aristotle,
83:Wealth comes from knowing ~ Aristotle Onassis,
84:A man is the origin of his action. ~ Aristotle,
85:Anybody can get hit over the head. ~ Aristotle,
86:For good is simple, evil manifold. ~ Aristotle,
87:Happiness is the reward of virtue. ~ Aristotle,
88:The greatest victory is over self. ~ Aristotle,
89:All men by nature desire knowledge. ~ Aristotle,
90:Every realm of nature is marvelous. ~ Aristotle,
91:for nobility is excellence of race. ~ Aristotle,
92:He who hath many friends hath none. ~ Aristotle,
93:Human beings are curious by nature. ~ Aristotle,
94:No one loves the man whom he fears. ~ Aristotle,
95:Wonder implies the desire to learn. ~ Aristotle,
96:A friend to all is a friend to none. ~ Aristotle,
97:Excellence is not an act, but habit. ~ Aristotle,
98:For the activity of the mind is life ~ Aristotle,
99:[Hope is] the dream of a waking man. ~ Aristotle,
100:Man is by nature a political animal. ~ Aristotle,
101:The end of labor is to gain leisure. ~ Aristotle,
102:The Law is Reason free from Passion. ~ Aristotle,
103:Try is a noisy way of doing nothing. ~ Aristotle,
104:We become brave by doing brave acts. ~ Aristotle,
105:Your happiness depends on you alone. ~ Aristotle,
106:A friend to all is a friend to none. ~ Aristotle,
107:All communication must lead to change ~ Aristotle,
108:Amicus Plato, sed magis amica veritas ~ Aristotle,
109:Character is revealed through action. ~ Aristotle,
110:Der Anfang ist die Hälfte vom Ganzen. ~ Aristotle,
111:PLOT is CHARACTER revealed by ACTION. ~ Aristotle,
112:Quality is not an act, it is a habit. ~ Aristotle,
113:Sólo hay una fuerza motriz: el deseo. ~ Aristotle,
114:The avarice of mankind is insatiable. ~ Aristotle,
115:The law is reason, free from passion. ~ Aristotle,
116:The probable is what usually happens. ~ Aristotle,
117:Wir sind das, was wir wiederholt tun. ~ Aristotle,
118:A man without regrets cannot be cured. ~ Aristotle,
119:A promise made must be a promise kept. ~ Aristotle,
120:Excellence is not an act, but a habit. ~ Aristotle,
121:We make war that we may live in peace. ~ Aristotle,
122:Worms are the intestines of the earth. ~ Aristotle,
123:Het geluk behoort toe aan de tevredenen ~ Aristotle,
124:He who has many friends has no friends. ~ Aristotle,
125:In justice is all virtues found in sum. ~ Aristotle,
126:One has no friend who has many friends. ~ Aristotle,
127:Our actions determine our dispositions. ~ Aristotle,
128:Prayers and sacrifices are of no avail. ~ Aristotle,
129:The law is reason unaffected by desire. ~ Aristotle,
130:The physician heals, Nature makes well. ~ Aristotle,
131:We must become just be doing just acts. ~ Aristotle,
132:A gentleman is not disturbed by anything ~ Aristotle,
133:Aristotle doesn’t exist for Nietzsche. ~ Leo Strauss,
134:A true friend is one soul in two bodies. ~ Aristotle,
135:Friendship is essentially a partnership. ~ Aristotle,
136:If something's bound to happen, it will ~ Aristotle,
137:The soul never thinks without a picture. ~ Aristotle,
138:we cannot be prudent without being good. ~ Aristotle,
139:Yellow-colored objects appear to be gold ~ Aristotle,
140:Your name is Angel Aristotle? ~ Benjamin Alire S enz,
141:You should never think without an image. ~ Aristotle,
142:Happiness belongs to the self sufficient. ~ Aristotle,
143:Happiness belongs to the self-sufficient. ~ Aristotle,
144:Law is order, and good law is good order. ~ Aristotle,
145:Love is the cause of unity in all things. ~ Aristotle,
146:Nature creates nothing without a purpose. ~ Aristotle,
147:To love someone is to identify with them. ~ Aristotle,
148:What a society honors will be cultivated. ~ Aristotle,
149:A friend is simply one soul in two bodies. ~ Aristotle,
150:A friend of everyone is a friend of no one ~ Aristotle,
151:All paid jobs absorb and degrade the mind. ~ Aristotle,
152:All virtue is summed up in dealing justly. ~ Aristotle,
153:Criticism is something we can avoid easily ~ Aristotle,
154:Imagination is a sort of faint perception. ~ Aristotle,
155:"I was not alone when I was in Goofy hell" ~ Aristotle,
156:The basis of a democratic state is liberty ~ Aristotle,
157:We are what we repeatedly do. —Aristotle ~ Joe Navarro,
158:Aristotle said: "Evil brings men together." ~ Aristotle,
159:Boundaries don't protect rivers, people do. ~ Aristotle,
160:Earthworms are the intenstines of the soil. ~ Aristotle,
161:Education is the best provision for old age ~ Aristotle,
162:Justice is Equality...but equality of what? ~ Aristotle,
163:Men create the gods after their own images. ~ Aristotle,
164:Patience is bitter, but its fruit is sweet. ~ Aristotle,
165:Patience s bitter, but it's fruit is sweet. ~ Aristotle,
166:The blood of a goat will shatter a diamond. ~ Aristotle,
167:They should rule who are able to rule best. ~ Aristotle,
168:All art is concerned with coming into being. ~ Aristotle,
169:All men seek one goal: success or happiness. ~ Aristotle,
170:Between friends there is no need of justice. ~ Aristotle,
171:Choice, not chance, determines your destiny. ~ Aristotle,
172:Education is the best provision for old age. ~ Aristotle,
173:Friendship is two souls inhabiting one body. ~ Aristotle,
174:habits of virtue and vice are caused by acts ~ Aristotle,
175:Human beings are by nature political animals ~ Aristotle,
176:Live and die in Aristotle's works. ~ Christopher Marlowe,
177:People generally despise where they flatter. ~ Aristotle,
178:The best things are placed between extremes. ~ Aristotle,
179:The only rule is there are no rules. ~ Aristotle Onassis,
180:There is only one driving force: The desire. ~ Aristotle,
181:The student of politics must study the soul. ~ Aristotle,
182:The whole is more than the sum of its parts. ~ Aristotle,
183:They who love in excess also hate in excess. ~ Aristotle,
184:Education begins at the level of the learner. ~ Aristotle,
185:Friends enhance our ability to think and act. ~ Aristotle,
186:Happiness is prosperity combined with virtue. ~ Aristotle,
187:it seems impossible for all things to be one. ~ Aristotle,
188:La esperanza es el sueño del hombre despierto ~ Aristotle,
189:Men are good in but one way, but bad in many. ~ Aristotle,
190:Nature operates in the shortest way possible. ~ Aristotle,
191:No science ever defends its first principles. ~ Aristotle,
192:Our characters are the result of our conduct. ~ Aristotle,
193:The antidote for fifty enemies is one friend. ~ Aristotle,
194:The first principle of all action is leisure. ~ Aristotle,
195:the first principle of all action is leisure. ~ Aristotle,
196:The hardest victory is the victory over self. ~ Aristotle,
197:The whole is more than the sum of its parts. ~ Aristotle,
198:Wicked me obey from fear; good men,from love. ~ Aristotle,
199:education is the best provision for
old age ~ Aristotle,
200:Existentia nunquam ad essentiam rei pertinent. ~ Aristotle,
201:Freedom is obedience to self-formulated rules. ~ Aristotle,
202:Love well, be loved and do something of value. ~ Aristotle,
203:Men are swayed more by fear than by reverence. ~ Aristotle,
204:Poverty is the parent of revolution and crime. ~ Aristotle,
205:Teaching is the highest form of understanding. ~ Aristotle,
206:Temperance is a mean with regard to pleasures. ~ Aristotle,
207:The complete man must work, study and wrestle. ~ Aristotle,
208:The energy of the mind is the essence of life. ~ Aristotle,
209:The goal of war is peace, of business, leisure ~ Aristotle,
210:The saddest of all tragedies - the wasted life ~ Aristotle,
211:We deliberate not about ends, but about means. ~ Aristotle,
212:We laugh at that which we cannot bear to face. ~ Aristotle,
213:Youth loves honor and victory more than money. ~ Aristotle,
214:A person's life persuades better than his word. ~ Aristotle,
215:A vivid image compels the whole body to follow. ~ Aristotle,
216:By myth I mean the arrangement of the incidents ~ Aristotle,
217:Character is determined by choice, not opinion. ~ Aristotle,
218:Every great genius has an admixture of madness. ~ Aristotle,
219:Il n'y a point de génie sans un grain de folie. ~ Aristotle,
220:It is likely that unlikely things should happen ~ Aristotle,
221:It is unbecoming for young men to utter maxims. ~ Aristotle,
222:Plato is dear to me, but dearer still is truth. ~ Aristotle,
223:The smallest number, strictly speaking, is two. ~ Aristotle,
224:The soul never thinks without a mental picture. ~ Aristotle,
225:The whole is greater than the sum of its parts. ~ Aristotle,
226:We become just by the practice of just actions. ~ Aristotle,
227:What we have to learn to do, we learn by doing. ~ Aristotle,
228:95% of everything you do is the result of habit. ~ Aristotle,
229:A human being is a naturally political [animal]. ~ Aristotle,
230:God has many names, though He is only one Being. ~ Aristotle,
231:Intuition is the source of scientific knowledge. ~ Aristotle,
232:Knowing yourself is the beginning of all wisdom. ~ Aristotle,
233:Philosophy is the science which considers truth. ~ Aristotle,
234:Pleasure in the job puts perfection in the work. ~ Aristotle,
235:There's many a slip between the cup and the lip. ~ Aristotle,
236:Wicked men obey for fear, but the good for love. ~ Aristotle,
237:Fate of empires depends on the education of youth ~ Aristotle,
238:He who has overcome his fears will truly be free. ~ Aristotle,
239:Hope is the dream of a waking man. —Aristotle ~ Aleatha Romig,
240:Laughter is a bodily exercise, precious to Health ~ Aristotle,
241:Liars when they speak the truth are not believed. ~ Aristotle,
242:Life in the true sense is perceiving or thinking. ~ Aristotle,
243:Most people would rather give than get affection. ~ Aristotle,
244:Plato is my friend, but truth is a better friend. ~ Aristotle,
245:The life of the mind is only open to rich people. ~ Aristotle,
246:Those who know, do. Those that understand, teach. ~ Aristotle,
247:We do not know a truth without knowing its cause. ~ Aristotle,
248:What you have to learn to do, you learn by doing. ~ Aristotle,
249:A common danger unites even the bitterest enemies. ~ Aristotle,
250:and poverty is the parent of revolution and crime. ~ Aristotle,
251:Aristotle wrote, “We are what we repeatedly do. ~ Darren Hardy,
252:Art is a higher type of knowledge than experience. ~ Aristotle,
253:Melancholy men, of all others, are the most witty. ~ Aristotle,
254:Misfortune shows those who are not really friends. ~ Aristotle,
255:Nothing in life is more necessary than friendship. ~ Aristotle,
256:Reason is a light that God has kindled in the soul ~ Aristotle,
257:the laughable is a species of what is disgraceful. ~ Aristotle,
258:The life of active virtue is essentially pleasant. ~ Aristotle,
259:There is no genius who hasn't a touch of insanity. ~ Aristotle,
260:There must be in prudence also some master virtue. ~ Aristotle,
261:The true end of tragedy is to purify the passions. ~ Aristotle,
262:They who are to be judges must also be performers. ~ Aristotle,
263:Those that know, do. Those that understand, teach. ~ Aristotle,
264:When we deliberate it is about means and not ends. ~ Aristotle,
265:Wicked men obey from fear;
good men, from love. ~ Aristotle,
266:Wicked men obey out of fear. good men, out of love ~ Aristotle,
267:As Aristotle had written, hope was a waking dream. ~ Sue London,
268:As often as we do good, we offer sacrifices to God. ~ Aristotle,
269:Fear is pain arising from the anticipation of evil. ~ Aristotle,
270:For what one has to learn to do, we learn by doing. ~ Aristotle,
271:Friendship is a single soul dwelling in two bodies. ~ Aristotle,
272:Happiness also requires external goods in addition. ~ Aristotle,
273:Happiness comes from theperfect practice of virtue. ~ Aristotle,
274:I seek to bring forth what you almost already know. ~ Aristotle,
275:Knowing yourself is the beginning of all wisdom.
   ~ Aristotle,
276:Le bonheur est à ceux qui se suffisent à eux-mêmes. ~ Aristotle,
277:logographos, a writer of speeches for others to use ~ Aristotle,
278:Pleasure in the job puts perfection in the work.
   ~ Aristotle,
279:Reason is a light that God has kindled in the soul. ~ Aristotle,
280:The ideal man takes joy in doing favors for others. ~ Aristotle,
281:There is always something new coming out of Africa. ~ Aristotle,
282:Consider pleasures as they depart, not as they come. ~ Aristotle,
283:Even subjects that are known are known only to a few ~ Aristotle,
284:Excellence, much labored for by the race of mortals. ~ Aristotle,
285:Good habits formed at youth make all the difference. ~ Aristotle,
286:I guess the kid had everything but the luck. ~ Aristotle Onassis,
287:Knowing what is right does not make a sagacious man. ~ Aristotle,
288:Nothing new had been done in Logic since Aristotle! ~ Kurt Godel,
289:Piety requires us to honour truth above our friends. ~ Aristotle,
290:The guest will judge better of a feast than the cook ~ Aristotle,
291:The more you know, the more you know you don't know. ~ Aristotle,
292:The quality of life is determined by its activities. ~ Aristotle,
293:The soul becomes prudent by sitting and being quiet. ~ Aristotle,
294:To be ignorant of motion is to be ignorant of nature ~ Aristotle,
295:We must be neither cowardly nor rash but courageous. ~ Aristotle,
296:All learning is derived from things previously known. ~ Aristotle,
297:All that we do is done with an eye to something else. ~ Aristotle,
298:Before you heal the body you must first heal the mind ~ Aristotle,
299:Courage is a mean with regard to fear and confidence. ~ Aristotle,
300:Excellence is an art won by training and habituation. ~ Aristotle,
301:Health is a matter of choice, not a mystery of chance ~ Aristotle,
302:In everything, it is no easy task to find the middle. ~ Aristotle,
303:It would be wrong to put friendship before the truth. ~ Aristotle,
304:Life cannot be lived, and understood, simultaneously. ~ Aristotle,
305:Nature makes nothing incomplete, and nothing in vain. ~ Aristotle,
306:Self-sufficiency is both a good and an absolute good. ~ Aristotle,
307:There is no great genius without a mixture of madness ~ Aristotle,
308:We cannot ... prove geometrical truths by arithmetic. ~ Aristotle,
309:When you ask a dumb question, you get a smart answer. ~ Aristotle,
310:Youth is easily deceived because it is quick to hope. ~ Aristotle,
311:youth is easily deceived because it is quick to hope. ~ Aristotle,
312:Excellence is not an art. It is the habit of practice. ~ Aristotle,
313:No excellent soul is exempt from a mixture of madness. ~ Aristotle,
314:The beginning, as the proverb says, is half the whole. ~ Aristotle,
315:The beginning seems to be more than half of the whole. ~ Aristotle,
316:There is no great genius without a mixture of madness. ~ Aristotle,
317:The souls ability to nourish itself lies in the heart. ~ Aristotle,
318:The young are heated by Nature as drunken men by wine. ~ Aristotle,
319:We can do noble acts without ruling the earth and sea. ~ Aristotle,
320:When Pleasure is at the bar the jury is not impartial. ~ Aristotle,
321:All human happiness and misery take the form of action. ~ Aristotle,
322:Great men are always of a nature originally melancholy. ~ Aristotle,
323:He overcomes a stout enemy who overcomes his own anger. ~ Aristotle,
324:He who is to be a good ruler must have first been ruled ~ Aristotle,
325:The greatest crimes are caused by surfeit, not by want. ~ Aristotle,
326:The more you know, the more you know you don't know.
   ~ Aristotle,
327:There was never a genius without a tincture of madness… ~ Aristotle,
328:the use of music for intellectual enjoyment in leisure; ~ Aristotle,
329:What is a friend? A single soul dwelling in two bodies. ~ Aristotle,
330:which we call men [Greek: euyvomoves], or say they have ~ Aristotle,
331:A bad man can do a million times more harm than a beast. ~ Aristotle,
332:Aristotle also believed that a vacuum was impossible. ~ Peter Kreeft,
333:Everything is done with a goal, and that goal is "good." ~ Aristotle,
334:For the more limited, if adequate, is always preferable. ~ Aristotle,
335:He who is to be a good ruler must have first been ruled. ~ Aristotle,
336:Love is composed of a single soul inhabiting two bodies. ~ Aristotle,
337:One can with but moderate possessions do what one ought. ~ Aristotle,
338:The greatest thing by far is to be a master of metaphor. ~ Aristotle,
339:The least deviation from truth will be multiplied later. ~ Aristotle,
340:The true nature of a thing is the highest it can become. ~ Aristotle,
341:Think as wise men do, but speak as the common people do. ~ Aristotle,
342:A great city is not to be confounded with a populous one. ~ Aristotle,
343:a poet must be a composer of plots rather than of verses, ~ Aristotle,
344:As our acts vary, our habits will follow in their course. ~ Aristotle,
345:Every rascal is not a thief, but every thief is a rascal. ~ Aristotle,
346:For 'activity in conformity with virtue' involves virtue. ~ Aristotle,
347:He who cannot be a good follower cannot be a good leader. ~ Aristotle,
348:Life is only meaningful when we are striving for a goal . ~ Aristotle,
349:Shame is an ornament to the young; a disgrace to the old. ~ Aristotle,
350:There is a foolish corner in the brain of the wisest man. ~ Aristotle,
351:We have next to consider the formal definition of virtue. ~ Aristotle,
352:... a science must deal with a subject and its properties. ~ Aristotle,
353:Friends are much better tried in bad fortune than in good. ~ Aristotle,
354:Give me a child until he is 7 and I will show you the man. ~ Aristotle,
355:It is in justice that the ordering of society is centered. ~ Aristotle,
356:No great mind has ever existed without a touch of madness. ~ Aristotle,
357:One swallow does not make a spring, nor does one fine day. ~ Aristotle,
358:The greatest of all pleasures is the pleasure of learning. ~ Aristotle,
359:The more you own, the more you know you don't own. ~ Aristotle Onassis,
360:There is no great genius without some touch of madness.
   ~ Aristotle,
361:The roots of education are bitter, but the fruit is sweet. ~ Aristotle,
362:Time past, even God is deprived of the power of recalling. ~ Aristotle,
363:To lead an orchestra, you must turn your back on the crowd ~ Aristotle,
364:You can never learn anything that you did not already know ~ Aristotle,
365:A very populous city can rarely, if ever, be well governed. ~ Aristotle,
366:A whole is that which has a beginning, a middle and an end. ~ Aristotle,
367:Equality consists in the same treatment of similar persons. ~ Aristotle,
368:he who had never learned to obey cannot be a good commander ~ Aristotle,
369:Learning is not child's play; we cannot learn without pain. ~ Aristotle,
370:Poverty is the parent of revolution and crime. Aristotle ~ Arun D Ellis,
371:Praise invariably implies a reference to a higher standard. ~ Aristotle,
372:Revolutions are not about trifles, but spring from trifles. ~ Aristotle,
373:The energy or active exercise of the mind constitutes life. ~ Aristotle,
374:The final cause, then, produces motion through being loved. ~ Aristotle,
375:Tragedy is an imitation not of men but of a life, an action ~ Aristotle,
376:Where the laws are not supreme, there demagogues spring up. ~ Aristotle,
377:Happiness seems to require a modicum of external prosperity. ~ Aristotle,
378:He who has never learned to obey cannot be a good commander. ~ Aristotle,
379:I have no friends and no enemies - only competitors. ~ Aristotle Onassis,
380:In all things of nature there is something of the marvelous. ~ Aristotle,
381:Lo scopo del lavoro è quello di guadagnarsi il tempo libero. ~ Aristotle,
382:Madness is badness of spirit, when one seeks profit from all ~ Aristotle,
383:Men are marked from the moment of birth to rule or be ruled. ~ Aristotle,
384:Obrar por ignorancia y obrar con ignorancia no son lo mísmo. ~ Aristotle,
385:Of mankind in general, the parts are greater than the whole. ~ Aristotle,
386:Revolutions are effected in two ways, by force and by fraud. ~ Aristotle,
387:The excellence of a thing is related to its proper function. ~ Aristotle,
388:There is nothing unequal as the equal treatment of unequals. ~ Aristotle,
389:What is the essence of life? To serve others and to do good. ~ Aristotle,
390:A constitution is the arrangement of magistracies in a state. ~ Aristotle,
391:Actions determine what kind of characteristics are developed. ~ Aristotle,
392:All art, all education, can be merely a supplement to nature. ~ Aristotle,
393:Education is the best provision for old age. — ARISTOTLE ~ Michael J Gelb,
394:Find the good. Seek the Unity. Ignore the divisions among us. ~ Aristotle,
395:God and nature create nothing that does not fulfill a purpose ~ Aristotle,
396:Happiness is an expression of the soul in considered actions. ~ Aristotle,
397:Nobody will be afraid who believes nothing can happen to him. ~ Aristotle,
398:poetry utters universal truths, history particular statements ~ Aristotle,
399:The best way to avoid envy is to deserve the success you get. ~ Aristotle,
400:The greatest thing in style is to have a command of metaphor. ~ Aristotle,
401:There are no experienced young people. Time makes experience. ~ Aristotle,
402:The roots of education are bitter, but the fruit is sweet.
   ~ Aristotle,
403:The young are permanently in a state resembling intoxication. ~ Aristotle,
404:Tolerance and apathy are the last virtues of a dying society. ~ Aristotle,
405:To the sober person adventurous conduct often seems insanity. ~ Aristotle,
406:What we have to learn to do we learn by doing. . .
   ~ Aristotle, Ethics,
407:Adoration is made out of a solitary soul occupying two bodies. ~ Aristotle,
408:A right election can only be made by those who have knowledge. ~ Aristotle,
409:Happiness is an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue ~ Aristotle,
410:Humility is a flower which does not grow in everyone's garden. ~ Aristotle,
411:rhetoric was to be surveyed from the standpoint of philosophy. ~ Aristotle,
412:Speeches are like babies-easy to conceive but hard to deliver. ~ Aristotle,
413:The end toward which all human acts are directed is happiness. ~ Aristotle,
414:The science that studies the supreme good for man is politics. ~ Aristotle,
415:The true nature of anything is what it becomes at its highest. ~ Aristotle,
416:We acquire a particular quality by acting in a particular way. ~ Aristotle,
417:A man becomes a friend whenever being loved he loves in return. ~ Aristotle,
418:Bashfulness is an ornament to youth, but a reproach to old age. ~ Aristotle,
419:Character is made by many acts; it may be lost by a single one. ~ Aristotle,
420:Each type of activity produces the corresponding sort of person ~ Aristotle,
421:Fear is pain arising from the anticipation of evil. —Aristotle ~ Wendy Webb,
422:Female cats are very Lascivious, and make advances to the male. ~ Aristotle,
423:Fine friendship requires duration rather than fitful intensity. ~ Aristotle,
424:For that which has become habitual, becomes as it were natural. ~ Aristotle,
425:for we are noble in only one way, but bad in all sorts of ways. ~ Aristotle,
426:Greatness of spirit is accompanied by simplicity and sincerity. ~ Aristotle,
427:Have a definite, clear, practical ideal - a goal, an objective. ~ Aristotle,
428:If Plato is a fine red wine, then Aristotle is a dry martini. ~ Eric Stoltz,
429:I will not allow the Athenians to sin twice against philosophy. ~ Aristotle,
430:No one finds fault with defects which are the result of nature. ~ Aristotle,
431:Rightness in our choice of an end is secured by [Moral] Virtue. ~ Aristotle,
432:The greatest threat to the state is not faction but distraction ~ Aristotle,
433:A brave man is clear in his discourse, and keeps close to truth. ~ Aristotle,
434:Before Aristotle, science was in embryo; with him it was born. ~ Will Durant,
435:Evidence from torture may be considered completely untrustworthy ~ Aristotle,
436:For [people] are good18 in one way, but in all kinds of ways bad ~ Aristotle,
437:men cannot know each other till they have ‘eaten salt together’; ~ Aristotle,
438:Men cling to life even at the cost of enduring great misfortune. ~ Aristotle,
439:Money is a guarantee that we can have what we want in the future ~ Aristotle,
440:Of all the varieties of virtues, liberalism is the most beloved. ~ Aristotle,
441:That rule is the better which is exercised over better subjects. ~ Aristotle,
442:The best tragedies are conflicts between a hero and his destiny. ~ Aristotle,
443:The man who is content to live alone is either a beast or a god. ~ Aristotle,
444:Think as the wise men think, but talk like the simple people do. ~ Aristotle,
445:What it lies in our power to do, it lies in our power not to do. ~ Aristotle,
446:While fiction is often impossible, it should not be implausible. ~ Aristotle,
447:Democracy is the form of government in which the free are rulers. ~ Aristotle,
448:Education is an ornament in prosperity and a refuge in adversity. ~ Aristotle,
449:Equity is that idea of justice which contravenes the written law. ~ Aristotle,
450:In the works of Nature, purpose, not accident, is the main thing. ~ Aristotle,
451:It is in our darkest moments that we must focus to see the light. ~ Aristotle,
452:Let us first understand the facts and then we may seek the cause. ~ Aristotle,
453:Men do not become tyrants in order that they may not suffer cold. ~ Aristotle,
454:The aim of the wise is not to secure pleasure, but to avoid pain. ~ Aristotle,
455:When the looms spin by themselves, we'll have no need for slaves. ~ Aristotle,
456:Art not only imitates nature, but also completes its deficiencies. ~ Aristotle,
457:Courage is the first virtue that makes all other virtues possible. ~ Aristotle,
458:É belo morrer antes de se fazer algo digno da morte. - Anaxândrias ~ Aristotle,
459:Happiness requires both complete goodness and a complete lifetime. ~ Aristotle,
460:It is a part of probability that many improbabilities will happen. ~ Aristotle,
461:Nature of man is not what he was born as, but what he is born for. ~ Aristotle,
462:Saying the words that come from knowledge is no sign of having it. ~ Aristotle,
463:The ideal man is his own best friend and takes delight in privacy. ~ Aristotle,
464:The proof that you know something is that you are able to teach it ~ Aristotle,
465:A flatterer is a friend who is your inferior, or pretends to be so. ~ Aristotle,
466:Civil confusions often spring from trifles but decide great issues. ~ Aristotle,
467:Education is an ornament in prosperity & a refuge in adversity. ~ Aristotle,
468:Friendship is a single soul dwelling in two bodies.” -Aristotle ~ Angela Roquet,
469:Happiness is the exercise of talent, along the lines of excellence. ~ Aristotle,
470:It's the fastest who gets paid, and it's the fastest who gets laid. ~ Aristotle,
471:Koruyucular mutlu değillerse, kim olabilir ki? — ARISTOTLE Politika ~ Anonymous,
472:Metaphor is halfway between the unintelligible and the commonplace. ~ Aristotle,
473:No tyrant need fear till men begin to feel confident in each other. ~ Aristotle,
474:Pay attention to the young, and make them just as good as possible. ~ Aristotle,
475:The best way to teach morality is to make it a habit with children. ~ Aristotle,
476:The body is at its best between the ages of thirty and thirty-five. ~ Aristotle,
477:The secret of business is to know something that nobody else knows. ~ Aristotle,
478:Think as the wise men think, but talk like the simple people do.
   ~ Aristotle,
479:To avoid criticism say nothing, do nothing, be nothing. —Aristotle ~ Bren Brown,
480:To be successful, you must act big, think big and talk big. ~ Aristotle Onassis,
481:We must as second best, as people say, take the least of the evils. ~ Aristotle,
482:What it lies in our power to do, it lies in our power not to do.
   ~ Aristotle,
483:Whosoever is delighted in solitude is either a wild beast or a god. ~ Aristotle,
484:A goal gets us motivated,while a good habit keeps us stay motivated. ~ Aristotle,
485:All flatterers are mercenary, and all low-minded men are flatterers. ~ Aristotle,
486:Definition of tragedy: A hero destroyed by the excess of his virtues ~ Aristotle,
487:Friendship also seems to be the bond that hold communities together. ~ Aristotle,
488:Identity exists where the Complication and Unravelling are the same. ~ Aristotle,
489:It is a part of probability that many improbable things will happen. ~ Aristotle,
490:It is not always the same thing to be a good man and a good citizen. ~ Aristotle,
491:Love is composed of a single soul inhabiting two bodies. ~Aristotle ~ Beth Rinyu,
492:Man, as an originator of action, is a union of desire and intellect. ~ Aristotle,
493:Our youth should also be educated with music and physical education. ~ Aristotle,
494:So the good has been well explained as that at which all things aim. ~ Aristotle,
495:The fool tells me his reason; the wise man persuades me with my own. ~ Aristotle,
496:The worst form of inequality is to try to make unequal things equal. ~ Aristotle,
497:We now doubt Aristotle, understand Shakespeare only with footnotes. ~ Ada Palmer,
498:We work to have leisure, on which happiness depends. —Aristotle ~ Brigid Schulte,
499:Where it is in our power to act, it is also in our power to not act. ~ Aristotle,
500:Whoever is delighted in solitude is either a wild beast or a god.
   ~ Aristotle,
501:Whosoever is delighted in solitude, is either a wild beast or a god. ~ Aristotle,
502:Com toda certeza, os antigos tiranos originaram-se dos
demagogos. ~ Aristotle,
503:Dignity does not consist in possessing honors, but in deserving them. ~ Aristotle,
504:Dissimilarity of habit tends more than anything to destroy affection. ~ Aristotle,
505:Educating the head without educating the heart is no education at all ~ Aristotle,
506:Every virtue is a mean between two extremes, each of which is a vice. ~ Aristotle,
507:Good laws, if they are not obeyed, do not constitute good government. ~ Aristotle,
508:Happiness is the settling of the soul into its most appropriate spot. ~ Aristotle,
509:It is during our darkest moments that we must focus to see the light. ~ Aristotle,
510:Men in general desire the good and not merely what their fathers had. ~ Aristotle,
511:The character which results from wealth is that of a prosperous fool. ~ Aristotle,
512:The coward calls the brave man rash, the rash man calls him a coward. ~ Aristotle,
513:The virtue of justice consists in moderation, as regulated by wisdom. ~ Aristotle,
514:When the storytelling goes bad in a society, the result is decadence. ~ Aristotle,
515:A man is his own best friend; therefore he ought to love himself best. ~ Aristotle,
516:By 'life,' we mean a thing that can nourish itself and grow and decay. ~ Aristotle,
517:Character may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion. ~ Aristotle,
518:Educating the mind without educating the heart is no education at all. ~ Aristotle,
519:For though the wish for friendship comes quickly, friendship does not. ~ Aristotle,
520:Happiness is the settling of the soul into its most appropriate spot. ~ Aristotle,
521:Millions do not always add up to what a man needs out of life. ~ Aristotle Onassis,
522:No state will be well administered unless the middle class holds sway. ~ Aristotle,
523:The bad man is continually at war with, and in opposition to, himself. ~ Aristotle,
524:The deficiencies of nature are what art and education seek to fill up. ~ Aristotle,
525:The greatest virtues are those which are most useful to other persons. ~ Aristotle,
526:The light of the day is followed by night, as a shadow follows a body. ~ Aristotle,
527:The one exclusive sign of thorough knowledge is the power of teaching. ~ Aristotle,
528:Therefore, the good of man must be the end of the science of politics. ~ Aristotle,
529:There is no great genius without a mixture of madness. —Aristotle ~ Marty Neumeier,
530:uncaused cause, or to use Aristotle’s famous expression, an Unmoved ~ Edward Feser,
531:Educating the mind without educating the heart is no education at all. ~ Aristotle,
532:He who confers a benefit on anyone loves him better than he is beloved. ~ Aristotle,
533:He who is by nature not his own but another's man is by nature a slave. ~ Aristotle,
534:It is, (10) then, clearly impossible for Being to be one in this sense. ~ Aristotle,
535:It is better for a city to be governed by a good man than by good laws. ~ Aristotle,
536:Mục tiêu lớn nhất của đời người là sống đúng với tiềm năng của bản thân ~ Aristotle,
537:My best friend is the man who in wishing me well wishes it for my sake. ~ Aristotle,
538:The best political community is formed by citizens of the middle class. ~ Aristotle,
539:There are some jobs in which it is impossible for a man to be virtuous. ~ Aristotle,
540:Those who cannot bravely face danger are the slaves of their attackers. ~ Aristotle,
541:Top-heavy was the ship as a dinnerless student with all Aristotle ~ Herman Melville,
542:A man can make up his mind quickly when he has only a little to make up. ~ Aristotle,
543:A man may possess the disposition without its producing any good result. ~ Aristotle,
544:And yet the true creator is necessity, which is the mother of invention. ~ Aristotle,
545:Happiness is the utilization of one's talents along lines of excellence. ~ Aristotle,
546:If one way be better than another, that you may be sure is nature's way. ~ Aristotle,
547:In educating the young we steer them by the rudders of pleasure and pain ~ Aristotle,
548:Knowledge of the fact differs from knowledge of the reason for the fact. ~ Aristotle,
549:Our feelings towards our friends reflect our feelings towards ourselves. ~ Aristotle,
550:The best friend is the man who in wishing me well wishes it for my sake. ~ Aristotle,
551:The man who does not enjoy doing noble actions is not a good man at all. ~ Aristotle,
552:The nobelest expenditure is that which is made in the Divine Service
~ Aristotle,
553:They are fond of fun and therefore witty, wit being well-bred insolence. ~ Aristotle,
554:Wenn auf der Erde Liebe herrschen würde, wären alle Gesetze entbehrlich. ~ Aristotle,
555:What is a friend? A single soul dwelling in two bodies.   —ARISTOTLE ~ Eric Greitens,
556:Whereas the law is passionless, passion must ever sway the heart of man. ~ Aristotle,
557:Without virtue it is difficult to bear gracefully the honors of fortune. ~ Aristotle,
558:A fool contributes nothing worth hearing and takes offense at everything. ~ Aristotle,
559:A man's happiness consists in the free exercise of his highest faculties. ~ Aristotle,
560:Anyone who has no need of anybody but himself is either a beast or a God. ~ Aristotle,
561:Comedy has had no history, because it was not at first treated seriously. ~ Aristotle,
562:In poverty and other misfortunes of life, true friends are a sure refuge. ~ Aristotle,
563:Personal beauty is a greater recommendation than any letter of reference. ~ Aristotle,
564:Probable impossibilities are to be preferred to improbable possibilities. ~ Aristotle,
565:The friend of wisdom is also a friend of the myth. —ARISTOTLE ~ Christopher McDougall,
566:The man who confers a favour would rather not be repaid in the same coin. ~ Aristotle,
567:The one exclusive sign of thorough knowledge is the power of teaching.
   ~ Aristotle,
568:Time is the measurable unit of movement concerning a before and an after. ~ Aristotle,
569:To avoid criticism, say nothing, do nothing, be nothing. —ARISTOTLE ~ Anthony Robbins,
570:We should behave to our friends as we would wish our friends behave to us ~ Aristotle,
571:Where your talents and the needs of the world cross lies your calling.
   ~ Aristotle,
572:But Aristotle's philosophy was the intellect's Declaration of Independence. ~ Ayn Rand,
573:Descartes's epistemology is a special case of Aristotle's virtue ethics. ~ Ernest Sosa,
574:El sabio no dice todo lo que piensa, pero siempre piensa todo lo que dice. ~ Aristotle,
575:Happiness is at once the best, the noblest, and the pleasantest of things. ~ Aristotle,
576:If the art of ship-building were in the wood, ships would exist by nature. ~ Aristotle,
577:It is not enough to win a war; it is more important to organize the peace. ~ Aristotle,
578:Meanness is incurable; it cannot be cured by old age, or by anything else. ~ Aristotle,
579:Men acquire a particular quality by constantly acting in a particular way. ~ Aristotle,
580:Not every action or emotion however admits of the observance of a due mean ~ Aristotle,
581:The End is included among goods of the soul, and not among external goods. ~ Aristotle,
582:The word is a sign or symbol of the impressions or affections of the soul. ~ Aristotle,
583:Those who cannot bravely face danger are
the slaves of their attackers. ~ Aristotle,
584:Whatever lies within our power to do lies also within our power not to do. ~ Aristotle,
585:A likely impossibility is always preferable to an unconvincing possibility. ~ Aristotle,
586:A vowel is that which without impact of tongue or lip has an audible sound. ~ Aristotle,
587:Education and morals make the good man, the good statesman, the good ruler. ~ Aristotle,
588:Happiness is a certain activity of soul in conformity with perfect goodness ~ Aristotle,
589:He who sees things grow from the beginning will have the best view of them. ~ Aristotle,
590:If you would understand anything, observe its beginning and its development ~ Aristotle,
591:In order to be effective you need not only virtue but also mental strength. ~ Aristotle,
592:Man first begins to philosophize when the necessities of life are supplied. ~ Aristotle,
593:Man is a political animal. A man who lives alone is either a Beast or a God ~ Aristotle,
594:One thing alone not even God can do,To make undone whatever hath been done. ~ Aristotle,
595:Sophocles said he drew men as they ought to be, and Euripides as they were. ~ Aristotle,
596:The appropriate age for marrige is around eighteen and thirty-seven for man ~ Aristotle,
597:The cultivation of the intellect is man's highest good and purest happiness ~ Aristotle,
598:The only stable state is the one in which all men are equal before the law. ~ Aristotle,
599:The secret of business is to know something that nobody else knows. ~ Aristotle Onassis,
600:The worst thing about slavery is that the slaves eventually get to like it. ~ Aristotle,
601:This only is denied the Gods: the power to remake the past. —ARISTOTLE ~ Jeffery Deaver,
602:We are what we repeatedly do. Excellence, then, is not an act, but a habit. ~ Aristotle,
603:Without friends no one would choose to live, though he had all other goods. ~ Aristotle,
604:Without friends, no one would want to live, even if he had all other goods. ~ Aristotle,
605:A change in the shape of the body creates a change in the state of the soul. ~ Aristotle,
606:A true disciple shows his appreciation by reaching further than his teacher. ~ Aristotle,
607:Democracy is when the indigent, and not the men of property, are the rulers. ~ Aristotle,
608:Hay 3 cosas que siempre vamos a preferir: lo bueno, lo útil y lo placentero. ~ Aristotle,
609:It is best to rise from life as from a banquet, neither thirsty nor drunken. ~ Aristotle,
610:men are guilty of the greatest crimes from ambition, and not from necessity, ~ Aristotle,
611:No great mind has ever existed without a touch of madness,” Aristotle ~ Susannah Cahalan,
612:No one will dare maintain that it is better to do injustice than to bear it. ~ Aristotle,
613:Quid quid movetur ab alio movetur"(nothing moves without having been moved). ~ Aristotle,
614:Sophocles said that he drew men as they ought to be; Euripides, as they are. ~ Aristotle,
615:The educated differ from the uneducated as much as the living from the dead. ~ Aristotle,
616:The high-minded man must care more for the truth than for what people think. ~ Aristotle,
617:Whether we will philosophize or we won't philosophize, we must philosophize. ~ Aristotle,
618:Find a priest who understands English and doesn't look like Rasputin. ~ Aristotle Onassis,
619:Hippocrates is an excellent geometer but a complete fool in everyday affairs. ~ Aristotle,
620:In revolutions the occasions may be trifling but great interest are at stake. ~ Aristotle,
621:It is during our darkest moments that we must focus to see the light. ~ Aristotle Onassis,
622:Justice is that virtue of the soul which is distributive according to desert. ~ Aristotle,
623:The honors and rewards fall to those who show their good qualities in action. ~ Aristotle,
624:To be always seeking after the useful does not become free and exalted souls. ~ Aristotle,
625:We should aim rather at leveling down our desires than leveling up our means. ~ Aristotle,
626:Wishing to be friends is quick work, but friendship is a slow ripening fruit. ~ Aristotle,
627:A democracy when put to the strain grows weak, and is supplanted by Oligarchy. ~ Aristotle,
628:A good style must have an air of novelty, at the same time concealing its art. ~ Aristotle,
629:Das Ziel des Weisen ist nicht Glück zu erlangen, sondern Unglück zu vermeiden. ~ Aristotle,
630:For the things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing them. ~ Aristotle,
631:Humour is human. Why? Well, because the Philosopher, Aristotle, says so. ~ Simon Critchley,
632:If men are given food, but no chastisement nor any work, they become insolent. ~ Aristotle,
633:No notice is taken of a little evil, but when it increases it strikes the eye. ~ Aristotle,
634:No one who desires to become good will become good unless he does good things. ~ Aristotle,
635:Republics decline into democracies and democracies degenerate into despotisms. ~ Aristotle,
636:The least initial deviation from the truth is multiplied later a thousandfold. ~ Aristotle,
637:To Thales the primary question was not what do we know, but how do we know it. ~ Aristotle,
638:We are what we repeatedly do. Excellence, then, is not an act, but a habit.
   ~ Aristotle,
639:Where your talents and the needs of the world cross, there lies your vocation. ~ Aristotle,
640:Where your talents and the needs of the world cross; there lies your vocation. ~ Aristotle,
641:You are not truly wealthy unless you earn money while you are sleeping ~ Aristotle Onassis,
642:Further, the orator should be able to prove opposites, as in logical arguments; ~ Aristotle,
643:He who is a citizen in a democracy will often not be a citizen in an oligarchy. ~ Aristotle,
644:If things do not turn out as we wish, we should wish for them as they turn out. ~ Aristotle,
645:Patience is so like fortitude that she seems either her sister or her daughter. ~ Aristotle,
646:Plato is my friend, Aristotle is my friend, but my greatest friend is truth. ~ Isaac Newton,
647:That which is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it ~ Aristotle,
648:a man investigating principles cannot argue with one who denies their existence. ~ Aristotle,
649:A pior forma de desigualdade é tentar fazer duas coisas diferentes serem iguais. ~ Aristotle,
650:Comedy aims at representing men as worse, Tragedy as better than in actual life. ~ Aristotle,
651:If women didn't exist, all the money in the world would have no meaning. ~ Aristotle Onassis,
652:The democrats think that as they are equal they ought to be equal in all things. ~ Aristotle,
653:There is nothing strange in the circle being the origin of any and every marvel. ~ Aristotle,
654:We are the sum of our actions, and therefore our habits make all the difference. ~ Aristotle,
655:Ancient laws remain in force long after the people have the power to change them. ~ Aristotle,
656:And, generally speaking, all things are good which men deliberately choose to do; ~ Aristotle,
657:Aristotle wrote, “Wisdom is an equal combination of experience plus reflection. ~ Brian Tracy,
658:Education and morals will be found almost the whole that goes to make a good man. ~ Aristotle,
659:Even when laws have been written down, they ought not always to remain unaltered. ~ Aristotle,
660:Every tragedy falls into two parts, — Complication and Unravelling or Denouement. ~ Aristotle,
661:Happiness does not consist in pastimes and amusements but in virtuous activities. ~ Aristotle,
662:Irrational passions would seem to be as much a part of human nature as is reason. ~ Aristotle,
663:The good citizen need not of necessity possess the virtue which makes a good man. ~ Aristotle,
664:. . . the man is free, we say, who exists for his own sake and not for another's. ~ Aristotle,
665:... There must then be a principle of such a kind that its substance is activity. ~ Aristotle,
666:All that one gains by falsehood is, not to be believed when he speaks the truth. ~ Aristotle,
667:A tragedy is that moment where the hero comes face to face with his true identity. ~ Aristotle,
668:Even when the laws have been written down, they ought not always remain unchanged. ~ Aristotle,
669:Everything that depends on the action of nature is by nature as good as it can be. ~ Aristotle,
670:Happiness involves engagement in activities that promote one's highest potentials. ~ Aristotle,
671:If the hammer and the shuttle could move themselves, slavery would be unnecessary. ~ Aristotle,
672:In inventing a model we may assume what we wish, but should avoid impossibilities. ~ Aristotle,
673:It is Homer who has chiefly taught other poets the art of telling lies skillfully. ~ Aristotle,
674:It is the repeated performance of just and temperate actions that produces virtue. ~ Aristotle,
675:No great mind has ever existed without a touch of madness,” Aristotle said. ~ Susannah Cahalan,
676:Our problem is not that we aim too high and miss, but that we aim too low and hit. ~ Aristotle,
677:That body is heavier than another which, in an equal bulk, moves downward quicker. ~ Aristotle,
678:The Eyes are the organs of temptation, and the Ears are the organs of instruction. ~ Aristotle,
679:The Ideal age for marriage in men is 35. The Ideal age for marriage in women is 18 ~ Aristotle,
680:The law does not expressly permit suicide, and what it does not permit it forbids. ~ Aristotle,
681:There is only one way to avoid criticism: do nothing, say nothing, and be nothing. ~ Aristotle,
682:To say this, however, is not to claim that it was the object of theoretical study. ~ Aristotle,
683:To write well, express yourself like the common people, but think like a wise man. ~ Aristotle,
684:What makes a man a 'sophist' is not his faculty, but his moral purpose. (1355b 17) ~ Aristotle,
685:All persons ought to endeavor to follow what is right, and not what is established. ~ Aristotle,
686:(Aristotle once said “To avoid criticism say nothing, do nothing, and be nothing.”) ~ Anonymous,
687:Aristotle once said, “To avoid criticism say nothing, do nothing, and be nothing. ~ Dave Ramsey,
688:Aristotle said that some minds are not vases to be filled, but fires to be lit. ~ Craig Johnson,
689:Being a father is the most rewarding thing a man whose career has plateaued can do. ~ Aristotle,
690:Choice not chance determines your destiny [my family motto...credited to Aristotle] ~ Aristotle,
691:Distance does not break off the friendship absolutely, but only the activity of it. ~ Aristotle,
692:For the essence of a riddle is to express true facts under impossible combinations. ~ Aristotle,
693:It is not the possessions but the desires of mankind which require to be equalized. ~ Aristotle,
694:It is possible to fail in many ways...while to succeed is possible only in one way. ~ Aristotle,
695:Men were first led to the study of philosophy, as indeed they are today, by wonder. ~ Aristotle,
696:The educated differ from the uneducated as much as the living differ from the dead. ~ Aristotle,
697:Therefore, even the lover of myth is a philosopher; for myth is composed of wonder. ~ Aristotle,
698:To appreciate the beauty of a snow flake, it is necessary to stand out in the cold. ~ Aristotle,
699:Again what city ever received Plato's or Aristotle's laws, or Socrates' precepts? But, ~ Erasmus,
700:All Earthquakes and Disasters are warnings; there’s too much corruption in the world ~ Aristotle,
701:Educating the mind without educating the heart is no education at all.” ― Aristotle ~ Penny Reid,
702:Happiness is a quality of the soul...not a function of one's material circumstances. ~ Aristotle,
703:In part, art completes what nature cannot elaborate; and in part it imitates nature. ~ Aristotle,
704:It may be argued that peoples for whom philosophers legislate are always prosperous. ~ Aristotle,
705:Obstinate people can be divided into the opinionated, the ignorant, and the boorish. ~ Aristotle,
706:Only an armed people can be truly free. Only an unarmed people can ever be enslaved. ~ Aristotle,
707:Selfishness doesn't consist in a love to yourself, but in a big degree of such love. ~ Aristotle,
708:This much then, is clear: in all our conduct it is the mean that is to be commended. ~ Aristotle,
709:To learn is a natural pleasure, not confined to philosophers, but common to all men. ~ Aristotle,
710:Top-heavy was the ship as a dinnerless student with all Aristotle in his head. ~ Herman Melville,
711:We are what we repeatedly do.Excellence, then, is not an act, but a habit. ARISTOTLE ~ Anonymous,
712:While the faculty of sensation is dependent upon the body, mind is separable from it ~ Aristotle,
713:A body in motion can maintain this motion only if it remains in contact with a mover. ~ Aristotle,
714:A good character carries with it the highest power of causing a thing to be believed. ~ Aristotle,
715:It seems that ambition makes most people wish to be loved rather than to love others. ~ Aristotle,
716:It was through the feeling of wonder that men now and at first began to philosophize. ~ Aristotle,
717:People never know each other until they have eaten a certain amount of salt together. ~ Aristotle,
718:The actions from which [virtue] was produced are also those in which it is exercised. ~ Aristotle,
719:The Founding Fathers were devotees of Cicero and Locke, of the Bible and Aristotle. ~ Ben Shapiro,
720:Without virtue, man is most unholy and savage, and worst in regard to sex and eating. ~ Aristotle,
721:All teaching and all intellectual learning come about from already existing knowledge. ~ Aristotle,
722:In general, what is written must be easy to read and easy to speak; which is the same. ~ Aristotle,
723:Not to get what you have set your heart on is almost as bad as getting nothing at all. ~ Aristotle,
724:Political society exists for the sake of noble actions, and not of mere companionship. ~ Aristotle,
725:Some believe it to be just friends wanting, as if to be healthy enough to wish health. ~ Aristotle,
726:Speech is the representation of the mind, and writing is the representation of speech. ~ Aristotle,
727:The high-minded man is fond of conferring benefits, but it shames him to receive them. ~ Aristotle,
728:And, speaking generally, passion seems not to be amenable to reason, but only to force. ~ Aristotle,
729:Aristotle dines when it seems good to King Philip, but Diogenes when he himself pleases. ~ Diogenes,
730:Both oligarch and tyrant mistrust the people, and therefore deprive them of their arms. ~ Aristotle,
731:Moral qualities are so constituted as to be destroyed by excess and by deficiency . . . ~ Aristotle,
732:The weak are always anxious for justice and equality. The strong pay no heed to either. ~ Aristotle,
733:Art is identical with a state of capacity to make, involving a true course of reasoning. ~ Aristotle,
734:Hay quienes no pasan de ser sólo acciones, otros además de la acción, dejan un producto. ~ Aristotle,
735:It is impossible, or not easy, to alter by argument what has long been absorbed by habit ~ Aristotle,
736:The specific excellence of verbal expression in poetry is to be clear without being low. ~ Aristotle,
737:Tis the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain a thought without accepting it. ~ Aristotle,
738:Accordingly, the poet should prefer probable impossibilities to improbable possibilities. ~ Aristotle,
739:Aristotle had it right, but he was missing a number: “We are what we do repeatedly. ~ Timothy Ferriss,
740:I say that habit's but a long practice, friend, and this becomes men's nature in the end. ~ Aristotle,
741:It is not sufficient to know what one ought to say, but one must also know how to say it. ~ Aristotle,
742:Learning is an ornament in prosperity, a refuge in adversity, and a provision in old age. ~ Aristotle,
743:Some men are just as sure of the truth of their opinions as are others of what they know. ~ Aristotle,
744:The continuum is that which is divisible into indivisibles that are infinitely divisible. ~ Aristotle,
745:To succeed in business it is necessary to make others see things as you see them. ~ Aristotle Onassis,
746:Virtue makes us aim at the right end, and practical wisdom makes us take the right means. ~ Aristotle,
747:We are what we repeatedly do. Excellence then is not an act, but a habit.” —Aristotle ~ Brian P Moran,
748:Choice not chance determines your destiny

