object:ENNEAD 03.07 - Of Time and Eternity.
book class:Plotinus - Complete Works Vol 03
author class:Plotinus
subject class:Philosophy
subject class:Christianity
class:chapter
A. ETERNITY.
INTRODUCTION. ETERNITY EXISTS PERPETUALLY, WHILE TIME BECOMES.
(1.)436 When saying that eternity and time differ, that eternity refers to perpetual existence, and time to what "becomes" (this visible world), we are speaking off-hand, spontaneously, intuitionally, and common language supports these forms of expression. When however we try to define our conceptions thereof in greater detail, we become embarrassed; the different opinions of ancient philosophers, and often even the same opinions, are interpreted differently. We however shall limit ourselves to an examination of these opinions, and we believe that we can fulfil our task of answering all questions by explaining the teachings of the ancient philosophers, without starting any minute disquisition of our own. We do indeed insist that some of these ancient philosophers, these blessed men437 have achieved the truth. It remains only to decide which of them have done so, and how we ourselves can grasp their thought.
ETERNITY IS THE MODEL OF ITS IMAGE, TIME.
First, we have to examine that of which eternity consists, according to those who consider it as different from time; for, by gaining a conception of the model986 (eternity), we shall more clearly understand its image called time.438 If then, before observing eternity, we form a conception of time, we may, by reminiscence, from here below, rise to the contemplation of the model to which time, as its image, resembles.
RELATION BETWEEN THE AEON AND INTELLIGIBLE BEING.
1. (2). How shall we define the aeon (or, eternity)? Shall we say that it is the intelligible "being" (or, nature) itself, just as we might say that time is the heaven and the universe, as has been done, it seems, by certain (Pythagorean) philosophers?439 Indeed, as we conceive and judge that the aeon (eternity) is something very venerable, we assert the same of intelligible "being," and yet it is not easy to decide which of the two should occupy the first rank; as, on the other hand, the principle which is superior to them (the One) could not be thus described, it would seem that we would have the right to identify intelligible "being" (or, nature), and the aeon (or, eternity), so much the more as the intelligible world and the aeon (age, or eternity), comprise the same things. Nevertheless, were we to place one of these principles within the other, we would posit intelligible nature ("being") within the aeon (age, or eternity). Likewise, when we say that an intelligible entity is eternal, as (Plato) does:346 "the nature of the model is eternal," we are thereby implying that the aeon (age or eternity) is something distinct from intelligible nature ("being"), though referring thereto, as attribute or presence. The mere fact that both the aeon (eternity) and intelligible nature ("being"), are both venerable does not imply their identity; the venerableness of the one may be no more than derivative from that of the other. The argument that both comprise the same entities would987 still permit intelligible nature ("being") to contain all the entities it contains as parts, while the aeon (or age, or eternity) might contain them as wholes, without any distinctions as parts; it contains them, in this respect, that they are called eternal on its account.
FAULTS OF THE DEFINITION THAT ETERNITY IS AT REST, WHILE TIME IS IN MOTION.
Some define eternity as the "rest"440 of intelligible nature ("being"), just like time is defined as "motion" here below. In this case we should have to decide whether eternity be identical with rest in general, or only in such rest as would be characteristic of intelligible nature ("being"). If indeed eternity were to be identified with rest in general, we would first have to observe that rest could not be said to be eternal, any more than we can say that eternity is eternal, for we only call eternal that which participates in eternity; further, under this hypothesis, we should have to clear up how movement could ever be eternal; for if it were eternal, it would rest (or, it would stop). Besides, how could the idea of rest thus imply the idea of perpetuity, not indeed of that perpetuity which is in time, but of that of which we conceive when speaking of the aeonial (or, eternal)? Besides, if the rest characteristic of intelligible "being" in itself alone contain perpetuity, this alone would exclude from eternity the other genera (or categories) of existence. Further yet, eternity has to be conceived of as not only in rest, but (according to Plato438) also in unity, which is something that excludes every intervalotherwise, it would become confused with time;now rest does not imply the idea of unity, nor that of an interval. Again, we assert that eternity resides in unity; and therefore participates in rest without being identified therewith.
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ETERNITY AS A UNION OF THE FIVE CATEGORIES.
2. (3). What then is that thing by virtue of which the intelligible world is eternal and perpetual? Of what does perpetuity consist? Either perpetuity and eternity are identical, or eternity is related to perpetuity. Evidently, however, eternity consists in an unity, but in an unity formed by multiple elements, in a conception of nature derived from intelligible entities, or which is united to them, or is perceived in them, so that all these intelligible entities form an unity, though this unity be at the same time manifold in nature and powers. Thus contemplating the manifold power of the intelligible world, we call "being" its substrate; movement its life; rest its permanence; difference the manifoldness of its principles; and identity, their unity.441 Synthesizing these principles, they fuse into one single life, suppressing their difference, considering the inexhaustible duration, the identity and immutability of their action, of their life and thought, for which there is neither change nor interval. The contemplation of all these entities constitutes the contemplation of eternity; and we see a life that is permanent in its identity, which ever possesses all present things, which does not contain them successively, but simultaneously; whose manner of existence is not different at various times, but whose perfection is consummate and indivisible. It therefore contains all things at the same time, as in a single point, without any of them draining off; it resides in identity, that is, within itself, undergoing no change. Ever being in the present, because it never lost anything, and will never acquire anything, it is always what it is. Eternity is not intelligible existence; it is the (light) that radiates from this existence, whose identity completely excludes the future and admits nothing but present existence, which remains what it is, and does not change.
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THE LIFE OF THE INTELLIGENCE IS EVER CONTEMPORANEOUS.