[my family motto...credited to Aristotle] ~ Aristotle,
749:It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain a thought without accepting it. ~ Aristotle,
750:Prosperity makes friends and adversity tries them. A true friend is one soul in two bodies ~ Aristotle,
751:To seek for utility everywhere is entirely unsuited to men that are great-souled and free. ~ Aristotle,
752:We are better able to study our neighbours than ourselves, and their actions than our own. ~ Aristotle,
753:Worthless persons appointed to have supreme control of weighty affairs do a lot of damage. ~ Aristotle,
754:Aristotle wrote that the human soul is purged by the fear and compassion that tragedy evokes. ~ Jo Nesb,
755:Civil strife is caused not only by inequality of property, but also by inequality of honors ~ Aristotle,
756:Concluons donc qu'on est ami dès qu'on souhaite à un autre ce qu'on souhaite pour soi-même. ~ Aristotle,
757:For it is owing to their wonder that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize. ~ Aristotle,
758:Happiness is the meaning and the purpose of life, the whole aim and end of human existence. ~ Aristotle,
759:If you see a man approaching with the obvious intent of doing you good, run for your life. ~ Aristotle,
760:Injustice results as much from treating unequals equally as from treating equals unequally. ~ Aristotle,
761:That which is impossible and probable is better than that which is possible and improbable. ~ Aristotle,
762:The family is the association established by nature for the supply of men's everyday wants. ~ Aristotle,
763:To be conscious that we are perceiving or thinking is to be conscious of our own existence. ~ Aristotle,
764:Virtue is the golden mean between two vices, the one of excess and the other of deficiency. ~ Aristotle,
765:A person’s life persuades better than his word,” said one of Aristotle’s contemporaries. ~ Jay Heinrichs,
766:Fear, Aristotle observed, does not strike those who are “in the midst of great prosperity. ~ Jon Meacham,
767:For through wondering human beings now and in the beginning have been led to philosophizing. ~ Aristotle,
768:Poetry demands a man with a special gift for it, or else one with a touch of madness in him. ~ Aristotle,
769:. . . Political society exists for the sake of noble actions, and not of mere companionship. ~ Aristotle,
770:That in the soul which is called the mind is, before it thinks, not actually any real thing. ~ Aristotle,
771:That which is in locomotion must arrive at the half-way stage before it arrives at the goal. ~ Aristotle,
772:We are what we repeatedly do,” Aristotle wrote. “Greatness then, is not an act, but a habit. ~ Anonymous,
773:We laugh at inferior or ugly individuals, because we feel a joy at feeling superior to them. ~ Aristotle,
774:All friendly feelings toward others come from the friendly feelings a person has for himself. ~ Aristotle,
775:Aristotle says that the aim of education is to make the pupil like and dislike what he ought. ~ C S Lewis,
776:Aristotle uses a mother's love for her child as the prime example of love or friendship. ~ Mortimer Adler,
777:Aristotle was very explicit. He said that women are good for two things—children and cooking. ~ Anonymous,
778:Dignity does not consist in possessing honors, but in the consciousness that we deserve them. ~ Aristotle,
779:Es ignorancia no saber distinguir entre lo que necesita demostración y lo que no la necesita. ~ Aristotle,
780:For Aristotle, goodness is a kind of prospering in the precarious affair of being human. ~ Terry Eagleton,
781:It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain a thought without accepting it.
   ~ Aristotle,
782:Pleasure causes us to do base actions and pain causes us to abstain from doing noble actions. ~ Aristotle,
783:Practical wisdom," Aristotle told us, "is the combination of moral will and moral skill. ~ Barry Schwartz,
784:Temperance and bravery, then, are ruined by excess and deficiency, but preserved by the mean. ~ Aristotle,
785:The only way to achieve true success is to express yourself completely in service to society. ~ Aristotle,
786:The same ideas, one must believe, recur in men's minds not once or twice but again and again. ~ Aristotle,
787:Thinking is different from perceiving and is held to be in part imagination, in part judgment ~ Aristotle,
788:We learn an art or craft by doing the things that we shall have to do when we have learnt it. ~ Aristotle,
789:Why is it that all men who are outstanding in philosophy, poetry or the arts are melancholic? ~ Aristotle,
790:Youth should stay away from all evil, especially things that produce wickedness and ill-will. ~ Aristotle,
791:Also, that which is desirable in itself is more desirable than what is desirable per accidens. ~ Aristotle,
792:Aristotle's axiom: The worst form of inequality is to try to make unequal things equal. ~ Laurence J Peter,
793:Courage is the first of human qualities because it is the quality which guarantees the others. ~ Aristotle,
794:For though we love both the truth and our friends, piety requires us to honor the truth first. ~ Aristotle,
795:It is not easy to determine the nature of music, or why any one should have a knowledge of it. ~ Aristotle,
796:It is well to be up before daybreak, for such habits contribute to health, wealth, and wisdom. ~ Aristotle,
797:The life of children, as much as that of intemperate men, is wholly governed by their desires. ~ Aristotle,
798:Whether we call it sacrifice, or poetry, or adventure, it is always the same voice that calls. ~ Aristotle,
799:Wise men speak when they have something to say, fools speak because they have to say something ~ Aristotle,
800:All people are alike when they sleep."

Jeremiah Lopper paraphrasing Aristotle (p. 146) ~ Joan Bauer,
801:Aristotle deemed courage to be the first virtue, because it makes all the other possible. ~ Jonathan V Last,
802:At his best, man is the noblest of all animals; separated from law and justice he is the worst. ~ Aristotle,
803:One cannot say of something that it is and that it is not in the same respect at the same time. ~ Aristotle,
804:Shall we not, like archers who have a mark to aim at, be more likely to hit upon what is right? ~ Aristotle,
805:Something is infinite if, taking it quantity by quantity, we can always take something outside. ~ Aristotle,
806:The most beautiful colors laid on at random, give less pleasure than a black-and-white drawing. ~ Aristotle,
807:The person who lived an entirely private life, Aristotle said, was either a beast or a god. ~ Jay Heinrichs,
808:There is more both of beauty and of raison d'etre in the works of nature- than in those of art. ~ Aristotle,
809:The unfortunate need people who will be kind to them; the prosperous need people to be kind to. ~ Aristotle,
810:Truth is a remarkable thing. We cannot miss knowing some of it. But we cannot know it entirely. ~ Aristotle,
811:We are what we repeatedly do. Excellence, then, is not an act, but a habit. —ARISTOTLE ~ Jeffrey M Schwartz,
812:A city is composed of different kinds of men; similar people cannot bring a city into existence. ~ Aristotle,
813:Aristotle said, Love is composed of a single soul inhabiting two bodies. Isn't that a three-way? ~ Bob Saget,
814:But also philosophy is not about perceptible substances they, you see, are prone to destruction. ~ Aristotle,
815:Criticism is something you can easily avoid by saying nothing, doing nothing, and being nothing. ~ Aristotle,
816:Educating the mind without educating the heart is no education at all" 
                      ~ Aristotle,
817:...for all men do their acts with a view to achieving something which is, in their view, a good. ~ Aristotle,
818:The Chameleon's face reminded Aristotle of a Baboon. Aristotle wasn't much of a looker himself. ~ Will Cuppy,
819:The mass of mankind are evidently slavish in their tastes, preferring a life suitable to beasts. ~ Aristotle,
820:The student of politics therefore as well as the psychologist must study the nature of the soul. ~ Aristotle,
821:We are what we repeatedly do.
Excellence, then, is not an act but a habit.” —Aristotle ~ Brendon Burchard,
822:we do not have knowledge of a thing until we have grasped its why, that is to say, its cause.
   ~ Aristotle,
823:Aristotle [would] probably conclude most Americans, for all intents and purposes, are slaves. ~ David Graeber,
824:A speaker who is attempting to move people to thought or action must concern himself with Pathos. ~ Aristotle,
825:At his best, man is the noblest of all animals; separated from law & justice he is the worst. ~ Aristotle,
826:Criticism, as it was first instituted by Aristotle, was meant as a standard of judging well. ~ Samuel Johnson,
827:For nothing is moved at haphazard, but in every case there must be some reason present
[1071b] ~ Aristotle,
828:For what is the best choice for each individual is the highest it is possible for him to achieve. ~ Aristotle,
829:It is no part of a physician's business to use either persuasion or compulsion upon the patients. ~ Aristotle,
830:it is the function of a poet to relate not things that have happened, but things that may happen, ~ Aristotle,
831:Men come together in cities in order to live: they remain together in order to live the good life ~ Aristotle,
832:Purpose is a desire for something in our own power, coupled with an investigation into its means. ~ Aristotle,
833:The activity of happiness must occupy an entire lifetime; for one swallow does not a summer make. ~ Aristotle,
834:The best friend is he that, when he wishes a person's good, wishes it for that person's own sake. ~ Aristotle,
835:The soul is characterized by these capacities; self-nutrition, sensation, thinking, and movement. ~ Aristotle,
836:Thou wilt find rest from vain fancies if thou doest every act in life as though it were thy last. ~ Aristotle,
837:Today you can start forming habits for overcoming all obstacles in life... even nicotine cravings ~ Aristotle,
838:A democracy is a government in the hands of men of low birth, no property, and vulgar employments. ~ Aristotle,
839:Aristotle also felt strongly that virtue requires action; mere noble intentions are not enough. ~ Derren Brown,
840:But nature flies from the infinite; for the infinite is imperfect, and nature always seeks an end. ~ Aristotle,
841:Criticism is something you can easily avoid — by saying nothing, doing nothing, and being nothing. ~ Aristotle,
842:For what is the best choice, for each individual is the highest it is possible for him to achieve. ~ Aristotle,
843:Get a sun lamp to keep you looking as if you have just come back from somewhere expensive. ~ Aristotle Onassis,
844:Good has two meanings: it means that which is good absolutely and that which is good for somebody. ~ Aristotle,
845:Homero, más que ningún otro, nos ha enseñado a todos el arte de forjar mentiras de manera adecuada ~ Aristotle,
846:It is a part of probability that many improbable things will happen.   —Aristotle, Poetics, XXV ~ Megan Chance,
847:It is well to be up before daybreak, for such habits contribute to health, wealth, and wisdom.
~ Aristotle,
848:Justice is the loveliest and health is the best, but the sweetest to obtain is the heart's desire. ~ Aristotle,
849:Justice is the loveliest and health is the best. but the sweetest to obtain is the heart's desire. ~ Aristotle,
850:Kita harus berperilaku kepada orang lainseperti yang kita inginkan orang lain berlaku kepada kita. ~ Aristotle,
851:So it is clear that the search for what is just is a search for the mean; for the law is the mean. ~ Aristotle,
852:The misanthrope, as an essentially solitary man, is not a man at all: he must be a beast or a god. ~ Aristotle,
853:There is, at this moment, imperative need for men possessing, like Aristotle, universal knowledge. ~ Anonymous,
854:Wisdom or intelligence and prudence are intellectual, liberality and temperance are moral virtues. ~ Aristotle,
855:Aristotle says that metaphor causes the mind to experience itself in the act of making a mistake. ~ Anne Carson,
856:Bring your desires down to your present means. Increase them only when your increased means permit. ~ Aristotle,
857:Character is that which reveals moral purpose, showing what kind of things a man chooses or avoids. ~ Aristotle,
858:Co svou přítomností nebo nepřítomností nepůsobí pražádný patrný rozdíl, není důležitou částí celku. ~ Aristotle,
859:Even Aristotle, master of pure reason, said: 'The friend of wisdom is also a friend of myth. ~ Bruno Bettelheim,
860:Even when laws have been written down, they ought not always to remain unaltered. ~ Aristotle, Politics, II, 8,
861:Great is the good fortune of a state in which the citizens have a moderate and sufficient property. ~ Aristotle,
862:Halk yığınları aldatıldıkları zaman kendilerini kötü şeyler yapmaya özendirenlere karşı kin besler. ~ Aristotle,
863:...happiness is an activity and a complete utilization of virtue, not conditionally but absolutely. ~ Aristotle,
864:In a polity, each citizen is to possess his own arms, which are not supplied or owned by the state. ~ Aristotle,
865:It is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political animal. ~ Aristotle,
866:It is our choice of good or evil that determines our character, not our opinion about good or evil. ~ Aristotle,
867:(..) labais tiek izteikts atbilstoši visās esības kategorijās (..) laika kategorijā - īstais brīdis ~ Aristotle,
868:Masculine republics give way to feminine democracies, and feminine democracies give way to tyranny. ~ Aristotle,
869:Mothers are fonder than fathers of their children because they are more certain they are their own. ~ Aristotle,
870:Mothers are fonder than fathers of their children because they are more certain they are therir own ~ Aristotle,
871:So that the lover of myths, which are a compact of wonders, is by the same token a lover of wisdom. ~ Aristotle,
872:The aim of art is to represent not the outward appearance of things, but their inward significance. ~ Aristotle,
873:... the science we are after is not about mathematicals either none of them, you see, is separable. ~ Aristotle,
874:Aristotle was by far a less able thinker than Plato ... he was completely overwhelmed by Plato. ~ Wolfgang Pauli,
875:Business or toil is merely utilitarian. It is necessary but does not enrich or ennoble a human life. ~ Aristotle,
876:Courage is the mother of all virtues because without it, you cannot consistently perform the others. ~ Aristotle,
877:Democracy arose from men's thinking that if they are equal in any respect they are equal absolutely. ~ Aristotle,
878:For liberality resides not in the multitude of the gifts but in the state of character of the giver. ~ Aristotle,
879:For pleasure is a state of soul, and to each man that which he is said to be a lover of is pleasant. ~ Aristotle,
880:For what were the business of a speaker, if the Thought were revealed quite apart from what he says? ~ Aristotle,
881:How can a man know what is good or best for him, and yet chronically fail to act upon his knowledge? ~ Aristotle,
882:No more will there be any difference between 'the ideal good' and 'good' in so far as both are good. ~ Aristotle,
883:No one would choose a friendless existence on condition of having all the other things in the world. ~ Aristotle,
884:The aim of art is to represent not the outward appearance of things, but their inward significance. ~ Aristotle,
885:The government is everywhere sovereign in the state, and the constitution is in fact the government. ~ Aristotle,
886:The habits we form from childhood make no small difference, but rather they make all the difference. ~ Aristotle,
887:The pleasures arising from thinking and learning will make us think and learn all the more. 1153a 23 ~ Aristotle,
888:The vigorous are no better than the lazy during one half of life, for all men are alike when asleep. ~ Aristotle,
889:Those that deem politics beneath their dignity are doomed to be governed by those of lesser talents. ~ Aristotle,
890:With the truth, all given facts harmonize; but with what is false, the truth soon hits a wrong note. ~ Aristotle,
891:Anything whose presence or absence makes no discernible difference is no essential part of the whole. ~ Aristotle,
892:Character is that which reveals moral purpose, exposing the class of things a man chooses and avoids. ~ Aristotle,
893:Democracy arose from men's thinking that if they are equal in any respect, they are equal absolutely. ~ Aristotle,
894:Happiness seems to depend on leisure, because we work to have leisure, and wage war to live in peace. ~ Aristotle,
895:It is our actions and the soul's active exercise of its functions that we posit (as being Happiness). ~ Aristotle,
896:The state comes into existence for the sake of life and continues to exist for the sake of good life. ~ Aristotle,
897:The virtue of the good man is necessarily the same as the virtue of the citizen of the perfect state. ~ Aristotle,
898:Aristotle discovered all the half-truths which were necessary to the creation of science. ~ Alfred North Whitehead,
899:Aristotle says that tragedy is the downfall of the protagonist through his own internal tragic flaw. ~ Laura Bates,
900:At the Olympic Games, it isn't the most beautiful or strongest who are crowned, but those who compete. ~ Aristotle,
901:Es de importancia para quien desee encontrar una certeza en su investigación, el saber dudar a tiempo. ~ Aristotle,
902:Everything is true, Aristotle seems to say, so long as it is never taken for anything more than it is. ~ Anonymous,
903:For Aristotle, politics is about something higher. It’s about learning how to live a good life. ~ Michael J Sandel,
904:It has been said that Aristotle was the last man to be familiar with the whole of his own culture. ~ Kurt Vonnegut,
905:It is of the nature of desire not to be satisfied, and most men live only for the gratification of it. ~ Aristotle,
906:Now to investigate whether Being is one and motionless is not a contribution to the science of Nature. ~ Aristotle,
907:After a certain point, money is meaningless. It ceases to be the goal. The game is what counts. ~ Aristotle Onassis,
908:Between husband and wife friendship seems to exist by nature, for man is naturally disposed to pairing. ~ Aristotle,
909:Character gives us qualities, but it is in our actions — what we do — that we are happy or the reverse. ~ Aristotle,
910:For imagining lies within our power whenever we wish . . . but in forming opinons we are not free . . . ~ Aristotle,
911:If there are two definitive features of ancient Greek civilization, they are loquacity and competition. ~ Aristotle,
912:No one chooses what does not rest with himself, but only what he thinks can be attained by his own act. ~ Aristotle,
913:The body is most fully developed from thirty to thirty-five years of age, the mind at about forty-nine. ~ Aristotle,
914:The greatest injustices proceed from those who pursue excess, not by those who are driven by necessity. ~ Aristotle,
915:As Aristotle said, you have to be an aristocrat or a reactionary to write a good proletarian poem. ~ Kenneth Rexroth,
916:He who thus considers things in their first growth and origin ... will obtain the clearest view of them. ~ Aristotle,
917:It is easy to perform a good action, but not easy to acquire a settled habit of performing such actions. ~ Aristotle,
918:Men become richer not only by increasing their existing wealth but also by decreasing their expenditure. ~ Aristotle,
919:Polygnotus depicted men as nobler than they are, Pauson as less noble, Dionysius drew them true to life. ~ Aristotle,
920:Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion. ~ Aristotle,
921:The angry man wishes the object of his anger to suffer in return; hatred wishes its object not to exist. ~ Aristotle,
922:We are what we repeatedly do.
Excellence, then, is not an act but a habit. —Aristotle ~ Hector Garcia Puigcerver,
923:Why do men seek honour? Surely in order to confirm the favorable opinion they have formed of themselves. ~ Aristotle,
924:Young people are in a condition like permanent intoxication, because life is sweet and they are growing. ~ Aristotle,
925:Algunos creen q para ser amigos basta con querer, como si para estar sanos bastara con desear buena salud ~ Aristotle,
926:Aristotle defined tragedy as a bad outcome for a person because of a fatal flaw that he can’t get around. ~ Anonymous,
927:...Aristotle said I am a rational animal; I say I am an angel with an incredible capacity for beer. ~ Brennan Manning,
928:Emotions of any kind can be evoked by melody and rhythm; therefore music has the power to form character. ~ Aristotle,
929:For this reason poetry is something more philosophical and more worthy of serious attention than history. ~ Aristotle,
930:If you prove the cause, you at once prove the effect; and conversely nothing can exist without its cause. ~ Aristotle,
931:It is not once nor twice but times without number that the same ideas make their appearance in the world. ~ Aristotle,
932:It is the characteristic of the magnanimous man to ask no favor but to be ready to do kindness to others. ~ Aristotle,
933:Man is a goal-seeking animal. His life only has meaning if he is reaching out and striving for his goals. ~ Aristotle,
934:None of the moral virtues is engendered in us by nature, for no natural property can be altered by habit. ~ Aristotle,
935:One must learn by doing the thing, for though you think you know it, you have no certainty until you try. ~ Aristotle,
936:Virtue is more clearly shown in the performance of fine ACTIONS than in the non-performance of base ones. ~ Aristotle,
937:When a draco has eaten much fruit, it seeks the juice of the bitter lettuce; it has been seen to do this. ~ Aristotle,
938:Aristotle... a mere bond-servant to his logic, thereby rendering it contentious and well nigh useless. ~ Francis Bacon,
939:At his best, man is the noblest of all animals; separated from law and justice he is the worst. —Aristotle ~ Greg Iles,
940:Being will not have magnitude, if it is substance. For each of the two parts must be in a different sense. ~ Aristotle,
941:Experience has shown that it is difficult, if not impossible, for a populous state to be run by good laws. ~ Aristotle,
942:It is easier to get one or a few of good sense, and of ability to legislate and adjudge, than to get many. ~ Aristotle,
943:The soul suffers when the body is diseased or traumatized, while the body suffers when the soul is ailing. ~ Aristotle,
944:Actions which produce [virtue] are those which increase it, and also, if differently performed, destroy it. ~ Aristotle,
945:Aristotle said I am a rational animal; I say I am an angel with an incredible capacity for beer.”31 ~ Rachel Held Evans,
946:At his best, man is the noblest of animals. Separated from law and justice, he is the worst. —Aristotle ~ Victor Methos,
947:Personal beauty requires that one should be tall; little people may have charm and elegance, but beauty-no. ~ Aristotle,
948:St. Thomas is as practical and plain and reasonable in ethics as Aristotle, or Confucius, or your uncle. ~ Peter Kreeft,
949:We give up leisure in order that we may have leisure, just as we go to war in order that we may have peace. ~ Aristotle,
950:Where perception is, there also are pain and pleasure, and where these are, there, of necessity, is desire. ~ Aristotle,
951:A king ruleth as he ought, a tyrant as he lists, a king to the profit of all, a tyrant only to please a few. ~ Aristotle,
952:Art completes what nature cannot bring to finish. The artist gives us knowledge of nature's unrealized ends. ~ Aristotle,
953:At his best, man is the noblest of all animals; separated from law and justice he is the worst.   —Aristotle ~ Greg Iles,
954:For this alone is lacking even to God, to make undone the things that have once been done. (Quoting Agathon) ~ Aristotle,
955:Happiness lies in virtuous activity, and perfect happiness lies in the best activity, which is contemplative ~ Aristotle,
956:Impatient much?” “Patience is bitter. It's the fruit that’s sweet.” “Did you just quote Aristotle?” “Maybe. ~ Vi Keeland,
957:Men regard it as their right to return evil for evil and, if they cannot, feel they have lost their liberty. ~ Aristotle,
958:since to avoid the painful and aim at the pleasurable is one of the most obvious tendencies of human nature. ~ Aristotle,
959:The man with a host of friends who slaps on the back everybody he meets is regarded as the friend of nobody. ~ Aristotle,
960:The wise man knows of all things, as far as possible, although he has no knowledge of each of them in detail ~ Aristotle,
961:True happiness flows from the possession of wisdom and virtue and not from the possession of external goods. ~ Aristotle,
962:Wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely useful and for the sake of something else. ~ Aristotle,
963:We must free ourselves of the hope that the sea will ever rest. We must learn to sail in high winds. ~ Aristotle Onassis,
964:Indeed, we may go further and assert that anyone who does not delight in fine actions is not even a good man. ~ Aristotle,
965:I think when Aristotle said that man is a political animal, he was really saying that man is a pack animal. ~ Toby Barlow,
966:Man is the metre of all things, the hand is the instrument of instruments, and the mind is the form of forms. ~ Aristotle,
967:Neither old people nor sour people seem to make friends easily; for there is little that is pleasant in them. ~ Aristotle,
968:Shipping magnate of the 20th century If women didn't exist, all the money in the world would have no meaning. ~ Aristotle,
969:The line between lawful and unlawful abortion will be marked by the fact of having sensation and being alive. ~ Aristotle,
970:Ultimately, my more significant agreement is with a virtue tradition that features Aristotle and Descartes. ~ Ernest Sosa,
971:When quarrels and complaints arise, it is when people who are equal have not got equal shares, or vice-versa. ~ Aristotle,
972:Without virtue and training, Aristotle observed, “it is hard to bear the results of good fortune suitably. ~ Ryan Holiday,
973:All human happiness or misery takes the form of action; the end for which we live is a certain kind of action. ~ Aristotle,
974:Be a free thinker and don't accept everything you hear as truth. Be critical and evaluate what you believe in. ~ Aristotle,
975:It is simplicity that makes the uneducated more effective than the educated when addressing popular audiences. ~ Aristotle,
976:Since music has so much to do with the molding of character, it is necessary that we teach it to our children. ~ Aristotle,
977:the production of spectacular effects depends more on the art of the stage machinist than on that of the poet. ~ Aristotle,
978:The rattle is a toy suited to the infant mind, and education is a rattle or toy for children of larger growth. ~ Aristotle,
979:Time crumbles things; everything grows old under the power of Time and is forgotten through the lapse of Time. ~ Aristotle,
980:Tragedy, however, is an imitation not only of a complete action, but also of incidents arousing pity and fear. ~ Aristotle,
981:We are what we repeatedly do. Excellence, then, is not an act but a habit.” — Attributed to Aristotle ~ Barbara De Angelis,
982:I have gained this from philosophy: that I do without being commanded what others do only from fear of the law. ~ Aristotle,
983:I reject any form of government in which the opinion of the village idiot is given the same weight as Aristotle ~ Anonymous,
984:Music has a power of forming the character, and should therefore be introduced into the education of the young. ~ Aristotle,
985:Que no existe ningún otro sentido aparte de los cinco 424b 22 —me refiero a vista, oído, olfato, gusto y tacto— ~ Aristotle,
986:The difference between a learned man and an ignorant one is the same as that between a living man and a corpse. ~ Aristotle,
987:The intelligence consists not only in the knowledge but also in the skill to apply the knowledge into practice. ~ Aristotle,
988:You will never do anything in this world without courage. It is the greatest quality of the mind next to honor. ~ Aristotle,
989:Aristotle defined the virtues simply as the ways of behaving that are most conducive to happiness in life. ~ Jordan Peterson,
990:Aristotle said, “It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain a thought without accepting it. ~ Chade Meng Tan,
991:Men create gods after their own image, not only with regard to their form but with regard to their mode of life. ~ Aristotle,
992:The only stable principle of government is equality according to proportion, and for every man to enjoy his own. ~ Aristotle,
993:The ultimate value of life depends upon awareness and the power of contemplation rather than upon mere survival. ~ Aristotle,
994:When people are friends, they have no need of justice, but when they are just, they need friendship in addition. ~ Aristotle,
995:With respect to the requirement of art, the probable impossible is always preferable to the improbable possible. ~ Aristotle,
996:And this lies in the nature of things: What people are potentially is revealed in actuality by what they produce. ~ Aristotle,
997:Be a free thinker and don't accept everything you hear as truth. Be critical and evaluate what you believe in.
   ~ Aristotle,
998:Man's best friend is one who wishes well to the object of his wish for his sake, even if no one is to know of it. ~ Aristotle,
999:Men create gods after their own image, not only with regard to their form, but with regard to their mode of life. ~ Aristotle,
1000:Not in depraved things,
but in those well oriented according to nature,
are we to consider what is natural. ~ Aristotle,
1001:Not to know of what things one should demand demonstration, and of what one should not, argues want of education. ~ Aristotle,
1002:The plot, then, is the first principle, and, as it were, the soul of a tragedy; Character holds the second place. ~ Aristotle,
1003:The purpose of art is to represent the meaning of things. This represents the true reality, not external aspects. ~ Aristotle,
1004:Thus then a single harmony orders the composition of the the mingling of the most contrary principles. ~ Aristotle,
1005:To enjoy the things we ought and to hate the things we ought has the greatest bearing on excellence of character. ~ Aristotle,
1006:To get angry is easy, to get angry with the right person, the right moment and for the right reason is difficult. ~ Aristotle,
1007:Aristotle defined the virtues simply as the ways of behaving that are most conducive to happiness in life. ~ Jordan B Peterson,
1008:Each man judges correctly those matters with which he is acquainted; it is of these that he is a competent critic. ~ Aristotle,
1009:Happiness, therefore, being found to be something final; and self-sufficient, is the end at which all actions aim. ~ Aristotle,
1010:Justice therefore demands that no one should do more ruling than being ruled, but that all should have their turn. ~ Aristotle,
1011:The brave man, if he be compared with the coward, seems foolhardy; and, if with the foolhardy man, seems a coward. ~ Aristotle,
1012:The simply complete thing, then, is that which is always chosen for itself and never on account of something else. ~ Aristotle,
1013:For those who possess and can wield arms are in a position to decide whether the constitution is to continue or not ~ Aristotle,
1014:My lectures are published and not published; they will be intelligible to those who heard them, and to none beside. ~ Aristotle,
1015:The greatest of all French critics, and possibly the greatest European critic since Aristotle . ~ Charles Augustin Sainte Beuve,
1016:The ideal man bears the accidents of life with dignity and grace, making the best of circumstances."
Aristotle ~ Aristotle,
1017:A courageous person is one who faces fearful things as he ought and as reason directs for the sake of what is noble. ~ Aristotle,
1018:For Kant one can be both good and stupid; but for Aristotle stupidity of a certain kind precludes goodness. ~ Alasdair MacIntyre,
1019:I shall never be persuaded that God hath shut up all light of learning within the lantern of Aristotle's brain. ~ Walter Raleigh,
1020:To be angry is easy. But to be angry with the right man at the right time and in the right manner, that is not easy. ~ Aristotle,
1021:Aristotle, I swear that kid is going to get himself killed one of these days. He’s a dumbass at the genetic level. ~ Gary Ballard,
1022:But to be constantly asking ‘What is the use of it?’ is unbecoming to those of broad vision and unworthy of free men. ~ Aristotle,
1023:Denn es sind immer die Unterlegenen, die Gleichheit und Recht suchen, während die Mächtigen sich darum nicht scheren. ~ Aristotle,
1024:good character is the indispensable condition and chief determinant of happiness, itself the goal of all human doing. ~ Aristotle,
1025:How many a dispute could have been deflated into a single paragraph if the disputants had dared to define their terms ~ Aristotle,
1026:I count him braver who overcomes his desires than him who conquers his enemies, for the hardest victory is over self. ~ Aristotle,
1027:I count him braver who overcomes his desires than him who conquers his enemies; for the hardest victory is over self. ~ Aristotle,
1028:If 'bounded by a surface' is the definition of body there cannot be an infinite body either intelligible or sensible. ~ Aristotle,
1029:If some animals are good at hunting and others are suitable for hunting, then the Gods must clearly smile on hunting. ~ Aristotle,
1030:It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain a thought without accepting it.” ― Aristotle, Metaphysics ~ Penny Reid,
1031:Life in accordance with intellect is best and pleasantest, since this, more than anything else, constitutes humanity. ~ Aristotle,
1032:Those who have been eminent in philosophy, politics, poetry, and the arts have all had tendencies toward melancholia. ~ Aristotle,
1033:wherefore one who divines well in regard to the truth will also be able to divine well in regard to probabilities. It ~ Aristotle,
1034:All human actions have one or more of these seven causes: chance, nature, compulsions, habit, reason, passion, desire. ~ Aristotle,
1035:At the intersection where your gifts, talents, and abilities meet a human need; therein you will discover your purpose ~ Aristotle,
1036:Being reproached for giving to an unworthy person, Aristotle said, I did not give it to the man, but to humanity. ~ Samuel Johnson,
1037:For the beginning is thought to be more than half of the whole, and many of the questions we ask are cleared up by it. ~ Aristotle,
1038:Happiness then, is found to be something perfect and self sufficient, being the end to which our actions are directed. ~ Aristotle,
1039:He is courageous who endures and fears the right thing, for the right motive, in the right way and at the right times. ~ Aristotle,
1040:How many a dispute could have been deflated into a single paragraph if the disputants had dared to define their terms! ~ Aristotle,
1041:it is not possible to be good in the strict sense without practical wisdom, nor practically wise without moral virtue. ~ Aristotle,
1042:Những thói quen tốt ta hình thành khi còn trẻ không tạo nên khác biệt nhỏ nào, đúng hơn, chúng tạo ra tất cả khác biệt ~ Aristotle,
1043:One should not study what is best, but also what is possible, and similarly what is easier and more attainable by all. ~ Aristotle,
1044:There is no such thing as character other than the habitual action, as Mr. Aristotle told us two thousand years ago. ~ David Mamet,
1045:We become just by performing just action, temperate by performing temperate actions, brave by performing brave action. ~ Aristotle,
1046:We must no more ask whether the soul and body are one than ask whether the wax and the figure impressed on it are one. ~ Aristotle,
1047:Aristotle described the Crow as chaste. In some departments of knowledge, Aristotle was too innocent for his own good. ~ Will Cuppy,
1048:Happiness, then, is found to be something perfect and self-sufficient, being the end to which our actions are directed. ~ Aristotle,
1049:Hippodamus, son of Euryphon, a native of Miletus, invented the art of planning and laid out the street plan of Piraeus. ~ Aristotle,
1050:I have gained this by philosophy … I do without being ordered what some are constrained to do by their fear of the law. ~ Aristotle,
1051:Inequality is everywhere at the bottom of faction, for in general faction arises from men's striving for what is equal. ~ Aristotle,
1052:Now it is evident that the form of government is best in which every man, whoever he is, can act best and live happily. ~ Aristotle,
1053:The two qualities which chiefly inspire regard and affection are that a thing is your own and that it is your only one. ~ Aristotle,
1054:To give a satisfactory decision as to the truth it is necessary to be rather an arbitrator than a party to the dispute. ~ Aristotle,
1055:We have divided the Virtues of the Soul into two groups, the Virtues of the Character and the Virtues of the Intellect. ~ Aristotle,
1056:[W]here there are things to be done the end is not to survey and recognize the various things, but rather to do them... ~ Aristotle,
1057:All the elements of an Epic poem are found in Tragedy, but the elements of a Tragedy are not all found in the Epic poem. ~ Aristotle,
1058:Aristotle was once asked what those who tell lies gain by it. Said he - That when they speak truth they are not believed. ~ Diogenes,
1059:As Aristotle saw, the problem is not with emotionality, but with the appropriateness of emotion and its expression. ~ Daniel Goleman,
1060:I count him braver who overcomes his desires than him who conquers his enemies; for the hardest victory is over self.
   ~ Aristotle,
1061:Moral virtue is the quality of acting in the best way in relation to pleasures and pains, and that vice is the opposite. ~ Aristotle,
1062:The perversions are as follows: of royalty, tyranny; of aristocracy, oligarchy; of constitutional government, democracy. ~ Aristotle,
1063:This world is inescapably linked to the motions of the worlds above. All power in this world is ruled by these options. ~ Aristotle,
1064:Those who excel in virtue have the best right of all to rebel, but then they are of all men the least inclined to do so. ~ Aristotle,
1065:What affirmation and denial are in the case of thinking, pursuit and avoidance are in the case of longing for something. ~ Aristotle,
1066:According to Aristotle, “Happiness is the meaning and the purpose of life, the whole aim and end of human existence. ~ Gretchen Rubin,
1067:All human actions have one or more of these seven causes: chance, nature, compulsion, habit, reason, passion, and desire. ~ Aristotle,
1068:All human actions have one or more of these seven causes; chance, nature, compulsion, habit, reason, passion, and desire. ~ Aristotle,
1069:Aristotle’s words, “Criticism is something we can avoid easily by saying nothing, doing nothing, and being nothing. ~ Rajith Rajappan,
1070:It is the nature of desire not to be satisfied, and most human beings live only for the gratification of it. ARISTOTLE ~ Gerald G May,
1071:Nós nos transformamos naquilo que praticamos com frequência.
A perfeição, portanto, não é um ato isolado. É um hábito. ~ Aristotle,
1072:One may go wrong in many different ways, but right only in one, which is why it is easy to fail and difficult to succeed. ~ Aristotle,
1073:Poetry is finer and more philosophical than history; for poetry expresses the universal, and history only the particular. ~ Aristotle,
1074:The tragedies of most of our modern poets fail in the rendering of character; and of poets in general this is often true. ~ Aristotle,
1075:When there is no middle class, and the poor greatly exceed in number, troubles arise, and the state soon comes to an end. ~ Aristotle,
1076:And if a man believes nothing, but believes it equally so and not so, how would his state be different from a vegetable's? ~ Aristotle,
1077:Aristotle, asked what those who tell lies gain by it, replied: That when they speak the truth they are not believed:: ~ Elizabeth Bear,
1078:Criticism is something we can avoid easily by saying nothing, doing nothing, and being nothing.          —Aristotle ~ Danielle LaPorte,
1079:Even that some people try deceived me many times ... I will not fail to believe that somewhere, someone deserves my trust. ~ Aristotle,
1080:Hence, in a constitutional government the fighting-men have the supreme power, and those who possess arms are the citizens ~ Aristotle,
1081:Here and elsewhere we shall not obtain the best insight into things until we actually see them growing from the beginning. ~ Aristotle,
1082:Legislative enactments proceed from men carrying their views a long time back; while judicial decisions are made off hand. ~ Aristotle,
1083:[Meanness] is more ingrained in man's nature than Prodigality; the mass of mankind are avaricious rather than open-handed. ~ Aristotle,
1084:A good style must, first of all, be clear. It must not be mean or above the dignity of the subject. It must be appropriate. ~ Aristotle,
1085:[I]n speaking about someone's character, we do not say that he is wise or comprehending, but that he is gentle or moderate. ~ Aristotle,
1086:The greater the length, the more beautiful will the piece be by reason of its size, provided that the whole be perspicuous. ~ Aristotle,
1087:The high-minded man does not bear grudges, for it is not the mark of a great soul to remember injuries, but to forget them. ~ Aristotle,
1088:Aristocracy is that form of government in which education and discipline are qualifications for suffrage and office holding. ~ Aristotle,
1089:Happiness is thought to depend on leisure; for we are busy that we may have leisure, and make war that we may live in peace. ~ Aristotle,
1090:It is not easy for a person to do any great harm when his tenure of office is short, whereas long possession begets tyranny. ~ Aristotle,
1091:It will contribute towards one's object, who wishes to acquire a facility in the gaining of knowledge, to doubt judiciously. ~ Aristotle,
1092:Of the irrational part of the soul again one division appears to be common to all living things, and of a vegetative nature. ~ Aristotle,
1093:Since the time of Plato and Aristotle philosophers have had an interest in taking note of common fallacies in reasoning. ~ Randal Marlin,
1094:...The entire preoccupation of the physicist is with things that contain within themselves a principle of movement and rest. ~ Aristotle,
1095:But what is happiness? If we consider what the function of man is, we find that happiness is a virtuous activity of the soul. ~ Aristotle,
1096:Happiness may be defined as good fortune joined to virtue, or a independence, or as a life that is both agreeable and secure. ~ Aristotle,
1097:He who takes his fill of every pleasure ... becomes depraved; while he who avoids all pleasures alike ... becomes insensible. ~ Aristotle,
1098:We, on the other hand, must take for granted that the things that exist by nature are, either all or some of them, in motion. ~ Aristotle,
1099:Wise people have an inward sense of what is beautiful, and the highest wisdom is to trust this intuition and be guided by it. ~ Aristotle,
1100:Aristotle and Plato are reckoned the respective heads of two schools. A wise man will see that Aristotle platonizes. ~ Ralph Waldo Emerson,
1101:Finally, if nothing can be truly asserted, even the following claim would be false, the claim that there is no true assertion. ~ Aristotle,
1102:He who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god. ~ Aristotle,
1103:Linnaeus and Cuvier have been my two gods, though in very different ways, but they were mere schoolboys to old Aristotle. ~ Charles Darwin,
1104:The happy life is thought to be one of excellence; now an excellent life requires exertion, and does not consist in amusement. ~ Aristotle,
1105:The most perfect political community is one in which the middle class is in control, and outnumbers both of the other classes. ~ Aristotle,
1106:The principle aim of gymnastics is the education of all youth and not simply that minority of people highly favored by nature. ~ Aristotle,
1107:There is no such thing as observing a mean in excess or deficiency, nor as exceeding or falling short in observance of a mean. ~ Aristotle,
1108:The senses are gateways to the intelligence. There is nothing in the intelligence which did not first pass through the senses. ~ Aristotle,
1109:The true friend of the people should see that they be not too poor, for extreme poverty lowers the character of the democracy. ~ Aristotle,
1110:Une chose, quand elle n'est pas excessive, est un bien ; du moment qu'elle est plus grande qu'il ne faut, elle devient un mal. ~ Aristotle,
1111:As Aristotle tells us: “For the purposes of [story] a convincing impossibility is preferable to an unconvincing possibility. ~ Robert McKee,
1112:He who cannot see the truth for himself, nor, hearing it from others, store it away in his mind, that man is utterly worthless. ~ Aristotle,
1113:It is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits ~ Aristotle,
1114:Life is full of chances and changes, and the most prosperous of men may in the evening of his days meet with great misfortunes. ~ Aristotle,
1115:Purpose ... is held to be most closely connected with virtue, and to be a better token of our character than are even our acts. ~ Aristotle,
1116:and Euripides, faulty though he may be in the general management of his subject, yet is felt to be the most tragic of the poets. ~ Aristotle,
1117:Aristoteles quidem ait: 'Omnes ingeniosos melancholicos esse.' Aristotle says that all men of genius are melancholy. ~ Marcus Tullius Cicero,
1118:Even a woman may be good, and also a slave; though the woman may be said to be an inferior being, and the slave quite worthless. ~ Aristotle,
1119:For often, when one is asleep, there is something in consciousness which declares that what then presents itself is but a dream. ~ Aristotle,
1120:One of Aristotle’s most interesting discoveries is that social conflicts arise from the inequality in Economic and Social conditions… ~ Rius,
1121:On imagination-
“that in virtue of which an image occurs in us”
In other words...
Imagination is a faculty of the soul ~ Aristotle,
1122:Pero a todas las cosas de que puede disponer el hombre, puede darse un destino bueno o malo, y la riqueza es una de estas cosas. ~ Aristotle,
1123:That judges of important causes should hold office for life is a questionable thing, for the mind grows old as well as the body. ~ Aristotle,
1124:The virtue as the art consecrates itself constantly to what's difficult to do, and the harder the task, the shinier the success. ~ Aristotle,
1125:Thus every action must be due to one or other of seven causes: chance, nature, compulsion, habit, reasoning, anger, or appetite. ~ Aristotle,
1126:Treba se, dakle, baviti filozofijom ili se oprostiti od života i otići odavde, jer sve ostalo je golema besmislica i naklapanje. ~ Aristotle,
1127:Yet what difference does it make whether the women rule or the rulers are ruled by women? The result is the same.” —ARISTOTLE ~ Stacy Schiff,
1128:It is more difficult to organize a peace than to win a war; but the fruits of victory will be lost if the peace is not organized. ~ Aristotle,
1129:Our account does not rob the mathematicians of their science... In point of fact they do not need the infinite and do not use it. ~ Aristotle,
1130:Rhetoric then may be defined as the faculty of discovering the possible means of persuasion in reference to any subject whatever. ~ Aristotle,
1131:Slavery was regarded by Aristotle as an ordinance of nature, and so probably was it by the slaves themselves in olden time. ~ Alfred Marshall,
1132:The happy life is regarded as a life in conformity with virtue. It is a life which involves effort and is not spent in amusement. ~ Aristotle,
1133:The mathematical sciences particularly exhibit order symmetry and limitations; and these are the greatest forms of the beautiful. ~ Aristotle,
1134:A friend is a second self, so that our consciousness of a friend's existence...makes us more fully conscious of our own existence. ~ Aristotle,
1135:Aristotle said that friendship is only possible between two virtuous people. Therefore, friendship between us is impossible. ~ Sylvain Reynard,
1136:For example, justice is considered to mean equality, It does mean equality- but equality for those who are equal, and not for all. ~ Aristotle,
1137:If men think that a ruler is religious and has a reverence for the Gods, they are less afraid of suffering injustice at his hands. ~ Aristotle,
1138:Impulse is, after all, the best linguist; its logic, if not conformable to Aristotle, cannot fail to be most convincing. ~ Henry David Thoreau,
1139:the good of the individual by himself is certainly desirable enough, but that of a nation and of cities is nobler and more divine. ~ Aristotle,
1140:The greater the length, the more beautiful will the piece be by reason of its size, provided that the whole be perspicuous.” (VII) ~ Aristotle,
1141:There is one end we all have – not in virtue of being rational, but simply in virtue of being human being – and that is happiness. ~ Aristotle,
1142:Man perfected by society is the best of all animals; he is the most terrible of all when he lives without law, and without justice. ~ Aristotle,
1143:On the Contrary, to Aristotle the 'forms' were in the things because they were the particular characteristics of these things ~ Jostein Gaarder,
1144:The chief forms of beauty are order and symmetry and definiteness, which the mathematical sciences demonstrate in a special degree. ~ Aristotle,
1145:There also appears to be another element in the soul, which, though irrational, yet in a manner participates in rational principle. ~ Aristotle,
1146:The self-indulgent man craves for all pleasant things... and is led by his appetite to choose these at the cost of everything else. ~ Aristotle,
1147:This is what Aristotle meant when he said that the object of science is the necessary and the universal; man and not this man. ~ Fulton J Sheen,
1148:To live alone one must be a beast or a god, says Aristotle. Leaving out the third case: one must be both - a philosopher. ~ Friedrich Nietzsche,
1149:Aristotle said, “We are what we repeatedly do. Excellence then is not an act, but a habit.” Winning is a habit, and so is losing. ~ Ronda Rousey,
1150:Every word is either current, or strange, or metaphorical, or ornamental, or newly-coined, or lengthened, or contracted, or altered. ~ Aristotle,
1151:For as the eyes of bats are to the blaze of day, so is the reason in our soul to the things which are by nature most evident of all. ~ Aristotle,
1152:In a democracy the poor will have more power than the rich, because there are more of them, and the will of the majority is supreme. ~ Aristotle,
1153:It is true, indeed, that the account Plato gives in 'Timaeus' is different from what he says in his so-called 'unwritten teachings.' ~ Aristotle,
1154:Music imitates (represents) the passions or states of the soul, such as gentleness, anger, courage, temperance, and their opposites. ~ Aristotle,
1155:Socrates had a student named Plato, Plato had a student named Aristotle, and Aristotle had a student named Alexander the Great. ~ Old Tom Morris,
1156:The devotee of myth is in a way a philosopher, for myth is made up of things that cause wonder.

(Metaphysics, I, 982b 18–19) ~ Aristotle,
1157:There is no such thing as committing adultery with the right woman, at the right time, and in the right way, for it is simply WRONG. ~ Aristotle,
1158:Virtue lies in our power, and similarly so does vice; because where it is in our power to act, it is also in our power not to act... ~ Aristotle,
1159:Aeschylus first introduced a second actor; he diminished the importance of the Chorus, and assigned the leading part to the dialogue. ~ Aristotle,
1160:Don’t sleep too much. If you sleep 3 hours less each night for a year, you will have an extra month and a half to succeed in. ~ Aristotle Onassis,
1161:.. for desire is like a wild beast, and anger perverts rulers and the very best of men. Hence law is intelligence without appetition. ~ Aristotle,
1162:For none of the others can exist independently: substance alone is independent: for everything is predicated of substance as subject. ~ Aristotle,
1163:For one swallow does not make a summer, nor does one day; and so too one day, or a short time, does not make a man blessed and happy. ~ Aristotle,
1164:Good cannot be a single and universal general notion; if it were, it would not be predictable in all the categories, but only in one. ~ Aristotle,
1165:If happiness is activity in accordance with excellence, it is reasonable that it should be in accordance with the highest excellence. ~ Aristotle,
1166:In business we cut each others' throats, but now and then we sit around the same table and behave-for the sake of the ladies. ~ Aristotle Onassis,
1167:It is the active exercise of our faculties in conformity with virtue that causes happiness, and the opposite activities its opposite. ~ Aristotle,
1168:It is their character indeed that makes people who they are. But it is by reason of their actions that they are happy or the reverse. ~ Aristotle,
1169:Money originated with royalty and slavery, it has nothing to do with democracy or the struggle of the empoverished enslaved majority. ~ Aristotle,
1170:The man who is truly good and wise will bear with dignity whatever fortune sends, and will always make the best of his circumstances. ~ Aristotle,
1171:When you feel yourself lacking something, send your thoughts towards your Intimate and search for the Divinity that lives within you. ~ Aristotle,
1172:All who have meditated on the art of governing mankind have been convinced that the fate of empires depends on the education of youth. ~ Aristotle,
1173:It is of itself that the divine thought thinks (since it is the most excellent of things), and its thinking is a thinking on thinking. ~ Aristotle,
1174:There is simple ignorance, which is the source of lighter offenses, and double ignorance, which is accompanied by a conceit of wisdom. ~ Aristotle,
1175:The shape of the heaven is of necessity spherical; for that is the shape most appropriate to its substance and also by nature primary. ~ Aristotle,
1176:A state of the soul is either (1) an emotion, (2) a capacity, or (3) a disposition; virtue therefore must be one of these three things. ~ Aristotle,
1177:But in all cases we must guard most carefully against what is pleasant, and pleasure itself, because we are not impartial judges of it. ~ Aristotle,
1178:Fame means being respected by everybody, or having some quality that is desired by all men, or by most, or by the good, or by the wise. ~ Aristotle,
1179:If then it be possible that one contrary should exist, or be called into existence, the other contrary will also appear to be possible. ~ Aristotle,
1180:Music directly represents the passions of the soul. If one listens to the wrong kind of music, he will become the wrong kind of person. ~ Aristotle,
1181:not seek for exactness in all matters alike, but in each according to the subject-matter, and so far as properly belongs to the system. ~ Aristotle,
1182:Persahabatan sangat diperlukan dalam hidup, karena tanpa sahabat hidup terasa hambar, walau pun kita memiliki kekayaan dan kemasyhuran. ~ Aristotle,
1183:since we are most strongly convinced when we suppose anything to have been demonstrated; that rhetorical demonstration is an enthymeme, ~ Aristotle,
1184:The many are more incorruptible than the few; they are like the greater quantity of water which is less easily corrupted than a little. ~ Aristotle,
1185:To die in order to avoid the pains of poverty, love, or anything that is disagreeable, is not the part of a brave man, but of a coward. ~ Aristotle,
1186:We may have many acquaintances, but we can have but few friends; this made Aristotle say that he that hath many friends hath none. ~ Samuel Johnson,
1187:When the citizens at large administer the state for the common interest, the government is called by the generic name - a constitution. ~ Aristotle,
1188:Yes the truth is that men's ambition and their desire to make money are among the most frequent causes of deliberate acts of injustice. ~ Aristotle,
1189:At the dressing table, every woman has a chance to be an artist, and art, as Aristotle said, 'completes what nature left unfinished.' ~ Sophia Loren,
1190:It is evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician demonstrative proofs. ~ Aristotle,
1191:Neglect of an effective birth control policy is a never-failing source of poverty which, in turn, is the parent of revolution and crime. ~ Aristotle,
1192:Nowadays, for the sake of the advantage which is to be gained from the public revenues and from office, men want to be always in office. ~ Aristotle,
1193:The ultimate not knowledge, but action. To be half right on time may be more important than to obtain the whole truth too late. ~ Aristotle,
1194:We must not feel a childish disgust at the investigations of the meaner animals. For there is something marvelous in all natural things. ~ Aristotle,
1195:Whatsoever that be within us that feels, thinks, desires, and animates, is something celestial, divine, and, consequently, imperishable. ~ Aristotle,
1196:When you are lonely, when you feel yourself an alien in the world, play Chess. This will raise your spirits and be your counselor in war ~ Aristotle,
1197:All who have meditated upon the art of governing mankind have been convinced that the fate of empires depend upon the education of youth. ~ Aristotle,
1198:He who can be, and therefore is, another's, and he who participates in reason enough to apprehend, but not to have, is a slave by nature. ~ Aristotle,
1199:Modesty is hardly to be described as a virtue. It is a feeling rather than a disposition. It is a kind of fear of falling into disrepute. ~ Aristotle,
1200:We become just by the practice of just actions, self-controlled by exercising self-control, and courageous by performing acts of courage. ~ Aristotle,
1201:Beside these there is no other way; for the act is necessarily either done or not done, and those who act either have knowledge or do not. ~ Aristotle,
1202:Friendship is a thing most necessary to life, since without friends no one would choose to live, though possessed of all other advantages. ~ Aristotle,
1203:Politicians also have no leisure, because they are always aiming at something beyond political life itself, power and glory, or happiness. ~ Aristotle,
1204:Suffering becomes beautiful when anyone bears great calamities with cheerfulness, not through insensibility but through greatness of mind. ~ Aristotle,
1205:The proof that the state is a creation of nature and prior to the individual is that the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing. ~ Aristotle,
1206:This body is not a home, but an inn; and that only for a short time. Seneca Friendship is composed of a single soul inhabiting two bodies. ~ Aristotle,
1207:To live alone one must be either a beast or a god, says Aristotle. Leaving out the third case: one must be both - a philosopher. ~ Friedrich Nietzsche,
1208:To the beautiful falls the right of command, he observes, quoting Aristotle, although he adds that this situation is not always just. ~ Charles Baxter,
1209:Aristotle was to verge from his mentor in the Poetics, recognizing the light both tragic drama and epic poetry shed on the human condition. ~ Aristotle,
1210:there is no gain in being persuaded not to be hot or in pain or hungry or the like, since we shall experience these feelings none the less. ~ Aristotle,
1211:A proper wife should be as obedient as a slave... The female is a female by virtue of a certain lack of qualities - a natural defectiveness. ~ Aristotle,
1212:Aristotle, the great Greek philosopher and scientist, proclaimed in a treatise written in 350 BC that women have fewer teeth than men. ~ Frederic Laloux,
1213:For the lesser evil is reckoned a good in comparison with the greater evil, since the lesser evil is rather to be chosen than the greater. . ~ Aristotle,
1214:for we are inquiring not in order to know what virtue is, but in order to become good, since otherwise our inquiry would have been of no use ~ Aristotle,
1215:He [William Harvey] bid me to goe to the Fountain-head, and read Aristotle, Cicero, Avicenna, and did call the Neoteriques shitt-breeches. ~ John Aubrey,
1216:I’ll quote from Ecclesiastes to the Catholics, from the Koran to the Muslims, from the Torah to the Jews, from Aristotle to the atheists. ~ Paulo Coelho,
1217:Inferiors revolt in order that they may be equal, and equals that they may be superior. Such is the state of mind which creates revolutions. ~ Aristotle,
1218:The same distinction marks off Tragedy from Comedy; for Comedy aims at representing men as worse, Tragedy as better than in actual life. III ~ Aristotle,
1219:whenever a reasonable explanation comes to sight as to why a thing appears to be but is not true, this makes for greater trust in the truth. ~ Aristotle,
1220:Let all the disciples of Aristotle…,” he would write, “recognize that experiment is the true master who must be followed in Physics.”6 ~ Leonard Mlodinow,
1221:No man of high and generous spirit is ever willing to indulge in flattery; the good may feel affection for others, but will not flatter them. ~ Aristotle,
1222:...perhaps there is some element of good even in the simple act of living, so long as the evils of existence do not preponderate too heavily. ~ Aristotle,
1223:Quite often good things have hurtful consequences. There are instances of men who have been ruined by their money or killed by their courage. ~ Aristotle,
1224:So we must lay it down that the association which is a state exists not for the purpose of living together but for the sake of noble actions. ~ Aristotle,
1225:[Aristotle formal logic thus far (1787)] has not been able to advance a single step, and hence is to all appearances closed and completed. ~ Immanuel Kant,
1226:Each human being is bred with a unique set of potentials that yearn to be fulfilled as surely as the acorn yearns to become the oak within it. ~ Aristotle,
1227:Excellence or virtue in a man will be the disposition which renders him a good man and also which will cause him to perform his function well. ~ Aristotle,
1228:If then nature makes nothing without some end in view, nothing to no purpose, it must be that nature has made all of them for the sake of man. ~ Aristotle,
1229:Now all orators effect their demonstrative proofs by allegation either of enthymems or examples, and, besides these, in no other way whatever. ~ Aristotle,
1230:Such an event is probable in Agathon's sense of the word: 'it is probable,' he says, 'that many things should happen contrary to probability.' ~ Aristotle,
1231:In painting, the most brilliant colors, spread at random and without design, will give far less pleasure than the simplest outline of a figure. ~ Aristotle,
1232:People become house builders through building houses, harp players through playing the harp. We grow to be just by doing things which are just. ~ Aristotle,
1233:Those who educate children well are more to be honored than they who produce them; for these only gave them life, those the art of living well. ~ Aristotle,
1234:As in other departments of science, so in politics, the compound should always be resolved into the simple elements or least parts of the whole. ~ Aristotle,
1235:He is his own best friend and takes delight in privacy whereas the man of no virtue or ability is his own worst enemy and is afraid of solitude. ~ Aristotle,
1236:Leisure of itself gives pleasure and happiness and enjoyment of life, which are experienced, not by the busy man, but by those who have leisure. ~ Aristotle,
1237:Marriage is like retiring as a bachelor and getting a sexual pension. You don't have to work for the sex any more, but you only get 65% as much. ~ Aristotle,
1238:Metaphysics involves intuitive knowledge of unprovable starting-points concepts and truth and demonstrative knowledge of what follows from them. ~ Aristotle,
1239:No democracy can exist unless each of its citizens is as capable of outrage at injustice to another as he is of outrage at unjustice to himself. ~ Aristotle,
1240:No one praises happiness as one praises justice, but we call it a 'blessing,' deeming it something higher and more divine than things we praise. ~ Aristotle,
1241:People of superior refinement and of active disposition identify happiness with honour; for this is roughly speaking, the end of political life. ~ Aristotle,
1242:To know what virtue is is not enough; we must endeavor to possess and to practice it, or in some other manner actually ourselves to become good. ~ Aristotle,
1243:Virtue is a greater good than honour; and one might perhaps accordingly suppose that virtue rather than honour is the end of the political life. ~ Aristotle,
1244:Aristotle said that some people were only fit to be slaves. I do not contradict him. But I reject slavery because I see no men fit to be masters. ~ C S Lewis,
1245:Aristotle thought the earth was stationary and that the sun, the moon, the planets, and the stars moved in circular orbits about the earth. ~ Stephen Hawking,
1246:Everybody loves a thing more if it has cost him trouble: for instance those who have made money love money more than those who have inherited it. ~ Aristotle,
1247:Happiness does not lie in amusement; it would be strange if one were to take trouble and suffer hardship all one's life in order to amuse oneself ~ Aristotle,
1248:He who has conferred a benefit on anyone from motives of love or honor will feel pain, if he sees that the benefit is received without gratitude. ~ Aristotle,
1249:We assume therefore that moral virtue is the quality of acting in the best way in relation to pleasures and pains, and that vice is the opposite. ~ Aristotle,
1250:A man who examines each subject from a philosophical standpoint cannot neglect them: he has to omit nothing, and state the truth about each topic. ~ Aristotle,
1251:Cicero called Aristotle a river of flowing gold, and said of Plato's Dialogues, that if Jupiter were to speak, it would be in language like theirs. ~ Plutarch,
1252:Happiness does not lie in amusement; it would be strange if one were to take trouble and suffer hardship all one's life in order to amuse oneself. ~ Aristotle,
1253:In a democracy the poor will have more power than the rich, because there are more of them, and the will of the majority is supreme. --Aristotle ~ Cornel West,
1254:One swallow does not make a summer, neither does one fine day; similarly one day or brief time of happiness does not make a person entirely happy. ~ Aristotle,
1255:Rash men wish for dangers beforehand but draw back when they are in them. Brave men are excited at the moment of action, but collected beforehand. ~ Aristotle,
1256:The nonexistence of absolute rest therefore meant that one could not give an event an absolute position in space, as Aristotle had believed. ~ Stephen Hawking,
1257:The peculiar circumstances arising out of the fall of the Syracusan tyranny seem to have produced the first practitioners of the art of rhetorical ~ Aristotle,
1258:These virtues are formed in man by his doing the actions ... The good of man is a working of the soul in the way of excellence in a complete life. ~ Aristotle,
1259:[this element], the seat of the appetites and of desire in general, does in a sense participate in principle, as being amenable and obedient to it ~ Aristotle,
1260:What is common to many is least taken care of, for all men have greater regard for what is their own than what they possess in common with others. ~ Aristotle,
1261:Accordingly, the poet should prefer probable impossibilities to improbable possibilities. The tragic plot must not be composed of irrational parts. ~ Aristotle,
1262:Evening may therefore be called ‘the old age of the day,’ and old age, ‘the evening of life,’ or, in the phrase of Empedocles, ‘life’s setting sun. ~ Aristotle,
1263:For Tragedy is an imitation, not of men, but of an action and of life, and life consists in action, and its end is a mode of action, not a quality. ~ Aristotle,
1264:Moral excellence comes about as a result of habit. We become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts. ~ Aristotle,
1265:Perhaps here we have a clue to the reason why royal rule used to exist formerly, namely the difficulty of finding enough men of outstanding virtue. ~ Aristotle,
1266:The truly good and wise man will bear all kinds of fortune in a seemly way, and will always act in the noblest manner that the circumstances allow. ~ Aristotle,
1267:A good man may make the best even of poverty and disease, and the other ills of life; but he can only attain happiness under the opposite conditions ~ Aristotle,
1268:All food must be capable of being digested, and that what produces digestion is warmth; that is why everything that has soul in it possesses warmth. ~ Aristotle,
1269:A men whose every word is nothing but the truth is not a human being but a god! Gods do not die, whereas Aristotle is lying in a grave now. ~ Mehmet Murat ildan,
1270:Aristotle is the last Greek philosopher who faces the world cheerfully; after him, all have, in one form or another, a philosophy of retreat. ~ Bertrand Russell,
1271:But is it just then that the few and the wealthy should be the rulers? And what if they, in like manner, rob and plunder the people, - is this just? ~ Aristotle,
1272:Daher ist die Dichtkunst Sache von phantasiebegabten oder von leidenschaftlichen Naturen; die einen sind wandlungsfähig, die anderen stark erregbar. ~ Aristotle,
1273:Equality is of two kinds, numerical and proportional; by the first I mean sameness of equality in number or size; by the second, equality of ratios. ~ Aristotle,
1274:If happiness, then, is activity expressing virtue, it is reasonable for it to express the supreme virtue, which will be the virtueof the best thing. ~ Aristotle,
1275:So too the poet, in representing men who are irascible or indolent, or have other defects of character, should preserve the type and yet ennoble it. ~ Aristotle,
1276:What is it that Aristotle said: ‘Republics decline into democracies, and democracies degenerate into despotisms.’ We have approached that day. ~ Taylor Caldwell,
1277:What was Aristotle’s life?’ Well, the answer lay in a single sentence: ‘He was born, he thought, he died.’ And all the rest is pure anecdote. ~ Martin Heidegger,
1278:A tragedy is a representation of an action that is whole and complete and of a certain magnitude. A whole is what has a beginning and middle and end. ~ Aristotle,
1279:Moral experience—the actual possession and exercise of good character—is necessary truly to understand moral principles and profitably to apply them. ~ Aristotle,
1280:The atomists , unlike Socrates , Plato , and Aristotle , sought to explain the world without introducing the notion of purpose or final cause. ~ Bertrand Russell,
1281:To live alone, you need to be either an animal or a god–says Aristotle. But he left out the third case: you can be both–a philosopher . . . ~ Friedrich Nietzsche,
1282:We may assume the superiority ceteris paribus of the demonstration which derives from fewer postulates or hypotheses - in short, from fewer premises. ~ Aristotle,
1283:Aristotle taught that the brain exists merely to cool the blood and is not involved in the process of thinking. This is true only of certain persons. ~ Will Cuppy,
1284:If, then, ‘substance’ is not attributed to anything, but other things are attributed to it, how does ‘substance’ mean what is rather than what is not? ~ Aristotle,
1285:It concerns us to know the purposes we seek in life, for then, like archers aiming at a definite mark, we shall be more likely to attain what we want. ~ Aristotle,
1286:We are what we repeatedly do. Excellence, then, is not an act, but a habit. Aristotle How very little can be done under the spirit of fear. ~ Florence Nightingale,
1287:We should venture on the study of every kind of animal without distaste; for each and all will reveal to us something natural and something beautiful. ~ Aristotle,
1288:While those whom devotion to abstract discussions has rendered unobservant of the facts are too ready to dogmatize on the basis of a few observations. ~ Aristotle,
1289:A period may be defined as a portion of speech that has in itself a beginning and an end, being at the same time not too big to be taken in at a glance ~ Aristotle,
1290:Aristotle warned that inequality brought instability, while Plato believed that demagogues exploited free speech to install themselves as tyrants. ~ Timothy Snyder,
1291:Comedy, as we said, is an imitation of people of a lower sort, though not in respect to every vice; rather, what is ridiculous is part of what is ugly. ~ Aristotle,
1292:He then alone will strictly be called brave who is fearless of a noble death, and of all such chances as come upon us with sudden death in their train. ~ Aristotle,
1293:It is difficult to be funny and great at the same time. Aristophanes and Moliere and Mark Twain must sit below Aristotle and Bossuet and Emerson. ~ Stephen Leacock,
1294:Aristotle insists that habituation, not teaching, is the route to moral virtue (II. 1). We must practise doing good actions, not just read about virtue. ~ Aristotle,
1295:Aristotle says of leisure, “A man will live thus, not to the extent that he is a man, but to the extent that a divine principle dwells within him.”16 ~ Josef Pieper,
1296:Different men seek after happiness in different ways and by different means, and so make for themselves different modes of life and forms of government. ~ Aristotle,
1297:For if Being is just one, and one in the way mentioned, there is a principle no longer, since a principle must be the principle of some thing or things. ~ Aristotle,
1298:In the information age, you don't teach philosophy as they did after feudalism. You perform it. If Aristotle were alive today he'd have a talk show. ~ Timothy Leary,
1299:It is clear that there is some difference between ends: some ends are energeia [energy], while others are products which are additional to the energeia. ~ Aristotle,
1300:Again, it is harder to fight with pleasure than with anger, to use Heraclitus' phrase', but both art and virtue are always concerned with what is harder; ~ Aristotle,
1301:In all things which have a plurality of parts, and which are not a total aggregate but a whole of some sort distinct from the parts, there is some cause. ~ Aristotle,
1302:It is also in the interests of a tyrant to make his subjects poo...the people are so occupied with their daily tasks that they have no time for plotting. ~ Aristotle,
1303:So, if we must give a general formula applicable to all kinds of soul, we must describe it as the first actuality [entelechy] of anatural organized body. ~ Aristotle,
1304:To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true. ~ Aristotle,
1305:Without action, knowledge is often meaningless. As Aristotle put it, to be excellent we cannot simply think or feel excellent, we must act excellently. ~ Shawn Achor,
1306:If it is better to be happy as a result of one's own exertions than by the gift of fortune, it is reasonable to suppose that this is how happiness is won. ~ Aristotle,
1307:It is accepted as democratic when public offices are allocated by lot; and as oligarchic when they are filled by election. -- Aristotle, Politics, Book IV ~ Aristotle,
1308:Most people have some purpose or other in their lives. Aristotle says that the end of every being is its greatest good. We all act in view of some good. ~ James Joyce,
1309:The same things are best both for individuals and for states, and these are the things which the legislator ought to implant in the minds of his citizens. ~ Aristotle,
1310:The vices respectively fall short of or exceed what is right in both passions and actions, while virtue both finds and chooses that which is intermediate. ~ Aristotle,
1311:Todos los cuerpos naturales, en efecto, son órganos del alma tanto los de los animales como los de las plantas: lo que demuestra que su fin 20 es el alma. ~ Aristotle,
1312:To the size of the state there is a limit, as there is to plants, animals and implements, for none of these retain their facility when they are too large. ~ Aristotle,
1313:Men are divided between those who are as thrifty as if they would live forever, and those who are as extravagant as if they were going to die the next day. ~ Aristotle,
1314:Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit. ~ Aristotle,
1315:Conscientious and careful physicians allocate causes of disease to natural laws, while the ablest scientists go back to medicine for their first principles. ~ Aristotle,
1316:Since the things we do determine the character of life, no blessed person can become unhappy. For he will never do those things which are hateful and petty. ~ Aristotle,
1317:The precepts of the law may be comprehended under these three points: to live honestly, to hurt no man willfully, and to render every man his due carefully. ~ Aristotle,
1318:To leave the number of births unrestricted, as is done in most states, inevitably causes poverty among the citizens, and poverty produces crime and faction. ~ Aristotle,
1319:Two characteristic marks have above all others been recognized as distinguishing that which has soul in it from that which has not - movement and sensation. ~ Aristotle,
1320:It is also in the interests of the tyrant to make his subjects poor... the people are so occupied with their daily tasks that they have no time for plotting. ~ Aristotle,
1321:Lawgivers make the citizens food by training them in habits of right action - this is the aim of all legislation, and if it fails to do this it is a failure. ~ Aristotle,
1322:Marx wrote his dissertation on Epicurus, and he was familiar with Greek thought. Aristotle, as you will see, provides a frequent anchor for his arguments. ~ David Harvey,
1323:I will admit, like Socrates and Aristotle and Plato and some other philosophers, that there are instances where the death penalty would seem appropriate. ~ Jack Kevorkian,
1324:Rising before daylight is also to be commended; it is a healthy habit, and gives more time for the management of the household as well as for liberal studies. ~ Aristotle,
1325:Some men turn every quality or art into a means of making money; this they conceive to be the end, and to the promotion of the end all things must contribute. ~ Aristotle,
1326:The good lawgiver should inquire how states and races of men and communities may participate in a good life, and in the happiness which is attainable by them. ~ Aristotle,
1327:The line has magnitude in one way, the plane in two ways, and the solid in three ways, and beyond these there is no other magnitude because the three are all. ~ Aristotle,
1328:Among people lacking self-restraint, those apt to be impulsive40 are better than those who are in possession of an argument [logos] but do not abide by it. For ~ Aristotle,
1329:People do not naturally become morally excellent or practically wise. They become so, if at all, only as the result of lifelong personal and community effort. ~ Aristotle,
1330:There is also a doubt as to what is to be the supreme power in the state: - Is it the multitude? Or the wealthy? Or the good? Or the one best man? Or a tyrant? ~ Aristotle,
1331:We are not angry with people we fear or respect, as long as we fear or respect them; you cannot be afraid of a person and also at the same time angry with him. ~ Aristotle,
1332:Again, the male is by nature superior, and the female inferior; and the one rules, and the other is ruled; this principle, of necessity, extends to all mankind. ~ Aristotle,
1333:Aristotle says that in order to live alone one must either be an animal or a god. The third alternative is lacking. A man must be both; a philosopher. ~ Friedrich Nietzsche,
1334:Some vices miss what is right because they are deficient, others because they are excessive, in feelings or in actions, while virtue finds and chooses the mean. ~ Aristotle,
1335:Aristotle and Plato considered Greeks so innately superior to barbarians that slavery is justified so long as the master is Greek and the slave barbarian. ~ Bertrand Russell,
1336:For we don't wish to know what bravery is but to be brave, not what justice is but to be just, just as we wish to be in health rather than to know what health is ~ Aristotle,
1337:Like Aristotle, conservatives generally accept the world as it is; they distrust the politics of abstract reason – that is, reason divorced from experience. ~ Benjamin Wiker,
1338:Opinion involves belief (for without belief in what we opine we cannot have an opinion), and in the brutes though we often find imagination we never find belief. ~ Aristotle,
1339:si el alma se encuentra en todo cuerpo dotado de sensibilidad y si además suponemos que el alma es un cuerpo, necesariamente habrá dos cuerpos en el mismo lugar. ~ Aristotle,
1340:The beginning of reform is not so much to equalize property as to train the noble sort of natures not to desire more, and to prevent the lower from getting more. ~ Aristotle,
1341:To run away from trouble is a form of cowardice and, while it is true that the suicide braves death, he does it not for some noble object but to escape some ill. ~ Aristotle,
1342:1 is not prime, by definition. 2 is an unnatural prime, 4 is an unnatural prime, and 6 is an unnatural prime. All other natural primes cannot be unnatural primes. ~ Aristotle,
1343:The female is, as it were, a mutilated male, and the catamenia are semen, only not pure; for there is only one thing they have not in them, the principle of soul. ~ Aristotle,
1344:The ideal Government of all reflective men, from Aristotle onward, is one which lets the individual alone - one which barely escapes being no government at all. ~ H L Mencken,
1345:Those who believe that all virtue is to be found in their own party principles push matters to extremes; they do not consider that disproportion destroys a state. ~ Aristotle,
1346:Victory is plesant, not only to those who love to conquer, bot to all; for there is produced an idea of superiority, which all with more or less eagerness desire. ~ Aristotle,
1347:We do not act rightly because we have virtue or excellence. But they hesitate, waiting for the other fellow to make the first move-and he, in turn, waits for you. ~ Aristotle,
1348:A government which is composed of the middle class more nearly approximates to democracy than to oligarchy, and is the safest of the imperfect forms of government. ~ Aristotle,
1349:All men by nature desire to know. An indication of this is the delight we take in our senses; for even apart from their usefulness they are loved for themselves... ~ Aristotle,
1350:And of course, the brain is not responsible for any of the sensations at all. The correct view is that the seat and source of sensation is the region of the heart. ~ Aristotle,
1351:Aristotle’s scala naturae, which runs from God, the angels, and humans at the top, downward to other mammals, birds, fish, insects, and mollusks at the bottom. ~ Frans de Waal,
1352:Good moral character is not something that we can achieve on our own. We need a culture that supports the conditions under which self-love and friendship flourish. ~ Aristotle,
1353:Let us be well persuaded that everyone of us possesses happiness in proportion to his virtue and wisdom, and according as he acts in obedience to their suggestion. ~ Aristotle,
1354:Nothing seems to me more doubtful than Aristotle's remark that it is probable the arts and philosophy have several times been discovered and several times lost. ~ Julien Benda,
1355:That which is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it, everybody is more inclined to neglect the duty which he expects another to fulfil. ~ Aristotle,
1356:The avarice of mankind is insatiable; at one time two obols was pay enough; but now, when this sum has become customary, men always want more and more without end. ~ Aristotle,
1357:The Life of the intellect is the best and pleasantest for man, because the intellect more than anything else is the man. Thus it will be the happiest life as well. ~ Aristotle,
1358:Perhaps the most accurate term for happiness, then, is the one Aristotle used: eudaimonia, which translates not directly to “happiness” but to “human flourishing. ~ Shawn Achor,
1359:The physician himself, if sick, actually calls in another physician, knowing that he cannot reason correctly if required to judge his own condition while suffering. ~ Aristotle,
1360:Anyone who doesn’t need company is either greater than a man, and is a God, or lesser than a man, and is a beast.17 —Aristotle, as quoted by Saint Thomas Aquinas ~ Leonard Sweet,
1361:As Aristotle said, “What a society honors will be cultivated.” It is time for us to understand, honor, and cultivate the deepest relational elements in our nature. ~ Sue Johnson,
1362:As they knew, Aristotle warned that inequality brought instability, while Plato believed that demagogues exploited free speech to install themselves as tyrants. ~ Timothy Snyder,
1363:Besides which, the most powerful elements of emotional interest in Tragedy — Peripeteia or Reversal of the Situation, and Recognition scenes — are parts of the plot. ~ Aristotle,
1364:He is happy who lives in accordance with complete virtue and is sufficiently equipped with external goods, not for some chance period but throughout a complete life. ~ Aristotle,
1365:It is by no means certain that we advance our philosophical quest by reading Plato or Aristotle. It may increase our knowledge of history but not of the world. ~ Jostein Gaarder,
1366:Perfect friendship is the friendship of men who are good, and alike in excellence; for these wish well alike to each other qua good, and they are good in themselves. ~ Aristotle,
1367:Recognition, as the name indicates, is a change from ignorance to knowledge, producing love or hate between the persons destined by the poet for good or bad fortune. ~ Aristotle,
1368:Teachers, who educate children, deserve more honour than parents, who merely gave them birth; for the latter provided mere life, while the former ensure a good life. ~ Aristotle,
1369:The heart is the perfection of the whole organism. Therefore the principles of the power of perception and the souls ability to nourish itself must lie in the heart. ~ Aristotle,
1370:We praise a man who feels angry on the right grounds and against the right persons and also in the right manner at the right moment and for the right length of time. ~ Aristotle,
1371:Aristotle's metaphysics, roughly speaking, may be described as Plato diluted by common sense. He is difficult because Plato and common sense do not mix easily. ~ Bertrand Russell,
1372:Democracy arises out of the notion that those who are equal in any respect are equal in all respects; because men are equally free, they claim to be absolutely equal. ~ Aristotle,
1373:For he would rather have, by his bedside, twenty books, bound in black or red, of Aristotle and his philosophy, than rich robes or costly fiddles or gay harps. ~ Geoffrey Chaucer,
1374:For hym was levere have at his beddes heed Twenty bookes, clad in blak or reed, Of Aristotle and his philosophie, Than robes riche, or fithele, or gay sautrie. ~ Geoffrey Chaucer, is all wrong that a person who is going to be deemed worthy of the office should himself solicit it... for no one who is not ambitious would ask to hold office. ~ Aristotle,
1376:It is evident, then, that there is a sort of education in which parents should train their sons, not as being useful or necessary, but because it is liberal or noble. ~ Aristotle,
1377:One who faces and who fears the right things and from the right motive, in the right way and at the right time, posseses character worthy of our trust and admiration. ~ Aristotle,
1378:the Good of Man comes to be “a working of the Soul in the way of Excellence,” or, if Excellence admits of degrees, in the way of the best and most perfect Excellence. ~ Aristotle,
1379:Today, see if you can stretch your heart and expand your love so that it touches not only those to whom you can give it easily, but also to those who need it so much. ~ Aristotle,
1380:baseness that does not possess its own starting point [or principle] is always less harmful than that which does possess it, and intellect is such a starting point. It ~ Aristotle,
1381:Money was established for exchange, but interest causes it to be reproduced by itself. Therefore this way of earning money is greatly in conflict with the natural law. ~ Aristotle,
1382:There seems to be in us a sort of affinity to musical modes and rhythms, which makes some philosophers say that the soul is a tuning, others, that it possesses tuning. ~ Aristotle,
1383:...virtue is not merely a state in conformity with the right principle, but one that implies the right principle; and the right principle in moral conduct is prudence. ~ Aristotle,
1384:But justice is the bond of men in states, for the administration of justice, which is the determination of what is just, is the principle of order in political society. ~ Aristotle,
1385:For nature by the same cause, provided it remain in the same condition, always produces the same effect, so that either coming-to-be or passing-away will always result. ~ Aristotle,
1386:Remember that time slurs over everything, let all deeds fade, blurs all writings and kills all memories. Exempt are only those which dig into the hearts of men by love. ~ Aristotle,
1387:The highest type of intelligence, says Aristotle, manifests itself in an ability to see connections where no one has seen them before, that is, to think analogically. ~ J M Coetzee,
1388:Thus if every intellectual activity [διάνοια] is either practical or productive or speculative (θεωρητική), physics (φυσικὴ) will be a speculative [θεωρητική] science. ~ Aristotle,
1389:We are what we repeatedly do... excellence, therefore, isn't just an act, but a habit and life isn't just a series of events, but an ongoing process of self-definition. ~ Aristotle,
1390:Demonstration is also something necessary, because a demonstration cannot go otherwise than it does, ... And the cause of this lies with the primary premises/principles. ~ Aristotle,
1391:For the laughable is a sort of error and ugliness that is not painful and destructive, just as, evidently, a laughable mask is something ugly and distorted without pain. ~ Aristotle,
1392:The state or political community, which is the highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims at good in a greater degree than any other, and at the highest good. ~ Aristotle,
1393:The things best to know are first principles and causes, but these things are perhaps the most difficult for men to grasp, for they are farthest removed from the senses. ~ Aristotle,
1394:Yet Aristotle's excellence of substance, so far from being associated with the grand style, is associated with something that at times comes perilously near jargon. ~ Irving Babbitt,
1395:And by this very difference tragedy stands apart in relation to comedy, for the latter intends to imitate those who are worse, and the former better, than people are now. ~ Aristotle,
1396:Every formed disposition of the soul realizes its full nature in relation to and dealing with that class of objects by which it is its nature to be corrupted or improved. ~ Aristotle,
1397:If liberty and equality, as is thought by some, are chiefly to be found in democracy, they will be best attained when all persons alike share in government to the utmost. ~ Aristotle,
1398:Some of you read with me 40 years ago a portion of Aristotle's Ethics, a selection of passages that describe his idea of happiness. You may not remember too well. ~ Charles Van Doren,
1399:What the statesman is most anxious to produce is a certain moral character in his fellow citizens, namely a disposition to virtue and the performance of virtuous actions. ~ Aristotle,
1400:For it is owing to their wonder that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize... They were pursuing science in order to know, and not for any utilitarian end. ~ Aristotle,
1401:In everything continuous and divisible, it is possible to grasp the more, the less, and the equal, and these either in reference to the thing itself, or in relation to us. ~ Aristotle,
1402:It is clearly better that property should be private, but the use of it common; and the special business of the legislator is to create in men this benevolent disposition. ~ Aristotle,
1403:It is impossible that there should be demonstration of absolutely everything; [for then] there would be an infinite regress, so that there would still be no demonstration. ~ Aristotle,
1404:Character gives us qualities, but it is in actions—what we do—that we are happy or the reverse…. All human happiness and misery take the form of action. —ARISTOTLE Writing ~ Lisa Unger,
1405:Every wicked man is in ignorance as to what he ought to do, and from what to abstain, and it is because of error such as this that men become unjust and, in a word, wicked. ~ Aristotle,
1406:For he who lives as passion directs will not hear argument that dissuades him, nor understand it if he does; and how can we persuade one in such a state to change his ways? ~ Aristotle,
1407:However, it is not the same with the subject matter, but, generally speaking, that which is true and better is naturally always easier to prove and more likely to persuade. ~ Aristotle,
1408:Men become builders by building and lyreplayers by playing the lyre; so too we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts. ~ Aristotle,
1409:Money is a guarantee that we may have what we want in the future. Though we need nothing at the moment it insures the possibility of satisfying a new desire when it arises. ~ Aristotle,
1410:Nevertheless, some men turn every quality or art into a means of making money; this they conceive to be the end, and to the promotion of the end all things must contribute. ~ Aristotle,
1411:The arousing of prejudice, pity, anger, and similar emotions has nothing to do with the essential facts, but is merely a personal appeal to the man who is judging the case. ~ Aristotle,
1412:... the good for man is an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue, or if there are more kinds of virtue than one, in accordance with the best and most perfect kind. ~ Aristotle,
1413:In the perfect state the good man is absolutely the same as the good citizen; whereas in other states the good citizen is only good relatively to his own form of government. ~ Aristotle,
1414:It is therefore not of small moment whether we are trained from adulthood in one set of habits or another; on the contrary it is of very great, or rather supreme importance. ~ Aristotle,
1415:Men pay most attention to what is their own: they care less for what is common; or, at any rate, they care for it only to the extent to which each is individually concerned. ~ Aristotle,
1416:The Chorus too should be regarded as one of the actors; it should be an integral part of the whole, and share in the action, in the manner not of Euripides but of Sophocles. ~ Aristotle,
1417:The life of money-making is one undertaken under compulsion, and wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely useful and for the sake of something else. ~ Aristotle,
1418:Democracy is the form of government in which the free are rulers, and oligarchy in which the rich; it is only an accident that the free are the many and the rich are the few. ~ Aristotle,
1419:Man's work as Man is accomplished by virtue of Practical Wisdom and Moral Virtue, the latter giving the right aim and direction, the former the right means to its attainment; ~ Aristotle,
1420:Newton wrote, “Amicus Plato amicus Aristoteles magis amica veritas.” That is Latin for, “Plato is my friend, Aristotle is my friend, but my best friend is truth.” When ~ Susan Wise Bauer,
1421:Pero si estos funcionarios son pocos, la institución es oligárquica; y como los comisarios no pueden ser nunca muchos, la institución pertenece esencialmente a la oligarquía. ~ Aristotle,
1422:Teenagers these days are out of control. They eat like pigs, they are disrespectful of adults, they interrupt and contradict their parents, and they terrorize their teachers. ~ Aristotle,
1423:For hym was levere have at his beddes heed
Twenty bookes, clad in blak or reed,
Of Aristotle and his philosophie,
Than robes riche, or fithele, or gay sautrie. ~ Geoffrey Chaucer,
1424:was Aristotle who said it: “All human actions have one or more of seven causes,” and then he named them: chance, nature, compulsion, habit, reason, passion, and desire. ~ Carole Radziwill,
1425:We are what we repeatedly do. Excellence, then, is not an act, but a habit. ~ Aristotle Aristotle

Pleasure in the job puts perfection in the work. ~ Aristotle Aristotle ~ Aristotle,
1426:For we do not think that we know a thing until we are acquainted with its primary conditions or first principles, and have carried our analysis as far as its simplest elements. ~ Aristotle,
1427:I hate the opera. I think I must have a tin ear. No matter how hard I concentrate it still sounds like a bunch of Italian chefs screaming risotto recipes at each other. ~ Aristotle Onassis,
1428:In making a speech one must study three points: first, the means of producing persuasion; second, the language; third the proper arrangement of the various parts of the speech. ~ Aristotle,
1429:No matter what Aristotle and the Philosophers say, nothing is equal to tobacco; it's the passion of the well-bred, and he who lives without tobacco lives a life not worth living. ~ Moliere, Greek city state had a fundamental law: anyone proposing revisions to the constitution did so with a noose around his neck. If his proposal lost he was instantly hanged. ~ Aristotle,
1431:The world of conceptualized ideas is quite wonderful, even when it's - like Aristotle's Physics - an outmoded book. The physics is not true. But the reasoning is dazzling. ~ William H Gass,
1432:We physicists, on the other hand, must take for granted that the things that exist by nature are, either all or some of them, in motion—which is indeed made plain by induction. ~ Aristotle,
1433:A likely impossibility is always preferable to an unconvincing possibility. The story should never be made up of improbable incidents; there should be nothing of the sort in it. ~ Aristotle,
1434:Even if we could suppose the citizen body to be virtuous, without each of them being so, yet the latter would be better, for in the virtue of each the virtue of all is involved. ~ Aristotle,
1435:The noble things and the just things, which the political art examines, admit of much dispute and variability, such that they are held to exist by law11 alone and not by nature. ~ Aristotle,
1436:The world is an astonishing place, and the idea that we have in our possession the basic tools needed to understand it is no more credible now than it was in Aristotle’s day. ~ Thomas Nagel,
1437:This is Galileo,” said Aristotle. “He advocates understanding the world through observation and experiment. He is an unimaginative thinker, but his results demand our attention. ~ Liu Cixin,
1438:Aristotle maintained that women have fewer teeth than men; although he was twice married, it never occurred to him to verify this statement by examining his wives' mouths. ~ Bertrand Russell,
1439:As for the life of money-making, it is one of constraint, and wealth manifestly is not the good we are seeking, because it is for use, that is, for the sake of something further: ~ Aristotle,
1440:Even in adversity, nobility shines through, when a man endures repeated and severe misfortune with patience, not owing to insensibility but from generosity and greatness of soul. ~ Aristotle,
1441:Hence poetry is something more philosophic and of graver import than history, since its statements are of the nature rather of universals, whereas those of history are singulars. ~ Aristotle,
1442:Nature does nothing in vain. Therefore, it is imperative for persons to act in accordance with their nature and develop their latent talents, in order to be content and complete. ~ Aristotle,
1443:The greatest crimes are not those committed for the sake of necessity but those committed for the sake of superfluity. One does not become a tyrant to avoid exposure to the cold. ~ Aristotle,
1444:The seat of the soul and the control of voluntary movement - in fact, of nervous functions in general, - are to be sought in the heart. The brain is an organ of minor importance. ~ Aristotle,
1445:Humor is the only test of gravity, and gravity of humor; for a subject which will not bear raillery is suspicious, and a jest which will not bear serious examination is false wit. ~ Aristotle,
1446:In a race, the quickest runner can never overtake the slowest, since the pursuer must first reach the point whence the pursued started, so that the slower must always hold a lead. ~ Aristotle,
1447:The soul of animals is characterized by two faculties, (a) the faculty of discrimination which is the work of thought and sense, and (b) the faculty of originating local movement. ~ Aristotle,
1448:Women should marry when they are about eighteen years of age, and men at seven and thirty; then they are in the prime of life, and the decline in the powers of both will coincide. ~ Aristotle,
1449:A line is not made up of points. ... In the same way, time is not made up parts considered as indivisible 'nows.' Part of Aristotle's reply to Zeno's paradox concerning continuity. ~ Aristotle,
1450:I consider a good reputation is a great part of the human happiness. Some people, if they are very, very rich can permit themselves certain negligence to their reputations. ~ Aristotle Onassis,
1451:Le début de l'amour, c'est toujours lorsque non seulement on est heureux de la présence de la personne qu'on chérit, mais qu'on l'aime rien que de souvenir, quand elle est absente. ~ Aristotle,
1452:Our tradition of political thought had its definite beginning in the teachings of Plato and Aristotle. I believe it came to a no less definite end in the theories of Karl Marx. ~ Hannah Arendt,
1453:Where some people are very wealthy and others have nothing, the result will be either extreme democracy or absolute oligarchy, or despotism will come from either of those excesses. ~ Aristotle,
1454:All art is concerned with coming into being; for it is concerned neither with things that are, or come into being by necessity, nor with things that do so in accordance with nature. ~ Aristotle,
1455:As for the story, whether the poet takes it ready made or constructs it for himself, he should first sketch its general outline, and then fill in the episodes and amplify in detail. ~ Aristotle,
1456:Between friends there is no need for justice, but people who are just still need the quality of friendship; and indeed friendliness is considered to be justice in the fullest sense. ~ Aristotle,
1457:How can a man who, for a significant phase of his formation, shared his master’s opposition to rhetoric have in maturity composed a masterpiece of the formal study of rhetoric? This ~ Aristotle,
1458:Any polis which is truly so called, and is not merely one in name, must devote itself to the end of encouraging goodness. Otherwise, political association sinks into a mere alliance. ~ Aristotle,
1459:A tyrant must put on the appearance of uncommon devotion to religion. Subjects are less apprehensive of illegal treatment from a ruler whom they consider to be God-fearing and pious. ~ Aristotle,
1460:Hence anyone who is to listen intelligently to lectures about what is noble and just and, generally, about the subjects of political science must have been brought up in good habits. ~ Aristotle,
1461:If everything when it occupies an equal space is at rest, and if that which is in locomotion is always occupying such a space at any moment, the flying arrow is therefore motionless. ~ Aristotle,
1462:If the poor, for example, because they are more in number, divide among themselves the property of the rich,- is not this unjust? . . this law of confiscation clearly cannot be just. ~ Aristotle,
1463:It is clear that those constitutions which aim at the common good are right, as being in accord with absolute justice; while those which aim only at the good of the rulers are wrong. ~ Aristotle,
1464:refuting a merely contentious argument—a description which applies to the arguments both of Melissus and of Parmenides: their premisses are false and their conclusions do not follow. ~ Aristotle,
1465:Even the best of men in authority are liable to be corrupted by passion. We may conclude then that the law is reason without passion, and it is therefore preferable to any individual. ~ Aristotle,
1466:If purpose, then, is inherent in art, so is it in Nature also. The best illustration is the case of a man being his own physician, for Nature is like that - agent and patient at once. ~ Aristotle,
1467:Nature, as we say, does nothing without some purpose; and for thepurpose of making mana political animal she has endowed him alone among the animals with the power of reasoned speech. ~ Aristotle,
1468:One day, a daughter of Aristotle, Pythias by name, was asked what color pleased her most. She replied, "The color with which modesty suffuses the face of simple, inoffensive men. ~ Joseph Joubert,
1469:the fact that it took the rise of democracies and otherwise open societies at Athens and elsewhere to create the climate in which public eloquence became a political indispensability. ~ Aristotle,
1470:Anyone can get angry, but to do this to the right person, to the right extent, at the right time, with the right motive, and in the right way, that is not for everyone, nor is it easy. ~ Aristotle,
1471:Aristotle could have avoided the mistake of thinking that women have fewer teeth than men, by the simple device of asking Mrs. Aristotle to keep her mouth open while he counted. ~ Bertrand Russell,
1472:Goodness is to do good to the deserving and love the good and hate the wicked, and not to be eager to inflict punishment or take vengeance, but to be gracious and kindly and forgiving. ~ Aristotle,
1473:Hence poetry implies either a happy gift of nature or a strain of madness. In the one case a man can take the mould of any character; in the other, he is lifted out of his proper self. ~ Aristotle,
1474:It is the activity of the intellect that constitutes complete human happiness - provided it be granted a complete span of life, for nothing that belongs to happiness can be incomplete. ~ Aristotle,
1475:No excellent soul is exempt from a mixture of madness.

- Aristotle (Attributed by Seneca in Moral Essays, "De Tranquillitate Animi" On Tranquility of Mind, sct. 17, subsct. 10.) ~ Aristotle,
1476:The megalopsychos cannot let anyone else, except a friend, determine his life. For that would be slavish; and this is why all flatterers are servile and inferior people are flatterers. ~ Aristotle,
1477:Every skill and every inquiry, and similarly every action and rational choice, is thought to aim at some good; and so the good had been aptly described as that at which everything aims. ~ Aristotle, this way the structure of the universe- I mean, of the heavens and the earth and the whole world- was arranged by one harmony through the blending of the most opposite principles. ~ Aristotle,
1479:[I]t is rather the case that we desire something because we believe it to be good than that we believe a thing to be good because we desire it. It is the thought that starts things off. ~ Aristotle,
1480:Those who are not angry at the things they should be angry at are thought to be fools, and so are those who are not angry in the right way, at the right time, or with the right persons. ~ Aristotle,
1481:Aristotle... a mere bond-servant to his logic, thereby rendering it contentious... ~ Francis Bacon,
1482:Clearly, imagining cannot be expected to mean exactly the same thing today as it did in the Middle Ages or antiquity. For one thing, Aristotle and Aquinas never watched television. ~ Richard Kearney,
1483:*La excelencia moral es resultado del hábito. Nos volvemos justos realizando
actos de justicia; templados, realizando actos de templanza; valientes,
realizando actos de valentía. ~ Aristotle,
1484:The beauty of the soul shines out when a man bears with composure one heavy mischance after another, not because he does not feel them, but because he is a man of high and heroic temper. ~ Aristotle,
1485:Bad people...are in conflict with themselves; they desire one thing and will another, like the incontinent who choose harmful pleasures instead of what they themselves believe to be good. ~ Aristotle,
1486:Civic life, though, was not optional, and Aristotle tells me the Athenians had a word for those who refused to participate in public affairs: idiotes. It is where we get our word idiot. ~ Eric Weiner,
1487:Euclid, who was still, when I was young, the sole acknowledged text-book of geometry for boys, lived in Alexandria, about 300 B.C., a few years after the death of Alexander and Aristotle. ~ Anonymous,
1488:It is the mark of an educated mind to rest satisfied with the degree of precision which the nature of the subject admits and not to seek exactness where only an approximation is possible. ~ Aristotle,
1489:The greatest thing by far is to have a command of metaphor. This alone cannot be imparted by another; it is the mark of genius, for to make good metaphors implies an eye for resemblances. ~ Aristotle,
1490:the greatest thing by far is to have a command of metaphor. This alone cannot be imparted by another; it is the mark of genius, for to make good metaphors implies an eye for resemblances. ~ Aristotle,
1491:Trees are good for contemplation. Plato and Aristotle did their best thinking in the groves of olives and figs around Athens, and Buddha found enlightenment beneath a bo or peepul tree. ~ Colin Tudge,
1492:We delight in marvelous things. One proof of that is that everyone embellishes somewhat when telling a story in the assumption he is pleasing his listener.” —ARISTOTLE, Poetics, XXIV ~ Oliver P tzsch,
1493:Aristotle was famous for knowing everything. He taught that the brain exists merely to cool the blood and is not involved in the process of thinking. This is true only of certain persons. ~ Will Cuppy,
1494:El filósofo no pretende aparecer si no tal cual es, busca la verdad con el solo fin de conocer sin mira alguna de interés personal; su vida es un sacrificio perpetuo en honor a la ciencia. ~ Aristotle,
1495:Excellence, then, is a state concerned with choice, lying in a mean, relative to us, this being determined by reason and in the way in which the man of practical wisdom would determine it. ~ Aristotle,
1496:If there are several virtues the best and most complete or perfect of them will be the happiest one. An excellent human will be a person good at living life, living well and ‘beautifully’. ~ Aristotle,
1497:In most constitutional states the citizens rule and are ruled by turns, for the idea of a constitutional state implies that the natures of the citizens are equal, and do not differ at all. ~ Aristotle,
1498:To amuse oneself in order that one may exert oneself, as Anacharsis puts it, seems right; for amusement is a sort of relaxation, and we need relaxation because we cannot work continuously. ~ Aristotle,
1499:A state is an association of similar persons whose aim is the best life possible. What is best is happiness, and to be happy is an active exercise of virtue and a complete employment of it. ~ Aristotle,
1500:Criticism, as it was first instituted by Aristotle, was meant as a standard of judging well; the chiefest part of which is to observe those excellencies which delight a reasonable reader. ~ John Dryden,


   39 Philosophy
   28 Christianity
   11 Integral Yoga
   9 Occultism
   7 Psychology
   3 Poetry
   3 Integral Theory
   2 Yoga
   2 Fiction
   1 Sufism
   1 Mysticism
   1 Hinduism
   1 Baha i Faith
   1 Alchemy

   22 Plotinus
   9 Nolini Kanta Gupta
   8 Plato
   7 Carl Jung
   6 Jorge Luis Borges
   5 Aldous Huxley
   3 Saint Augustine of Hippo
   3 Pierre Teilhard de Chardin
   2 Swami Krishnananda
   2 James George Frazer
   2 Friedrich Nietzsche

   9 Plotinus - Complete Works Vol 03
   7 Plotinus - Complete Works Vol 01
   5 The Perennial Philosophy
   5 Plotinus - Complete Works Vol 02
   4 The Secret Doctrine
   4 Mysterium Coniunctionis
   4 Labyrinths
   4 Collected Works of Nolini Kanta Gupta - Vol 01
   3 The Phenomenon of Man
   3 Collected Works of Nolini Kanta Gupta - Vol 07
   3 City of God
   2 Twilight of the Idols
   2 The Study and Practice of Yoga
   2 The Golden Bough
   2 The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious
   2 Collected Works of Nolini Kanta Gupta - Vol 02

01.04 - The Poetry in the Making, #Collected Works of Nolini Kanta Gupta - Vol 02, #Nolini Kanta Gupta, #Integral Yoga
   The consciously purposive activity of the poetic consciousness in fact, of all artistic consciousness has shown itself with a clear and unambiguous emphasis in two directions. First of all with regard to the subject-matter: the old-world poets took things as they were, as they were obvious to the eye, things of human nature and things of physical Nature, and without questioning dealt with them in the beauty of their normal form and function. The modern mentality has turned away from the normal and the obvious: it does not accept and admit the "given" as the final and definitive norm of things. It wishes to discover and establish other norms, it strives to bring about changes in the nature and condition of things, envisage the shape of things to come, work for a brave new world. The poet of today, in spite of all his effort to remain a pure poet, in spite of Housman's advocacy of nonsense and not-sense being the essence of true Art, is almost invariably at heart an incorrigible prophet. In revolt against the old and established order of truths and customs, against all that is normally considered as beautiful,ideals and emotions and activities of man or aspects and scenes and movements of Natureagainst God or spiritual life, the modern poet turns deliberately to the ugly and the macabre, the meaningless, the insignificant and the triflingtins and teas, bone and dust and dustbin, hammer and sicklehe is still a prophet, a violent one, an iconoclast, but one who has his own icon, a terribly jealous being, that seeks to pull down the past, erase it, to break and batter and knead the elements in order to fashion out of them something conforming to his heart's desire. There is also the class who have the vision and found the truth and its solace, who are prophets, angelic and divine, messengers and harbingers of a new beauty that is to dawn upon earth. And yet there are others in whom the two strains mingle or approach in a strange way. All this means that the artist is far from being a mere receiver, a mechanical executor, a passive unconscious instrument, but that he is supremely' conscious and master of his faculties and implements. This fact is doubly reinforced when we find how much he is preoccupied with the technical aspect of his craft. The richness and variety of patterns that can be given to the poetic form know no bounds today. A few major rhythms were sufficient for the ancients to give full expression to their poetic inflatus. For they cared more for some major virtues, the basic and fundamental qualitiessuch as truth, sublimity, nobility, forcefulness, purity, simplicity, clarity, straightforwardness; they were more preoccupied with what they had to say and they wanted, no doubt, to say it beautifully and powerfully; but the modus operandi was not such a passion or obsession with them, it had not attained that almost absolute value for itself which modern craftsmanship gives it. As technology in practical life has become a thing of overwhelming importance to man today, become, in the Shakespearean phrase, his "be-all and end-all", even so the same spirit has invaded and pervaded his aesthetics too. The subtleties, variations and refinements, the revolutions, reversals and inventions which the modern poet has ushered and takes delight in, for their own sake, I repeat, for their intrinsic interest, not for the sake of the subject which they have to embody and clothe, have never been dream by Aristotle, the supreme legislator among the ancients, nor by Horace, the almost incomparable craftsman among the ancients in the domain of poetry. Man has become, to be sure, a self-conscious creator to the pith of his bone.
   Such a stage in human evolution, the advent of Homo Faber, has been a necessity; it has to serve a purpose and it has done admirably its work. Only we have to put it in its proper place. The salvation of an extremely self-conscious age lies in an exceeding and not in a further enhancement or an exclusive concentration of the self-consciousness, nor, of course, in a falling back into the original unconsciousness. It is this shift in the poise of consciousness that has been presaged and prepared by the conscious, the scientific artists of today. Their task is to forge an instrument for a type of poetic or artistic creation completely new, unfamiliar, almost revolutionary which the older mould would find it impossible to render adequately. The yearning of the human consciousness was not to rest satisfied with the familiar and the ordinary, the pressure was for the discovery of other strands, secret stores of truth and reality and beauty. The first discovery was that of the great Unconscious, the dark and mysterious and all-powerful subconscient. Many of our poets and artists have been influenced by this power, some even sought to enter into that region and become its denizens. But artistic inspiration is an emanation of Light; whatever may be the field of its play, it can have its origin only in the higher spheres, if it is to be truly beautiful and not merely curious and scientific.

02.14 - Panacea of Isms, #Collected Works of Nolini Kanta Gupta - Vol 01, #Nolini Kanta Gupta, #Integral Yoga
   And yet internationalism is not the one thing needful either. If it means the obliteration of all national values, of all cultural diversity, it will not certainly conduce to the greater enrichment and perfection of humanity. Taken by itself and in its absolute sense, it cannot be a practical success. The fact is being proved every moment these days. Internationalism in the economic sphere, however, seems to have a greater probability and utility than in the merely political sphere. Economics is forcing peoples and nations to live together and move together: it has become the soldering agent in modern times of all the elements the groups and types of the human family that were so long separate from each other, unknown to each other or clashing with each other. But that is good so far as it goes. Powerful as economic forces are, they are not the only deciding or directing agents in human affairs. That is the great flaw in the "International", the Marxian type of internationalism which has been made familiar to us. Man is not a political animal, in spite of Aristotle, nor is he an economic animal, in spite of Marx and Engels. Mere economics, even when working for a greater unity of mankind, tends to work more for uniformity: it reduces man to the position of a machine and a physical or material machine at that. By an irony of fate the human value for which the international proletariate raised its banner of revolt is precisely what suffers in the end. The Beveridge Plan, so much talked of nowadays, made such an appeal, no doubt because of the economic advantages it ensures, but also, by far and large, because it views man as a human being in and against the machine to which he belongs, because it is psychologically a scheme to salvage the manhood of man, so far as is possible, out of a rigidly mechanistic industrial organization.

03.02 - The Philosopher as an Artist and Philosophy as an Art, #Collected Works of Nolini Kanta Gupta - Vol 02, #Nolini Kanta Gupta, #Integral Yoga
   For we must remember that Plato himself was really more of a poet than a philosopher. Very few among the great representative souls of humanity surpassed him in the true poetic afflatus. The poet and the mysticKavi and Rishiare the same in our ancient lore. However these two, Plato and Aristotle, the mystic and the philosopher, the master and the disciple, combine to form one of these dual personalities which Nature seems to like and throws up from time to time in her evolutionary marchnot as a mere study in contrast, a token of her dialectical process, but rather as a movement of polarity making for a greater comprehensiveness and richer values. They may be taken as the symbol of a great synthesis that humanity needs and is preparing. The role of the mystic is to envisage and unveil the truth, the supernal reality which the mind cannot grasp nor all the critical apparatus of human reason demonstrate and to bring it down and present it to the understanding and apprehending consciousness. The philosopher comes at this stage: he receives and gathers all that is given to him, arranges and systematises, puts the whole thing in a frame as it were.
   The poet-philosopher or the philosopher-poet, whichever way we may put it, is a new formation of the human consciousness that is coming upon us. A wide and rationalising (not rationalistic) intelligence deploying and marshalling out a deep intuitive and direct Knowledge that is the pattern of human mind developing in the new age. Bergson's was a harbinger, a definite landmark on the way. Sri Aurobindo's The Life Divine arrives and opens the very portals of the marvellous temple city of a dynamic integral knowledge.

03.09 - Art and Katharsis, #Collected Works of Nolini Kanta Gupta - Vol 01, #Nolini Kanta Gupta, #Integral Yoga
   Aristotle speaks of the purifying function of the tragic art. How is the purification effected? By the evocation of the feelings of pity and terror. For such feelings widen the sympathies, pull us out of our small egoistic personal ephemeral pleasures and put us in contact with what is to be shared and enjoyed in wide commonalty. Tragedy, in this way, initiates the spectator into the enjoyment that is born not of desire and gain but of detachment and freedom.
   The uplifting power of Art is inherent in its nature, for Art itself is the outcome of an uplifted nature. Art is the expression of a heightened consciousness. The ordinary consciousness in which man lives and moves is narrow, limited, obscure, faltering, unhappyit is the abode of all that is evil and ugly; it is inartistic. The poetic zeal, enthusiasm or frenzy, when it seizes the consciousness, at once lifts it high into a state that is characterised by wideness and depth and a new and fresh exhilarating intensity of perception and experience. We seem to arrive at the very fountain-head, where things take birth and are full of an unspoilt life and power and beauty and light and harmony. A line burdened with the whole tragedy of earthly existence such as Shakespeare's:

04.02 - A Chapter of Human Evolution, #Collected Works of Nolini Kanta Gupta - Vol 01, #Nolini Kanta Gupta, #Integral Yoga
   The appearance of the Greeks on the stage of human civilisation is a mystery to historians. They are so different from all that preceded them. There does not seem to exist any logical link between them and the races from whom they are supposed to have descended or whose successors they were. The Minoan or Cretan civilisation is said to be cradle of the Greek, but where is the parallel or proportion between the two, judging from whatever relics have been left over from the older, the more ancient one. Indeed that is the term which best describes the situation. Whatever has gone before the Hellenic culture is ancient; they belong to the Old Regime. Egypt is old, Phoenicia is old, the Hebrews are old, all the other races of the old world are old, not merely chronologically, but psychologically. But Hellas is modern. There is a breath in the Ionian atmosphere, a breath of ozone, as it were, which wafts down to us, even into the air of today. Homer and Solon, Socrates and Aristotle, Pythagoras and Plato are still the presiding gods ruling over the human spirit that was born on Olympus and Ida.
   Human evolution took a decisive turn with the advent of the Hellenic culture and civilisation. All crises in evolution are a sudden revelation, an unexpected outburst, a saltum, a leap into the unknown. Now, what the Greeks brought in was the Mind, the luminous Reason, the logical faculty that is married to the senses, no doubt, but still suffused with an inner glow of consciousness. It is the faculty mediating between a more direct and immediate perception of things, Intuition and Instinct, on the one hand, and on the other, the perception given by the senses and a power of control over material things. Take Egypt or Israel or Chaldea, what one finds prominent there is the instinctive-intuitive man, spontaneousprime-sautierimaginative, mythopoeic, clairvoyant, clairaudient (although not very clear, in the modern and Greek sense), bringing into this world things of the other world and pushing this world as much as possible into the other, maintaining a kind of direct connection and communion between the two. The Greeks are of another mould. They are a rational people; they do not move and act simply or mainly by instinctive reactions, but even these are filtered in them through a light of the Mind of Intelligence, a logical pattern, a rational disposition of things; through Mind they seek to know Matter and to control it. It is the modern methodology, that of observation and experiment, in other words, the scientific procedure. The Greeks have had their gods, their mythology; but these are modelled somewhat differently: the gods are made more human, too human, as has often been observed. Zeus and Juno (Hera) are infinitely more human than Isis and Osiris or Moloch and Baal or even the Jewish Jehovah. These vital gods have a sombre air about them, solemn and serious, grim and powerful, but they have not the sunshine, the radiance and smile of Apollo (Apollo Belvedere) or Hermes. The Greeks might have, they must have taken up their gods from a more ancient Pantheon, but they have, after the manner of their sculptor Phidias, remoulded them, shaped and polished them, made them more luminous and nearer and closer to earth and men. 1 Was it not said of Socrates that he brought down the gods from heaven upon earth?

05.07 - The Observer and the Observed, #Collected Works of Nolini Kanta Gupta - Vol 01, #Nolini Kanta Gupta, #Integral Yoga
   Science was born the day when the observer cut himself aloof from the observed. Not only so, not only he is to stand aside, outside the field of observation and be a bare recorder, but that he must let the observed record itself, that is, be its own observer. Modern Science means not so much the observer narrating the story of the observed but the observed telling its own story. The first step is well exemplified in the story of Galileo. When hot discussion was going on and people insisted on sayingas Aristotle decided and common sense declared that heavier bodies most naturally fall quicker from a height, it was this prince of experimenters who straightaway took two different weights, went up the tower of Pisa and let them drop and astounded the people by showing that both travel with equal speed and fall to the ground at the same time.
   Science also declared that it is not the observation of one person, however qualified, that determines the truth or otherwise of a fact, but the observation of many persons and the possibility of observations of all persons converging, coinciding, corroborating. It is only when observation has thus been tested and checked that one can be sure that the personal element has been eliminated. Indeed the ideal condition would be if the observer, the scientist himself, could act as part of the machine for observation: at the most he should be a mere assembler of the parts of the machine that would record itself, impersonally, automatically. The rocket instruments that are sent high up in the sky to record the temperature, pressure or other weather condition in the stratosphere or the deep-sea recording machines are ingenious inventions in that line. The wizard Jagadish Chandra Bose showed his genius precisely in the way he made the plant itself declare its life-story: it is not what the scientist thinks or feels about the plant, but what the plant has to say of its own accord, as it wereits own tale of growth and decay, of suffering, spasm, swoon, suffocation or death under given conditions. This is the second step that Science took in the direction of impersonal and objective inquiry.

1.00 - Introduction to Alchemy of Happiness, #The Alchemy of Happiness, #Al-Ghazali, #Sufism
  Mohammedan scholars of the present day still hold him in such high respect, that his name is never mentioned by them without some such distinctive epithet, as the "Scientific [6] Imaum," or "Chief witness for Islamism." His rank in the eastern world, as a philosopher and a theologian, had naturally given his name some distinction in our histories of philosophy, and it is enumerated in connection with those of Averroes (Abu Roshd) and Avicenna (Abu Sina) as illustrating the intellectual life and the philosophical schools of the Mohammedans. Still his writings were less known than either of the two others. His principal work, The Destruction of the Philosophers, called forth in reply one of the two most important works of Averroes entitled The Destruction of the Destruction. Averroes, in his commentary upon Aristotle, extracts from Ghazzali copiously for the purpose of refuting bis views. A short treatise of his had been published at Cologne, in 1506, and Pocock had given in Latin his interpretation of the two fundamental articles of the Mohammedan creed. Von Hammer printed in 1838, at Vienna, a translation of a moral essay, Eyuha el Weled, as a new year's token for youth.
  It has been reserved to our own times to obtain a more intimate acquaintance with Ghazzali, and this chiefly by means of a translation by M. Pallia, into French, of his Confessions, wherein he announces very clearly his philosophical views; and from an essay on his writings by M. Smolders. In consequence, Mr. Lewes, who in his first edition of the Biographical History of Philosophy, found no place for Ghazzali, is induced in his last edition, from the evidenee which that treatise contains that he was one of the controlling minds of his age, to devote an entire section to an exhibition of his opinions in the same series with Abclard and Bruno, and to make him the typical figure to represent Arabian philosophy. For a full account of Ghazzali's [7] school of philosophy, we refer to his history and to the two essays, just mentioned. We would observe, very briefly however, that like most of the learned Mohammedans of his age, he was a student of Aristotle. While they regarded all the Greek philosophers as infidels, they availed themselves of their logic and their principles of philosophy to maintain, as far possible, the dogmas of the Koran. Ghazzali's mind possessed however Platonizing tendencies, and he affiliated himself to the Soofies or Mystics in his later years. He was in antagonism with men who to him appeared, like Avicenna, to exalt reason above the Koran, yet he himself went to the extreme limits of reasoning in his endeavors to find an intelligible basis for the doctrines of the Koran, and a philosophical basis for a holy rule of life. His character, and moral and intellectual rank are vividly depicted in the following extract from the writings of Tholuck, a prominent leader of the modern Evangelical school of Germany.
  "Ghazzali," says Tholuck, "if ever any man have deserved the name, was truly a divine, and he may justly he placed on a level with Origen, so remarkable was he for learning and ingenuity, and gifted with such a rare faculty for the skillful and worthy exposition of doctrine. All that is good, noble and sublime, which his great soul had compassed, he bestowed upon Mohammedanism; and he adorned the doctrines of the Koran with so much piety and learning, that, in the form given them by him, they seem in my opinion worthy the assent of Christians. Whatsoever was most excellent in the philosophy of Aristotle or in the Soofi mysticism, he discreetly adapted to the Mohammedan theology. From every school, he sought the [8] means of shedding light and honor upon religion; while his sincere piety and lofty conscientiousness imparted to all his writings a sacred majesty. He was the first of Mohammedan divines." (Bibliotheca Sacra, vi, 233).
  Sale, in the preliminary discourse to his translation of the Koran, shows that he had discovered the peculiar traits of Ghazzali's mind; for wherever he gives an explanation of the Mussulman creed, peculiarly consonant to universal reason and opposed to superstition, it will be found that he quotes from him.1

1.01 - THAT ARE THOU, #The Perennial Philosophy, #Aldous Huxley, #Philosophy
  All this sheds some lightdim, it is true, and merely inferentialon the problem of the perennialness of the Perennial Philosophy. In India the scriptures were regarded, not as revelations made at some given moment of history, but as eternal gospels, existent from everlasting to everlasting, inasmuch as coeval with man, or for that matter with any other kind of corporeal or incorporeal being possessed of reason. A similar point of view is expressed by Aristotle, who regards the fundamental truths of religion as everlasting and indestructible. There have been ascents and falls, periods (literally roads around or cycles) of progress and regress; but the great fact of God as the First Mover of a universe which partakes of His divinity has always been recognized. In the light of what we know about prehistoric man (and what we know amounts to nothing more than a few chipped stones, some paintings, drawings and sculptures) and of what we may legitimately infer from other, better documented fields of knowledge, what are we to think of these traditional doctrines? My own view is that they may be true. We know that born contemplatives in the realm both of analytic and of integral thought have turned up in fair numbers and at frequent intervals during recorded history. There is therefore every reason to suppose that they turned up before history was recorded. That many of these people died young or were unable to exercise their talents is certain. But a few of them must have survived. In this context it is highly significant that, among many contemporary primitives, two thought-patterns are foundan exoteric pattern for the unphilosophic many and an esoteric pattern (often monotheistic, with a belief in a God not merely of power, but of goodness and wisdom) for the initiated few. There is no reason to suppose that circumstances were any harder for prehistoric men than they are for many contemporary savages. But if an esoteric monotheism of the kind that seems to come natural to the born thinker is possible in modern savage societies, the majority of whose members accept the sort of polytheistic philosophy that seems to come natural to men of action, a similar esoteric doctrine might have been current in prehistoric societies. True, the modern esoteric doctrines may have been derived from higher cultures. But the significant fact remains that, if so derived, they yet had a meaning for certain members of the primitive society and were considered valuable enough to be carefully preserved. We have seen that many thoughts are unthinkable apart from an appropriate vocabulary and frame of reference. But the fundamental ideas of the Perennial Philosophy can be formulated in a very simple vocabulary, and the experiences to which the ideas refer can and indeed must be had immediately and apart from any vocabulary whatsoever. Strange openings and theophanies are granted to quite small children, who are often profoundly and permanently affected by these experiences. We have no reason to suppose that what happens now to persons with small vocabularies did not happen in remote antiquity. In the modern world (as Vaughan and Traherne and Wordsworth, among others, have told us) the child tends to grow out of his direct awareness of the one Ground of things; for the habit of analytical thought is fatal to the intuitions of integral thinking, whether on the psychic or the spiritual level. Psychic preoccupations may be and often are a major obstacle in the way of genuine spirituality. In primitive societies now (and, presumably, in the remote past) there is much preoccupation with, and a widespread talent for, psychic thinking. But a few people may have worked their way through psychic into genuinely spiritual experiencejust as, even in modern industrialized societies, a few people work their way out of the prevailing preoccupation with matter and through the prevailing habits of analytical thought into the direct experience of the spiritual Ground of things.
  Such, then, very briefly are the reasons for supposing that the historical traditions of oriental and our own classical antiquity may be true. It is interesting to find that at least one distinguished contemporary ethnologist is in agreement with Aristotle and the Vedantists. Orthodox ethnology, writes Dr. Paul Radin in his Primitive Man as Philosopher, has been nothing but an enthusiastic and quite uncritical attempt to apply the Darwinian theory of evolution to the facts of social experience. And he adds that no progress in ethnology will be achieved until scholars rid themselves once and for all of the curious notion that everything possesses a history; until they realize that certain ideas and certain concepts are as ultimate for man, as a social being, as specific physiological reactions are ultimate for him, as a biological being. Among these ultimate concepts, in Dr. Radins view, is that of monotheism. Such monotheism is often no more than the recognition of a single dark and numinous Power ruling the world. But it may sometimes be genuinely ethical and spiritual.
  The nineteenth centurys mania for history and prophetic Utopianism tended to blind the eyes of even its acutest thinkers to the timeless facts of eternity. Thus we find T. H. Green writing of mystical union as though it were an evolutionary process and not, as all the evidence seems to show, a state which man, as man, has always had it in his power to realize. An animal organism, which has its history in time, gradually becomes the vehicle of an eternally complete consciousness, which in itself can have no history, but a history of the process by which the animal organism becomes its vehicle. But in actual fact it is only in regard to peripheral knowledge that there has been a genuine historical development. Without much lapse of time and much accumulation of skills and information, there can be but an imperfect knowledge of the material world. But direct awareness of the eternally complete consciousness, which is the ground of the material world, is a possibility occasionally actualized by some human beings at almost any stage of their own personal development, from childhood to old age, and at any period of the races history.

1.025 - Sadhana - Intensifying a Lighted Flame, #The Study and Practice of Yoga, #Swami Krishnananda, #Yoga
  This is a very interesting subject in political science, where political thinkers differ in their opinions as to whether there is a total absence of improvement in quality when there is social order, and there is only a quantitative increase, or whether there is also an element of an increase of quality in thinking. This has led to divergent opinions among statesmen and political philosophers right from Plato and Aristotle onwards, through to Chanakya and other thinkers in India - where the opinion swung like a pendulum. One side held that there is absolutely no improvement in quality, though there is a large improvement in quantity, and the other side thought that there is an element of qualitative superiority. We are not going to discuss this subject at present, as it is outside the jurisdiction of our current topic.
  However, the point on hand is that a larger reality should also be qualitatively superior to the discrete particulars from which the mind is supposed to be withdrawn for the purpose of the practice of yoga. Though it is somewhat easy to bring about a quantitative increase in the concept of reality by methods such as the ones I just mentioned, it is a little more difficult to introduce a qualitative increase into the concept of reality. This is the main difficulty for everyone. However much we may concentrate on God, we will not be able to improve upon the human concept, even when there is a concept of God. So we feel unhappy even when we are meditating on God, because we have not improved the quality but have only increased the quantity, so that we may think of God as a large human individual a massive individual, as expansive as the universe itself, for example. That is quite wonderful, but still this human thought does not leave us.

1.02 - The Three European Worlds, #The Ever-Present Origin, #Jean Gebser, #Integral
  This psychic inner-space breaks forth at the very moment that the Troubadours are writing the first lyric "I"-Poems, the first personal poetry that suddenly opens an abyss between man, as poet, and the world or nature (1250 A.D.). Concurrently at the University of Paris, Thomas Aquinas, following the thought of his teacher Albertus Magnus, asserts the validity of Aristotle, thereby initiating the rational displacement of the predominantly psychic-bound Platonic world.
  And this occurred in the wake of Petrus Hispanus (PetrusLucitanus), the later Pope John XXI (d. 1277), who had authored the first comprehensive European textbook on psychology (De anima), introducing via Islam and Spain the Aristotelian theory of the soul. Shortly thereafter, Duns Scotus (d. 1308) freed theology from the hieratic rigors of scholasticism by teaching the primacy of volition and emotion. And the blindness of antiquity to time inherent in its unperspectival, psychically-stressed world (which amounted to a virtual timelessness) gave way to the visualization of and openness to time with a quantifiable, spatial character. This was exemplified by the erection of the first public clock in the courtyard of Westminister Palace in 1283,an event anticipated by Pope Sabinus, who in 604ordered the ringing of bells to announce the passing of the hours.

1.037 - Preventing the Fall in Yoga, #The Study and Practice of Yoga, #Swami Krishnananda, #Yoga
  After that, something else can come, says Patanjali. This working for the world and merging oneself in social liberating activity cannot go on for a long time, because the world will give us a kick. All great saviours of mankind were thrown to the pits because they could not save mankind. A day comes when society will dislike and even hate us, though we are utmost sincere in trying to help it. We have only to read history that is sufficient. All masters in the political field and most sincere workers in the social field were finally doomed by society. They were either killed by the very same people for whom they were working, or they were condemned to a condition worse than death. This is what happened to great leaders of mankind right from Pedicles, Plato and Aristotle, and nobody has been exempted from this, right up to modern times which is the tragedy of human effort. Then we will realise what is in front of us. People generally leave this world with a sob and a cry, not with joy on their faces, because they realised this fact too late. There was very little time for them to live in this world, and all the time had been spent in wrong activity under the impression that it is right activity.
  When it is too late to realise this, there is a deep sorrow supervening in oneself, and then people wind up all their activities, spiritual as well as temporal, and nothing happens. There is the condition of torpidity alasya, as Patanjali mentions. If there had not been lethargy in people, who would not be successful in life? We are not successful because of lethargy. We are not active, really speaking. A little finger is active, but the whole body is not active. A little part of the mind is functioning, while the other part is sleeping. Alasya, or the lethargic condition of the whole personality, will swallow up all effort. The mind and the understanding cease to function. There is a complete hibernation that takes place, and oblivion, both inward as well as outward, occurs. This oblivion is most dangerous. This total inactivity which a person may resort to, and an extreme type of negativity that may become the consequence of the difficulties on hand, may stir up another storm altogether, because these forces of nature will not allow us to keep quiet for long. They will neither allow us to do the right thing, nor will they allow us to keep quiet. They always want us to be punished, harassed and put to the greatest of hardship. This lethargic condition may continue for a long time.

1.03 - PERSONALITY, SANCTITY, DIVINE INCARNATION, #The Perennial Philosophy, #Aldous Huxley, #Philosophy
  What is the nature of this stinking lump of selfness or personality, which has to be so passionately repented of and so completely died to, before there can be any true knowing of God in purity of spirit? The most meagre and non-committal hypodiesis is that of Hume. Mankind, he says, are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity and are in a perpetual flux and movement. An almost identical answer is given by the Buddhists, whose doctrine of anatta is the denial of any permanent soul, existing behind the flux of experience and the various psycho-physical skandhas (closely corresponding to Humes bundles), which constitute the more enduring elements of personality. Hume and the Buddhists give a sufficiently realistic description of selfness in action; but they fail to explain how or why the bundles ever became bundles. Did their constituent atoms of experience come together of their own accord? And, if so, why, or by what means, and within what kind of a non-spatial universe? To give a plausible answer to these questions in terms of anatta is so difficult that we are forced to abandon the doctrine in favour of the notion that, behind the flux and within the bundles, there exists some kind of permanent soul, by which experience is organized and which in turn makes use of that organized experience to become a particular and unique personality. This is the view of the orthodox Hinduism, from which Buddhist thought parted company, and of almost all European thought from before the time of Aristotle to the present day. But whereas most contemporary thinkers make an attempt to describe human nature in terms of a dichotomy of interacting psyche and physique, or an inseparable wholeness of these two elements within particular embothed selves, all the exponents of the Perennial Philosophy make, in one form or another, the affirmation that man is a kind of trinity composed of body, psyche and spirit. Selfness or personality is a product of the first two elements. The third element (that quidquid increatum et increabile, as Eckhart called it) is akin to, or even identical with, the divine Spirit that is the Ground of all being. Mans final end, the purpose of his existence, is to love, know and be united with the immanent and transcendent Godhead. And this identification of self with spiritual not-self can be achieved only by dying to selfness and living to spirit.
  What could begin to deny self, if there were not something in man different from self?

1.03 - Sympathetic Magic, #The Golden Bough, #James George Frazer, #Occultism
  on the ebb. Another ancient belief, attri buted to Aristotle, was
  that no creature can die except at ebb tide. The belief, if we can

1.04 - GOD IN THE WORLD, #The Perennial Philosophy, #Aldous Huxley, #Philosophy
  These phrases about the unmoving first mover remind one of Aristotle. But between Aristotle and the exponents of the Perennial Philosophy within the great religious traditions there is this vast difference: Aristotle is primarily concerned with cosmology, the Perennial Philosophers are primarily concerned with liberation and enlightenment: Aristotle is content to know about the unmoving mover, from the outside and theoretically; the aim of the Perennial Philosophers is to become directly aware of it, to know it unitively, so that they and others may actually become the unmoving One. This unitive knowledge can be knowledge in the heights, or knowledge in the fulness, or knowledge simultaneously in the heights and the fulness. Spiritual knowledge exclusively in the heights of the soul was rejected by Mahayana Buddhism as inadequate. The similar rejection of quietism within the Christian tradition will be touched upon in the section, Contemplation and Action. Meanwhile it is interesting to find that the problem which aroused such acrimonious debate throughout seventeenth-century Europe had arisen for the Buddhists at a considerably earlier epoch. But whereas in Catholic Europe the outcome of the battle over Molinos, Mme. Guyon and Fnelon was to all intents and purposes the extinction of mysticism for the best part of two centuries, in Asia the two parties were tolerant enough to agree to differ. Hinayana spirituality continued to explore the heights within, while the Mahayanist masters held up the ideal not of the Arhat, but of the Bodhisattva, and pointed the way to spiritual knowledge in its fulness as well as in its heights. What follows is a poetical account, by a Zen saint of the eighteenth century, of the state of those who have realized the Zen ideal.
  Abiding with the non-particular which is in particulars,

1.04 - Narayana appearance, in the beginning of the Kalpa, as the Varaha (boar), #Vishnu Purana, #Vyasa, #Hinduism
  παντα, set his own hand to every work, which, as Aristotle says, would be, ἀπρεπὲς τῷ θεῷ, unbecoming God; but, as in the case of Brahmā and other subordinate agents, that they should occasion p. 33 the various developments of crude nature to take place, by supplying that will, of which nature itself is incapable. Action being once instituted by an instrumental medium, or by the will of an intellectual agent, it is continued by powers or a vitality inherent in nature or the matter of creation itself. The efficiency of such subordinate causes was advocated by Plato, Aristotle, and others; and the opinion of Zeno, as stated by Laertius, might be taken for a translation of some such passage as that in our text: Ἔστι δὲ φύσις ἕξις ἐξ αὐτῆς κινο
  μένη κατὰ σπερματικοὺς λόγο

1.05 - Christ, A Symbol of the Self, #Aion, #Carl Jung, #Psychology
  St. Thomas himself recalls the saying of Aristotle that "the
  thing is the whiter, the less it is mixed with black," 45 without
  45 Summa theologica, I, q. 48, ad 2 (trans., II, p. 266, citing Aristotle's Topics,
  iii, 4).

1.05 - THE HOSTILE BROTHERS - ARCHETYPES OF RESPONSE TO THE UNKNOWN, #Maps of Meaning, #Jordan Peterson, #Psychology
  In both Plato and Aristotle mind is sharply distinguished from the body. It is the unifying and
  ordering principle, the organ of logos, which brings harmony into the life of the soul, as logos is the
  formless or unformed stuff which is never completely tractable. In the thought of Aristotle matter is a
  remnant, the non-existent in itself unknowable and alien to reason, that remains after the process of

1.06 - Being Human and the Copernican Principle, #Preparing for the Miraculous, #George Van Vrekhem, #Integral Yoga
  ways since Aristotle, then Ptolemy, then Copernicus, Gali
  leo and Newton, then Einstein, and it is changing today

1.08 - RELIGION AND TEMPERAMENT, #The Perennial Philosophy, #Aldous Huxley, #Philosophy
  In the West, the traditional Catholic classification of human beings is based upon the Gospel anecdote of Martha and Mary. The way of Martha is the way of salvation through action, the way of Mary is the way through contemplation. Following Aristotle, who in this as in many other matters was in accord with the Perennial Philosophy, Catholic thinkers have regarded contemplation (the highest term of which is the unitive knowledge of the Godhead) as mans final end, and therefore have always held that Marys was indeed the better way.
  Significantly enough, it is in essentially similar terms that Dr. Radin classifies and (by implication) evaluates primitive human beings in so far as they are philosophers and religious devotees. For him there is no doubt that the higher monotheistic forms of primitive religion are created (or should one rather say, with Plato, discovered?) by people belonging to the first of the two great psycho-physical classes of human beings the men of thought. To those belonging to the other class, the men of action, is due the creation or discovery of the lower, unphilosophical, polytheistic kinds of religion.

1.10 - THINGS I OWE TO THE ANCIENTS, #Twilight of the Idols, #Friedrich Nietzsche, #Philosophy
  which has been misunderstood not only by Aristotle, but also even
  more by our pessimists. Tragedy is so far from proving anything in

1.12 - The Sacred Marriage, #The Golden Bough, #James George Frazer, #Occultism
  learn from Aristotle that the ceremony took place in the old
  official residence of the King, known as the Cattle-stall, which

1.27 - CONTEMPLATION, ACTION AND SOCIAL UTILITY, #The Perennial Philosophy, #Aldous Huxley, #Philosophy
  Now, the last end of each thing is that which is intended by the first author or mover of that thing; and the first author and mover of the universe is an intellect. Consequently, the last end of the universe must be the good of the intellect; and this is truth. Therefore truth must be the last end of the whole universe, and the consideration thereof must be the chief occupation of wisdom. And for this reason divine Wisdom, clothed in flesh declares that He came into the world to make known the truth. Moreover Aristotle defines the First Philosophy as being the knowledge of truth, not of any truth, but of that truth which is the source of all truth, of that, namely, which refers to the first principle of being of all things; wherefore its truth is the principle of all truth, since the disposition of things is the same in truth as in being.
  St. Thomas Aquinas

1.A - ANTHROPOLOGY, THE SOUL, #Philosophy of Mind, #unset, #Integral Yoga
   389 The soul is no separate immaterial entity. Wherever there is Nature, the soul is its universal immaterialism, its simple 'ideal' life. Soul is the substance or 'absolute' basis of all the particularizing and individualizing of mind: it is in the soul that mind finds the material on which its character is wrought, and the soul remains the pervading, identical ideality of it all. But as it is still conceived thus abstractly, the soul is only the sleep of mind - the passive of Aristotle, which is potentially all things.
  The question of the immateriality of the soul has no interest, except where, on the one hand, matter is regarded as something true, and mind conceived as a thing, on the other. But in modern times even the physicists have found matters grow thinner in their hands: they have come upon imponderable matters, like heat, light, etc., to which they might perhaps add space and time. These 'imponderables', which have lost the property (peculiar to matter) of gravity and, in a sense, even the capacity of offering resistance, have still, however, a sensible existence and outness of part to part; whereas the 'vital' matter, which may also be found enumerated among them, not merely lacks gravity, but even every other aspect of existence which might lead us to treat it as material.

1f.lovecraft - The Mound, #Lovecraft - Poems, #unset, #Integral Yoga
   and I stood side by side; just as Aristotle and I, or Cheops and I,
   might have stood.

1.pbs - The Triumph Of Life, #Shelley - Poems, #Percy Bysshe Shelley, #Fiction
  The tutor and his pupil: Aristotle and Alexander the Great.

1.poe - Eureka - A Prose Poem, #Poe - Poems, #unset, #Integral Yoga
  "Do you know, my dear friend," says the writer, addressing, no doubt, a contemporary -"Do you know that it is scarcely more than eight or nine hundred years ago since the metaphysicians first consented to relieve the people of the singular fancy that there exist but two practicable roads to Truth? Believe it if you can! It appears, however, that long, long ago, in the night of Time, there lived a Turkish philosopher called Aries and surnamed Tottle." [Here, possibly, the letter-writer means Aristotle; the best names are wretchedly corrupted in two or three thousand years.] "The fame of this great man depended mainly upon his demonstration that sneezing is a natural provision, by means of which over-profound thinkers are enabled to expel superfluous ideas through the nose; but he obtained a scarcely less valuable celebrity as the founder, or at all events as the principal propagator, of what was termed the de ductive or a priori philosophy. He started with what he maintained to be axioms, or self-evident truths: -and the now well-understood fact that no truths are self -evident, really does not make in the slightest degree against his speculations: -it was sufficient for his purpose that the truths in question were evident at all. From axioms he proceeded, logically, to results. His most illustrious disciples were one Tuclid, a geometrician," [meaning Euclid] "and one Kant, a Dutchman, the originator of that species of Transcendentalism which, with the change merely of a C for a K, now bears his peculiar name.
  "Well, Aries Tottle flourished supreme, until the advent of one Hog, surnamed 'the Ettrick shepherd,' who preached an entirely different system, which he called the a posteriori or in ductive. His plan referred altogether to sensation. He proceeded by observing, analyzing, and classifying facts -instantiae Naturae, as they were somewhat affectedly called -and arranging them into general laws. In a word, while the mode of Aries rested on noumena, that of Hog depended on phenomena; and so great was the admiration excited by this latter system that, at its first introduction, Aries fell into general disrepute. Finally, however, he recovered ground, and was permitted to divide the empire of Philosophy with his more modern rival: -the savans contenting themselves with proscribing all other competitors, past, present, and to come; putting an end to all controversy on the topic by the promulgation of a Median law, to the effect that the Aristotelian and Baconian roads are, and of right ought to be, the sole possible avenues to knowledge: -'Baconian,' you must know, my dear friend," adds the letter-writer at this point, "was an adjective invented as equivalent to Hog-ian, and at the same time more dignified and euphonious.

1.wby - Among School Children, #Yeats - Poems, #William Butler Yeats, #Poetry
  Solider Aristotle played the taws
  Upon the bottom of a king of kings;

2.01 - On the Concept of the Archetype, #The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious, #Carl Jung, #Psychology
  influence of Aristotle, it was not too difficult to understand
  Plato's conception of the Idea as supraordinate and pre-existent

2.02 - THE EXPANSION OF LIFE, #The Phenomenon of Man, #Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, #Christianity
  naturalists from Aristotle to Linnaeus and onwards. In the course
  of describing it, we have already tried to communicate the

2.03 - THE ENIGMA OF BOLOGNA, #Mysterium Coniunctionis, #Carl Jung, #Psychology
  [95] As is clear from the title of his book, Allegoria peripatetica de generatione, amicitia, et privatione in Aristotelicum Aenigma Elia Lelia Crispis,250 Fortunius Licetus reads the whole philosophy of Aristotle into the monument. He mentions the report that it was sculptured in stone, formerly set in a high position on the walls of St. Peters, but he does not say that he saw it with his own eyes, for in his day it was no longer in existence, if ever it existed at all. He thinks the inscription contains the summation of a serious philosophical theory about the origin of mundane things, a theory that was scientifico-moralis or ethico-physica. It is the authors intention to combine in a way to be marvelled at the attri butes of generation, friendship, and privation.251 That is why, he says, the monument is a true treasure-house.
  [96] After reviewing a number of earlier authors who had devoted themselves to the same theme, Licetus mentions the work of Joannes Casparius Gevartius,252 who propounded the theory that the inscription described the nature of Love. This author cites the comic poet Alexis in Athenaeus:

2.08 - ALICE IN WONDERLAND, #God Exists, #Swami Sivananda Saraswati, #Hinduism
  They cannot have any significance unless they are connected to a thing which is already there. This is the gross realistic doctrine of empirical philosophers which was highlighted by British thinkers like Locke, Berkeley and Hume, but already anticipated by people like Plato and Aristotle in a different fashion.
  This is a very terrible problem before us. Notwithstanding the fact that we are devotees of God and honest religious thinkers, the concreteness of the world and the reality of the things we see with our eyes and contact with our senses cannot be abrogated merely by the notion that ideas are precedent. Ideas cannot be precedent as long as we are accustomed to thinking in the way we are thinking today. Here is a man coming: I am saying like this. This man is there; therefore I have an idea that he is coming. If the man was not there, the idea cannot be there. It is not the I think the man first than the man comes. The man is there and the idea comes afterwards.
  These Tanmatras are not substances, but principles behind the objects which produce these sensations. They are not hard substances like earth, water, fire, air and ether; they are comparable to the secondary qualities of Aristotle and Plato and modern scientists.
  Oh, what a wonder! We seem to be living in a dreaml and like Alice in Wonderland. We are not living in a world as it appears. The primary qualities condensing themselves into secondary qualities of sensations, solidify themselves as it were into hard realities like heaviness that you feel when you get an electrical shock.
  Buddha said this. A really perceiving individual cannot exist in this world for three days. He will melt into nothing. But the fact that perception has not arisen is the reason why we are very happy here. So, ignorance is the cause of our very comfortable existence. Now this comparative study of Eastern conclusions with Western discoveries seems to make us feel that all great men are thinking alikewhe ther Plato or Aristotle, Kent or Hegel, Acharya Sankara or Vidyaranya Swami.
  Ideas are therefore not ideas of things which are earlier than the ideas, just as space and time are not subsequent to what we call the objective world, but precedent to the objective world. It is the final conclusion of Sir James Jean, for instance, that God must be a mathematician. It is not a man thinking mathematical point, but mathematics itself. How can you only think mathematics, without a person thinking mathematics? He says it is a mathematical consciousness, highly abstract, purely impersonal, and the universe is nothing but conceptions of mathematical point-events.
  I brought those ideas before you to bring about a comparison between the greatest thinkers of the East like Acharya Sankara, the Rishis of the Upanishads, and Sri Krishna of the Bhagavad Gita and Western thinkers like Plato, Aristotle and Kant. They seem to be thinking alike. Only they seem to be thinking in different languages and giving different definitions.
  So we are now face to face with the great reality, the God of the cosmos. We have passed through the analysis. We have conducted a study of the three stages of consciousness waking, dream and deep sleep. We studied epistomological processes the perception of the world, how we come in contact with things, and how we know that the world exists at all. This also we have concluded. Many of you may not remember it, but think over or see your diaries if you have noted anything down.

2.0 - THE ANTICHRIST, #Twilight of the Idols, #Friedrich Nietzsche, #Philosophy
  virtue.... Aristotle, as you know, recognised in pity a morbid and
  dangerous state, of which it was wise to rid one's self from time to - Aristotle, #Letters On Poetry And Art, #Sri Aurobindo, #Integral Yoga
  object: - Aristotle
  author class:Sri Aurobindo
  I tried to read Aristotle but found him dry and abstract.
  I always found him exceedingly dry. It is a purely mental philosophy, unlike Platos.

30.06 - The Poet and The Seer, #Collected Works of Nolini Kanta Gupta - Vol 07, #Nolini Kanta Gupta, #Integral Yoga
   PLATO has exiled the poet from his Republic - in his ideal society there is no place for the poet - this is a stern condemnation. It is a matter of surprise to us, even of disbelief. Especially when we notice that there is no dearth of poetry in Plato himself - he was no dry-as-dust reasoner like his disciple Aristotle. In genius and temperament he was a true poet. The literary grace that expresses itself in his style is still regarded as something of an ideal. But why is he then so averse to the poets?
   Plato's charge is that poets are no worshippers of truth. They are but servitors of imagination, of pseudo-truth or falsehood. Not only that. Their entire skill is to make falsehood appear as truth and imagination as reality; they give to an airy nothing a local habitation and a name - and, what is worse, they make this falsehood and imagination as far as possible beautiful and attractive. What then is the consequence? Men are easily deluded and fascinated by the false beauty of a visionary world and depart from truth, good and real beauty. Poetry, the sweetheart, is the enchantress, the Circe, whose only work is to delude men and turn them into pigs or at least lambs.1

30.07 - The Poet and the Yogi, #Collected Works of Nolini Kanta Gupta - Vol 07, #Nolini Kanta Gupta, #Integral Yoga
   The author of Sahitya Darpan (The Mirror of Literature) tells us something profound and significant as regards the spiritual nature or form in poetic creation. The delight of poetry can be grasped neither by impure, lifeless and rigid qualities nor by restless vitalistic movements; it is reflected in Sattwic virtues alone. Hence the poet creates something only after he has been surcharged with Sattwic qualities. Further, the purpose of reading poetry is to arouse the qualities of sattva in oneself and to move towards our nature's purification and emancipation, free from the evil contact of rajas and tamas. We may as well recollect here the similar .conclusion the Greek thinker, Aristotle, arrived at, that a tragedy has katharsis, a power to purge the heart. However, it is doubtful if anybody has raised the greatness of poetry to such a pitch as Vishwanath Kaviraj has done.
   Fundamentally there is no difference between Vishwanath Kaviraj and Abbe Bremond. The difference that does exist is not about the source of poetry but about its culmination. According to Bremond, the inner inspiration of the poet or the source of it is a spiritual experience. He also adds to it that the poet descends into a lower level of nature the moment he endeavours to mould his experience into words and tries to give it a metrical shape without following the straight yogic process, without assimilating the inner divinity into his entire being; he has spread it out and lost it in the display of words. So he has to give himself up to falsehood and play tricks. The thing that has to be manifested with the effort of his life has been totally exhausted in easy trifles and meaningless words. He has grown into an artist displaying false and baseless words instead of becoming an artist of life. In the place of having a genuine full realisation he becomes enamoured of the visionary illusive creation of a nine-day wonder. He has been fascinated, as it were, by the dance of the nymphs and has deviated from the real path. It is not that at times the poet does not feel that his creation is simply a jugglery of words. Strangely enough, with the help of fruitless words a modern poet proves the worthlessness of words:
   Aristotle's preceptor, Plato, draws our attention to this side of poetry - the illusory charming power of poetry. No doubt, the world of the poet is charming. But it is equally the world of falsehood. Plato was religious to the marrow. The main cause of his looking upon the poets with considerable displeasure is that in their creations - e.g. Homer - the gods have an inferior nature even to that of a human being. It is an absurdity on the face of it. Having turned falsehood and an evil ideal into a thing of grace and delight the poets place it before man and thus they keep him away from truth, beauty and bliss.
   Of course, it cannot be affirmed that in the poetic creation there can be no illusory power of Ignorance. No doubt, there are poets who have either blurred their spirituality or their inner soul by resorting to poetry. But in that case we can safely affirm that it is the poet and not his poetic creation that is in fault. It is absolutely a personal affair. If things are to be judged in this light, then there is not even a single object which does not stand as an obstacle to one's inner spiritual discipline.

3.02 - The Psychology of Rebirth, #The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious, #Carl Jung, #Psychology
  27 A Pseudo- Aristotle quotation in Rosarium philosophorum (1550), fol. Q.
  28 "Largiri vis mihi meum" is the usual reading, as in the first edition (1556) of

3.03 - THE MODERN EARTH, #The Phenomenon of Man, #Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, #Christianity
  before Aristotle), bending back on itself the apparent flatness of
  p Cf. Collingwood, Idea of Nature (O.U.P. 1944) passim]

3.04 - LUNA, #Mysterium Coniunctionis, #Carl Jung, #Psychology
  [171] The moon appears to be in a disadvantageous position compared with the sun. The sun is a concentrated luminary: The day is lit by a single sun. The moon, on the other handas if less powerfulneeds the help of the stars when it comes to the task of composition and separation, rational reflection, definition, etc.257 The appetites, as potentiae sensuales, pertain to the sphere of the moon; they are anger (ira) and desire (libido) or, in a word, concupiscentia. The passions are designated by animals because we have these things in common with them, and, what is more unfortunate, they often drive us into leading a bestial life.258 According to Pico, Luna has an affinity with Venus, as is particularly to be seen from the fact that she is sublimated in Taurus, the House of Venus, so much that she nowhere else appears more auspicious and more beneficent.259 Taurus is the house of the hierogamy of Sol and Luna.260 Indeed, Pico declares that the moon is the lowest earth and the most ignoble of all the stars,261 an opinion which recalls Aristotles comparison of the moon with the earth. The moon, says Pico, is inferior to all the other planets.262 The novilunium is especially unfavourable, as it robs growing bodies of their nourishment and in this way injures them.263
  [172] Psychologically, this means that the union of consciousness (Sol) with its feminine counterpart the unconscious (Luna) has undesirable results to begin with: it produces poisonous animals such as the dragon, serpent, scorpion, basilisk, and toad;264 then the lion, bear, wolf, dog,265 and finally the eagle266 and the raven. The first to appear are the cold-blooded animals, then warm-blooded predators, and lastly birds of prey or ill-omened scavengers. The first progeny of the matrimonium luminarium are all, therefore, rather unpleasant. But that is only because there is an evil darkness in both parents which comes to light in the children, as indeed often happens in real life. I remember, for instance, the case of a twenty-year-old bank clerk who embezzled several hundred francs. His old father, the chief cashier at the same bank, was much pitied, because for forty years he had discharged his highly responsible duties with exemplary loyalty. Two days after the arrest of his son he decamped to South America with a million. So there must have been something in the family. We have seen in the case of Sol that he either possesses a shadow or is even a Sol niger. As to the position of Luna, we have already been told what this is when we discussed the new moon. In the Epistola Solis ad Lunam crescentem267 Sol cautiously says: If you do me no hurt, O moon.268 Luna has promised him complete dissolution while she herself coagulates, i.e., becomes firm, and is clothed with his blackness (induta fuero nigredine tua).269 She assumes in the friendliest manner that her blackness comes from him. The matrimonial wrangle has already begun. Luna is the shadow of the sun, and with corruptible bodies she is consumed, and through her corruption . . . is the Lion eclipsed.270

3.05 - SAL, #Mysterium Coniunctionis, #Carl Jung, #Psychology
  [261] This curious text requires a little elucidation. The serpent is the prima materia, the Serpens Hermetis, which he [Hermes] sent to King Antiochus, that he might do battle with thee [Alexander] and thine army.479 The serpent is placed in the chariot of its vessel and is led hither and thither by the fourfold rotation of the natures, but it should be securely enclosed. The wheels are the wheels of the elements. The vessel or vehicle is the spherical tomb of the serpent.480 The fourfold rotation of the natures corresponds to the ancient tetrameria of the opus (its division into four parts), i.e., transformation through the four elements, from earth to fire. This symbolism describes in abbreviated form the essentials of the opus: the serpent of Hermes or the Agathodaimon, the Nous that animates the cold part of nature that is, the unconsciousis enclosed in the spherical vessel of diaphanous glass which, on the alchemical view, represents the world and the soul.481 The psychologist would see it rather as the psychic reflection of the world, namely, consciousness of the world and the psyche.482 The transformation corresponds to the psychic process of assimilation and integration by means of the transcendent function.483 This function unites the pairs of opposites, which, as alchemy shows, are arranged in a quaternio when they represent a totality. The totality appears in quaternary form only when it is not just an unconscious fact but a conscious and differentiated totality; for instance, when the horizon is thought of not simply as a circle that can be divided into any number of parts but as consisting of four clearly defined points. Accordingly, ones given personality could be represented by a continuous circle, whereas the conscious personality would be a circle divided up in a definite way, and this generally turns out to be a quaternity. The quaternity of basic functions of consciousness meets this requirement. It is therefore only to be expected that the chariot should have four wheels,484 to correspond with the four elements or natures. The chariot as a spherical vessel and as consciousness rests on the four elements or basic functions,485 just as the floating island where Apollo was born, Delos, rested on the four supports which Poseidon made for it. The wheels, naturally, are on the outside of the chariot and are its motor organs, just as the functions of consciousness facilitate the relation of the psyche to its environment. It must, however, be stressed that what we today call the schema of functions is archetypally prefigured by one of the oldest patterns of order known to man, namely the quaternity, which always represents a consciously reflected and differentiated totality. Quite apart from its almost universal incidence it also appears spontaneously in dreams as an expression of the total personality. The chariot of Aristotle can be understood in this sense as a symbol of the self.
  [262] The recipe goes on to say that this symbolic vehicle should be immersed in the sea of the unconscious for the purpose of heating and incubation,486 corresponding to the state of tapas,487 incubation by means of self-heating. By this is obviously meant a state of introversion in which the unconscious content is brooded over and digested. During this operation all relations with the outside world are broken off; the feelers of perception and intuition, discrimination and valuation are withdrawn. The four wheels are placed upon the chariot: outside everything is quiet and still, but deep inside the psyche the wheels go on turning, performing those cyclic evolutions which bring the mandala of the total personality,488 the ground-plan of the self, closer to consciousness. But so long as consciousness has not completed the process of integration it is covered by the blackest dead sea, darkened by unconsciousness and oppressed by heat, as was the hero in the belly of the whale during the night sea journey.489 Through the incubation the snake-like content is vapourized, literally sublimated, which amounts to saying that it is recognized and made an object of conscious discrimination.

31.10 - East and West, #Collected Works of Nolini Kanta Gupta - Vol 07, #Nolini Kanta Gupta, #Integral Yoga
   Further, let us turn to the spiritual practices of the East and the West and their effects on life. What is the nature of European religion? Greece is the mother of modern Europe. The Europe of to-day is the outcome of Graeco-Roman culture. What was the conception of religion in Greece? Her religion surely consisted in all that is decent, lovely and harmonious. But the Greek people failed to discover or envisage the self-existent truth that reigns supreme within the heart of man. They were solely interested in external expression through rhythm; cadence and harmony of a mental or rational idealism. There was Plato, no doubt, and the Platonists and esoterics (like Pythagoras), but Aristotle and not Plato came to be their teacher and legislator. The virtue of the Romans lay in virility and the spirit of conquest and effective organisation of life. And the virtue of Europe has combined in itself the aesthetic sense of Greece and the military and state spirit of Rome. In Europe they want to regulate life through codes, moral and legal. Forced by circumstances and for the sake of mutual interest they have set up a mode of moral standard, and this they want to impose on all peoples and countries. The utmost contri bution of European religion has been a kind of temporising and understanding with the lower propensities of men and somehow presenting a smooth and decorous surface of life. Association, Arbitration, Federation, Co-existence and such other mottoes and shibboleths that are in the air to-day are but the echoes of that mentality. Deutschtum of Germany sought to transcend this religion of morality. It tried to found religion on some deeper urge within. But in its quest it took the ego for the Self and the demoniac vital energy for the Divine Power.
   No doubt, the East has moral codes and in profusion, but they are not considered to be the last word on spirituality; they all fall under the category of the 'Lesser Knowledge' (Apara Vidya) and therefore the East has not confined itself within the play of the lower - the three gunasof nature. Its gaze is fixed on a still higher region. Europe claims herself to be the follower of the Christ. But how has Christianity developed there? It was the Church martyr in the beginning, it developed into the Church militant which finally turned into the Church political. The Christian church aimed at establishing the kingdom of Heaven on earth, but as a matter of fact, it has succeeded in establishing something of an earthly kingdom only. On the other hand, the religion of the East has quite a different movement. The ideal of the East is represented by Vedic seers like Vasishtha and Viswamitra who sought to realise the great Heavens - the Vast Truth. And their descendants clung to this ideal so firmly that no other thing existed for them. Vasishtha and Viswamitra have been consummated in Buddha and Shankara. The West has brought religion down to the level of the mundane and is about to lose it there, while the East has pushed religion up and is at last on the verge of losing the world in the Brahman or the Void.

3.18 - Of Clairvoyance and the Body of Light, #Liber ABA, #Aleister Crowley, #Occultism
  plane are intimately interwoven. The arguments of Aristotle were
  dependent on the atmospheric pressure which prevented his blood

3-5 Full Circle, #unset, #Anonymous, #Various
  "To the Greeks," says Jonas, "be it Plato or Aristotle, the number of the truly knowable things is finite, and the apprehension of first principles, whenever obtained, is definitive--subject to intermittent renewal but not to obsolescence through new discovery and better approximation." pp. 206-207.2
  The present book affirms in its title that with its appearance , mankind has come full circle. It claims that to nearly all scientists--one-field specialists and Unified-Scientists alike--the point of maximum entropy , and the region of maximum ectopy , are incapable of obsolescence through new discovery and better approximation; and that the number of truly knowable systems is not infinite but finite. Until these limits were conceived and the Systemshierarchy extending between them was defined, it had been, as Hans Jonas says, "inconceivable to the modern experience of knowledge . . . that any state of theory, including the conceptual system of first principles governing it, should be more than a temporary construct to be superseded by the next vista to which it opens the way when all its implications are matched againstall the facts." pp. 206-207.2

4.03 - THE ULTIMATE EARTH, #The Phenomenon of Man, #Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, #Christianity
  to say whether there are any Aristotles, Platos or St. Augustines now on earth
  (how could it be proved : on the other hand why not?) But what is clear is

5.06 - THE TRANSFORMATION, #Mysterium Coniunctionis, #Carl Jung, #Psychology
  [624] Green signifies hope and the future, and herein lies the reason for the Shulamites hidden joy, which otherwise would be difficult to justify. But in alchemy green also means perfection. Thus Arnaldus de Villanova says: Therefore Aristotle says in his book, Our gold, not the common gold, because the green which is in this substance signifies its total perfection, since by our magistery that green is quickly turned into truest gold.231 Hence the Shulamite continues:
  But I must be like a dove with wings, and I shall come and be free at vespertime, when the waters of impurity are abated, with a green olive leaf; then is my head of the fairest Asophol,232 and my hair curly-gleaming as the

Aeneid, #unset, #Anonymous, #Various
  average human type will rise to the heights of an Aristotle, a
  Goethe, or a Marx. And above this ridge new peaks will rise."

Avatars of the Tortoise, #unset, #Anonymous, #Various
  Vorsokratiker, 1935, page 178) translates the original text by Aristotle: "The
  second argument of Zeno is the one known by the name of Achilles. He
  We owe to the pen of Aristotle the communication and first refutation
  of these arguments. He refutes them with a perhaps disdainful brevity, but
  are mere temporal appearances of an eternal archetype. Aristotle asks if the
  many men and the Manthe temporal individuals and the archetypehave
  humanity. In that case, maintains Aristotle, one would have to postulate
  another archetype to include them all, and then a fourth. . . Patricio de
  presentation of the problem to one of Aristotle's disciples: "If what is
  affirmed of many things is at the same time a separate being, different from
  But also, according to Aristotle:
  a + b + c = d
  man denounced by Aristotle. Zeno of Elea resorts to the idea of infinite
  regression against movement and number; his refuter, against the idea of
  cosmological proof; it is prefigured by Aristotle and Plato; later Leibniz

Averroes Search, #Labyrinths, #Jorge Luis Borges, #Poetry
  in the eyes of men: his commentary on Aristotle. This Greek, fountainhead
  of all philosophy, had been bestowed upon men to teach them all that could

BOOK II. -- PART II. THE ARCHAIC SYMBOLISM OF THE WORLD-RELIGIONS, #The Secret Doctrine, #H P Blavatsky, #Theosophy
  storm-clouds and lightning -- a conflagration due to friction; while Aristotle saw in the thunderbolt
  only the action of clouds which clashed with each other. What was this theory, if not the scientific
  It could be studied, in short, from the Universals of Plato, and the inductive method of Aristotle. The
  former started from a divine comprehension, when the plurality proceeded from unity, or the digits of

BOOK I. -- PART I. COSMIC EVOLUTION, #The Secret Doctrine, #H P Blavatsky, #Theosophy
  manifesting." This manifestation is triple in its aspects, for it requires, as Aristotle has it, three (5 von 8) [06.05.2003 03:30:40]
  theory. The sphericity of the earth was distinctly taught by Aristotle, who appealed for proof to the
  figure of the Earth's shadow on the moon in eclipses ( Aristotle, De Coelo, lib. II, cap. XIV.). The same
  the Pagans and the Christians in this cause? Following Plato, Aristotle explained that the term
  [[stoicheia]] was understood only as meaning the incorporeal principles placed at each of the four great
  time a fervent Darwinist -- ought to hasten to repair the deficiency. The German Embryologistphilosopher shows -- thus stepping over the heads of the Greek Hippocrates and Aristotle, right back
  into the teachings of the old Aryans -- one infinitesimal cell, out of millions of others at work in the
  [[Vol. 1, Page]] 279 HERMES, OR Aristotle?
  tional matter; and to bulwark our doctrines against the too strong attacks of modern Sectarianism, and
  "Wisdom" -- in its universal character; they -- to Aristotle as against intuition and the experience of
  the ages, fancying that Truth is the exclusive property of the Western world. Hence the disagreement.

BOOK I. -- PART III. SCIENCE AND THE SECRET DOCTRINE CONTRASTED, #The Secret Doctrine, #H P Blavatsky, #Theosophy
  not only by his inductive method (renovated from ill-digested Aristotle), but by the general tenor of
  his writings. He inverts the order of mental Evolution when saying that "the first Creation of God was
  boatman in his boat." As for Aristotle, he called those rulers "immaterial substances;"* though as one
  who had never been initiated, he rejected the gods as Entities (See Vossius, Vol. II., p. 528). But this
  Discoverer" (p. 123) the author shows the great physicist using "old reflections of Aristotle" which are
  "concisely found in some of his works." Faraday, Boscovitch, and all others, however, who see, in the
  Omega of mystical conception -- became dwarfed after Pythagoras by Aristotle. By omitting the Point
  and the Circle, and taking no account of the apex, he reduced the metaphysical value of the idea, and
  them to the substantial forms of Aristotle. (See Systeme Nouveau, 3.)
  [[Vol. 1, Page]] 632 THE SECRET DOCTRINE.
  * Leibnitz, like Aristotle, calls the created or emanated monads (the Elementals issued from Cosmic
  Spirits or Gods) -- Entelechies, [[Entelecheia]] -- and "incorporeal automata." ( 18, Monadologie.)

  The [[stoicheia]] (Elements) of Plato and Aristotle, were thus the incorporeal principles attached to
  the four great divisions of our Cosmic World, and it is with justice that Creuzer defines those

BOOK IX. - Of those who allege a distinction among demons, some being good and others evil, #City of God, #Saint Augustine of Hippo, #Christianity
  Among the philosophers there are two opinions about these mental emotions, which the Greeks call , while some of our own writers, as Cicero, call them perturbations,[331] some[Pg 356] affections, and some, to render the Greek word more accurately, passions. Some say that even the wise man is subject to these perturbations, though moderated and controlled by reason, which imposes laws upon them, and so restrains them within necessary bounds. This is the opinion of the Platonists and Aristotelians; for Aristotle was Plato's disciple, and the founder of the Peripatetic school. But others, as the Stoics, are of opinion that the wise man is not subject to these perturbations. But Cicero, in his book De Finibus, shows that the Stoics are here at variance with the Platonists and Peripatetics rather in words than in reality; for the Stoics decline to apply the term "goods" to external and bodily advantages,[332] because they reckon that the only good is virtue, the art of living well, and this exists only in the mind. The other philosophers, again, use the simple and customary phraseology, and do not scruple to call these things goods, though in comparison of virtue, which guides our life, they are little and of small esteem. And thus it is obvious that, whether these outward things are called goods or advantages, they are held in the same estimation by both parties, and that in this matter the Stoics are pleasing themselves merely with a novel phraseology. It seems, then, to me that in this question, whether the wise man is subject to mental passions, or wholly free from them, the controversy is one of words rather than of things; for I think that, if the reality and not the mere sound of the words is considered, the Stoics hold precisely the same opinion as the Platonists and Peripatetics. For, omitting for brevity's sake other proofs which I might adduce in support of this opinion, I will state but one which I consider conclusive. Aulus Gellius, a man of extensive erudition, and gifted with an eloquent and graceful style, relates, in his work entitled Noctes Attic,[333] that he once made a voyage with an eminent Stoic philosopher; and he goes on to relate fully and with gusto what I shall barely state, that when the ship was tossed and in danger from a violent storm, the philosopher[Pg 357] grew pale with terror. This was noticed by those on board, who, though themselves threatened with death, were curious to see whether a philosopher would be agitated like other men. When the tempest had passed over, and as soon as their security gave them freedom to resume their talk, one of the passengers, a rich and luxurious Asiatic, begins to banter the philosopher, and rally him because he had even become pale with fear, while he himself had been unmoved by the impending destruction. But the philosopher availed himself of the reply of Aristippus the Socratic, who, on finding himself similarly bantered by a man of the same character, answered, "You had no cause for anxiety for the soul of a profligate debauchee, but I had reason to be alarmed for the soul of Aristippus." The rich man being thus disposed of, Aulus Gellius asked the philosopher, in the interests of science and not to annoy him, what was the reason of his fear? And he, willing to instruct a man so zealous in the pursuit of knowledge, at once took from his wallet a book of Epictetus the Stoic,[334] in which doctrines were advanced which precisely harmonized with those of Zeno and Chrysippus, the founders of the Stoical school. Aulus Gellius says that he read in this book that the Stoics maintain that there are certain impressions made on the soul by external objects which they call phantasi, and that it is not in the power of the soul to determine whether or when it shall be invaded by these. When these impressions are made by alarming and formidable objects, it must needs be that they move the soul even of the wise man, so that for a little he trembles with fear, or is depressed by sadness, these impressions anticipating the work of reason and self-control; but this does not imply that the mind accepts these evil impressions, or approves or consents to them. For this consent is, they think, in a man's power; there being this difference between the mind of the wise man and that of the fool, that the fool's mind yields to these passions and consents to them, while that of the wise man, though it cannot help being invaded by them, yet retains with unshaken firmness a true and steady persuasion of those things which it ought rationally to desire or avoid. This account of what[Pg 358] Aulus Gellius relates that he read in the book of Epictetus about the sentiments and doctrines of the Stoics I have given as well as I could, not, perhaps, with his choice language, but with greater brevity, and, I think, with greater clearness. And if this be true, then there is no difference, or next to none, between the opinion of the Stoics and that of the other philosophers regarding mental passions and perturbations, for both parties agree in maintaining that the mind and reason of the wise man are not subject to these. And perhaps what the Stoics mean by asserting this, is that the wisdom which characterizes the wise man is clouded by no error and sullied by no taint, but, with this reservation that his wisdom remains undisturbed, he is exposed to the impressions which the goods and ills of this life (or, as they prefer to call them, the advantages or disadvantages) make upon them. For we need not say that if that philosopher had thought nothing of those things which he thought he was forthwith to lose, life and bodily safety, he would not have been so terrified by his danger as to betray his fear by the pallor of his cheek. Nevertheless, he might suffer this mental disturbance, and yet maintain the fixed persuasion that life and bodily safety, which the violence of the tempest threatened to destroy, are not those good things which make their possessors good, as the possession of righteousness does. But in so far as they persist that we must call them not goods but advantages, they quarrel about words and neglect things. For what difference does it make whether goods or advantages be the better name, while the Stoic no less than the Peripatetic is alarmed at the prospect of losing them, and while, though they name them differently, they hold them in like esteem? Both parties assure us that, if urged to the commission of some immorality or crime by the threatened loss of these goods or advantages, they would prefer to lose such things as preserve bodily comfort and security rather than commit such things as violate righteousness. And thus the mind in which this resolution is well grounded suffers no perturbations to prevail with it in opposition to reason, even though they assail the weaker parts of the soul; and not only so, but it rules over them, and, while it refuses its consent and resists them, administers[Pg 359] a reign of virtue. Such a character is ascribed to neas by Virgil when he says,
  "He stands immovable by tears, Nor tenderest words with pity hears."[335]

Book of Imaginary Beings (text), #unset, #Anonymous, #Various
  different animal from the carnivorous mammal of presentday zoology. Aristotle had written that it gives off a sweet
  smell attractive to other animals; Aelian - the Roman author
  with feathers and eggshells. Aristotle allots them underground dens. For the harvest of wheat they wielded axes, as
  though they were out to chop down a forest. Each year they
  have feet, but Aristotle denies this, adding that its limbs
  resemble wings.
  Salamanders exist. In a parallel fashion, Aristotle speaks of
  animals of the air.

BOOK VIII. - Some account of the Socratic and Platonic philosophy, and a refutation of the doctrine of Apuleius that the demons should be worshipped as mediators between gods and men, #City of God, #Saint Augustine of Hippo, #Christianity
  But we need not determine from what source he learned these things,whether it was from the books of the ancients who preceded him, or, as is more likely, from the words of the apostle: "Because that which is known of God has been manifested among them, for God hath manifested it to them. For His invisible things from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by those things which have been made, also His eternal power and Godhead."[306] From whatever source he may have derived this knowledge, then, I think I have made it sufficiently plain that I have not chosen the Platonic philosophers undeservedly as the parties with whom to discuss; because the question we have just taken up concerns the natural theology,the question, namely, whether sacred rites are to be performed to one God, or to many, for the sake of the happiness which is to be after death. I have specially chosen them because their juster thoughts concerning the one God who made heaven and earth, have made them illustrious among philosophers. This has given them such superiority to all others in the judgment of posterity, that, though Aristotle, the disciple of Plato, a man of eminent abilities, inferior in eloquence to Plato, yet far superior to many in that respect, had founded the Peripatetic sect,so called because they were in the habit of walking about during their disputations, and though he had, through the greatness of his fame, gathered very many disciples into his school, even during the life of his master; and though Plato at his death[Pg 324] was succeeded in his school, which was called the Academy, by Speusippus, his sister's son, and Xenocrates, his beloved disciple, who, together with their successors, were called from this name of the school, Academics; nevertheless the most illustrious recent philosophers, who have chosen to follow Plato, have been unwilling to be called Peripatetics, or Academics, but have preferred the name of Platonists. Among these were the renowned Plotinus, Iamblichus, and Porphyry, who were Greeks, and the African Apuleius, who was learned both in the Greek and Latin tongues. All these, however, and the rest who were of the same school, and also Plato himself, thought that sacred rites ought to be performed in honour of many gods.
  13. Concerning the opinion of Plato, according to which he defined the gods as beings entirely good and the friends of virtue.

BOOK XXII. - Of the eternal happiness of the saints, the resurrection of the body, and the miracles of the early Church, #City of God, #Saint Augustine of Hippo, #Christianity
  But against what I have formerly said they can find nothing to say, even though they introduce and make the most of this order of the elements in which they confide. For if the order be that the earth is first, the water second, the air third, the heaven fourth, then the soul is above all. For Aristotle said that the soul was a fifth body, while Plato denied that it was a body at all. If it were a fifth body, then certainly it would be above the rest; and if it is not a body at all, so much the more does it rise above all. What, then, does it do in an earthly body? What does this soul, which is finer than all else, do in such a mass of matter as this? What does the lightest of substances do in this ponderosity? this swiftest substance in such sluggishness? Will[Pg 503] not the body be raised to heaven by virtue of so excellent a nature as this? and if now earthly bodies can retain the souls below, shall not the souls be one day able to raise the earthly bodies above?
  If we pass now to their miracles which they oppose to our martyrs as wrought by their gods, shall not even these be found to make for us, and help out our argument? For if any of the miracles of their gods are great, certainly that is a great one which Varro mentions of a vestal virgin, who, when she was endangered by a false accusation of unchastity, filled a sieve with water from the Tiber, and carried it to her judges without any part of it leaking. Who kept the weight of water in the sieve? Who prevented any drop from falling from it through so many open holes? They will answer, Some god or some demon. If a god, is he greater than the God who made the world? If a demon, is he mightier than an angel who serves the God by whom the world was made? If, then, a lesser god, angel, or demon could so sustain the weight of this liquid element that the water might seem to have changed its nature, shall not Almighty God, who Himself created all the elements, be able to eliminate from the earthly body its heaviness, so that the quickened body shall dwell in whatever element the quickening spirit pleases?

  his wits, and used to lie awake striving to understand them and worm the meaning out of them; what Aristotle
  himself could not have made out or extracted had he come to life again for that special purpose. He was not at

Deutsches Requiem, #Labyrinths, #Jorge Luis Borges, #Poetry
  in the polemics of Aristotle or Plato; across the centuries and latitudes, the
  names, faces and dialects change but not the eternal antagonists. The history

DS2, #unset, #Anonymous, #Various
  Chinese translations that include it render it as hsiu-hsing (practice). When used in reference to a path, however, pratipad means walk. Note, too, the similarity between the Sanskrit pratipad and the Greek peripate (walk), which was also an integral part of the manner in which Aristotle and his followers went about seeking the truth. In place of kathan cittan pragrahitavyan (how should they control their thoughts/mind), Paramartha has yun-ho fa-chi pu-sa-hsin (how should they give birth to the thought of enlightenment). In the same phrase, Kumarajiva, Bodhiruci, and Dharmagupta interpret pragraha (control) as chiang-fu (subdue), while Hsuan-tsang and Yi-ching read it as she-fu
  (bring under control). Mller gives restrain, while Conze has control. Edgerton, however, suggests exercises.

ENNEAD 01.03 - Of Dialectic, or the Means of Raising the Soul to the Intelligible World., #Plotinus - Complete Works Vol 01, #Plotinus, #Christianity
  5. Whence does this science derive its proper principles? Intelligence furnishes the soul with the clear principles she is capable of receiving. Having discovered and achieved these principles, dialectics puts their consequences in order. Dialectics composes, and divides, till it has arrived at a perfect intelligence of things; for according to (Plato),350 dialectics is the purest application of intelligence and wisdom. In this case, if dialectics be the noblest exercise of our faculties, it must exercise itself with essence and the highest objects. Wisdom studies existence, as intelligence studies that which is still beyond existence (the One, or the Good). But is not philosophy also that which is most eminent? Surely. But there is no confusion between philosophy and dialectics, because dialectics is the highest part of philosophy. It is not (as Aristotle thought) merely an instrument for philosophy, nor (as Epicurus thought) made up of pure speculations and abstract rules. It studies things themselves, and its matter is the (real) beings. It reaches them by following a method which yields reality as well as the idea. Only accidentally does dialectics busy itself with error and sophisms. Dialectics considers them alien to its mission, and as produced by a foreign principle. Whenever anything contrary to the rule of truth is advanced, dialectics recognizes the error by the light of the truths it contains. Dialectics, however, does not care for274 propositions, which, to it, seem only mere groupings of letters. Nevertheless, because it knows the truth, dialectics also understands propositions, and, in general, the operations of the soul. Dialectics knows what it is to affirm, to deny, and how to make contrary or contradictory assertions. Further, dialectics distinguishes differences from identities, grasping the truth by an intuition that is as instantaneous as is that of the senses; but dialectics leaves to another science, that enjoys those details, the care of treating them with exactness.
  6. Dialectics, therefore, is only one part of philosophy, but the most important. Indeed, philosophy has other branches. First, it studies nature (in physics), therein employing dialectics, as the other arts employ arithmetic, though philosophy owes far more to dialectics. Then philosophy treats of morals, and here again it is dialectics that ascertains the principles; ethics limits itself to building good habits thereon, and to propose the exercises that shall produce those good habits. The (Aristotelian) rational virtues also owe to dialectics the principles which seem to be their characteristics; for they chiefly deal with material things (because they moderate the passions). The other virtues351 also imply the application of reason to the passions and actions which are characteristic of each of them. However, prudence applies reason to them in a superior manner. Prudence deals rather with the universal, considering whether the virtues concatenate, and whether an action should be done now, or be deferred, or be superseded by another352 (as thought Aristotle). Now it is dialectics, or its resultant science of wisdom which, under a general and immaterial form, furnishes prudence with all the principles it needs.

ENNEAD 02.01 - Of the Heaven., #Plotinus - Complete Works Vol 03, #Plotinus, #Christianity
  On the contrary, in the system of Aristotle, the immutability of the stars is easily explained, but only after accepting his theory of a fifth element (the quintessence205). If, however, it be rejected, it would be impossible to demonstrate that the heaven, let alone its parts, the sun and the stars, do not perish, while (as Aristotle does) we regard the body of the heaven as being composed of the same elements as terrestrial animals.
  4. Apart from the exigencies of our argument, it may be interesting to consider whether there be any818 wastage off from heaven, so as to create a need of being (replenished or) fed, so to speak; or whether all its contents, being once for all established, subsist there naturally, without allowing any of their substance to escape. In the latter case we would be driven further to inquire whether the heaven be composed of fire exclusively or principally213; and whether, while dominating the other elements, the fire engages them in its course. Were we to associate (with fire) the Soul, which is the most powerful of all causes, so as to unite her with elements so pure and excellent (just as, in other animals, the soul chooses the best parts of the body as dwelling-place), we would have produced a solid argument for the immortality of the heaven. Aristotle indeed says that the flame surges, and that the fire devours everything with an insatiable avidity206; but he was evidently speaking only of the terrestrial fire, for the celestial fire is calm, immovable, and in harmony with the nature of the stars.

ENNEAD 02.04a - Of Matter., #Plotinus - Complete Works Vol 01, #Plotinus, #Christianity
  1. Matter is a substrate (or subject) underlying nature, as thought Aristotle,278 and a residence for forms. Thus much is agreed upon by all authors who have studied matter, and who have succeeded in forming a clear idea of this kind of nature; but further than this, there is no agreement. Opinions differ as to whether matter is an underlying nature (as thought Aristotle),279 as to its receptivity, and to what it is receptive.
  (The Stoics, who condensed Aristotle's categories to four, substrate, quality-mode and relation),280 who admit the existence of nothing else than bodies, acknowledge no existence other than that contained by bodies. They insist that there is but one kind of matter, which serves as substrate to the elements, and that it constitutes "being"; that all other things are only affections ("passions") of matter, or modified matter: as are the elements. The teachers of this doctrine do not hesitate to introduce this matter into the (very nature of the) divinities, so that their supreme divinity is no more than modified matter.281 Besides, of matter they make a body, calling it a "quantityless body," still attri buting to it magnitude.
  2. Let us first examine whether this (latter intelligible) matter exists, how it exists, and what it is. If (the nature) of matter be something indeterminate, and shapeless, and if in the perfect (intelligible beings) there must not be anything indeterminate or shapeless, it seems as if there could not be any matter in the intelligible world. As every (being) is simple, it could not have any need of matter which, by uniting with something else, constitutes something composite. Matter is necessary in begotten beings, which make one thing arise out of another; for it is such beings that have led to the conception of matter (as thought Aristotle).282 It may however be objected that in unbegotten beings matter would seem useless. Whence could it have originated to enter in (among intelligible beings), and remain there? If it were begotten, it must have been so by some principle; if it be eternal, it must have had several principles; in which case the beings that occupy the first rank would seem to be contingent. Further, if (in those beings) form come to join matter, their union will constitute a body, so that the intelligible (entities) will be corporeal.
  6. Now let us speak of bodies. The mutual transformation of elements demonstrates that they must have a substrate. Their transformation is not a complete destruction; otherwise (a general) "being"287 would perish in nonentity. Whereas, what is begotten would have passed from absolute nonentity to essence; and all change is no more than the passing of one form into another (as thought Aristotle).288 It presupposes the existence of permanent (subject) which would receive the form of begotten things only after having lost the earlier form. This is demonstrated by destruction, which affects only something composite; therefore every dissolved object must have been a composite. Dissolution proves it also. For instance, where a vase is dissolved, the result is gold; on being dissolved, gold leaves water; and so analogy would suggest that the dissolution of water would result in something else, that is analogous to its nature. Finally, elements necessarily are either form, or primary matter, or the composites of form and matter. However, they cannot be form, because, without matter, they could not possess either mass nor magnitude. Nor can they be primary matter, because they are subject to destruction. They must therefore be composites of form and matter; form constituting their shape and quality, and matter a substrate that is indeterminate, because it is not a form.
  7. (According to Aristotle),289 Empedocles thinks matter consists of elements; but this opinion is refuted by the decay to which they are exposed. (According to Aristotle),290 Anaxagoras supposes that matter is a mixture and, instead of saying that this (mixture) is capable of becoming all things, he insists that it contains all things in actualization. Thus he annihilates the intelligence that he had introduced into the world; for, according to him, it is not intelligence that endows all the rest with shape and form; it is contemporaneous with matter, instead of preceding it.291 Now it is impossible for intelligence to be the contemporary of matter, for if mixture participate in essence, then must essence precede it; if, however, essence itself be the mixture, they will need some third principle. Therefore if the demiurgic creator necessarily precede, what need was there for the forms in miniature to exist in matter, for intelligence to unravel their inextricable confusion, when it is possible to predicate qualities of matter, because matter had none of its own, and thus to subject matter entirely to shape? Besides, how could (the demiurgic creator) then be in all?
  (According to Aristotle's account of Democritus),293 neither could the atoms fulfil the part of matter because they are nothing (as before thought Cicero).294 Every body is divisible to infinity. (Against the system of the atoms) might further be alleged the continuity and humidity of bodies. Besides nothing can exist without intelligence and soul, which could not be composed of atoms. Nothing with a nature different from the atoms could produce anything with the atoms, because no demiurgic creator could produce something with a matter that lacked continuity. Many other objections against this system have and can be made; but further discussion is unnecessary.
  8. What then is this matter which is one, continuous, and without qualities? Evidently, it could not be a body, since it has no quality; if it were a body, it would have a quality. We say that it is the matter of all sense-objects, and not the matter of some, and the form of others, just as clay is matter, in respect to the potter, without being matter absolutely (as thought Aristotle).295 As we are not considering the matter of any particular object, but the matter of all things, we would not attribute to its nature anything of what falls under our sensesno quality, color, heat, cold, lightness, weight, density, sparseness, figure or magnitude; for magnitude is something entirely different from being large, and figure from the figured object. Matter therefore is not anything composite, but something simple, and by nature one (according to the views of206 Plato and Aristotle combined).296 Only thus could matter be deprived of all properties (as it is).
  10. (Some objector) might ask how one could conceive of matter without quantity? This might be answered by a retort. How then do you (as you do) manage to conceive of it without quality? Do you again object, by what conception or intelligence could it be reached? By the very indetermination of the soul. Since that which knows must be similar to that which is known (as Aristotle298 quotes from Empedocles), the indeterminate must be grasped by the indeterminate. Reason, indeed, may be determined in respect to the indeterminate; but the glance which reason directs on the indeterminate itself is indeterminate. If everything were known by reason and by intelligence, reason here tells us about matter what reason rightly should tell us about it. By wishing to conceive of matter in an intellectual manner, intelligence208 arrives at a state which is the absence of intelligence, or rather, reason forms of matter a "bastard" or "illegitimate" image, which is derived from the other, which is not true, and which is composed of the other (deceptive material called) reason. That is why Plato299 said that matter is perceived by a "bastard reasoning." In what does the indetermination of the soul consist? In an absolute ignorance, or in a complete absence of all knowledge? No: the indeterminate condition of the soul implies something positive (besides something negative). As for the eye, darkness is the matter of all invisible color, so the soul, by making abstraction in sense-objects of all things that somehow are luminous, cannot determine what then remains; and likewise, as the eye, in darkness (becomes assimilated to darkness), the soul becomes assimilated to what she sees. Does she then see anything else? Doubtless, she sees something without figure, without color, without light, or even without magnitude.300 If this thing had any magnitude, the soul would lend it a form.
  11. (Following the ideas of Aristotle,301 Plotinos wonders whether some objector) will ask whether the composition of a body requires anything beyond extension and all the other qualities? Yes: it demands a substrate to receive them (as a residence). This substrate is not a mass; for in this case, it would be an extension. But if this substrate have no extension, how can it be a residence (for form)? Without extension, it could be of no service, contri buting neither to form nor qualities, to magnitude nor extension. It seems that extension, wherever it be, is given to bodies by matter. Just as actions, effects, times and movements, though they do not imply any matter, nevertheless are beings, it would seem that the elementary bodies do not necessarily imply matter (without extension), being individual beings, whose diverse substance is constituted by the mingling of several forms. Matter without extension, therefore, seems to be no more than a meaningless name.
  (Our answer to the above objection is this:) To begin with, not every residence is necessarily a mass, unless it have already received extension. The soul, which possesses all things, contains them all simultaneously. If it possessed extension, it would possess all things in extension. Consequently matter receives all it contains in extension, because it is capable thereof. Likewise in animals and plants there is a correspondence between the growth and diminution of their magnitude, with that of their quality. It would be wrong to claim that magnitude is necessary to matter because, in sense-objects, there exists a previous magnitude, on which is exerted the action of the forming principle; for the matter of these objects is not pure matter, but individual matter (as said Aristotle).302 Matter pure and simple must receive its extension from some other principle. Therefore the residence of form could not be a mass; for in receiving extension, it would also receive the other qualities. Matter therefore, is the image of extension, because as it is primary matter, it possesses the ability to become extended. People often imagine matter as empty extension; consequently several philosophers have claimed that matter is identical with emptiness. I repeat: matter is the image of extension because the soul, when considering matter, is unable to determine anything, spreads into indetermination, without being able to circumscribe or mark anything; otherwise, matter would determine something. This substrate could not properly be called big or little; it is simultaneously big and little (as said Aristotle).303 It is simultaneously extended and non-extended, because it is the matter of extension. If it were enlarged or made smaller, it would somehow move in extension. Its indetermination is an extension which consists in being the very residence of extension,211 but really in being only imaginary extension, as has been explained above. Other beings, that have no extension, but which are forms, are each of them determinate, and consequently imply no other idea of extension. On the contrary, matter, being indeterminate, and incapable of remaining within itself, being moved to receive all forms everywhere, ever being docile, by this very docility, and by the generation (to which it adapts itself), becomes manifold. It is in this way its nature seems to be extension.
  12. Extensions therefore contri bute to the constitutions of bodies; for the forms of bodies are in extensions. These forms produce themselves not in extension (which is a form), but in the substrate that has received extension. If they occurred in extension, instead of occurring in matter, they would nevertheless have neither extension nor (hypostatic) substance; for they would be no more than reasons. Now as reasons reside in the soul, there would be no body. Therefore, in the sense-world, the multiplicity of forms must have a single substrate which has received extension, and therefore must be other than extension. All things that mingle form a mixture, because they contain matter; they have no need of any other substrate, because each of them brings its matter along with it. But (forms) need a receptacle (a residence), a "vase" (or stand), a location (this in answer to the objection at the beginning of the former section). Now location is posterior to matter and to bodies. Bodies, therefore, presuppose matter. Bodies are not necessarily immaterial, merely because actions and operations are. In the occurrence of an action, matter serves as substrate to the agent; it remains within him without itself entering into action; for that is not that which is212 sought by the agent. One action does not change into another, and consequently has no need of containing matter; it is the agent who passes from one action to another, and who, consequently, serves as matter to the actions (as thought Aristotle).304
  Let us grant that matter has no quality, because, by virtue of its nature, it does not participate in a quality of any other thing. What, however, would hinder this property, because it is a qualification in matter, from participating in some quality? This would be a particular and distinctive characteristic, which consists of the privation of all other things (referring to Aristotle)?307 In man, the privation of something may be considered a quality; as, for instance, the privation of sight is blindness. If the privation of certain things inhere in matter, this privation is also a qualification for matter. If further the privation in matter extend to all things, absolutely, our objection is still better grounded, for privation is a qualification. Such an objection, however, amounts to making qualities and qualified things of everything. In this case quantity, as well as "being," would be a quality. Every qualified thing must possess some quality. It is ridiculous to suppose that something qualified is qualified by what itself has no quality, being other than quality.
  14. Let us now examine if matter be privation, or if privation be an attri bute of matter. If you insist that privation and matter are though logically distinct, substantially one and the same thing, you will have to explain the nature of these two things, for instance, defining matter without defining privation, and conversely.215 Either, neither of these two things implies the other, or they imply each other reciprocally, or only one of them implies the other. If each of them can be defined separately, and if neither of them imply the other, both will form two distinct things, and matter will be different from privation, though privation be an accident of matter. But neither of the two must even potentially be present in the definition of the other. Is their mutual relation the same as that of a stub nose, and the man with the stub nose (as suggested by Aristotle)?308 Then each of these is double, and there are two things. Is their relation that between fire and heat? Heat is in fire, but fire is not necessarily contained in heat; thus matter, having privation (as a quality), as fire has heat (as a quality), privation will be a form of matter, and has a substrate different from itself, which is matter.309 Not in this sense, therefore, is there a unity (between them).
  The infinite seems born of the infinity of the One, either of its power, or eternity; there is no infinity in the One, but the One is creator of the infinite. How can there be infinity simultaneously above and below (in the One and in matter)? Because there are two infinities (the infinite and the indefinite; the infinite in the One, the indefinite in matter). Between them obtains the same difference as the archetype and its image.312 Is the infinite here below less infinite? On the contrary, it is more so. By the mere fact that the image is far from veritable "being," it is more infinite. Infinity is greater in that which is less determinate (as thought Aristotle).313 Now that which is more distant from good is further in evil. Therefore the infinite on high, possessing the more essence, is the ideal infinite; here below, as the infinite possesses less essence, because it is far from essence and truth, it degenerates into the image of essence, and is the truer (indefinite) infinite.

ENNEAD 02.05 - Of the Aristotelian Distinction Between Actuality and Potentiality., #Plotinus - Complete Works Vol 02, #Plotinus, #Christianity
  3. The purpose of the preceding considerations was to determine the meaning of the statement that intelligibles are actual; to decide whether every intelligible exist only actually, or whether it be only an actuality; and third, how even up there in the intelligible, where all things are actualities, there can also exist something potentially. If, then, in the intelligible world, there be no matter which might be called potential, if no being is to become something which it not yet is, nor transform itself, nor, while remaining what it is, beget something else, nor by altering, cause any substitution, then there could not be anything potential in this World of eternal essence outside of time. Let us now address the following question to those who admit the existence of matter, even in intelligible things: "How can we speak of matter in the intelligible world, if by virtue of this matter nothing exists potentially? For even if in the intelligible world matter existed otherwise than it does in the sense-world, still in every being would be the matter, the form and the compound which constitutes it." They would answer that in intelligible things, what plays the part of matter is a form, and that the soul, by herself, is form; but, in relation to something else, is matter. Is the soul then potential in respect of this other thing? Hardly, for the soul possesses the form, and possesses it at present, without regard to the future, and she is divisible in form and matter only for reason; if she contain matter, it is only because thought conceives of her as double (by distinguishing form and matter in her).346 But these two things form a single nature, as Aristotle also says that his "quintessence" is immaterial.

ENNEAD 02.06 - Of Essence and Being., #Plotinus - Complete Works Vol 01, #Plotinus, #Christianity
  We may now say that, in the intelligible world, qualities are the characteristic differences in being or essence. These differences effect distinction between the246 beings; in short, they cause them to be beings. This definition seems reasonable. But it does not suit the qualities below (in the sense-world); some are differences of being, as biped, or quadruped (as thought Aristotle);330 others are not differences, and on that very account are called qualities. Still, the same thing may appear a difference when it is a complement of the being, and again it may not seem a difference when it is not a complement of the being, but an accident: as, for instance, whiteness is a complement of being in a swan, or in white lead; but in a human being like you, it is only an accident (as thought Aristotle).331 So long as the whiteness is in the ("seminal) reason," it is a complement of being, and not a quality; if it be on the surface of a being, it is a quality.
  Taking the illustration of fire, is it "mere being" before it is "such being?" In this case, it would be a body. Consequently, the body will be a being; fire will be a hot body. Body and heat combined will not constitute being; but heat will exist in the body as in you exists the property of having a stub nose (as said Aristotle).333 Consequently, if we abstract heat, shine and lightness, which seem to be qualities, and also impenetrability, nothing will remain but tridimensional extension, and matter will be "being." But this hypothesis does not seem likely; it is rather form which will be "being."

ENNEAD 02.07 - About Mixture to the Point of Total Penetration., #Plotinus - Complete Works Vol 03, #Plotinus, #Christianity
  As to the (Peripatetic) philosophers who assert that in a mixture only the qualities mingle, while the material extension of both bodies are only in juxtaposition, so long as the qualities proper to each of them are spread throughout the whole mass, they seem to establish the rightness of their opinion by attacking the doctrine which asserts that the two bodies mutually interpenetrate in mixture.60 (They object) that the molecules of both bodies will finally lose all magnitude692 by this continuous division which will leave no interval between the parts of either of the two bodies; for if the two bodies mutually interpenetrate each other in every part, their division must become continuous. Besides, the mixture often occupies an extent greater than each body taken separately, and as great as if mere juxtaposition had occurred. Now if two bodies mutually interpenetrate totally, the resulting mixture would occupy no more place than any one of them taken separately. The case where two bodies occupy no more space than a single one of them is by these philosophers explained by the air's expulsion, which permits one of the bodies to penetrate into the pores of the other. Besides, in the case of the mixture of two bodies of unequal extent, how could the body of the smaller extend itself sufficiently to spread into all the parts of the greater? There are many other such reasons.

ENNEAD 02.08 - Of Sight, or of Why Distant Objects Seem Small., #Plotinus - Complete Works Vol 03, #Plotinus, #Christianity
  2. Some51 hold that distant objects seem to us lesser only because they are seen under a smaller visual angle. Elsewhere52 we have shown that this is wrong; and here we shall limit ourselves to the following considerations. The assertion that a distant object seems less because it is perceived under a smaller visual angle supposes that the rest of the eye still sees something outside of this object, whether this be some other object, or something external, such as the air. But if683 we suppose that the eye sees nothing outside of this object, whether this object, as would a great mountain, occupy the whole extent of the glance, and permit nothing beyond it to be seen; or whether it even extend beyond the sweep of the glance on both sides, then this object should not, as it actually does, seem smaller than it really is, even though it fill the whole extension of the glance. The truth of this observation can be verified by a mere glance at the sky. Not in a single glance can the whole hemisphere be perceived, for the glance could not be extended widely enough to embrace so vast an expanse. Even if we grant the possibility of this, and that the whole glance embraces the whole hemisphere; still the real magnitude of the heaven is greater than its apparent magnitude. How then by the diminution of the visual angle could we explain the smallness of the apparent magnitude of the sky, on the hypothesis that it is the diminution of the visual angle which makes distant objects appear smaller?

ENNEAD 02.09 - Against the Gnostics; or, That the Creator and the World are Not Evil., #Plotinus - Complete Works Vol 02, #Plotinus, #Christianity
  15 Aristotle, Met. v. 4.
  16 Aristotle, Met. xii. 2.
  17 Aristotle, Met. vii. 8.
  18 Aristotle, de Anima, ii. 5.
  19 Aristotle, Met. xii. 5.
  20 Aristotle, Met. ix. 8.
  21 Aristotle, Met. ix. 5.
  22 That is, their producing potentiality, and not the potentiality of becoming these things, as thought Aristotle. Met. ix. 2.
  23 As thought Aristotle, Soul, iii. 7; Met. xii.
  24 By Plato in the Timaeus 52.
  25 See iv. 6. A polemic against Aristotle, de Anima ii. 5, and the Stoics, Cleanthes, Sextus Empiricus, adv. Math. vii. 288, and Chrysippus, Diog. Laert. vii. 50.
  26 As thought Chrysippus, Diog. Laert. vii. 111.
  60 As objected Aristotle, in de Gen. et Corr. i. 7.
  61 See ii. 7.1.
  63 As asked Aristotle, de Gen. i. 7.
  64 In his Timaeus 50.
  105 As thought Cicero, Tusculans, i. 20; and Aristotle, de Anima, iii. 13.
  106 See ii. 9.18.
  117 As thought Xenocrates and Aristotle, de Coelo, i. 10.
  118 See iv. 3.10.
  132 See Aristotle, Plato's Critias, Numenius, 32, and Proclus.
  133 As thought Aristotle, de Anima, ii. 1.4.
  134 In his Timaeus, 34; 30.
  140 As Aristotle asked, de Memoria et Remin. 1.
  141 See i. 1.11.
  148 As thought Aristotle, de Mem. 1.
  149 As thought Aristotle.
  150 As thought Aristotle.
  151 See i. 4.10.
  157 As thought Aristotle, de Gen. et Corr. ii. 28.
  158 Rep. x. 617; C x. 287; see 2.3.9.
  160 According to Aristotle.
  161 iv. 4.23.
  162 Aristotle, de Anima, ii. 7.
  163 See section 5.
  164 As thought Aristotle, de Anim. ii. 7.
  165 As Plato pointed out in his Meno, 80.
  173 As thought Aristotle, de Anima, ii. 8.
  174 As Aristotle again thought.
  175 As thought Aristotle, de Gener. Anim. v. 1.
  176 See iv. 4.29.
  179 As thought Aristotle in his Physics, viii.
  180 iv. 3.10.
  190 As thought Plato, Banquet, Cary, 31, and Aristotle in Aristotle, de Anima, ii. 4.
  191 This sounds as if it were a quotation from Numenius, though it does not appear in the latter's fragments.
  199 As thought Aristotle, in Nic. Eth. i. 7; de Anima, ii. 1.
  200 See vi. 8.16.
  286 This is a mingling of Platonic and Aristotelic thought, see Ravaisson, Essay on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, ii. 407.
  287 Which would be nonsense; the Gnostics (Valentinus) had gone as far as 33 aeons.

ENNEAD 03.06 - Of the Impassibility of Incorporeal Entities (Soul and and Matter)., #Plotinus - Complete Works Vol 02, #Plotinus, #Christianity
  8. (According to Aristotle59), it is absolutely necessary that what can be affected must have powers and qualities opposed to the things that approach it, and affect it. Thus, it is the cold that alters the heat of an object, and humidity that alters its dryness, and we say that the substrate is altered, when it ceases being hot, and grows cold; and ceasing to be dry, becomes humid. Another proof of this truth is the destruction of the fire that, by changing, becomes another element. Then we say that it is the fire, but not the matter that has been destroyed. What is affected is therefore that which is destroyed; for it is always a passive modification that occasions destruction. Consequently being destroyed and being affected are inseparable notions. Now it is impossible for matter366 to be destroyed; for how could it be destroyed, and in what would it change?

ENNEAD 03.07 - Of Time and Eternity., #Plotinus - Complete Works Vol 03, #Plotinus, #Christianity
  As the existence of begotten things consists in perpetually acquiring (something or another), they will be annihilated by a removal of their future. An attri bution of the future to the (intelligible) entities of a nature contrary (to begotten things), would degrade them from the rank of existences. Evidently they will not be consubstantial with existence, if this existence of theirs be in the future or past. The nature ("being") of begotten things on the contrary consists in going from the origin of their existence to the last limits of the time beyond which they will no longer exist; that is in what their future consists.442 Abstraction of their future diminishes their life, and consequently their existence. That is also what will happen to the universe, in so far as it will exist; it aspires to being what it should be, without any interruption, because it derives existence from the continual production of fresh actualizations; for the same reason, it moves in a circle991 because it desires to possess intelligible nature ("being"). Such is the existence that we discover in begotten things, such is the cause that makes them ceaselessly aspire to existence in the future. The Beings that occupy the first rank and which are blessed, have no desire of the future, because they are already all that it lies in them to be, and because they possess all the life they are ever to possess. They have therefore nothing to seek, since there is no future for them; neither can they receive within themselves anything for which there might be a future. Thus the nature ("being") of intelligible existence is absolute, and entire, not only in its parts, but also in its totality, which reveals no fault, which lacks nothing, and to which nothing that in any way pertains to nonentity could be added; for intelligible existence must not only embrace in its totality and universality all beings, but it must also receive nothing that pertains to nonentity. It is this disposition and nature of intelligible existence that constitutes the aeon (or eternity); for (according to Aristotle)443 this word is derived from "aei on," "being continually."
  8. (9). Let us now examine in what sense it may be said (by Aristotle452) that time is the number and measure of movement, which definition seems more reasonable, because of the continuity of movement. To begin with, following the method adopted with the definition of time as "the interval of movement," we might ask whether time be the measure and number of any kind of movement.453 For how indeed could we give a numerical valuation of unequal or irregular1001 movement. What system of numbering or measurement shall we use for this? If the same measure be applied to slow or to swift movement, in their case measure and number will be the same as the number ten applied equally to horses and oxen; and further, such measure might also be applied to dry and wet substances. If time be a measure of this kind, we clearly see that it is the measure of movements, but we do not discover what it may be in itself. If the number ten can be conceived as a number, after making abstraction of the horses it served to measure, if therefore a measure possess its own individuality, even while no longer measuring anything, the case must be similar with time, inasmuch as it is a measure. If then time be a number in itself, in what does it differ from the number ten, or from any other number composed of unities? As it is a continuous measure, and as it is a quantity, it might, for instance, turn out to be something like a foot-rule. It would then be a magnitude, as, for instance, a line, which follows the movement; but how will this line be able to measure what it follows? Why would it measure one thing rather than another? It seems more reasonable to consider this measure, not as the measure of every kind of movement, but only as the measure of the movement it follows.452 Then that measure is continuous, so far as the movement it follows itself continue to exist. In this case, we should not consider measure as something exterior, and separated from movement, but as united to the measured movement. What then will measure? Is it the movement that will be measured, and the extension that will measure it? Which of these two things will time be? Will it be the measuring movement, or the measuring extension? Time will be either the movement measured by extension, or the measuring extension; or some third thing which makes use of extension, as one makes use of a1002 foot-rule, to measure the quantity of movement. But in all these cases, we must, as has already been noticed, suppose that movement is uniform; for unless the movement be uniform, one and universal, the theory that movement is a measure of any kind whatever will become almost impossible. If time be "measured movement," that is, measured by quantitybesides granting that it at all needs to be measuredmovement must not be measured by itself, but by something different. On the other hand, if movement have a measure different from itself, and if, consequently, we need a continuous measure to measure it, the result would be that extension itself would need measure, so that movement, being measured, may have a quantity which is determined by that of the thing according to which it is measured. Consequently, under this hypothesis, time would be the number of the extension which follows movement, and not extension itself which follows movement.
  What is this number? Is it composed of unities? How does it measure? That would still have to be explained. Now let us suppose that we had discovered how it measures; we would still not have discovered the time that measures, but a time that was such or such an amount. Now that is not the same thing as time; there is a difference between time and some particular quantity of time. Before asserting that time has such or such a quantity, we have to discover the nature of that which has that quantity. We may grant that time is the number which measures movement, while remaining exterior thereto, as "ten" is in "ten horses" without being conceived with them (as Aristotle claimed, that it was not a numbering, but a numbered1003 number). But in this case, we still have to discover the nature of this number that, before numbering, is what it is, as would be "ten" considered in itself.454 It may be said that it is that number which, by following number, measures according to the priority and posteriority of that movement.452 Nor do we yet perceive the nature of that number which measures by priority and posteriority. In any case, whatever measures by priority or posteriority, or by a present moment,455 or by anything else, certainly does measure according to time. Thus this number (?) which measures movement according to priority or posteriority, must touch time, and, to measure movement, be related thereto. Prior and posterior necessarily designate either different parts of space, as for instance the beginning of a stadium, or parts of time. What is called priority is time that ends with the present; what is called posteriority, is the time that begins at the present. Time therefore is something different from the number that measures movement according to priority or posteriority,I do not say, any kind of movement, but still regular movement. Besides, why should we have time by applying number either to what measures, or to what is measured? For in this case these two may be identical. If movement exist along with the priority and posteriority which relate thereto, why will we not have time without number? This would amount to saying that extension has such a quantity only in case of the existence of somebody who recognizes that it possesses that quantity. Since ( Aristotle456) says that time is infinite, and that it is such effectually, how can it contain number without our taking a portion of time to measure it? From that would result that time existed before it was measured. But why could time not exist before the existence of a soul to measure it? ( Aristotle) might have answered that it was begotten by the soul. The1004 mere fact that the soul measures time need not necessarily imply that the soul produced the time; time, along with its suitable quantity, would exist even if nobody measured it. If however it be said that it is the soul that makes use of extension to measure time, we will answer that this is of no importance to determine the notion of time.
  Is time also within us?467 It is uniformly present in the universal Soul, and in the individual souls that are1015 all united together.468 Time, therefore, is not parcelled out among the souls, any more than eternity is parcelled out among the (Entities in the intelligible world) which, in this respect, are all mutually uniform.
  12 Aristotle, Met. i. 5; Jamblichus, de Vita. Pyth. 28.150; and 29.162; found in their oath; also Numenius, 60.
  13 See vi. 2.7.
  15 As thought Plato and Aristotle combined, see Ravaisson, Essay, ii. 407.
  16 Atheneus, xii. 546; see i. 6.4.
  24 Peripatetic commentators on Aristotle's Metaphysics, which was used as a text-book in Plotinos's school.
  25 See end of Sec. 13.
  27 See Aristotle, Categories, ii. 6.
  28 As Aristotle thought, Met. x. 2.
  29 See vi. 9.2.
  33 Aristotle, Met. x. 2.
  34 Aristotle, Metaph. xiii. 7.
  35 See iv. 8.3.
  51 Like Aristotle, de Sensu et Sensili, 2.
  52 iv. 5.
  55 See Aristotle, Nic. Ethics, 1.10.
  56 See Cicero, de Finibus, ii. 2729.
  65 Bouillet explains that in this book Plotinos summated all that Plato had to say of the Ideas and of their dependence on the Good, in the Timaeus, Philebus, Phaedrus, the Republic, the Banquet, and the Alcibiades; correcting this summary by the reflections of Aristotle, in Met. xii. But Plotinos advances beyond both Plato and Aristotle in going beyond Intelligence to the supreme Good. (See Sec. 37.) This treatise might well have been written at the instigation of Porphyry, who desired to understand Plotinos's views on this great subject.
  66 The famous Philonic distinction between "ho theos," and "theos."
  72 Aristotle, Met. vii. 17.
  73 Met. vii. 1.
  75 Aristotle, Met. v. 8.
  76 Met. 1.3.
  78 Aristotle, de Anima, ii. 2; Met. vii. 17.
  79 Porphyry, Of the Faculties of the Soul, fr. 5.
  81 Aristotle, de Anima, i. 3; ii. 24.
  82 Plato, I Alcibiades, p. 130, Cary, 52.
  166 As Aristotle asks, Eth. Nic. iii.
  167 Arist. Nic. Eth. iii. 1.
  173 Plato, Alcinous, 31; this is opposed by Aristotle, Nic. Eth. iii. 2.6.
  174 Aristotle, Eud. Eth. ii. 10.
  175 Aristotle, Mor. Magn. i. 32; Nic. Eth. iii. 6.
  176 Aristotle, Nic. Eth. iii. 4.
  177 Arist. de Anim. iii. 10.
  200 In this book Plotinos uses synonymously the "Heaven," the "World," the "Universal Organism or Animal," the "All" (or universe), and the "Whole" (or Totality). This book as it were completes the former one on the Ideas and the Divinity, thus studying the three principles (Soul, Intelligence and Good) cosmologically. We thus have here another proof of the chronological order. In it Plotinos defends Plato's doctrine against Aristotle's objection in de Anima i. 3.
  201 As thought Heraclitus, Diog. Laert. ix. 8; Plato, Timaeus, p. 31; Cary, 11; Arist. Heaven, 1, 8, 9.
  227 As Aristotle would say, de Anima, iii. 3.
  228 Aristotle, de Sensu, 6.
  229 v. 3.
  233 Aristotle, Mem. et Rec., 2.
  234 Porphyry, Treatise, Psych.
  236 Substance, Quantity, Quality, Relation, When, Where, Action-and-Reaction, to Have, and Location. Aristotle's treatment thereof in his Categories, and Metaphysics.
  237 Met. v. 7.
  240 Aristotle, Met. vii. 3, distinguished many different senses of Being; at least four principal ones: what it seems, or the universal, the kind, or the subject. The subject is that of which all the rest is an attri bute, but which is not the attri bute of anything. Being must be the first subject. In one sense this is matter; in another, form; and in the third place, the concretion of form and matter.
  241 See ii. 4.616, for intelligible matter, and ii. 4.25 for sense-matter.
  274 As Aristotle says, Categ. ii. 7.1.
  275 Plotinos proposes to divide verbs not as transitive and intransitive, but as verbs expressing a completed action or state, (as to think), and those expressing successive action, (as, to walk). The French language makes this distinction by using with these latter the auxiliary "tre." Each of these two classes are subdivided into some verbs expressing an absolute action, by which the subject alone is modified; and into other verbs expressing relative action, referring to, or modifying an exterior object. These alone are used to form the passive voice, and Plotinos does not want them classified apart.
  295 Plotinos was here in error; Aristotle ignored them, because he did not admit existence.
  296 This refers to the Hylicists, who considered the universe as founded on earth, water, air or fire; or, Anaxagoras, who introduced the category of mind.
  297 Plotinos's own categories are developed from the thought of Plato, found in his "Sophists," for the intelligible being; and yet he harks back to Aristotle's Categories and Metaphysics, for his classification of the sense-world.
  298 See vi. 4, 6, 9.
  309 As said Aristotle, Met. iv. 2.
  310 Plato, Sophist, p. 245; Cary, 63.
  314 Aristotle. Met. xiv. 6.
  315 See ii. 6.2.
  317 As said Aristotle. Eth. Nic. i. 6.2.
  318 Against Aristotle.
  319 See vi. 1.14.
  355 According to Aristotle, Met. vii. 3.
  356 Aristotle, Met. viii. 5.6.
  357 Aristotle, Categ. ii. 5.
  358 See ii. 5.4.
  377 Plotinos is here defending Plato's valuation of the universal, against Aristotle, in Met. vii. 13.
  378 Arist. de Anima, ii. 1.
  380 Plotinos follows Aristotle in his definition of quantity, but subsumes time and place under relation. Plot., vi. 1.4; Arist. Categ. ii. 6.1, 2.
  381 Arist. Met. v. 13.
  434 For Aristotle says that an accident is something which exists in an object without being one of the distinctive characteristics of its essence.
  435 In this book Plotinos studies time and eternity comparatively; first considering Plato's views in the Timaeus, and then the views of Pythagoras (1), Epicurus (9), the Stoics (7), and Aristotle (4, 8, 12).
  436 The bracketed numbers are those of the Teubner edition; the unbracketed, those of the Didot edition.
  452 Aristotle, Physica, iv. 12.
  453 Mueller: "Whether this may be predicated of the totality of the movement."
  455 As Aristotle, Phys. iv. 11, claimed.
  456 In Physica, iii. 7.
  467 As thought Aristotle, de Mem. et Remin. ii. 12.
  468 See iv. 9.

ENNEAD 03.08b - Of Nature, Contemplation and Unity., #Plotinus - Complete Works Vol 02, #Plotinus, #Christianity
  Likewise it is men too weak for speculation who, in action, seek a shadow of speculation and reason. Not being capable of rising to speculation, and because of their soul-weakness not being able to grasp that which in itself is intelligible, and to fill themselves therewith, though however desiring to contemplate it, these men seek, by action, to achieve that which they could not obtain by thought alone. Thus we find that action is a weakness or result of contemplation, when we act, or desire to see, or to contemplate, or to grasp the intelligible, or try to get others to grasp it, or propose to act to the extent of our ability. It is a weakness, for, after having acted, we possess nothing of what we have done; and a consequence, because we contemplate something better than we ourselves have made. What man indeed who could contemplate truth would go and contemplate its image? This is the explanation of the taste for manual arts, and for physical activity183 (as thought Aristotle).

ENNEAD 04.02 - How the Soul Mediates Between Indivisible and Divisible Essence., #Plotinus - Complete Works Vol 01, #Plotinus, #Christianity
  1. While studying the nature ("being") of the soul, we have shown (against the Stoics) that she is not a body; that, among incorporeal entities, she is not a "harmony" (against the Pythagoreans); we have also shown that she is not an "entelechy" (against Aristotle), because this term, as its very etymology implies, does not express a true idea, and reveals nothing about the soul's (nature itself); last, we said that the soul has an intelligible nature, and is of divine condition; the "being" or nature of the soul we have also, it would seem, clearly enough set forth. Still, we have to go further. We have formerly established a distinction between intelligible and sense nature, assigning the soul to the intelligible world. Granting this, that the soul forms part of the intelligible world, we must, in another manner, study what is suitable to her nature.
  37 Ecl. Phys., p. 797, Heeren and Aristotle, de Anima, i. 2.
  38 See Nemesius, de Nat. Hom. 2.
  76 Aristotle, de Anima, ii. 1.
  77 Arist. de Anima, ii. 2; iii. 5.
  78 See Aristotle, de Anima, i. 5.
  79 See Aristotle, de Anima, ii. 2.
  80 Here we resume Ennead IV. Book 7. The bracketed numbers are those of the Teubner text; the unbracketed those of the Didot edition.
  129 See Aristotle, de Gen. i. 18.
  130 By Stoics.
  190 Aristotle, Met. iv. 2.
  191 Evidently a pun on forms and ideas.
  330 As thought Aristotle, Met. v. 14.
  331 As thought Aristotle, Met. v. 30.
  332 As thought Plato, Letter 7, 343.
  333 As said Aristotle, Met. vii. 5.
  334 Phaedros C1,217.

ENNEAD 04.05 - Psychological Questions III. - About the Process of Vision and Hearing., #Plotinus - Complete Works Vol 02, #Plotinus, #Christianity
  If a medium of sight exist, it exists only by accident, and in no way contri butes to sight.164 Since opaque and earthy bodies hinder sight, and as we see so much the better as the medium is more subtle, it may be said, indeed, that mediums contri bute to sight, or at least, if they do not contri bute such thereto, they may be hindrances as slight (as possible); but evidently a medium, however refined, is some sort of an obstacle, however slight.
  2. If vision166 presupposes the union of the "light of the eye,"167 with the light interposed (between the eye) and the sense-object itself, the interposed medium is the light, and this medium is necessary, on this hypothesis. (On the theory of Aristotle) the colored substance produces a modification in the medium; but nothing here would hinder this modification from reaching the eye itself, even when there is no medium. For, in this case, the medium is necessarily modified before the eye is. (The Platonic philosophers) teach that vision operates by an effusion of the light of the eye. They have no need to postulate a medium, unless indeed they should fear that the ray of the eye should lose its way; but this ray is luminous, and the light travels in a straight line. (The Stoics) explain vision by the resistance experienced by the visual ray. They cannot do without a medium.168 (The Atomists and) the believers in "images" (such as Epicurus), insist that these images move in emptiness, thereby implying the existence of a free space to avoid hindering the images. Consequently as they will be hindered in a direct ratio to the existence of a medium, this opinion does not run counter to our own hypothesis (that there is no medium).
  5. As to hearing, there are several theories. One is that the air is first set in motion, and that this motion, being transmitted unaltered from point to point from the (location of the) sound-producing air as far as the ear, causes the sound to arrive to the sense. Again, another theory is that the medium is here affected accidentally, and only because it happens to be interposed; so that, if the medium were annihilated, we would feel the sound immediately on its production by the shock of two bodies. We might think that the air must first be set in motion, but the medium interposed (between the first moved air and the ear) plays a different part. The air here seems to be the sovereign condition of the production of sound; for, at the origin of the sound, the shock of two bodies would produce no sound if the air, compressed and struck by their rapid concussion did not transmit the motion from point to point as far as the ear.173 But if the production of the sound depend on the impulsion impressed on the air, the (qualitative) difference between voices and (instrumental) sounds will challenge explanation; for there is great difference (of "timbre") between metal struck by metal of the same kind, or another. These differences are not merely quantitative, and cannot be attri buted to the air which (everywhere) is the same, nor to the force of the stimulus (which may be equal in intensity). Another theory (of Aristotle's) is that the production of voices and sound is due to the air, because the impulsion impressed524 on the air is sonorous. (To this it should be answered that) air, in so far as it is air, is not the cause of sound; for it resounds only in so far as it resembles some solid body, remaining in its situation, before it dilates, as if it were something solid.174 The (cause of the sound) then is the shock between objects, which forms the sound that reaches the sense of hearing. This is demonstrated by the sounds produced in the interior of animals, without the presence of any air, whenever one part is struck by some other. Such is the sound produced by certain articulations when they are bent (as, the knee); or certain bones, when they are struck against each other, or when they break; in this case air has nothing to do with the production of the sound. These considerations compel a theory of hearing similar to our conclusions about sight. The perception of audition, like that of vision, therefore consists in a repercussion (an affection sympathetically felt) in the universal organism.

ENNEAD 04.07 - Of the Immortality of the Soul: Polemic Against Materialism., #Plotinus - Complete Works Vol 01, #Plotinus, #Christianity
  The subject that perceives a sense-object must itself be single, and grasp this object in its totality, by one and the same power. This happens when by several organs we perceive several qualities of a single object, or when, by a single organ, we embrace a single complex object in its totality, as, for instance, a face. It is not one principle that sees the face, and another one that sees the eyes; it is the "same principle" which embraces everything at once. Doubtless we do receive a sense-impression by the eyes, and another by the ears; but both of them must end in some single principle. How, indeed, could any decision be reached about the difference of sense-impressions unless they all converged toward the same principle? The latter is like a centre, and the individual sensations are like radii which from the circumference radiate towards the centre of a circle. This central principle is essentially single. If it was divisible, and if sense-impressions were directed towards two points at a distance from each other, such as the extremities of the same line, they would either still converge towards one and the same point, as, for instance, the middle (of the line), or one part would feel one thing, and another something else. It would be absolutely as if I felt one thing, and you felt another, when placed in the presence of one and the same thing (as thought Aristotle, de Anima53). Facts, therefore, demonstrate that sensations centre in one and the same principle; as visible images are centred in the pupil of the eye; otherwise how could we, through the pupil, see the greatest objects? So much the more, therefore,66 must the sensations that centre in the (Stoic) "directing principle"54 resemble indivisible intuitions and be perceived by an indivisible principle. If the latter possessed extension, it could, like the sense-object, be divided; each of its parts would thus perceive one of the parts of the sense-object, and nothing within us would grasp the object in its totality. The subject that perceives must then be entirely one; otherwise, how could it be divided? In that case it could not be made to coincide with the sense-object, as two equal figures superimposed on each other, because the directing principle does not have an extension equal to that of the sense-object. How then will we carry out the division? Must the subject that feels contain as many parts as there are in the sense-object? Will each part of the soul, in its turn, feel by its own parts, or will (we decide that) the parts of parts will not feel? Neither is that likely. If, on the other hand, each part feels the entire object, and if each magnitude is divisible to infinity, the result is that, for a single object, there will be an infinity of sensations in each part of the soul; and, so much the more, an infinity of images in the principle that directs us. (This, however, is the opposite of the actual state of affairs.)
  8. If, in any sense whatever, the soul were a body, we could not think. Here is the proof. If feeling58 is explained as the soul's laying hold of perceptible things by making use of the body, thinking cannot also of making use of the body. Otherwise, thinking and feeling would be identical. Thus, thinking must consist in perceiving without the help of the body (as thought Aristotle59). So much the more, the thinking principle cannot be corporeal. Since it is sensation that grasps sense-objects, it must likewise be thought, or intellection, that grasps intelligible objects. Though this should be denied, it will be admitted that we think certain intelligibles entities, and that we perceive entities that have no extension. How could an entity that had extension think one that had no extension? Or a divisible entity, think an indivisible one? Could this take place by an indivisible part? In this case, the thinking subject will not be corporeal; for there is no need that the whole subject be in contact with the object; it would suffice if one of its parts reached the object (as Aristotle said against Plato).6069 If then this truth be granted, that the highest thoughts must have incorporeal objects, the latter can be cognized only by a thinking principle that either is, or becomes independent of body. Even the objection that the object of thought is constituted by the forms inherent in matter, implies that these forces cannot be thought unless, by intelligence, they are separated from matter. It is not by means of the carnal mass of the body, nor generally by matter, that we can effect the abstraction of triangle, circle, line or point. To succeed in this abstraction, the soul must separate from the body, and consequently, the soul cannot be corporeal.
  (11). (If, as Stoics claim, man first was a certain nature called habit,70 then a soul, and last an intelligence, the perfect would have arisen from the imperfect, which is impossible). To say that the first nature of the soul is to be a spirit, and that this spirit became soul only after having been exposed to cold, and as it were became soaked by its contact, because the cold subtilized it;71 this is an absurd hypothesis. Many animals are born in warm places, and do not have their soul exposed to action of cold. Under this hypothesis, the primary nature of the soul would have been made dependent on the concourse of exterior circumstances. The Stoics, therefore, posit as principle that which is less perfect (the soul), and trace it to a still less perfect earlier thing called habit (or form of inorganic things).72 Intelligence, therefore, is posited in the last rank since it is alleged to be born of the soul, while, on the contrary, the first rank should be assigned to intelligence, the second to the soul, the third to nature, and, following natural order, consider that which is less perfect as the posterior element. In this system the divinity, by the mere fact of his possessing intelligence, is posterior and begotten, possessing only an incidental intelligence. The result would, therefore, be that there was neither soul, nor intelligence, nor divinity; for never can that which is potential pass to the condition of actualization, without the prior existence of some actualized principle. If what is potential were to transform itself into actualizationwhich is absurdits passage into actualization will have to involve at the74 very least a contemplation of something which is not merely potential, but actualized. Nevertheless, on the hypothesis that what is potential can permanently remain identical, it will of itself pass into actualization, and will be superior to the being which is potential only because it will be the object of the aspiration of such a being. We must, therefore, assign the first rank to the being that has a perfect and incorporeal nature, which is always in actualization. Thus intelligence and soul are prior to nature; the soul, therefore, is not a spirit, and consequently no body. Other reasons for the incorporeality of the soul have been advanced; but the above suffices (as thought Aristotle).73
  (13). b. Now let us examine the opinion of those who call the soul an entelechy. They say that, in the composite, the soul plays the part of form in respect to matter, in the body the soul animates. The soul, however, is not said to be the form of any body, nor of the body as such; but of the natural body, that is organized, and which possesses life potentially.76
  If the soul's relation to the body is the same as that of the statue to the metal, the soul will be divided with the body, and on cutting a member a portion of the soul would be cut along with it. According to this teaching, the soul separates from the body only during sleep, since she must inhere in the body of which she is the entelechy, in which case sleep would become entirely inexplicable. If the soul be an entelechy, the struggle of reason against the passions would become entirely impossible. The entire human being will experience but one single sentiment, and never be in disagreement with itself. If the soul be an entelechy, there will perhaps still be sensations, but mere sensations; pure thoughts will have become impossible. Consequently the Peripateticians themselves are obliged to introduce (into human nature) another soul, namely, the pure intelligence, which they consider immortal.77 The rational soul, therefore, would have to be an entelechy in a manner different from their definition thereof, if indeed this name is at all to be used.

ENNEAD 05.01 - The Three Principal Hypostases, or Forms of Existence., #Plotinus - Complete Works Vol 01, #Plotinus, #Christianity
   Aristotle, who lived at a later period, says that the First Principle is separated from (sense-objects), and that it is intelligible.252 But when Aristotle says that He thinks himself, Aristotle degrades Him from the first rank. Aristotle also asserts the existence of other intelligible entities in a number equal to the celestial spheres, so that each one of them might have a principle of motion. About the intelligible entities, therefore, Aristotle advances a teaching different from that of Plato, and as he has no plausible reason for this change, he alleges necessity. A well-grounded objection might here be taken against him. It seems more reasonable to suppose that all the spheres co-ordinated in a single system should, all of them, stand in relation to the One and the First. About Aristotle's views this question also might be raised: do the intelligible entities depend on the One and First, or are there several principles for the intelligible entities? If the intelligible entities depend on the One, they will no doubt be arranged symmetrically, as, in the sense-sphere, are the spheres, each of which contains another, and of which a single One, exterior to the others, contains them, and dominates them all. Thus, in this case, the first intelligible entity will contain all entities up there, and will be the intelligible world. Just as the spheres are not empty, as the first is full of stars, and as each of the others also is full of them, so above their motors will contain many entities, and everything will have a more real existence. On the other hand, if each of the intelligible entities is a principle, all will be contingent. How then will they unite their action, and will they, by agreement, contri bute in producing a single effect, which is the harmony of heaven? Why should sense-objects, in heaven, equal in number their intelligible motors? Again, why are there several of189 these, since they are incorporeal, and since no matter separates them from each other?

ENNEAD 05.07 - Do Ideas of Individuals Exist?, #Plotinus - Complete Works Vol 01, #Plotinus, #Christianity
  (Third objection): What then is the cause of the difference of the individuals conceived in some other place (than the womb, as in the mouth), (as Aristotle335 and Sextus Empiricus336 asked)? Would it arise from matter being penetrated by the ("seminal) reason" in differing degrees? In this case, all the individuals, except one, would be beings against nature (which, of course, is absurd). The varieties of the individuals are a principle of beauty; consequently, form cannot be one of them; ugliness alone should be attributed to the predominance of matter. In the intelligible world,254 the ("seminal) reasons" are perfect, and they are not given any less entirely for being hidden.

ENNEAD 06.01 - Of the Ten Aristotelian and Four Stoic Categories., #Plotinus - Complete Works Vol 03, #Plotinus, #Christianity
  Let us first examine the doctrine that classifies essence into ten (kinds). We shall have to investigate whether it be necessary to acknowledge that its partisans recognize ten kinds, all of which bear the name of essence, or ten categories; for they say237 that essence is not synonymous in everything, and they are right.

ENNEAD 06.02 - The Categories of Plotinos., #Plotinus - Complete Works Vol 03, #Plotinus, #Christianity
  1. After having discussed the doctrine of the ten categories (of Aristotle), and spoken of the (Stoics) who reduce all things to a single genus, and then distribute them in four species, we must still set forth our own opinion on the subject, striving however to conform ourselves to the doctrine of Plato.

ENNEAD 06.03 - Plotinos Own Sense-Categories., #Plotinus - Complete Works Vol 03, #Plotinus, #Christianity
  12. It must therefore be admitted that quantity admits of contraries. Even our thought admits of contraries when we say "great" and "small," since we then conceive of contraries, as when we say, "much and little"; for much and little are in the same condition as great and small. Sometimes it is said, "At home there are many people," and by this is intended a (relatively) great number; for in the latter case it is a relative. Likewise it is said, "There are few people in the theatre," instead of saying, "there are less people," (relatively); but when one uses the word "many" a great multitude in number must be understood.

ENNEAD 06.05 - The One and Identical Being is Everywhere Present In Its Entirety.345, #Plotinus - Complete Works Vol 04, #Plotinus, #Christianity
  In their writing about ethics, Plato and Aristotle divide the soul into three parts. This division has1257 been adopted by the greater part of later philosophers; but these have not understood that the object of this definition was to classify and define the virtues (Plato: reason, anger and appetite; Aristotle: locomotion, appetite and understanding). Indeed, if this classification be carefully scrutinized, it will be seen that it fails to account for all the faculties of the soul; it neglects imagination, sensibility, intelligence, and the natural faculties (the generative and nutritive powers).
  Other philosophers, such as Numenius, do not teach one soul in three parts, like the preceding, nor in two, such as the rational and irrational parts. They believe that we have two souls, one rational, the other irrational. Some among them attri bute immortality to both of the souls; others attri bute it only to the rational soul, and think that death not only suspends the exercise of the faculties that belong to the irrational soul, but even dissolves its "being" or essence. Last, there are some that believe, that by virtue of the union of the two souls, their movements are double, because each of them feels the passions of the other.
  We shall now explain the difference obtaining between a part and a faculty of the soul. One part differs from another by the characteristics of its genus (or, kind); while different faculties may relate to a common genus. That is why Aristotle did not allow that the soul contained parts, though granting that it contained faculties. Indeed, the introduction of a new part changes the nature of the subject, while the diversity of faculties does not alter its unity. Longinus did not allow in the animal (or, living being) for several1258 parts, but only for several faculties. In this respect, he followed the doctrine of Plato, according to whom the soul, in herself indivisible, is divided within bodies. Besides, that the soul does not have several parts does not necessarily imply that she has only a single faculty; for that which has no parts may still possess several faculties.
  To conclude this confused discussion, we shall have to lay down a principle of definition which will help to determine the essential differences and resemblances that exist either between the parts of a same subject, or between its faculties, or between its parts and its faculties. This will clearly reveal whether in the organism the soul really has several parts, or merely several faculties, and what opinion about them should be adopted. (For there are two special types of these.) The one attri butes to man a single soul, genuinely composed of several parts, either by itself, or in relation to the body. The other one sees in man a union of several souls, looking on the man as on a choir, the harmony of whose parts constitutes its unity, so that we find several essentially different parts contri buting to the formation of a single being.
   Aristotle says, in his Physics,364 that the soul has five faculties, the power of growth, sensation, locomotion, appetite, and understanding. But, in his Ethics, he divides the soul into two principal parts, which are rational part, and the irrational part; then Aristotle subdivides the latter into the part that is subject to reason, and the part not subject to reason.
  D. Jamblichus.365
  Then shone the wisdom of Ammonius, who is famous under the name of "Inspired by the Divinity." It was he, in fact, who, purifying the opinions of the ancient philosophers, and dissipating the fancies woven here and there, established harmony between the teaching of Plato, and that of Aristotle, in that which was most essential and fundamental.... It was Ammonius of Alexandria, the "Inspired by the Divinity," who, devoting himself enthusiastically to the truth in philosophy, and rising above the popular notions that made of philosophy an object of scorn, clearly understood the doctrine of Plato and of Aristotle, gathered them into a single ideal, and thus peacefully handed philosophy down to his disciples Plotinos, the (pagan) Origen, and their successors.
  1280 In the first place, the reader will ask himself, how does it come about that Plotinos is so dependent on Porphyry, and before him, on Amelius? The answer is that Plotinos himself was evidently somewhat deficient in the details of elementary education, however much proficiency in more general philosophical studies, and in independent thought, and personal magnetic touch with pupils he may have achieved. His pronunciation was defective, and in writing he was careless, so much so that he usually failed to affix proper headings or notice of definite authorship.441 These peculiarities would to some extent put him in the power, and under the influence of his editors, and this explains why he was dependent on Porphyry later, and Amelius earlier.442 These editors might easily have exerted potent, even if unconscious or merely suggestive influence; but we know that Porphyry did not scruple to add glosses of his own,443 not to speak of hidden Stoic and Aristotelian pieces,444 for he relied on Aristotle's "Metaphysics." Besides, Plotinos was so generally accused of pluming himself on writings of Numenius, falsely passed off as his own, that it became necessary for Amelius to write a book on the differences between Numenius and Plotinos, and for Porphyry to defend his master, as well as to quote a letter of Longinus on the subject;445 but Porphyry does not deny that among the writings of the Platonists Kronius, Caius, and Attikus, and the Peripatetics Aspasius, Alexander and Adrastus, the writings of Numenius also were used as texts in the school of Plotinos (14).
  Having thus shown the influence of the editors of Plotinos, we must examine who and what they were. Let us however first study the general trend of the Plotinic career.
  This intellectual dishonesty must not however be foisted on Aristotle485 or Plutarch. The latter, for instance,486 adopted this term only to denote the primary and original characteristics (or distinctions within) existing things, from a comparative study of Aristotle's "de Anima," and Plato's "Phaedo."487 These five hypostases were the divinity, mind, soul, forms immanent in inorganic nature, "hexis," in Stoic dialect, and to matter, as apart from these forms.
  So important to Neoplatonism did this term seem to Proclus, that he did not hesitate to say that Plutarch, by the use thereof, became "our first forefa ther." He therefore develops it further. Among the hidden and1302 intelligible gods are three hypostases. The first is characterized by the Good; it thinks the Good itself, and dwells with the paternal Monad. The second is characterized by knowledge, and resides in the first thought; while the third is characterized by beauty, and dwells with the most beautiful of the intelligible. They are the causes from which proceed three monads which are self-existent but under the form of a unity, and as in a germ, in their cause. Where they manifest, they take a distinct form: faith, truth, and love (Cousin's title: "Du Vrai, du Beau, et du Bien"). This trinity pervades all the divine worlds.
  In order to understand the attitude of Plotinos on the subject, we must try to put ourselves in his position. In the first place, on Porphyry's own admission, he had added to Platonism Peripatetic and Stoic views. From Aristotle his chief borrowings were the categories of form and matter, and the distinction between potentiality and actuality,488 as well as the Aristotelian psychology of various souls. To the Stoics he was drawn by their monism, which led him to drop the traditional Academico-Stoic feud, or rather to take the side of the Stoics against Numenius the Platonist dualist and the dualistic successors, the Gnostics. But there was a difference between the Stoics and Plotinos. The Stoics assimilated spirit to matter, while Plotinos, reminiscent of Plato, preferred to assimilate matter to spirit. Still, he used their terminology, and categories, including the conception of a hypostasis, or form of existence. With this equipment, he held to the traditional Platonic trinity of the "Letters," the King, the intellect, and the soul. Philosophically, however, he had received from Numenius the inheritance of a double name of the Divinity, Being and Essence. As a thinker, he was therefore forced to accommodate Numenius to Plato, and by adding to Numenius's name of the divinity, to complete Numenius's theology by Numenius's own1303 cosmology. This then he did by adding as third hypostasis the Aristotelian dynamic energy.
  But as Intellect is permanent, how can Energy arise therefrom? Here this eternal puzzle is solved by distinguishing energy into indwelling and out-flowing. As indwelling, Energy constitutes Intellect; but its energetic nature could not be demonstrated except by out-flowing, which produces a distinction.
  Summarizing, he formed a bridge between the pagan world, with its Greco-Roman civilization, and the modern world, in three departments: Christianity, philosophy, and mysticism. So long as the traditional Platonico-Stoical feud persisted there was no hope of progress; because it kept apart two elements that were to fuse into the Christian philosophy. Numenius was the last Platonist, as Posidonius was the last Stoic combatant. However, if reports are to be trusted, Ammonius was an eclecticist, who prided himself on combining Plato with Aristotle. If Plotinos was indeed his disciple, it was the theory eclecticism that he took from his reputed teacher. Practically he was to accomplish it by his dependence on the Numenian Amelius, the Stoic Porphyry, and the negative Eustochius. It will be seen therefore that his chief importance was not in spite of his weakness, but most because of it. By repeatedly "boxing the compass" he thoroughly assimilated the best of the conflicting schools, and became of interest to a sufficiency of different groups (Christian, philosophical and mystical) to insure preservation, study and quotation. His habit of omitting credit to any but ancient thinkers left his own work, to the uninformedwho constituted all but a minimal numberas a body of original thought. Thus he remains to us the last light of Greece, speaking a language with which we are familiar, and leaving us quotations that are imperishable.
  20 A Stoic confutation of Epicurus and the Gnostics. As soon as Porphyry has left him, Plotinos harks back to Amelius, on whose leaving he had written against the Gnostics. He also returns to Numenian thoughts. Bouillet notices that here Plotinos founded himself on Chrysippus, Marcus Aurelius, and Epictetus, and was followed by Nemesius. This new foundation enabled him to assume a rather independent attitude. Against Plato, he taught that matter derived existence from God, and that the union of the soul and body is not necessarily evil. Against Aristotle, he taught that God is not only the final, but also the efficient cause of the universe. Against the Stoics, he taught that the human soul is free, and is a cause, independent of the World Soul from which she proceeded. Against the Gnostics, he insisted that the creator is good, the world is the best possible, and Providence extends to mundane affairs. Against the Manicheans, he taught that the evil is not positive, but negative, and is no efficient cause, so that there is no dualism.
  21 Diog. Laert. x. 133.
  33 From Aristotle, de Anima, 2.
  34 This is the Aristotelian psychological scheme.
  97 In this book we no longer find detailed study of Plato, Aristotle and the Epicureans, as we did in the works of the Porphyrian period. Well indeed did Plotinos say that without Porphyry's objections he might have had little to say.
  98 Porphyry, Principles of the theory of the Intelligibles, 31.
  156 See books ii. 3; ii. 9; iii. 1, 2, 3, 4, for the foundations on which this summary of Plotinos's doctrine of evil is contained. To do this, he was compelled to return to Plato, whose Theaetetus, Statesman, Timaeus and Laws he consulted. Aristotle seems to have been more interested in natural phenomena and human virtue than in the root-questions of the destiny of the universe, and the nature of the divinity; so Plotinos studies him little here. But it will be seen that here Plotinos entirely returns to the later Plato, through Numenius.
  157 As thought Empedocles, 318320.
  239 According to Aristotle, Met. xii. 3.
  240 See iii. 1.6.
  261 Plotinos is here harking back to his very earliest writing, 1.6, where, before his monistic adventure with Porphyry, he had, under the Numenian influence of Amelius, constructed his system out of a combination of the doctrines of Plato (about the ideas), Aristotle (the distinctions of form and matter and of potentiality and actualization), and the Stoic (the "reasons," "seminal reasons," action and passions, and "hexis," or "habit," the inorganic informing principle). Of these, Numenius seems to have lacked the Aristotelian doctrines, although he left Plato's single triple-functioned soul for Aristotle's combination of souls of various degrees (fr. 53). Plotinos, therefore, seems to have distinguished in every object two elements, matter and form (ii. 4.1; ii. 5.2). Matter inheres potentially in all beings (ii. 5.3, 4) and therefore is non-being, ugliness, and evil (i. 6.6). Form is the actualization (K. Steinhart's Melemata Plotiniana, p. 31; ii. 5.2); that is, the essence and power (vi. 4.9), which are inseparable. Form alone possesses real existence, beauty and goodness. Form has four degrees: idea, reason, nature and habit; which degrees are the same as those of thought and life (Porphyry, Principles 12, 13, 14). The idea is distinguished into "idea" or intelligible Form, or "eidos," principle of human intellectual life. Reason is 1, divine (theios logos, i. 6, 2; the reason that comes from the universal Soul, iv. 3.10), 2, human (principle of the rational life, see Ficinus on ii. 6.2); 3, the seminal or generative reason (principle of the life of sensation, which imparts to the body the sense-form, "morph," 3.12-end; Bouillet, i. 365). Now reasons reside in the soul (ii. 4.12), and are simultaneously essences and powers (vi. 4.9), and as powers produce the nature, and as essences, the habits. Now nature ("physis") is the principle of the vegetative life, and habit, "hexis," Numenius, fr. 55, see ii. 4.16, is the principle of unity of inorganic things.
  262 As thought Aristotle, Met. xii, 3.
  263 See ii. 9.13.
  284 As thought Aristotle, de Anima 2.1; see 4.3.21, and Numenius, 32.
  285 A famous comparison, found in Aristotle, de Anima, ii. 1; Plato, Laws, x. p. 906; Cary, 14; and especially Numenius, 32.
  286 As Plotinos thinks.
  290 According to Aristotle.
  291 Phaedo, p. 87; Cary, 82.
  Happiness according to Aristotle, i. 4.1 (46-1019).
  Happiness as sensation, does not hinder search for higher, i. 4.2 (1021).
  Medium of sight, Aristotle's unnecessary iv. 5.1 (29-515).
  Medium, though possible, hinders organs of sight, iv. 5.1 (29-514).
  Visual angle theory of Aristotle refuted, ii. 8.2 (35-682).
  lxxii Voice as one would analyze it, so must the world be studied, vi. 3.1 (44-933).

ENNEAD 06.06 - Of Numbers., #Plotinus - Complete Works Vol 03, #Plotinus, #Christianity
  The objection that unity, without itself experiencing anything, by the mere addition of something else, is no longer one, but becomes double, is a mistake.32 The one has not become two, and is not that which has been added to it, nor that to which something has been added. Each of them remains one, such as it was; but two can be asserted of their totality, and one of each of them separately. Two therefore, not any more than "pair," is by nature a relation. If the pair consisted in the union (of two objects), and if "being united" were identical with "to duplicate," in this case the667 union, as well as the pair, would constitute two. Now a "pair" appears likewise in a state contrary (to that of the reunion of two objects); for two may be produced by the division of a single object. Two, therefore, is neither reunion nor division, as it would have to be in order to constitute a relation.
  16. The first objection might be, Where do you locate, or how do you classify these primary and veritable Numbers? All the philosophers (who follow Aristotle) classify numbers in the genus of quantity. It seems that we have above treated of quantity, and classified both discrete and continuous quantity38 among other "beings." Here however we seem to say that these Numbers form part of the primary Essences, and add that there are, in addition, numbers that serve for enumerations. We are now asked how we make these statements agree, for they seem to give rise to several questions. Is the unity which is found among sense-beings a quantity? Or is unity a quantity when repeated, while, when considered alone and in itself, it is the principle of quantity, but not a quantity itself? Besides, if unity be the principle of quantity, does it share the nature of quantity, or has it a different nature? Here are a number of points we ought to expound. We shall answer these questions, and here is what we consider our starting-point.

ENNEAD 06.07 - How Ideas Multiplied, and the Good., #Plotinus - Complete Works Vol 03, #Plotinus, #Christianity
  It will further be suggested (by followers of Aristotle) that we stop at Intelligence, predicating goodness of it. For life and soul are images of Intelligence. It is to Intelligence that the soul aspires, it is according to Intelligence that the soul judges, it is on Intelligence that the soul regulates herself, when she pronounces that justice is better than injustice, in preferring every kind of virtue to every kind of vice, and in holding in high estimation what she considers preferable. Unfortunately, the soul does not aspire to Intelligence exclusively. As might be demonstrated in a long discussion, Intelligence is not the supreme goal to which we aspire, and not everything aspires to Intelligence, whilst everything aspires to the Good. The (beings) which do not possess intelligence do not all seek to possess it, while those who do possess it, do not limit themselves to it. Intelligence is sought only as the result of a train of reasoning, whilst Good is desired even before reason comes into play. If the object of desire be to live, to exist always, and to be active, this object is not desired because of Intelligence, but because of its being good, inasmuch as the Good is its737 principle and its goal. It is only in this respect that life is desirable.

Euthyphro, #unset, #Anonymous, #Various
  The next definition, 'Piety is that which is loved of the gods,' is shipwrecked on a refined distinction between the state and the act, corresponding respectively to the adjective (philon) and the participle (philoumenon), or rather perhaps to the participle and the verb (philoumenon and phileitai). The act is prior to the state (as in Aristotle the energeia precedes the dunamis); and the state of being loved is preceded by the act of being loved. But piety or holiness is preceded by the act of being pious, not by the act of being loved; and therefore piety and the state of being loved are different. Through such subtleties of dialectic Socrates is working his way into a deeper region of thought and feeling. He means to say that the words 'loved of the gods' express an attri bute only, and not the essence of piety.
  Then follows the third and last definition, 'Piety is a part of justice.' Thus far Socrates has proceeded in placing religion on a moral foundation. He is seeking to realize the harmony of religion and morality, which the great poets Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Pindar had unconsciously anticipated, and which is the universal want of all men. To this the soothsayer adds the ceremonial element, 'attending upon the gods.' When further interrogated by Socrates as to the nature of this 'attention to the gods,' he replies, that piety is an affair of business, a science of giving and asking, and the like. Socrates points out the anthropomorphism of these notions, (compare Symp.; Republic; Politicus.) But when we expect him to go on and show that the true service of the gods is the service of the spirit and the co-operation with them in all things true and good, he stops short; this was a lesson which the soothsayer could not have been made to understand, and which every one must learn for himself.

Gorgias, #unset, #Anonymous, #Various
  (1) In the Gorgias, as in nearly all the other dialogues of Plato, we are made aware that formal logic has as yet no existence. The old difficulty of framing a definition recurs. The illusive analogy of the arts and the virtues also continues. The ambiguity of several words, such as nature, custom, the honourable, the good, is not cleared up. The Sophists are still floundering about the distinction of the real and seeming. Figures of speech are made the basis of arguments. The possibility of conceiving a universal art or science, which admits of application to a particular subject-matter, is a difficulty which remains unsolved, and has not altogether ceased to haunt the world at the present day (compare Charmides). The defect of clearness is also apparent in Socrates himself, unless we suppose him to be practising on the simplicity of his opponent, or rather perhaps trying an experiment in dialectics. Nothing can be more fallacious than the contradiction which he pretends to have discovered in the answers of Gorgias (see above). The advantages which he gains over Polus are also due to a false antithesis of pleasure and good, and to an erroneous assertion that an agent and a patient may be described by similar predicates;a mistake which Aristotle partly shares and partly corrects in the Nicomachean Ethics. Traces of a 'robust sophistry' are likewise discernible in his argument with Callicles.
  (2) Although Socrates professes to be convinced by reason only, yet the argument is often a sort of dialectical fiction, by which he conducts himself and others to his own ideal of life and action. And we may sometimes wish that we could have suggested answers to his antagonists, or pointed out to them the rocks which lay concealed under the ambiguous terms good, pleasure, and the like. But it would be as useless to examine his arguments by the requirements of modern logic, as to criticise this ideal from a merely utilitarian point of view. If we say that the ideal is generally regarded as unattainable, and that mankind will by no means agree in thinking that the criminal is happier when punished than when unpunished, any more than they would agree to the stoical paradox that a man may be happy on the rack, Plato has already admitted that the world is against him. Neither does he mean to say that Archelaus is tormented by the stings of conscience; or that the sensations of the impaled criminal are more agreeable than those of the tyrant drowned in luxurious enjoyment. Neither is he speaking, as in the Protagoras, of virtue as a calculation of pleasure, an opinion which he afterwards repudiates in the Phaedo. What then is his meaning? His meaning we shall be able to illustrate best by parallel notions, which, whether justifiable by logic or not, have always existed among mankind. We must remind the reader that Socrates himself implies that he will be understood or appreciated by very few.
  The idealism of Plato is founded upon this sentiment. He would maintain that in some sense or other truth and right are alone to be sought, and that all other goods are only desirable as means towards these. He is thought to have erred in 'considering the agent only, and making no reference to the happiness of others, as affected by him.' But the happiness of others or of mankind, if regarded as an end, is really quite as ideal and almost as paradoxical to the common understanding as Plato's conception of happiness. For the greatest happiness of the greatest number may mean also the greatest pain of the individual which will procure the greatest pleasure of the greatest number. Ideas of utility, like those of duty and right, may be pushed to unpleasant consequences. Nor can Plato in the Gorgias be deemed purely self-regarding, considering that Socrates expressly mentions the duty of imparting the truth when discovered to others. Nor must we forget that the side of ethics which regards others is by the ancients merged in politics. Both in Plato and Aristotle, as well as in the Stoics, the social principle, though taking another form, is really far more prominent than in most modern treatises on ethics.
  The idealizing of suffering is one of the conceptions which have exercised the greatest influence on mankind. Into the theological import of this, or into the consideration of the errors to which the idea may have given rise, we need not now enter. All will agree that the ideal of the Divine Sufferer, whose words the world would not receive, the man of sorrows of whom the Hebrew prophets spoke, has sunk deep into the heart of the human race. It is a similar picture of suffering goodness which Plato desires to pourtray, not without an allusion to the fate of his master Socrates. He is convinced that, somehow or other, such an one must be happy in life or after death. In the Republic, he endeavours to show that his happiness would be assured here in a well-ordered state. But in the actual condition of human things the wise and good are weak and miserable; such an one is like a man fallen among wild beasts, exposed to every sort of wrong and obloquy.

Ion, #unset, #Anonymous, #Various
  The Ion is the shortest, or nearly the shortest, of all the writings which bear the name of Plato, and is not au thenticated by any early external testimony. The grace and beauty of this little work supply the only, and perhaps a sufficient, proof of its genuineness. The plan is simple; the dramatic interest consists entirely in the contrast between the irony of Socrates and the transparent vanity and childlike enthusiasm of the rhapsode Ion. The theme of the Dialogue may possibly have been suggested by the passage of Xenophon's Memorabilia in which the rhapsodists are described by Euthydemus as 'very precise about the exact words of Homer, but very idiotic themselves.' (Compare Aristotle, Met.)
  Ion the rhapsode has just come to Athens; he has been exhibiting in Epidaurus at the festival of Asclepius, and is intending to exhibit at the festival of the Pana thenaea. Socrates admires and envies the rhapsode's art; for he is always well dressed and in good companyin the company of good poets and of Homer, who is the prince of them. In the course of conversation the admission is elicited from Ion that his skill is restricted to Homer, and that he knows nothing of inferior poets, such as Hesiod and Archilochus;he brightens up and is wide awake when Homer is being recited, but is apt to go to sleep at the recitations of any other poet. 'And yet, surely, he who knows the superior ought to know the inferior also;he who can judge of the good speaker is able to judge of the bad. And poetry is a whole; and he who judges of poetry by rules of art ought to be able to judge of all poetry.' This is confirmed by the analogy of sculpture, painting, flute-playing, and the other arts. The argument is at last brought home to the mind of Ion, who asks how this contradiction is to be solved. The solution given by Socrates is as follows:

Kafka and His Precursors, #Labyrinths, #Jorge Luis Borges, #Poetry
  (declares Aristotle) cannot reach point B, because it must first cover half the
  distance between the two points, and before that, half of the half, and before

Liber 46 - The Key of the Mysteries, #unset, #Anonymous, #Various
   Socrates and Pythagoras, Plato and Aristotle, resume, in explaining
   them, all the aspirations and all the glories of the ancient world; the

Meno, #unset, #Anonymous, #Various
  The idealism of Plato is here presented in a less developed form than in the Phaedo and Phaedrus. Nothing is said of the pre-existence of ideas of justice, temperance, and the like. Nor is Socrates positive of anything but the duty of enquiry. The doctrine of reminiscence too is explained more in accordance with fact and experience as arising out of the affinities of nature (ate tes thuseos oles suggenous ouses). Modern philosophy says that all things in nature are dependent on one another; the ancient philosopher had the same truth latent in his mind when he affirmed that out of one thing all the rest may be recovered. The subjective was converted by him into an objective; the mental phenomenon of the association of ideas (compare Phaedo) became a real chain of existences. The germs of two valuable principles of education may also be gathered from the 'words of priests and priestesses:' (1) that true knowledge is a knowledge of causes (compare Aristotle's theory of episteme); and (2) that the process of learning consists not in what is brought to the learner, but in what is drawn out of him.
  Some lesser points of the dialogue may be noted, such as (1) the acute observation that Meno prefers the familiar definition, which is embellished with poetical language, to the better and truer one; or (2) the shrewd reflection, which may admit of an application to modern as well as to ancient teachers, that the Sophists having made large fortunes; this must surely be a criterion of their powers of teaching, for that no man could get a living by shoemaking who was not a good shoemaker; or (3) the remark conveyed, almost in a word, that the verbal sceptic is saved the labour of thought and enquiry (ouden dei to toiouto zeteseos). Characteristic also of the temper of the Socratic enquiry is, (4) the proposal to discuss the teachableness of virtue under an hypothesis, after the manner of the mathematicians; and (5) the repetition of the favourite doctrine which occurs so frequently in the earlier and more Socratic Dialogues, and gives a colour to all of themthat mankind only desire evil through ignorance; (6) the experiment of eliciting from the slave-boy the mathematical truth which is latent in him, and (7) the remark that he is all the better for knowing his ignorance.
  Passing on to the Parmenides, we find in that dialogue not an exposition or defence of the doctrine of ideas, but an assault upon them, which is put into the mouth of the veteran Parmenides, and might be ascribed to Aristotle himself, or to one of his disciples. The doctrine which is assailed takes two or three forms, but fails in any of them to escape the dialectical difficulties which are urged against it. It is admitted that there are ideas of all things, but the manner in which individuals partake of them, whether of the whole or of the part, and in which they become like them, or how ideas can be either within or without the sphere of human knowledge, or how the human and divine can have any relation to each other, is held to be incapable of explanation. And yet, if there are no universal ideas, what becomes of philosophy? (Parmenides.) In the Sophist the theory of ideas is spoken of as a doctrine held not by Plato, but by another sect of philosophers, called 'the Friends of Ideas,' probably the Megarians, who were very distinct from him, if not opposed to him (Sophist). Nor in what may be termed Plato's abridgement of the history of philosophy (Soph.), is any mention made such as we find in the first book of Aristotle's Metaphysics, of the derivation of such a theory or of any part of it from the Pythagoreans, the Eleatics, the Heracleiteans, or even from Socrates. In the Philebus, probably one of the latest of the Platonic Dialogues, the conception of a personal or semi-personal deity expressed under the figure of mind, the king of all, who is also the cause, is retained. The one and many of the Phaedrus and Theaetetus is still working in the mind of Plato, and the correlation of ideas, not of 'all with all,' but of 'some with some,' is asserted and explained. But they are spoken of in a different manner, and are not supposed to be recovered from a former state of existence. The metaphysical conception of truth passes into a psychological one, which is continued in the Laws, and is the final form of the Platonic philosophy, so far as can be gathered from his own writings (see especially Laws). In the Laws he harps once more on the old string, and returns to general notions:these he acknowledges to be many, and yet he insists that they are also one. The guardian must be made to recognize the truth, for which he has contended long ago in the Protagoras, that the virtues are four, but they are also in some sense one (Laws; compare Protagoras).
  So various, and if regarded on the surface only, inconsistent, are the statements of Plato respecting the doctrine of ideas. If we attempted to harmonize or to combine them, we should make out of them, not a system, but the caricature of a system. They are the ever-varying expression of Plato's Idealism. The terms used in them are in their substance and general meaning the same, although they seem to be different. They pass from the subject to the object, from earth (diesseits) to heaven (jenseits) without regard to the gulf which later theology and philosophy have made between them. They are also intended to supplement or explain each other. They relate to a subject of which Plato himself would have said that 'he was not confident of the precise form of his own statements, but was strong in the belief that something of the kind was true.' It is the spirit, not the letter, in which they agreethe spirit which places the divine above the human, the spiritual above the material, the one above the many, the mind before the body.
  In Bacon and Locke we have another development in which the mind of man is supposed to receive knowledge by a new method and to work by observation and experience. But we may remark that it is the idea of experience, rather than experience itself, with which the mind is filled. It is a symbol of knowledge rather than the reality which is vouchsafed to us. The Organon of Bacon is not much nearer to actual facts than the Organon of Aristotle or the Platonic idea of good. Many of the old rags and ribbons which defaced the garment of philosophy have been stripped off, but some of them still adhere. A crude conception of the ideas of Plato survives in the 'forms' of Bacon. And on the other hand, there are many passages of Plato in which the importance of the investigation of facts is as much insisted upon as by Bacon. Both are almost equally superior to the illusions of language, and are constantly crying out against them, as against other idols.
  Locke cannot be truly regarded as the author of sensationalism any more than of idealism. His system is based upon experience, but with him experience includes reflection as well as sense. His analysis and construction of ideas has no foundation in fact; it is only the dialectic of the mind 'talking to herself.' The philosophy of Berkeley is but the transposition of two words. For objects of sense he would substitute sensations. He imagines himself to have changed the relation of the human mind towards God and nature; they remain the same as before, though he has drawn the imaginary line by which they are divided at a different point. He has annihilated the outward world, but it instantly reappears governed by the same laws and described under the same names.

Phaedo, #unset, #Anonymous, #Various
  4. Modern philosophy is perplexed at this whole question, which is sometimes fairly given up and handed over to the realm of faith. The perplexity should not be forgotten by us when we attempt to submit the Phaedo of Plato to the requirements of logic. For what idea can we form of the soul when separated from the body? Or how can the soul be united with the body and still be independent? Is the soul related to the body as the ideal to the real, or as the whole to the parts, or as the subject to the object, or as the cause to the effect, or as the end to the means? Shall we say with Aristotle, that the soul is the entelechy or form of an organized living body? or with Plato, that she has a life of her own? Is the Pythagorean image of the harmony, or that of the monad, the truer expression? Is the soul related to the body as sight to the eye, or as the boatman to his boat? (Arist. de Anim.) And in another state of being is the soul to be conceived of as vanishing into infinity, hardly possessing an existence which she can call her own, as in the pantheistic system of Spinoza: or as an individual informing another body and entering into new relations, but retaining her own character? (Compare Gorgias.) Or is the opposition of soul and body a mere illusion, and the true self neither soul nor body, but the union of the two in the 'I' which is above them? And is death the assertion of this individuality in the higher nature, and the falling away into nothingness of the lower? Or are we vainly attempting to pass the boundaries of human thought? The body and the soul seem to be inseparable, not only in fact, but in our conceptions of them; and any philosophy which too closely unites them, or too widely separates them, either in this life or in another, disturbs the balance of human nature. No thinker has perfectly adjusted them, or been entirely consistent with himself in describing their relation to one another. Nor can we wonder that Plato in the infancy of human thought should have confused mythology and philosophy, or have mistaken verbal arguments for real ones.
  5. Again, believing in the immortality of the soul, we must still ask the question of Socrates, 'What is that which we suppose to be immortal?' Is it the personal and individual element in us, or the spiritual and universal? Is it the principle of knowledge or of goodness, or the union of the two? Is it the mere force of life which is determined to be, or the consciousness of self which cannot be got rid of, or the fire of genius which refuses to be extinguished? Or is there a hidden being which is allied to the Author of all existence, who is because he is perfect, and to whom our ideas of perfection give us a title to belong? Whatever answer is given by us to these questions, there still remains the necessity of allowing the permanence of evil, if not for ever, at any rate for a time, in order that the wicked 'may not have too good a bargain.' For the annihilation of evil at death, or the eternal duration of it, seem to involve equal difficulties in the moral government of the universe. Sometimes we are led by our feelings, rather than by our reason, to think of the good and wise only as existing in another life. Why should the mean, the weak, the idiot, the infant, the herd of men who have never in any proper sense the use of reason, reappear with blinking eyes in the light of another world? But our second thought is that the hope of humanity is a common one, and that all or none will be partakers of immortality. Reason does not allow us to suppose that we have any greater claims than others, and experience may often reveal to us unexpected flashes of the higher nature in those whom we had despised. Why should the wicked suffer any more than ourselves? had we been placed in their circumstances should we have been any better than they? The worst of men are objects of pity rather than of anger to the philanthropist; must they not be equally such to divine benevolence? Even more than the good they have need of another life; not that they may be punished, but that they may be educated. These are a few of the reflections which arise in our minds when we attempt to assign any form to our conceptions of a future state.
  16. Yet after all the belief in the individuality of the soul after death had but a feeble hold on the Greek mind. Like the personality of God, the personality of man in a future state was not inseparably bound up with the reality of his existence. For the distinction between the personal and impersonal, and also between the divine and human, was far less marked to the Greek than to ourselves. And as Plato readily passes from the notion of the good to that of God, he also passes almost imperceptibly to himself and his reader from the future life of the individual soul to the eternal being of the absolute soul. There has been a clearer statement and a clearer denial of the belief in modern times than is found in early Greek philosophy, and hence the comparative silence on the whole subject which is often remarked in ancient writers, and particularly in Aristotle. For Plato and Aristotle are not further removed in their teaching about the immortality of the soul than they are in their theory of knowledge.
  17. Living in an age when logic was beginning to mould human thought, Plato naturally cast his belief in immortality into a logical form. And when we consider how much the doctrine of ideas was also one of words, it is not surprising that he should have fallen into verbal fallacies: early logic is always mistaking the truth of the form for the truth of the matter. It is easy to see that the alternation of opposites is not the same as the generation of them out of each other; and that the generation of them out of each other, which is the first argument in the Phaedo, is at variance with their mutual exclusion of each other, whether in themselves or in us, which is the last. For even if we admit the distinction which he draws between the opposites and the things which have the opposites, still individuals fall under the latter class; and we have to pass out of the region of human hopes and fears to a conception of an abstract soul which is the impersonation of the ideas. Such a conception, which in Plato himself is but half expressed, is unmeaning to us, and relative only to a particular stage in the history of thought. The doctrine of reminiscence is also a fragment of a former world, which has no place in the philosophy of modern times. But Plato had the wonders of psychology just opening to him, and he had not the explanation of them which is supplied by the analysis of language and the history of the human mind. The question, 'Whence come our abstract ideas?' he could only answer by an imaginary hypothesis. Nor is it difficult to see that his crowning argument is purely verbal, and is but the expression of an instinctive confidence put into a logical form:'The soul is immortal because it contains a principle of imperishableness.' Nor does he himself seem at all to be aware that nothing is added to human knowledge by his 'safe and simple answer,' that beauty is the cause of the beautiful; and that he is merely reasserting the Eleatic being 'divided by the Pythagorean numbers,' against the Heracleitean doctrine of perpetual generation. The answer to the 'very serious question' of generation and destruction is really the denial of them. For this he would substitute, as in the Republic, a system of ideas, tested, not by experience, but by their consequences, and not explained by actual causes, but by a higher, that is, a more general notion. Consistency with themselves is the only test which is to be applied to them. (Republic, and Phaedo.)

Sophist, #unset, #Anonymous, #Various
  The dramatic power of the dialogues of Plato appears to diminish as the metaphysical interest of them increases (compare Introd. to the Philebus). There are no descriptions of time, place or persons, in the Sophist and Statesman, but we are plunged at once into philosophical discussions; the poetical charm has disappeared, and those who have no taste for abstruse metaphysics will greatly prefer the earlier dialogues to the later ones. Plato is conscious of the change, and in the Statesman expressly accuses himself of a tediousness in the two dialogues, which he ascribes to his desire of developing the dialectical method. On the other hand, the kindred spirit of Hegel seemed to find in the Sophist the crown and summit of the Platonic philosophyhere is the place at which Plato most nearly approaches to the Hegelian identity of Being and Not-being. Nor will the great importance of the two dialogues be doubted by any one who forms a conception of the state of mind and opinion which they are intended to meet. The sophisms of the day were undermining philosophy; the denial of the existence of Not-being, and of the connexion of ideas, was making truth and falsehood equally impossible. It has been said that Plato would have written differently, if he had been acquainted with the Organon of Aristotle. But could the Organon of Aristotle ever have been written unless the Sophist and Statesman had preceded? The swarm of fallacies which arose in the infancy of mental science, and which was born and bred in the decay of the pre-Socratic philosophies, was not dispelled by Aristotle, but by Socrates and Plato. The summa genera of thought, the nature of the proposition, of definition, of generalization, of synthesis and analysis, of division and cross-division, are clearly described, and the processes of induction and deduction are constantly employed in the dialogues of Plato. The 'slippery' nature of comparison, the danger of putting words in the place of things, the fallacy of arguing 'a dicto secundum,' and in a circle, are frequently indicated by him. To all these processes of truth and error, Aristotle, in the next generation, gave distinctness; he brought them together in a separate science. But he is not to be regarded as the original inventor of any of the great logical forms, with the exception of the syllogism.
  There is little worthy of remark in the characters of the Sophist. The most noticeable point is the final retirement of Socrates from the field of argument, and the substitution for him of an Eleatic stranger, who is described as a pupil of Parmenides and Zeno, and is supposed to have descended from a higher world in order to convict the Socratic circle of error. As in the Timaeus, Plato seems to intimate by the withdrawal of Socrates that he is passing beyond the limits of his teaching; and in the Sophist and Statesman, as well as in the Parmenides, he probably means to imply that he is making a closer approach to the schools of Elea and Megara. He had much in common with them, but he must first submit their ideas to criticism and revision. He had once thought as he says, speaking by the mouth of the Eleatic, that he understood their doctrine of Not-being; but now he does not even comprehend the nature of Being. The friends of ideas (Soph.) are alluded to by him as distant acquaintances, whom he criticizes ab extra; we do not recognize at first sight that he is criticizing himself. The character of the Eleatic stranger is colourless; he is to a certain extent the reflection of his father and master, Parmenides, who is the protagonist in the dialogue which is called by his name. Theaetetus himself is not distinguished by the remarkable traits which are attributed to him in the preceding dialogue. He is no longer under the spell of Socrates, or subject to the operation of his midwifery, though the fiction of question and answer is still maintained, and the necessity of taking Theaetetus along with him is several times insisted upon by his partner in the discussion. There is a reminiscence of the old Theaetetus in his remark that he will not tire of the argument, and in his conviction, which the Eleatic thinks likely to be permanent, that the course of events is governed by the will of God. Throughout the two dialogues Socrates continues a silent auditor, in the Statesman just reminding us of his presence, at the commencement, by a characteristic jest about the statesman and the philosopher, and by an allusion to his namesake, with whom on that ground he claims relationship, as he had already claimed an affinity with Theaetetus, grounded on the likeness of his ugly face. But in neither dialogue, any more than in the Timaeus, does he offer any criticism on the views which are propounded by another.
  The style, though wanting in dramatic power,in this respect resembling the Philebus and the Laws,is very clear and accurate, and has several touches of humour and satire. The language is less fanciful and imaginative than that of the earlier dialogues; and there is more of bitterness, as in the Laws, though traces of a similar temper may also be observed in the description of the 'great brute' in the Republic, and in the contrast of the lawyer and philosopher in the Theaetetus. The following are characteristic passages: 'The ancient philosophers, of whom we may say, without offence, that they went on their way rather regardless of whether we understood them or not;' the picture of the materialists, or earth-born giants, 'who grasped oaks and rocks in their hands,' and who must be improved before they can be reasoned with; and the equally humourous delineation of the friends of ideas, who defend themselves from a fastness in the invisible world; or the comparison of the Sophist to a painter or maker (compare Republic), and the hunt after him in the rich meadow-lands of youth and wealth; or, again, the light and graceful touch with which the older philosophies are painted ('Ionian and Sicilian muses'), the comparison of them to mythological tales, and the fear of the Eleatic that he will be counted a parricide if he ventures to lay hands on his father Parmenides; or, once more, the likening of the Eleatic stranger to a god from heaven.All these passages, notwithstanding the decline of the style, retain the impress of the great master of language. But the equably diffused grace is gone; instead of the endless variety of the early dialogues, traces of the rhythmical monotonous cadence of the Laws begin to appear; and already an approach is made to the technical language of Aristotle, in the frequent use of the words 'essence,' 'power,' 'generation,' 'motion,' 'rest,' 'action,' 'passion,' and the like.
  The Sophist, like the Phaedrus, has a double character, and unites two enquirers, which are only in a somewhat forced manner connected with each other. The first is the search after the Sophist, the second is the enquiry into the nature of Not-being, which occupies the middle part of the work. For 'Not-being' is the hole or division of the dialectical net in which the Sophist has hidden himself. He is the imaginary impersonation of false opinion. Yet he denies the possibility of false opinion; for falsehood is that which is not, and therefore has no existence. At length the difficulty is solved; the answer, in the language of the Republic, appears 'tumbling out at our feet.' Acknowledging that there is a communion of kinds with kinds, and not merely one Being or Good having different names, or several isolated ideas or classes incapable of communion, we discover 'Not-being' to be the other of 'Being.' Transferring this to language and thought, we have no difficulty in apprehending that a proposition may be false as well as true. The Sophist, drawn out of the shelter which Cynic and Megarian paradoxes have temporarily afforded him, is proved to be a dissembler and juggler with words.
  But the real question is, not whether the word 'Sophist' has all these senses, but whether there is not also a specific bad sense in which the term is applied to certain contemporaries of Socrates. Would an Athenian, as Mr. Grote supposes, in the fifth century before Christ, have included Socrates and Plato, as well as Gorgias and Protagoras, under the specific class of Sophists? To this question we must answer, No: if ever the term is applied to Socrates and Plato, either the application is made by an enemy out of mere spite, or the sense in which it is used is neutral. Plato, Xenophon, Isocrates, Aristotle, all give a bad import to the word; and the Sophists are regarded as a separate class in all of them. And in later Greek literature, the distinction is quite marked between the succession of philosophers from Thales to Aristotle, and the Sophists of the age of Socrates, who appeared like meteors for a short time in different parts of Greece. For the purposes of comedy, Socrates may have been identified with the Sophists, and he seems to complain of this in the Apology. But there is no reason to suppose that Socrates, differing by so many outward marks, would really have been confounded in the mind of Anytus, or Callicles, or of any intelligent Athenian, with the splendid foreigners who from time to time visited Athens, or appeared at the Olympic games. The man of genius, the great original thinker, the disinterested seeker after truth, the master of repartee whom no one ever defeated in an argument, was separated, even in the mind of the vulgar Athenian, by an 'interval which no geometry can express,' from the balancer of sentences, the interpreter and reciter of the poets, the divider of the meanings of words, the teacher of rhetoric, the professor of morals and manners.
  2. The use of the term 'Sophist' in the dialogues of Plato also shows that the bad sense was not affixed by his genius, but already current. When Protagoras says, 'I confess that I am a Sophist,' he implies that the art which he professes has already a bad name; and the words of the young Hippocrates, when with a blush upon his face which is just seen by the light of dawn he admits that he is going to be made 'a Sophist,' would lose their point, unless the term had been discredited. There is nothing surprising in the Sophists having an evil name; that, whether deserved or not, was a natural consequence of their vocation. That they were foreigners, that they made fortunes, that they taught novelties, that they excited the minds of youth, are quite sufficient reasons to account for the opprobrium which attached to them. The genius of Plato could not have stamped the word anew, or have imparted the associations which occur in contemporary writers, such as Xenophon and Isocrates. Changes in the meaning of words can only be made with great difficulty, and not unless they are supported by a strong current of popular feeling. There is nothing improbable in supposing that Plato may have extended and envenomed the meaning, or that he may have done the Sophists the same kind of disservice with posterity which Pascal did to the Jesuits. But the bad sense of the word was not and could not have been invented by him, and is found in his earlier dialogues, e.g. the Protagoras, as well as in the later.
  The picture which he gives of both these latter schools is indistinct; and he appears reluctant to mention the names of their teachers. Nor can we easily determine how much is to be assigned to the Cynics, how much to the Megarians, or whether the 'repellent Materialists' (Theaet.) are Cynics or Atomists, or represent some unknown phase of opinion at Athens. To the Cynics and Antis thenes is commonly attri buted, on the authority of Aristotle, the denial of predication, while the Megarians are said to have been Nominalists, asserting the One Good under many names to be the true Being of Zeno and the Eleatics, and, like Zeno, employing their negative dialectic in the refutation of opponents. But the later Megarians also denied predication; and this tenet, which is attri buted to all of them by Simplicius, is certainly in accordance with their over-refining philosophy. The 'tyros young and old,' of whom Plato speaks, probably include both. At any rate, we shall be safer in accepting the general description of them which he has given, and in not attempting to draw a precise line between them.
  Of these Eristics, whether Cynics or Megarians, several characteristics are found in Plato:
  The Idealism of the fourth century before Christ in Greece, as in other ages and countries, seems to have provoked a reaction towards Materialism. The maintainers of this doctrine are described in the Theaetetus as obstinate persons who will believe in nothing which they cannot hold in their hands, and in the Sophist as incapable of argument. They are probably the same who are said in the Tenth Book of the Laws to attri bute the course of events to nature, art, and chance. Who they were, we have no means of determining except from Plato's description of them. His silence respecting the Atomists might lead us to suppose that here we have a trace of them. But the Atomists were not Materialists in the grosser sense of the term, nor were they incapable of reasoning; and Plato would hardly have described a great genius like Democritus in the disdainful terms which he uses of the Materialists. Upon the whole, we must infer that the persons here spoken of are unknown to us, like the many other writers and talkers at Athens and elsewhere, of whose endless activity of mind Aristotle in his Metaphysics has preserved an anonymous memorial.
  V. The Sophist is the sequel of the Theaetetus, and is connected with the Parmenides by a direct allusion (compare Introductions to Theaetetus and Parmenides). In the Theaetetus we sought to discover the nature of knowledge and false opinion. But the nature of false opinion seemed impenetrable; for we were unable to understand how there could be any reality in Not-being. In the Sophist the question is taken up again; the nature of Not-being is detected, and there is no longer any metaphysical impediment in the way of admitting the possibility of falsehood. To the Parmenides, the Sophist stands in a less defined and more remote relation. There human thought is in process of disorganization; no absurdity or inconsistency is too great to be elicited from the analysis of the simple ideas of Unity or Being. In the Sophist the same contradictions are pursued to a certain extent, but only with a view to their resolution. The aim of the dialogue is to show how the few elemental conceptions of the human mind admit of a natural connexion in thought and speech, which Megarian or other sophistry vainly attempts to deny.
  The Platonic unity of differences or opposites is the beginning of the modern view that all knowledge is of relations; it also anticipates the doctrine of Spinoza that all determination is negation. Plato takes or gives so much of either of these theories as was necessary or possible in the age in which he lived. In the Sophist, as in the Cratylus, he is opposed to the Heracleitean flux and equally to the Megarian and Cynic denial of predication, because he regards both of them as making knowledge impossible. He does not assert that everything is and is not, or that the same thing can be affected in the same and in opposite ways at the same time and in respect of the same part of itself. The law of contradiction is as clearly laid down by him in the Republic, as by Aristotle in his Organon. Yet he is aware that in the negative there is also a positive element, and that oppositions may be only differences. And in the Parmenides he deduces the many from the one and Not-being from Being, and yet shows that the many are included in the one, and that Not-being returns to Being.
  In several of the later dialogues Plato is occupied with the connexion of the sciences, which in the Philebus he divides into two classes of pure and applied, adding to them there as elsewhere (Phaedr., Crat., Republic, States.) a superintending science of dialectic. This is the origin of Aristotle's Architectonic, which seems, however, to have passed into an imaginary science of essence, and no longer to retain any relation to other branches of knowledge. Of such a science, whether described as 'philosophia prima,' the science of ousia, logic or metaphysics, philosophers have often dreamed. But even now the time has not arrived when the anticipation of Plato can be realized. Though many a thinker has framed a 'hierarchy of the sciences,' no one has as yet found the higher science which arrays them in harmonious order, giving to the organic and inorganic, to the physical and moral, their respective limits, and showing how they all work together in the world and in man.
  Plato arranges in order the stages of knowledge and of existence. They are the steps or grades by which he rises from sense and the shadows of sense to the idea of beauty and good. Mind is in motion as well as at rest (Soph.); and may be described as a dialectical progress which passes from one limit or determination of thought to another and back again to the first. This is the account of dialectic given by Plato in the Sixth Book of the Republic, which regarded under another aspect is the mysticism of the Symposium. He does not deny the existence of objects of sense, but according to him they only receive their true meaning when they are incorporated in a principle which is above them (Republic). In modern language they might be said to come first in the order of experience, last in the order of nature and reason. They are assumed, as he is fond of repeating, upon the condition that they shall give an account of themselves and that the truth of their existence shall be hereafter proved. For philosophy must begin somewhere and may begin anywhere,with outward objects, with statements of opinion, with abstract principles. But objects of sense must lead us onward to the ideas or universals which are contained in them; the statements of opinion must be verified; the abstract principles must be filled up and connected with one another. In Plato we find, as we might expect, the germs of many thoughts which have been further developed by the genius of Spinoza and Hegel. But there is a difficulty in separating the germ from the flower, or in drawing the line which divides ancient from modern philosophy. Many coincidences which occur in them are unconscious, seeming to show a natural tendency in the human mind towards certain ideas and forms of thought. And there are many speculations of Plato which would have passed away unheeded, and their meaning, like that of some hieroglyphic, would have remained undeciphered, unless two thousand years and more afterwards an interpreter had arisen of a kindred spirit and of the same intellectual family. For example, in the Sophist Plato begins with the abstract and goes on to the concrete, not in the lower sense of returning to outward objects, but to the Hegelian concrete or unity of abstractions. In the intervening period hardly any importance would have been attached to the question which is so full of meaning to Plato and Hegel.
  Hegel was quite sensible how great would be the difficulty of presenting philosophy to mankind under the form of opposites. Most of us live in the one-sided truth which the understanding offers to us, and if occasionally we come across difficulties like the time-honoured controversy of necessity and free-will, or the Eleatic puzzle of Achilles and the tortoise, we relegate some of them to the sphere of mystery, others to the book of riddles, and go on our way rejoicing. Most men (like Aristotle) have been accustomed to regard a contradiction in terms as the end of strife; to be told that contradiction is the life and mainspring of the intellectual world is indeed a paradox to them. Every abstraction is at first the enemy of every other, yet they are linked together, each with all, in the chain of Being. The struggle for existence is not confined to the animals, but appears in the kingdom of thought. The divisions which arise in thought between the physical and moral and between the moral and intellectual, and the like, are deepened and widened by the formal logic which elevates the defects of the human faculties into Laws of Thought; they become a part of the mind which makes them and is also made up of them. Such distinctions become so familiar to us that we regard the thing signified by them as absolutely fixed and defined. These are some of the illusions from which Hegel delivers us by placing us above ourselves, by teaching us to analyze the growth of 'what we are pleased to call our minds,' by reverting to a time when our present distinctions of thought and language had no existence.
  Of the great dislike and childish impatience of his system which would be aroused among his opponents, he was fully aware, and would often anticipate the jests which the rest of the world, 'in the superfluity of their wits,' were likely to make upon him. Men are annoyed at what puzzles them; they think what they cannot easily understand to be full of danger. Many a sceptic has stood, as he supposed, firmly rooted in the categories of the understanding which Hegel resolves into their original nothingness. For, like Plato, he 'leaves no stone unturned' in the intellectual world. Nor can we deny that he is unnecessarily difficult, or that his own mind, like that of all metaphysicians, was too much under the dominion of his system and unable to see beyond: or that the study of philosophy, if made a serious business (compare Republic), involves grave results to the mind and life of the student. For it may encumber him without enlightening his path; and it may weaken his natural faculties of thought and expression without increasing his philosophical power. The mind easily becomes entangled among abstractions, and loses hold of facts. The glass which is adapted to distant objects takes away the vision of what is near and present to us.
  (b) Hegel's treatment of the early Greek thinkers affords the readiest illustration of his meaning in conceiving all philosophy under the form of opposites. The first abstraction is to him the beginning of thought. Hitherto there had only existed a tumultuous chaos of mythological fancy, but when Thales said 'All is water' a new era began to dawn upon the world. Man was seeking to grasp the universe under a single form which was at first simply a material element, the most equable and colourless and universal which could be found. But soon the human mind became dissatisfied with the emblem, and after ringing the changes on one element after another, demanded a more abstract and perfect conception, such as one or Being, which was absolutely at rest. But the positive had its negative, the conception of Being involved Not-being, the conception of one, many, the conception of a whole, parts. Then the pendulum swung to the other side, from rest to motion, from Xenophanes to Heracleitus. The opposition of Being and Not-being projected into space became the atoms and void of Leucippus and Democritus. Until the Atomists, the abstraction of the individual did not exist; in the philosophy of Anaxagoras the idea of mind, whether human or divine, was beginning to be realized. The pendulum gave another swing, from the individual to the universal, from the object to the subject. The Sophist first uttered the word 'Man is the measure of all things,' which Socrates presented in a new form as the study of ethics. Once more we return from mind to the object of mind, which is knowledge, and out of knowledge the various degrees or kinds of knowledge more or less abstract were gradually developed. The threefold division of logic, physic, and ethics, foreshadowed in Plato, was finally established by Aristotle and the Stoics. Thus, according to Hegel, in the course of about two centuries by a process of antagonism and negation the leading thoughts of philosophy were evolved.
  There is nothing like this progress of opposites in Plato, who in the Symposium denies the possibility of reconciliation until the opposition has passed away. In his own words, there is an absurdity in supposing that 'harmony is discord; for in reality harmony consists of notes of a higher and lower pitch which disagreed once, but are now reconciled by the art of music' (Symp.). He does indeed describe objects of sense as regarded by us sometimes from one point of view and sometimes from another. As he says at the end of the Fifth Book of the Republic, 'There is nothing light which is not heavy, or great which is not small.' And he extends this relativity to the conceptions of just and good, as well as to great and small. In like manner he acknowledges that the same number may be more or less in relation to other numbers without any increase or diminution (Theat.). But the perplexity only arises out of the confusion of the human faculties; the art of measuring shows us what is truly great and truly small. Though the just and good in particular instances may vary, the IDEA of good is eternal and unchangeable. And the IDEA of good is the source of knowledge and also of Being, in which all the stages of sense and knowledge are gathered up and from being hypotheses become realities.
  The philosophy of Hegel appeals to an historical criterion: the ideas of men have a succession in time as well as an order of thought. But the assumption that there is a correspondence between the succession of ideas in history and the natural order of philosophy is hardly true even of the beginnings of thought. And in later systems forms of thought are too numerous and complex to admit of our tracing in them a regular succession. They seem also to be in part reflections of the past, and it is difficult to separate in them what is original and what is borrowed. Doubtless they have a relation to one anotherthe transition from Descartes to Spinoza or from Locke to Berkeley is not a matter of chance, but it can hardly be described as an alternation of opposites or figured to the mind by the vibrations of a pendulum. Even in Aristotle and Plato, rightly understood, we cannot trace this law of action and reaction. They are both idealists, although to the one the idea is actual and immanent,to the other only potential and transcendent, as Hegel himself has pointed out (Wallace's Hegel). The true meaning of Aristotle has been disguised from us by his own appeal to fact and the opinions of mankind in his more popular works, and by the use made of his writings in the Middle Ages. No book, except the Scriptures, has been so much read, and so little understood. The Pre-Socratic philosophies are simpler, and we may observe a progress in them; but is there any regular succession? The ideas of Being, change, number, seem to have sprung up contemporaneously in different parts of Greece and we have no difficulty in constructing them out of one anotherwe can see that the union of Being and Not-being gave birth to the idea of change or Becoming and that one might be another aspect of Being. Again, the Eleatics may be regarded as developing in one direction into the Megarian school, in the other into the Atomists, but there is no necessary connexion between them. Nor is there any indication that the deficiency which was felt in one school was supplemented or compensated by another. They were all efforts to supply the want which the Greeks began to feel at the beginning of the sixth century before Christ,the want of abstract ideas. Nor must we forget the uncertainty of chronology;if, as Aristotle says, there were Atomists before Leucippus, Eleatics before Xenophanes, and perhaps 'patrons of the flux' before Heracleitus, Hegel's order of thought in the history of philosophy would be as much disarranged as his order of religious thought by recent discoveries in the history of religion.
  Hegel is fond of repeating that all philosophies still live and that the earlier are preserved in the later; they are refuted, and they are not refuted, by those who succeed them. Once they reigned supreme, now they are subordinated to a power or idea greater or more comprehensive than their own. The thoughts of Socrates and Plato and Aristotle have certainly sunk deep into the mind of the world, and have exercised an influence which will never pass away; but can we say that they have the same meaning in modern and ancient philosophy? Some of them, as for example the words 'Being,' 'essence,' 'matter,' 'form,' either have become obsolete, or are used in new senses, whereas 'individual,' 'cause,' 'motive,' have acquired an exaggerated importance. Is the manner in which the logical determinations of thought, or 'categories' as they may be termed, have been handed down to us, really different from that in which other words have come down to us? Have they not been equally subject to accident, and are they not often used by Hegel himself in senses which would have been quite unintelligible to their original inventorsas for example, when he speaks of the 'ground' of Leibnitz ('Everything has a sufficient ground') as identical with his own doctrine of the 'notion' (Wallace's Hegel), or the 'Being and Not-being' of Heracleitus as the same with his own 'Becoming'?
  As the historical order of thought has been adapted to the logical, so we have reason for suspecting that the Hegelian logic has been in some degree adapted to the order of thought in history. There is unfortunately no criterion to which either of them can be subjected, and not much forcing was required to bring either into near relations with the other. We may fairly doubt whether the division of the first and second parts of logic in the Hegelian system has not really arisen from a desire to make them accord with the first and second stages of the early Greek philosophy. Is there any reason why the conception of measure in the first part, which is formed by the union of quality and quantity, should not have been equally placed in the second division of mediate or reflected ideas? The more we analyze them the less exact does the coincidence of philosophy and the history of philosophy appear. Many terms which were used absolutely in the beginning of philosophy, such as 'Being,' 'matter,' 'cause,' and the like, became relative in the subsequent history of thought. But Hegel employs some of them absolutely, some relatively, seemingly without any principle and without any regard to their original significance.
  The nomenclature of Hegel has been made by himself out of the language of common life. He uses a few words only which are borrowed from his predecessors, or from the Greek philosophy, and these generally in a sense peculiar to himself. The first stage of his philosophy answers to the word 'is,' the second to the word 'has been,' the third to the words 'has been' and 'is' combined. In other words, the first sphere is immediate, the second mediated by reflection, the third or highest returns into the first, and is both mediate and immediate. As Luther's Bible was written in the language of the common people, so Hegel seems to have thought that he gave his philosophy a truly German character by the use of idiomatic German words. But it may be doubted whether the attempt has been successful. First because such words as 'in sich seyn,' 'an sich seyn,' 'an und fur sich seyn,' though the simplest combinations of nouns and verbs, require a difficult and elaborate explanation. The simplicity of the words contrasts with the hardness of their meaning. Secondly, the use of technical phraseology necessarily separates philosophy from general literature; the student has to learn a new language of uncertain meaning which he with difficulty remembers. No former philosopher had ever carried the use of technical terms to the same extent as Hegel. The language of Plato or even of Aristotle is but slightly removed from that of common life, and was introduced naturally by a series of thinkers: the language of the scholastic logic has become technical to us, but in the Middle Ages was the vernacular Latin of priests and students. The higher spirit of philosophy, the spirit of Plato and Socrates, rebels against the Hegelian use of language as mechanical and technical.
  Hegel is fond of etymologies and often seems to trifle with words. He gives etymologies which are bad, and never considers that the meaning of a word may have nothing to do with its derivation. He lived before the days of Comparative Philology or of Comparative Mythology and Religion, which would have opened a new world to him. He makes no allowance for the element of chance either in language or thought; and perhaps there is no greater defect in his system than the want of a sound theory of language. He speaks as if thought, instead of being identical with language, was wholly independent of it. It is not the actual growth of the mind, but the imaginary growth of the Hegelian system, which is attractive to him.

Tablets of Baha u llah text, #Tablets of Baha u llah, #Baha u llah, #Baha i
  After Socrates came the divine Plato who was a pupil of the former and occupied the chair of philosophy as his successor. He acknowledged his belief in God and in His signs which pervade all that hath been and shall be. Then came Aristotle, the well-known man of knowledge. He it is who discovered the power of gaseous matter. These men who stand out as leaders of the people and are preeminent among them, one and all acknowledged their belief in the immortal Being Who holdeth in His grasp the reins of all sciences.
  I will also mention for thee the invocation voiced by Balínús who was familiar with the theories put forward by the Father of Philosophy regarding the mysteries of creation as given in his chrysolite tablets, that everyone may be fully assured of the things We have elucidated for thee in this manifest Tablet, which, if pressed with the hand of fairness and knowledge, will yield the spirit of life for the quickening of all created things. Great is the blessedness of him who swimmeth in this ocean and celebrateth the praise of his Lord, the Gracious, the Best-Beloved. Indeed the breezes of divine revelation are diffused from the verses of thy Lord in such wise that no one can dispute its truth, except those who are bereft of hearing, of vision, of understanding and of every human faculty. Verily thy Lord beareth witness unto this, yet the people understand not.

The Act of Creation text, #The Act of Creation, #Arthur Koestler, #Psychology
  days of Aristotle, the 'theory of degradation' appears as the most
  persistent. For Aristotle himself laughter was closely related to ugliness
  and debasement; for Cicero 'the province of the ridiculous ... lies in
  of their necessity, whereas Aristotle the Platonist asserted that the
  species are immutable and denied the continuity between homo sapiens
  scientific thought from Aristotle to the Renaissance. Even Galileo still
  believed that a heavenly body, left to itself, would for ever continue
  that the logic of the dream is not the logic of Aristotle; that it derives
  from the magic type of causation found in primitive societies and the
  nature into discredit. The physics of Aristotle, which ruled Europe for
  two thousand years, paid no attention to quantity or measurement;
  science between Thales and Aristotle.
  After the Macedonian conquest of Greece there followed a period
  married to theology when Aristotle's 'first mover' became identified
  with God, and his star-spinning spirits with the hierarchy of angels.
  To revert to Aristotle, the cathartic function of the tragedy is
  'through incidents arousing horror and pity to accomplish the purga-
  sciousness by the bisociative art. In this final illumination Aristotle
  saw 'the highest form of learning' because it shows us that we are 'men,
  that the categories of Aristotle acted as embryonic inductors on the
  self-differentiating morphogenetic fields of conceptual thought.
  the History of Physics by Theophrastus, the successor of Aristotle at the
  head of the Athenean Lyceum. He innocently remarks that when amber
  was summed up in a passage by Aristotle, from which I have briefly
  quoted before (my italics):
  It is amusing to note Aristotle's belief that applied science and
  technology had completed their task long before his time as the

Theaetetus, #unset, #Anonymous, #Various
  1. In reply to the first, we have only probabilities to offer. Three main points have to be decided: (a) Would Protagoras have identified his own thesis, 'Man is the measure of all things,' with the other, 'All knowledge is sensible perception'? (b) Would he have based the relativity of knowledge on the Heraclitean flux? (c) Would he have asserted the absoluteness of sensation at each instant? Of the work of Protagoras on 'Truth' we know nothing, with the exception of the two famous fragments, which are cited in this dialogue, 'Man is the measure of all things,' and, 'Whether there are gods or not, I cannot tell.' Nor have we any other trustworthy evidence of the tenets of Protagoras, or of the sense in which his words are used. For later writers, including Aristotle in his Metaphysics, have mixed up the Protagoras of Plato, as they have the Socrates of Plato, with the real person.
  Returning then to the Theaetetus, as the only possible source from which an answer to these questions can be obtained, we may remark, that Plato had 'The Truth' of Protagoras before him, and frequently refers to the book. He seems to say expressly, that in this work the doctrine of the Heraclitean flux was not to be found; 'he told the real truth' (not in the book, which is so entitled, but) 'privately to his disciples,'words which imply that the connexion between the doctrines of Protagoras and Heracleitus was not generally recognized in Greece, but was really discovered or invented by Plato. On the other hand, the doctrine that 'Man is the measure of all things,' is expressly identified by Socrates with the other statement, that 'What appears to each man is to him;' and a reference is made to the books in which the statement occurs;this Theaetetus, who has 'often read the books,' is supposed to acknowledge (so Cratylus). And Protagoras, in the speech attri buted to him, never says that he has been misunderstood: he rather seems to imply that the absoluteness of sensation at each instant was to be found in his words. He is only indignant at the 'reductio ad absurdum' devised by Socrates for his 'homo mensura,' which Theodorus also considers to be 'really too bad.'
  I. The saying of Theaetetus, that 'Knowledge is sensible perception,' may be assumed to be a current philosophical opinion of the age. 'The ancients,' as Aristotle (De Anim.) says, citing a verse of Empedocles, 'affirmed knowledge to be the same as perception.' We may now examine these words, first, with reference to their place in the history of philosophy, and secondly, in relation to modern speculations.
  (a) In the age of Socrates the mind was passing from the object to the subject. The same impulse which a century before had led men to form conceptions of the world, now led them to frame general notions of the human faculties and feelings, such as memory, opinion, and the like. The simplest of these is sensation, or sensible perception, by which Plato seems to mean the generalized notion of feelings and impressions of sense, without determining whether they are conscious or not.
  Plato appears to treat Protagoras much as he himself is treated by Aristotle; that is to say, he does not attempt to understand him from his own point of view. But he entangles him in the meshes of a more advanced logic. To which Protagoras is supposed to reply by Megarian quibbles, which destroy logic, 'Not only man, but each man, and each man at each moment.' In the arguments about sight and memory there is a palpable unfairness which is worthy of the great 'brainless brothers,' Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, and may be compared with the egkekalummenos ('obvelatus') of Eubulides. For he who sees with one eye only cannot be truly said both to see and not to see; nor is memory, which is liable to forget, the immediate knowledge to which Protagoras applies the term. Theodorus justly charges Socrates with going beyond the truth; and Protagoras has equally right on his side when he protests against Socrates arguing from the common use of words, which 'the vulgar pervert in all manner of ways.'
  III. The theory of Protagoras is connected by Aristotle as well as Plato with the flux of Heracleitus. But Aristotle is only following Plato, and Plato, as we have already seen, did not mean to imply that such a connexion was admitted by Protagoras himself. His metaphysical genius saw or seemed to see a common tendency in them, just as the modern historian of ancient philosophy might perceive a parallelism between two thinkers of which they were probably unconscious themselves. We must remember throughout that Plato is not speaking of Heracleitus, but of the Heracliteans, who succeeded him; nor of the great original ideas of the master, but of the Eristic into which they had degenerated a hundred years later. There is nothing in the fragments of Heracleitus which at all justifies Plato's account of him. His philosophy may be resolved into two elementsfirst, change, secondly, law or measure pervading the change: these he saw everywhere, and often expressed in strange mythological symbols. But he has no analysis of sensible perception such as Plato attri butes to him; nor is there any reason to suppose that he pushed his philosophy into that absolute negation in which Heracliteanism was sunk in the age of Plato. He never said that 'change means every sort of change;' and he expressly distinguished between 'the general and particular understanding.' Like a poet, he surveyed the elements of mythology, nature, thought, which lay before him, and sometimes by the light of genius he saw or seemed to see a mysterious principle working behind them. But as has been the case with other great philosophers, and with Plato and Aristotle themselves, what was really permanent and original could not be understood by the next generation, while a perverted logic carried out his chance expressions with an illogical consistency. His simple and noble thoughts, like those of the great Eleatic, soon degenerated into a mere strife of words. And when thus reduced to mere words, they seem to have exercised a far wider influence in the cities of Ionia (where the people 'were mad about them') than in the life-time of Heracleitusa phenomenon which, though at first sight singular, is not without a parallel in the history of philosophy and theology.
  It is this perverted form of the Heraclitean philosophy which is supposed to effect the final overthrow of Protagorean sensationalism. For if all things are changing at every moment, in all sorts of ways, then there is nothing fixed or defined at all, and therefore no sensible perception, nor any true word by which that or anything else can be described. Of course Protagoras would not have admitted the justice of this argument any more than Heracleitus would have acknowledged the 'uneducated fanatics' who appealed to his writings. He might have said, 'The excellent Socrates has first confused me with Heracleitus, and Heracleitus with his Ephesian successors, and has then disproved the existence both of knowledge and sensation. But I am not responsible for what I never said, nor will I admit that my common-sense account of knowledge can be overthrown by unintelligible Heraclitean paradoxes.'
  Many (1) fine expressions, and (2) remarks full of wisdom, (3) also germs of a metaphysic of the future, are scattered up and down in the dialogue. Such, for example, as (1) the comparison of Theaetetus' progress in learning to the 'noiseless flow of a river of oil'; the satirical touch, 'flavouring a sauce or fawning speech'; or the remarkable expression, 'full of impure dialectic'; or the lively images under which the argument is described,'the flood of arguments pouring in,' the fresh discussions 'bursting in like a band of revellers.' (2) As illustrations of the second head, may be cited the remark of Socrates, that 'distinctions of words, although sometimes pedantic, are also necessary'; or the fine touch in the character of the lawyer, that 'dangers came upon him when the tenderness of youth was unequal to them'; or the description of the manner in which the spirit is broken in a wicked man who listens to reproof until he becomes like a child; or the punishment of the wicked, which is not physical suffering, but the perpetual companionship of evil (compare Gorgias); or the saying, often repeated by Aristotle and others, that 'philosophy begins in wonder, for Iris is the child of Thaumas'; or the superb contempt with which the philosopher takes down the pride of wealthy landed proprietors by comparison of the whole earth. (3) Important metaphysical ideas are: a. the conception of thought, as the mind talking to herself; b. the notion of a common sense, developed further by Aristotle, and the explicit declaration, that the mind gains her conceptions of Being, sameness, number, and the like, from reflection on herself; c. the excellent distinction of Theaetetus (which Socrates, speaking with emphasis, 'leaves to grow') between seeing the forms or hearing the sounds of words in a foreign language, and understanding the meaning of them; and d. the distinction of Socrates himself between 'having' and 'possessing' knowledge, in which the answer to the whole discussion appears to be contained.
  In ancient philosophies the analysis of the mind is still rudimentary and imperfect. It naturally began with an effort to disengage the universal from sensethis was the first lifting up of the mist. It wavered between object and subject, passing imperceptibly from one or Being to mind and thought. Appearance in the outward object was for a time indistinguishable from opinion in the subject. At length mankind spoke of knowing as well as of opining or perceiving. But when the word 'knowledge' was found how was it to be explained or defined? It was not an error, it was a step in the right direction, when Protagoras said that 'Man is the measure of all things,' and that 'All knowledge is perception.' This was the subjective which corresponded to the objective 'All is flux.' But the thoughts of men deepened, and soon they began to be aware that knowledge was neither sense, nor yet opinionwith or without explanation; nor the expression of thought, nor the enumeration of parts, nor the addition of characteristic marks. Motion and rest were equally ill adapted to express its nature, although both must in some sense be attri buted to it; it might be described more truly as the mind conversing with herself; the discourse of reason; the hymn of dialectic, the science of relations, of ideas, of the so-called arts and sciences, of the one, of the good, of the all:this is the way along which Plato is leading us in his later dialogues. In its higher signification it was the knowledge, not of men, but of gods, perfect and all sufficing:like other ideals always passing out of sight, and nevertheless present to the mind of Aristotle as well as Plato, and the reality to which they were both tending. For Aristotle as well as Plato would in modern phraseology have been termed a mystic; and like him would have defined the higher philosophy to be 'Knowledge of being or essence,'words to which in our own day we have a difficulty in attaching a meaning.
  Yet, in spite of Plato and his followers, mankind have again and again returned to a sensational philosophy. As to some of the early thinkers, amid the fleetings of sensible objects, ideas alone seemed to be fixed, so to a later generation amid the fluctuation of philosophical opinions the only fixed points appeared to be outward objects. Any pretence of knowledge which went beyond them implied logical processes, of the correctness of which they had no assurance and which at best were only probable. The mind, tired of wandering, sought to rest on firm ground; when the idols of philosophy and language were stripped off, the perception of outward objects alone remained. The ancient Epicureans never asked whether the comparison of these with one another did not involve principles of another kind which were above and beyond them. In like manner the modern inductive philosophy forgot to enquire into the meaning of experience, and did not attempt to form a conception of outward objects apart from the mind, or of the mind apart from them. Soon objects of sense were merged in sensations and feelings, but feelings and sensations were still unanalyzed. At last we return to the doctrine attri buted by Plato to Protagoras, that the mind is only a succession of momentary perceptions. At this point the modern philosophy of experience forms an alliance with ancient scepticism.
  Whether space exists in the mind or out of it, is a question which has no meaning. We should rather say that without it the mind is incapable of conceiving the body, and therefore of conceiving itself. The mind may be indeed imagined to contain the body, in the same way that Aristotle (partly following Plato) supposes God to be the outer heaven or circle of the universe. But how can the individual mind carry about the universe of space packed up within, or how can separate minds have either a universe of their own or a common universe? In such conceptions there seems to be a confusion of the individual and the universal. To say that we can only have a true idea of ourselves when we deny the reality of that by which we have any idea of ourselves is an absurdity. The earth which is our habitation and 'the starry heaven above' and we ourselves are equally an illusion, if space is only a quality or condition of our minds.
  Again, we may compare the truths of space with other truths derived from experience, which seem to have a necessity to us in proportion to the frequency of their recurrence or the truth of the consequences which may be inferred from them. We are thus led to remark that the necessity in our ideas of space on which much stress has been laid, differs in a slight degree only from the necessity which appears to belong to other of our ideas, e.g. weight, motion, and the like. And there is another way in which this necessity may be explained. We have been taught it, and the truth which we were taught or which we inherited has never been contradicted in all our experience and is therefore confirmed by it. Who can resist an idea which is presented to him in a general form in every moment of his life and of which he finds no instance to the contrary? The greater part of what is sometimes regarded as the a priori intuition of space is really the conception of the various geometrical figures of which the properties have been revealed by mathematical analysis. And the certainty of these properties is immeasurably increased to us by our finding that they hold good not only in every instance, but in all the consequences which are supposed to flow from them.
  Within or behind space there is another abstraction in many respects similar to ittime, the form of the inward, as space is the form of the outward. As we cannot think of outward objects of sense or of outward sensations without space, so neither can we think of a succession of sensations without time. It is the vacancy of thoughts or sensations, as space is the void of outward objects, and we can no more imagine the mind without the one than the world without the other. It is to arithmetic what space is to geometry; or, more strictly, arithmetic may be said to be equally applicable to both. It is defined in our minds, partly by the analogy of space and partly by the recollection of events which have happened to us, or the consciousness of feelings which we are experiencing. Like space, it is without limit, for whatever beginning or end of time we fix, there is a beginning and end before them, and so on without end. We speak of a past, present, and future, and again the analogy of space assists us in conceiving of them as coexistent. When the limit of time is removed there arises in our minds the idea of eternity, which at first, like time itself, is only negative, but gradually, when connected with the world and the divine nature, like the other negative infinity of space, becomes positive. Whether time is prior to the mind and to experience, or coeval with them, is (like the parallel question about space) unmeaning. Like space it has been realized gradually: in the Homeric poems, or even in the Hesiodic cosmogony, there is no more notion of time than of space. The conception of being is more general than either, and might therefore with greater plausibility be affirmed to be a condition or quality of the mind. The a priori intuitions of Kant would have been as unintelligible to Plato as his a priori synthetical propositions to Aristotle. The philosopher of Konigsberg supposed himself to be analyzing a necessary mode of thought: he was not aware that he was dealing with a mere abstraction. But now that we are able to trace the gradual developement of ideas through religion, through language, through abstractions, why should we interpose the fiction of time between ourselves and realities? Why should we single out one of these abstractions to be the a priori condition of all the others? It comes last and not first in the order of our thoughts, and is not the condition precedent of them, but the last generalization of them. Nor can any principle be imagined more suicidal to philosophy than to assume that all the truth which we are capable of attaining is seen only through an unreal medium. If all that exists in time is illusion, we may well ask with Plato, 'What becomes of the mind?'
  Leaving the a priori conditions of sensation we may proceed to consider acts of sense. These admit of various degrees of duration or intensity; they admit also of a greater or less extension from one object, which is perceived directly, to many which are perceived indirectly or in a less degree, and to the various associations of the object which are latent in the mind. In general the greater the intension the less the extension of them. The simplest sensation implies some relation of objects to one another, some position in space, some relation to a previous or subsequent sensation. The acts of seeing and hearing may be almost unconscious and may pass away unnoted; they may also leave an impression behind them or power of recalling them. If, after seeing an object we shut our eyes, the object remains dimly seen in the same or about the same place, but with form and lineaments half filled up. This is the simplest act of memory. And as we cannot see one thing without at the same time seeing another, different objects hang together in recollection, and when we call for one the other quickly follows. To think of the place in which we have last seen a thing is often the best way of recalling it to the mind. Hence memory is dependent on association. The act of recollection may be compared to the sight of an object at a great distance which we have previously seen near and seek to bring near to us in thought. Memory is to sense as dreaming is to waking; and like dreaming has a wayward and uncertain power of recalling impressions from the past.
  c. But the knowledge of the mind is not to any great extent derived from the observation of the individual by himself. It is the growing consciousness of the human race, embodied in language, acknowledged by experience, and corrected from time to time by the influence of literature and philosophy. A great, perhaps the most important, part of it is to be found in early Greek thought. In the Theaetetus of Plato it has not yet become fixed: we are still stumbling on the threshold. In Aristotle the process is more nearly completed, and has gained innumerable abstractions, of which many have had to be thrown away because relative only to the controversies of the time. In the interval between Thales and Aristotle were realized the distinctions of mind and body, of universal and particular, of infinite and infinitesimal, of idea and phenomenon; the class conceptions of faculties and virtues, the antagonism of the appetites and the reason; and connected with this, at a higher stage of development, the opposition of moral and intellectual virtue; also the primitive conceptions of unity, being, rest, motion, and the like. These divisions were not really scientific, but rather based on popular experience. They were not held with the precision of modern thinkers, but taken all together they gave a new existence to the mind in thought, and greatly enlarged and more accurately defined man's knowledge of himself and of the world. The majority of them have been accepted by Christian and Western nations. Yet in modern times we have also drifted so far away from Aristotle, that if we were to frame a system on his lines we should be at war with ordinary language and untrue to our own consciousness. And there have been a few both in mediaeval times and since the Reformation who have rebelled against the Aristotelian point of view. Of these eccentric thinkers there have been various types, but they have all a family likeness. According to them, there has been too much analysis and too little synthesis, too much division of the mind into parts and too little conception of it as a whole or in its relation to God and the laws of the universe. They have thought that the elements of plurality and unity have not been duly adjusted. The tendency of such writers has been to allow the personality of man to be absorbed in the universal, or in the divine nature, and to deny the distinction between matter and mind, or to substitute one for the other. They have broken some of the idols of Psychology: they have challenged the received meaning of words: they have regarded the mind under many points of view. But though they may have shaken the old, they have not established the new; their views of philosophy, which seem like the echo of some voice from the East, have been alien to the mind of Europe.
  d. The Psychology which is found in common language is in some degree verified by experience, but not in such a manner as to give it the character of an exact science. We cannot say that words always correspond to facts. Common language represents the mind from different and even opposite points of view, which cannot be all of them equally true (compare Cratylus). Yet from diversity of statements and opinions may be obtained a nearer approach to the truth than is to be gained from any one of them. It also tends to correct itself, because it is gradually brought nearer to the common sense of mankind. There are some leading categories or classifications of thought, which, though unverified, must always remain the elements from which the science or study of the mind proceeds. For example, we must assume ideas before we can analyze them, and also a continuing mind to which they belong; the resolution of it into successive moments, which would say, with Protagoras, that the man is not the same person which he was a minute ago, is, as Plato implies in the Theaetetus, an absurdity.

The Dwellings of the Philosophers, #unset, #Anonymous, #Various
  This little fish shames not only the Roman greatness, but also Aristotle who loses credibility
  here and philosophy which goes bankrupt, for they find no reason for this strength, that a
  ask to explain to us what Aristotles master wanted to reveal by this fiction of a sinister
  nature. For we indeed believe that beyond doubt, Plate became the propagator of very ancient

the Eternal Wisdom, #unset, #Anonymous, #Various
  7) There is only one Ethics, as there is only one geometry. But the majority of men, it will be said, are ignorant of geometry. Yes, but as soon as they begin to apply themselves a little to that science, all are in agreement. Cultivators, workmen, artisans have not gone through courses in ethics; they have not read Cicero or Aristotle, but the moment they begin to think on the subject they become, without knowing it, the disciples of Cicero. The Indian dyer, the Tartar shepherd and the English sailor know what is just and what is injust. Confucius did not invent a system of ethics as one invents a system of physics. He had discovered it in the heart of all mankind. ~ Voltaire
  8) The sage's rule of moral conduct has its principle in the hearts of all men. ~ Tseu-tse

The Fearful Sphere of Pascal, #Labyrinths, #Jorge Luis Borges, #Poetry
  of a sphere without end; Albertelli (as Aristotle before him) thinks that to
  182speak in this wise is to commit a contradictio in adjecto, because subject and
  is the timid title which Copernicus, denier of Aristotle, placed at the head of
  the manuscript that transformed our vision of the cosmos.
  and microscopic vision; Robert South conspicuously wrote: "An Aristotle
  was but the fragment of an Adam, and Athens the rudiments of Paradise." In

Timaeus, #unset, #Anonymous, #Various
  The influence with the Timaeus has exercised upon posterity is due partly to a misunderstanding. In the supposed depths of this dialogue the Neo-Platonists found hidden meanings and connections with the Jewish and Christian Scriptures, and out of them they elicited doctrines quite at variance with the spirit of Plato. Believing that he was inspired by the Holy Ghost, or had received his wisdom from Moses, they seemed to find in his writings the Christian Trinity, the Word, the Church, the creation of the world in a Jewish sense, as they really found the personality of God or of mind, and the immortality of the soul. All religions and philosophies met and mingled in the schools of Alexandria, and the Neo-Platonists had a method of interpretation which could elicit any meaning out of any words. They were really incapable of distinguishing between the opinions of one philosopher and another between Aristotle and Plato, or between the serious thoughts of Plato and his passing fancies. They were absorbed in his theology and were under the dominion of his name, while that which was truly great and truly characteristic in him, his effort to realize and connect abstractions, was not understood by them at all. Yet the genius of Plato and Greek philosophy reacted upon the East, and a Greek element of thought and language overlaid and partly reduced to order the chaos of Orientalism. And kindred spirits, like St. Augustine, even though they were acquainted with his writings only through the medium of a Latin translation, were profoundly affected by them, seeming to find 'God and his word everywhere insinuated' in them (August. Confess.)
  There is no danger of the modern commentators on the Timaeus falling into the absurdities of the Neo-Platonists. In the present day we are well aware that an ancient philosopher is to be interpreted from himself and by the contemporary history of thought. We know that mysticism is not criticism. The fancies of the Neo-Platonists are only interesting to us because they exhibit a phase of the human mind which prevailed widely in the first centuries of the Christian era, and is not wholly extinct in our own day. But they have nothing to do with the interpretation of Plato, and in spirit they are opposed to him. They are the feeble expression of an age which has lost the power not only of creating great works, but of understanding them. They are the spurious birth of a marriage between philosophy and tradition, between Hellas and the East(Greek) (Rep.). Whereas the so-called mysticism of Plato is purely Greek, arising out of his imperfect knowledge and high aspirations, and is the growth of an age in which philosophy is not wholly separated from poetry and mythology.
  The ancient physical philosophers have been charged by Dr. Whewell and others with wasting their fine intelligences in wrong methods of enquiry; and their progress in moral and political philosophy has been sometimes contrasted with their supposed failure in physical investigations. 'They had plenty of ideas,' says Dr. Whewell, 'and plenty of facts; but their ideas did not accurately represent the facts with which they were acquainted.' This is a very crude and misleading way of describing ancient science. It is the mistake of an uneducated personuneducated, that is, in the higher sense of the wordwho imagines every one else to be like himself and explains every other age by his own. No doubt the ancients often fell into strange and fanciful errors: the time had not yet arrived for the slower and surer path of the modern inductive philosophy. But it remains to be shown that they could have done more in their age and country; or that the contri butions which they made to the sciences with which they were acquainted are not as great upon the whole as those made by their successors. There is no single step in astronomy as great as that of the nameless Pythagorean who first conceived the world to be a body moving round the sun in space: there is no truer or more comprehensive principle than the application of mathematics alike to the heavenly bodies, and to the particles of matter. The ancients had not the instruments which would have enabled them to correct or verify their anticipations, and their opportunities of observation were limited. Plato probably did more for physical science by asserting the supremacy of mathematics than Aristotle or his disciples by their collections of facts. When the thinkers of modern times, following Bacon, undervalue or disparage the speculations of ancient philosophers, they seem wholly to forget the conditions of the world and of the human mind, under which they carried on their investigations. When we accuse them of being under the influence of words, do we suppose that we are altogether free from this illusion? When we remark that Greek physics soon became stationary or extinct, may we not observe also that there have been and may be again periods in the history of modern philosophy which have been barren and unproductive? We might as well maintain that Greek art was not real or great, because it had nihil simile aut secundum, as say that Greek physics were a failure because they admire no subsequent progress.
  The charge of premature generalization which is often urged against ancient philosophers is really an anachronism. For they can hardly be said to have generalized at all. They may be said more truly to have cleared up and defined by the help of experience ideas which they already possessed. The beginnings of thought about nature must always have this character. A true method is the result of many ages of experiment and observation, and is ever going on and enlarging with the progress of science and knowledge. At first men personify nature, then they form impressions of nature, at last they conceive 'measure' or laws of nature. They pass out of mythology into philosophy. Early science is not a process of discovery in the modern sense; but rather a process of correcting by observation, and to a certain extent only, the first impressions of nature, which mankind, when they began to think, had received from poetry or language or unintelligent sense. Of all scientific truths the greatest and simplest is the uniformity of nature; this was expressed by the ancients in many ways, as fate, or necessity, or measure, or limit. Unexpected events, of which the cause was unknown to them, they attri buted to chance (Thucyd.). But their conception of nature was never that of law interrupted by exceptions,a somewhat unfortunate metaphysical invention of modern times, which is at variance with facts and has failed to satisfy the requirements of thought.
  Space is said by Plato to be the 'containing vessel or nurse of generation.' Reflecting on the simplest kinds of external objects, which to the ancients were the four elements, he was led to a more general notion of a substance, more or less like themselves, out of which they were fashioned. He would not have them too precisely distinguished. Thus seems to have arisen the first dim perception of (Greek) or matter, which has played so great a part in the metaphysical philosophy of Aristotle and his followers. But besides the material out of which the elements are made, there is also a space in which they are contained. There arises thus a second nature which the senses are incapable of discerning and which can hardly be referred to the intelligible class. For it is and it is not, it is nowhere when filled, it is nothing when empty. Hence it is said to be discerned by a kind of spurious or analogous reason, partaking so feebly of existence as to be hardly perceivable, yet always reappearing as the containing mother or nurse of all things. It had not that sort of consistency to Plato which has been given to it in modern times by geometry and metaphysics. Neither of the Greek words by which it is described are so purely abstract as the English word 'space' or the Latin 'spatium.' Neither Plato nor any other Greek would have spoken of (Greek) or (Greek) in the same manner as we speak of 'time' and 'space.'
  Yet space is also of a very permanent or even eternal nature; and Plato seems more willing to admit of the unreality of time than of the unreality of space; because, as he says, all things must necessarily exist in space. We, on the other hand, are disposed to fancy that even if space were annihilated time might still survive. He admits indeed that our knowledge of space is of a dreamy kind, and is given by a spurious reason without the help of sense. (Compare the hypotheses and images of Rep.) It is true that it does not attain to the clearness of ideas. But like them it seems to remain, even if all the objects contained in it are supposed to have vanished away. Hence it was natural for Plato to conceive of it as eternal. We must remember further that in his attempt to realize either space or matter the two abstract ideas of weight and extension, which are familiar to us, had never passed before his mind.
  We have now to consider the much discussed question of the rotation or immobility of the earth. Plato's doctrine on this subject is contained in the following words:'The earth, which is our nurse, compacted (OR revolving) around the pole which is extended through the universe, he made to be the guardian and artificer of night and day, first and eldest of gods that are in the interior of heaven'. There is an unfortunate doubt in this passage (1) about the meaning of the word (Greek), which is translated either 'compacted' or 'revolving,' and is equally capable of both explanations. A doubt (2) may also be raised as to whether the words 'artificer of day and night' are consistent with the mere passive causation of them, produced by the immobility of the earth in the midst of the circling universe. We must admit, further, (3) that Aristotle attri buted to Plato the doctrine of the rotation of the earth on its axis. On the other hand it has been urged that if the earth goes round with the outer heaven and sun in twenty-four hours, there is no way of accounting for the alternation of day and night; since the equal motion of the earth and sun would have the effect of absolute immobility. To which it may be replied that Plato never says that the earth goes round with the outer heaven and sun; although the whole question depends on the relation of earth and sun, their movements are nowhere precisely described. But if we suppose, with Mr. Grote, that the diurnal rotation of the earth on its axis and the revolution of the sun and outer heaven precisely coincide, it would be difficult to imagine that Plato was unaware of the consequence. For though he was ignorant of many things which are familiar to us, and often confused in his ideas where we have become clear, we have no right to attri bute to him a childish want of reasoning about very simple facts, or an inability to understand the necessary and obvious deductions from geometrical figures or movements. Of the causes of day and night the pre-Socratic philosophers, and especially the Pythagoreans, gave various accounts, and therefore the question can hardly be imagined to have escaped him. On the other hand it may be urged that the further step, however simple and obvious, is just what Plato often seems to be ignorant of, and that as there is no limit to his insight, there is also no limit to the blindness which sometimes obscures his intelligence (compare the construction of solids out of surfaces in his account of the creation of the world, or the attraction of similars to similars). Further, Mr. Grote supposes, not that (Greek) means 'revolving,' or that this is the sense in which Aristotle understood the word, but that the rotation of the earth is necessarily implied in its adherence to the cosmical axis. But (a) if, as Mr Grote assumes, Plato did not see that the rotation of the earth on its axis and of the sun and outer heavens around the earth in equal times was inconsistent with the alternation of day and night, neither need we suppose that he would have seen the immobility of the earth to be inconsistent with the rotation of the axis. And (b) what proof is there that the axis of the world revolves at all? (c) The comparison of the two passages quoted by Mr Grote (see his pamphlet on 'The Rotation of the Earth') from Aristotle De Coelo, Book II (Greek) clearly shows, although this is a matter of minor importance, that Aristotle, as Proclus and Simplicius supposed, understood (Greek) in the Timaeus to mean 'revolving.' For the second passage, in which motion on an axis is expressly mentioned, refers to the first, but this would be unmeaning unless (Greek) in the first passage meant rotation on an axis. (4) The immobility of the earth is more in accordance with Plato's other writings than the opposite hypothesis. For in the Phaedo the earth is described as the centre of the world, and is not said to be in motion. In the Republic the pilgrims appear to be looking out from the earth upon the motions of the heavenly bodies; in the Phaedrus, Hestia, who remains immovable in the house of Zeus while the other gods go in procession, is called the first and eldest of the gods, and is probably the symbol of the earth. The silence of Plato in these and in some other passages (Laws) in which he might be expected to speak of the rotation of the earth, is more favourable to the doctrine of its immobility than to the opposite. If he had meant to say that the earth revolves on its axis, he would have said so in distinct words, and have explained the relation of its movements to those of the other heavenly bodies. (5) The meaning of the words 'artificer of day and night' is literally true according to Plato's view. For the alternation of day and night is not produced by the motion of the heavens alone, or by the immobility of the earth alone, but by both together; and that which has the inherent force or energy to remain at rest when all other bodies are moving, may be truly said to act, equally with them. (6) We should not lay too much stress on Aristotle or the writer De Caelo having adopted the other interpretation of the words, although Alexander of Aphrodisias thinks that he could not have been ignorant either of the doctrine of Plato or of the sense which he intended to give to the word (Greek). For the citations of Plato in Aristotle are frequently misinterpreted by him; and he seems hardly ever to have had in his mind the connection in which they occur. In this instance the allusion is very slight, and there is no reason to suppose that the diurnal revolution of the heavens was present to his mind. Hence we need not attri bute to him the error from which we are defending Plato.
  After weighing one against the other all these complicated probabilities, the final conclusion at which we arrive is that there is nearly as much to be said on the one side of the question as on the other, and that we are not perfectly certain, whether, as Bockh and the majority of commentators, ancient as well as modern, are inclined to believe, Plato thought that the earth was at rest in the centre of the universe, or, as Aristotle and Mr. Grote suppose, that it revolved on its axis. Whether we assume the earth to be stationary in the centre of the universe, or to revolve with the heavens, no explanation is given of the variation in the length of days and nights at different times of the year. The relations of the earth and heavens are so indistinct in the Timaeus and so figurative in the Phaedo, Phaedrus and Republic, that we must give up the hope of ascertaining how they were imagined by Plato, if he had any fixed or scientific conception of them at all.
  Section 5.
  That there is a degree of confusion and indistinctness in Plato's account both of man and of the universe has been already acknowledged. We cannot tell (nor could Plato himself have told) where the figure or myth ends and the philosophical truth begins; we cannot explain (nor could Plato himself have explained to us) the relation of the ideas to appearance, of which one is the copy of the other, and yet of all things in the world they are the most opposed and unlike. This opposition is presented to us in many forms, as the antithesis of the one and many, of the finite and infinite, of the intelligible and sensible, of the unchangeable and the changing, of the indivisible and the divisible, of the fixed stars and the planets, of the creative mind and the primeval chaos. These pairs of opposites are so many aspects of the great opposition between ideas and phenomenathey easily pass into one another; and sometimes the two members of the relation differ in kind, sometimes only in degree. As in Aristotle's matter and form the connexion between them is really inseparable; for if we attempt to separate them they become devoid of content and therefore indistinguishable; there is no difference between the idea of which nothing can be predicated, and the chaos or matter which has no perceptible qualitiesbetween Being in the abstract and Nothing. Yet we are frequently told that the one class of them is the reality and the other appearance; and one is often spoken of as the double or reflection of the other. For Plato never clearly saw that both elements had an equal place in mind and in nature; and hence, especially when we argue from isolated passages in his writings, or attempt to draw what appear to us to be the natural inferences from them, we are full of perplexity. There is a similar confusion about necessity and free-will, and about the state of the soul after death. Also he sometimes supposes that God is immanent in the world, sometimes that he is transcendent. And having no distinction of objective and subjective, he passes imperceptibly from one to the other; from intelligence to soul, from eternity to time. These contradictions may be softened or concealed by a judicious use of language, but they cannot be wholly got rid of. That an age of intellectual transition must also be one of inconsistency; that the creative is opposed to the critical or defining habit of mind or time, has been often repeated by us. But, as Plato would say, 'there is no harm in repeating twice or thrice' (Laws) what is important for the understanding of a great author.
  It has not, however, been observed, that the confusion partly arises out of the elements of opposing philosophies which are preserved in him. He holds these in solution, he brings them into relation with one another, but he does not perfectly harmonize them. They are part of his own mind, and he is incapable of placing himself outside of them and criticizing them. They grow as he grows; they are a kind of composition with which his own philosophy is overlaid. In early life he fancies that he has mastered them: but he is also mastered by them; and in language (Sophist) which may be compared with the hesitating tone of the Timaeus, he confesses in his later years that they are full of obscurity to him. He attri butes new meanings to the words of Parmenides and Heracleitus; but at times the old Eleatic philosophy appears to go beyond him; then the world of phenomena disappears, but the doctrine of ideas is also reduced to nothingness. All of them are nearer to one another than they themselves supposed, and nearer to him than he supposed. All of them are antagonistic to sense and have an affinity to number and measure and a presentiment of ideas. Even in Plato they still retain their contentious or controversial character, which was developed by the growth of dialectic. He is never able to reconcile the first causes of the pre-Socratic philosophers with the final causes of Socrates himself. There is no intelligible account of the relation of numbers to the universal ideas, or of universals to the idea of good. He found them all three, in the Pythagorean philosophy and in the teaching of Socrates and of the Megarians respectively; and, because they all furnished modes of explaining and arranging phenomena, he is unwilling to give up any of them, though he is unable to unite them in a consistent whole.
  There is no difficulty, by the help of Aristotle and later writers, in criticizing the Timaeus of Plato, in pointing out the inconsistencies of the work, in dwelling on the ignorance of anatomy displayed by the author, in showing the fancifulness or unmeaningness of some of his reasons. But the Timaeus still remains the greatest effort of the human mind to conceive the world as a whole which the genius of antiquity has bequea thed to us.
  One more aspect of the Timaeus remains to be consideredthe mythological or geographical. Is it not a wonderful thing that a few pages of one of Plato's dialogues have grown into a great legend, not confined to Greece only, but spreading far and wide over the nations of Europe and reaching even to Egypt and Asia? Like the tale of Troy, or the legend of the Ten Tribes (Ewald, Hist. of Isr.), which perhaps originated in a few verses of II Esdras, it has become famous, because it has coincided with a great historical fact. Like the romance of King Arthur, which has had so great a charm, it has found a way over the seas from one country and language to another. It inspired the navigators of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries; it foreshadowed the discovery of America. It realized the fiction so natural to the human mind, because it answered the enquiry about the origin of the arts, that there had somewhere existed an ancient primitive civilization. It might find a place wherever men chose to look for it; in North, South, East, or West; in the Islands of the Blest; before the entrance of the Straits of Gibraltar, in Sweden or in Palestine. It mattered little whether the description in Plato agreed with the locality assigned to it or not. It was a legend so adapted to the human mind that it made a habitation for itself in any country. It was an island in the clouds, which might be seen anywhere by the eye of faith. It was a subject especially congenial to the ponderous industry of certain French and Swedish writers, who delighted in heaping up learning of all sorts but were incapable of using it.
  1. Did Plato derive the legend of Atlantis from an Egyptian source? It may be replied that there is no such legend in any writer previous to Plato; neither in Homer, nor in Pindar, nor in Herodotus is there any mention of an Island of Atlantis, nor any reference to it in Aristotle, nor any citation of an earlier writer by a later one in which it is to be found. Nor have any traces been discovered hitherto in Egyptian monuments of a connexion between Greece and Egypt older than the eighth or ninth century B.C. It is true that Proclus, writing in the fifth century after Christ, tells us of stones and columns in Egypt on which the history of the Island of Atlantis was engraved. The statement may be falsethere are similar tales about columns set up 'by the Canaanites whom Joshua drove out' (Procop.); but even if true, it would only show that the legend, 800 years after the time of Plato, had been transferred to Egypt, and inscribed, not, like other forgeries, in books, but on stone. Probably in the Alexandrian age, when Egypt had ceased to have a history and began to appropriate the legends of other nations, many such monuments were to be found of events which had become famous in that or other countries. The oldest witness to the story is said to be Crantor, a Stoic philosopher who lived a generation later than Plato, and therefore may have borrowed it from him. The statement is found in Proclus; but we require better assurance than Proclus can give us before we accept this or any other statement which he makes.
  Secondly, passing from the external to the internal evidence, we may remark that the story is far more likely to have been invented by Plato than to have been brought by Solon from Egypt. That is another part of his legend which Plato also seeks to impose upon us. The verisimilitude which he has given to the tale is a further reason for suspecting it; for he could easily 'invent Egyptian or any other tales' (Phaedrus). Are not the words, 'The truth of the story is a great advantage,' if we read between the lines, an indication of the fiction? It is only a legend that Solon went to Egypt, and if he did he could not have conversed with Egyptian priests or have read records in their temples. The truth is that the introduction is a mosaic work of small touches which, partly by their minuteness, and also by their seeming probability, win the confidence of the reader. Who would desire better evidence than that of Critias, who had heard the narrative in youth when the memory is strongest at the age of ten from his grandfa ther Critias, an old man of ninety, who in turn had heard it from Solon himself? Is not the famous expression'You Hellenes are ever children and there is no knowledge among you hoary with age,' really a compliment to the Athenians who are described in these words as 'ever young'? And is the thought expressed in them to be attri buted to the learning of the Egyptian priest, and not rather to the genius of Plato? Or when the Egyptian says'Hereafter at our leisure we will take up the written documents and examine in detail the exact truth about these things'what is this but a literary trick by which Plato sets off his narrative? Could any war between Athens and the Island of Atlantis have really coincided with the struggle between the Greeks and Persians, as is sufficiently hinted though not expressly stated in the narrative of Plato? And whence came the tradition to Egypt? or in what does the story consist except in the war between the two rival powers and the submersion of both of them? And how was the tale transferred to the poem of Solon? 'It is not improbable,' says Mr. Grote, 'that Solon did leave an unfinished Egyptian poem' (Plato). But are probabilities for which there is not a tittle of evidence, and which are without any parallel, to be deemed worthy of attention by the critic? How came the poem of Solon to disappear in antiquity? or why did Plato, if the whole narrative was known to him, break off almost at the beginning of it?


--- Overview of noun aristotle

The noun aristotle has 1 sense (first 1 from tagged texts)
1. (4) Aristotle ::: (one of the greatest of the ancient Athenian philosophers; pupil of Plato; teacher of Alexander the Great (384-322 BC))

--- Synonyms/Hypernyms (Ordered by Estimated Frequency) of noun aristotle

1 sense of aristotle                          

Sense 1
   INSTANCE OF=> philosopher
     => scholar, scholarly person, bookman, student
       => intellectual, intellect
         => person, individual, someone, somebody, mortal, soul
           => organism, being
             => living thing, animate thing
               => whole, unit
                 => object, physical object
                   => physical entity
                     => entity
           => causal agent, cause, causal agency
             => physical entity
               => entity

--- Hyponyms of noun aristotle

--- Synonyms/Hypernyms (Ordered by Estimated Frequency) of noun aristotle

1 sense of aristotle                          

Sense 1
   INSTANCE OF=> philosopher

--- Coordinate Terms (sisters) of noun aristotle

1 sense of aristotle                          

Sense 1
  -> philosopher
   => nativist
   => Cynic
   => eclectic, eclecticist
   => empiricist
   => epistemologist
   => esthetician, aesthetician
   => ethicist, ethician
   => existentialist, existentialist philosopher, existential philosopher
   => gymnosophist
   => libertarian
   => mechanist
   => moralist
   => naturalist
   => necessitarian
   => nominalist
   => pluralist
   => pre-Socratic
   => realist
   => Scholastic
   => Sophist
   => Stoic
   => transcendentalist
   => yogi
   HAS INSTANCE=> Abelard, Peter Abelard, Pierre Abelard
   HAS INSTANCE=> Anaxagoras
   HAS INSTANCE=> Anaximander
   HAS INSTANCE=> Anaximenes
   HAS INSTANCE=> Arendt, Hannah Arendt
   HAS INSTANCE=> Aristotle
   HAS INSTANCE=> Averroes, ibn-Roshd, Abul-Walid Mohammed ibn-Ahmad Ibn-Mohammed ibn-Roshd
   HAS INSTANCE=> Avicenna, ibn-Sina, Abu Ali al-Husain ibn Abdallah ibn Sina
   HAS INSTANCE=> Bacon, Francis Bacon, Sir Francis Bacon, Baron Verulam, 1st Baron Verulam, Viscount St. Albans
   HAS INSTANCE=> Bentham, Jeremy Bentham
   HAS INSTANCE=> Bergson, Henri Bergson, Henri Louis Bergson
   HAS INSTANCE=> Berkeley, Bishop Berkeley, George Berkeley
   HAS INSTANCE=> Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius
   HAS INSTANCE=> Bruno, Giordano Bruno
   HAS INSTANCE=> Buber, Martin Buber
   HAS INSTANCE=> Cassirer, Ernst Cassirer
   HAS INSTANCE=> Cleanthes
   HAS INSTANCE=> Comte, Auguste Comte, Isidore Auguste Marie Francois Comte
   HAS INSTANCE=> Condorcet, Marquis de Condorcet, Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas Caritat
   HAS INSTANCE=> Confucius, Kongfuze, K'ung Futzu, Kong the Master
   HAS INSTANCE=> Democritus
   HAS INSTANCE=> Derrida, Jacques Derrida
   HAS INSTANCE=> Descartes, Rene Descartes
   HAS INSTANCE=> Dewey, John Dewey
   HAS INSTANCE=> Diderot, Denis Diderot
   HAS INSTANCE=> Diogenes
   HAS INSTANCE=> Empedocles
   HAS INSTANCE=> Epictetus
   HAS INSTANCE=> Epicurus
   HAS INSTANCE=> Haeckel, Ernst Heinrich Haeckel
   HAS INSTANCE=> Hartley, David Hartley
   HAS INSTANCE=> Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel
   HAS INSTANCE=> Heraclitus
   HAS INSTANCE=> Herbart, Johann Friedrich Herbart
   HAS INSTANCE=> Herder, Johann Gottfried von Herder
   HAS INSTANCE=> Hobbes, Thomas Hobbes
   HAS INSTANCE=> Hume, David Hume
   HAS INSTANCE=> Husserl, Edmund Husserl
   HAS INSTANCE=> Hypatia
   HAS INSTANCE=> James, William James
   HAS INSTANCE=> Kant, Immanuel Kant
   HAS INSTANCE=> Kierkegaard, Soren Kierkegaard, Soren Aabye Kierkegaard
   HAS INSTANCE=> Lao-tzu, Lao-tse, Lao-zi
   HAS INSTANCE=> Leibniz, Leibnitz, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz
   HAS INSTANCE=> Locke, John Locke
   HAS INSTANCE=> Lucretius, Titus Lucretius Carus
   HAS INSTANCE=> Lully, Raymond Lully, Ramon Lully
   HAS INSTANCE=> Mach, Ernst Mach
   HAS INSTANCE=> Machiavelli, Niccolo Machiavelli
   HAS INSTANCE=> Maimonides, Moses Maimonides, Rabbi Moses Ben Maimon
   HAS INSTANCE=> Malebranche, Nicolas de Malebranche
   HAS INSTANCE=> Marcuse, Herbert Marcuse
   HAS INSTANCE=> Marx, Karl Marx
   HAS INSTANCE=> Mead, George Herbert Mead
   HAS INSTANCE=> Mill, John Mill, John Stuart Mill
   HAS INSTANCE=> Mill, James Mill
   HAS INSTANCE=> Montesquieu, Baron de la Brede et de Montesquieu, Charles Louis de Secondat
   HAS INSTANCE=> Moore, G. E. Moore, George Edward Moore
   HAS INSTANCE=> Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche
   HAS INSTANCE=> Occam, William of Occam, Ockham, William of Ockham
   HAS INSTANCE=> Origen
   HAS INSTANCE=> Ortega y Gasset, Jose Ortega y Gasset
   HAS INSTANCE=> Parmenides
   HAS INSTANCE=> Pascal, Blaise Pascal
   HAS INSTANCE=> Peirce, Charles Peirce, Charles Sanders Peirce
   HAS INSTANCE=> Perry, Ralph Barton Perry
   HAS INSTANCE=> Plotinus
   => Popper, Karl Popper, Sir Karl Raimund Popper
   HAS INSTANCE=> Pythagoras
   HAS INSTANCE=> Quine, W. V. Quine, Willard Van Orman Quine
   HAS INSTANCE=> Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, Sir Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan
   HAS INSTANCE=> Reid, Thomas Reid
   HAS INSTANCE=> Rousseau, Jean-Jacques Rousseau
   HAS INSTANCE=> Russell, Bertrand Russell, Bertrand Arthur William Russell, Earl Russell
   HAS INSTANCE=> Schopenhauer, Arthur Schopenhauer
   HAS INSTANCE=> Schweitzer, Albert Schweitzer
   HAS INSTANCE=> Seneca, Lucius Annaeus Seneca
   HAS INSTANCE=> Socrates
   HAS INSTANCE=> Spencer, Herbert Spencer
   HAS INSTANCE=> Spengler, Oswald Spengler
   HAS INSTANCE=> Spinoza, de Spinoza, Baruch de Spinoza, Benedict de Spinoza
   HAS INSTANCE=> Steiner, Rudolf Steiner
   HAS INSTANCE=> Stewart, Dugald Stewart
   HAS INSTANCE=> Tagore, Rabindranath Tagore, Sir Rabindranath Tagore
   HAS INSTANCE=> Teilhard de Chardin, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin
   HAS INSTANCE=> Thales, Thales of Miletus
   HAS INSTANCE=> Theophrastus
   HAS INSTANCE=> Weil, Simone Weil
   HAS INSTANCE=> Whitehead, Alfred North Whitehead
   HAS INSTANCE=> Williams, Sir Bernard Williams, Bernard Arthur Owen Williams
   HAS INSTANCE=> Wittgenstein, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Ludwig Josef Johan Wittgenstein
   HAS INSTANCE=> Xenophanes
   HAS INSTANCE=> Zeno, Zeno of Citium
   HAS INSTANCE=> Zeno, Zeno of Elea

--- Grep of noun aristotle

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