What that it does not already possess could (intelligible existence) possess later? What could it be in the future, that it is not now? There is nothing that could be added to or subtracted from its present state; for it was not different from what it is now; and it is not to possess anything that it does not necessarily possess now, so that one could never say of it, "it was"; for what did it have that it does not now have? Nor could it be said of it, "it will be"; for what could it acquire? It must therefore remain what it is. (As Plato thought438), that possesses eternity of which one cannot say either "it was," or "will be," but only, "it is;" that whose existence is immutable, because the past did not make it lose anything, and because the future will not make it acquire anything. Therefore, on examining the existence of intelligible nature, we see that its life is simultaneously entire, complete, and without any kind of an interval. That is the eternity we seek.
ETERNITY IS NOT AN ACCIDENT OF THE INTELLIGIBLE, BUT AN INTIMATE PART OF ITS NATURE.
3. (4). Eternity is not an extrinsic accident of (intelligible) nature, but is in it, of it, and with it. We see that it is intimately inherent in (intelligible nature) because we see that all other things, of which we say that they exist on high, are of and with this (intelligible) nature; for the things that occupy the first rank in existence must be united with the first Beings, and subsist there. Thus the beautiful is in them, and comes from them; thus also does truth dwell in them. There the whole in a certain way exists within the part; the parts also are in the whole; because this990 whole, really being the whole, is not composed of parts, but begets the parts themselves, a condition necessary to its being a whole. In this whole, besides, truth does not consist in the agreement of one notion with another, but is the very nature of each of the things of which it is the truth. In order, really to be a whole, this real whole must be all not only in the sense that it is all things, but also in the sense that it lacks nothing. In this case, nothing will, for it, be in the future; for to say that, for it, something "will be" for it implies that it lacked something before that, that it was not yet all; besides, nothing can happen to it against nature, because it is impassible. As nothing could happen to it, for it nothing "is to be," "will be," or "has been."
TO BEGOTTEN THINGS THE FUTURE IS NECESSARY; BUT NOT TO THE INTELLIGIBLE.
As the existence of begotten things consists in perpetually acquiring (something or another), they will be annihilated by a removal of their future. An attribution of the future to the (intelligible) entities of a nature contrary (to begotten things), would degrade them from the rank of existences. Evidently they will not be consubstantial with existence, if this existence of theirs be in the future or past. The nature ("being") of begotten things on the contrary consists in going from the origin of their existence to the last limits of the time beyond which they will no longer exist; that is in what their future consists.442 Abstraction of their future diminishes their life, and consequently their existence. That is also what will happen to the universe, in so far as it will exist; it aspires to being what it should be, without any interruption, because it derives existence from the continual production of fresh actualizations; for the same reason, it moves in a circle991 because it desires to possess intelligible nature ("being"). Such is the existence that we discover in begotten things, such is the cause that makes them ceaselessly aspire to existence in the future. The Beings that occupy the first rank and which are blessed, have no desire of the future, because they are already all that it lies in them to be, and because they possess all the life they are ever to possess. They have therefore nothing to seek, since there is no future for them; neither can they receive within themselves anything for which there might be a future. Thus the nature ("being") of intelligible existence is absolute, and entire, not only in its parts, but also in its totality, which reveals no fault, which lacks nothing, and to which nothing that in any way pertains to nonentity could be added; for intelligible existence must not only embrace in its totality and universality all beings, but it must also receive nothing that pertains to nonentity. It is this disposition and nature of intelligible existence that constitutes the aeon (or eternity); for (according to Aristotle)443 this word is derived from "aei on," "being continually."
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ETERNITY AND PERPETUITY.
4. (5). That this is the state of affairs appears when, on applying one's intelligence to the contemplation of some of the intelligible Entities, it becomes possible to assert, or rather, to see that it is absolutely incapable of ever having undergone any change; otherwise, it would not always exist; or rather, it would not always exist entirely. Is it thus perpetual? Doubtless; its nature is such that one may recognize that it is always such as it is, and that it could never be different in the future; so that, should one later on again contemplate it, it will be found similar to itself (unchanged).992 Therefore, if we should never cease from contemplation, if we should ever remain united thereto while admiring its nature, and if in that actualization we should show ourselves indefatigable, we would succeed in raising ourselves to eternity; but, to be as eternal as existence, we must not allow ourselves to be in anyway distracted from contemplating eternity, and eternal nature in the eternal itself. If that which exists thus be eternal, and exists ever, evidently that which never lowers itself to an inferior nature; which possesses life in its fulness, without ever having received, receiving, or being about to receive anything; this nature would be "aidion," or perpetual. Perpetuity is the property constitutive of such a substrate; being of it, and in it.443 Eternity is the substrate in which this property manifests. Consequently reason dictates that eternity is something venerable, identical with the divinity.444 We might even assert that the age ("aion," or eternity) is a divinity that manifests within itself, and outside of itself in its immutable and identical existence, in the permanence of its life. Besides, there is nothing to surprise any one if in spite of that we assert a manifoldness in the divinity. Every intelligible entity is manifoldness because infinite in power, infinite in the sense that it lacks nothing; it exercises this privilege peculiarly because it is not subject to losing anything.
ETERNITY IS INFINITE UNIVERSAL LIFE THAT CANNOT LOSE ANYTHING.
Eternity, therefore, may be defined as the life that is at present infinite because it is universal and loses nothing, as it has no past nor future; otherwise it would no longer be whole. To say that it is universal and loses nothing explains the expression: "the life that is at present infinite."
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ETERNITY IS SEMPITERNAL EXISTENCE.
5. (6). As this nature that is eternal and radiant with beauty refers to the One, issues from Him, and returns to Him, as it never swerves from Him, ever dwelling around Him and in Him, and lives according to Him, Plato was quite right438 in saying not casually, but with great profundity of thought, that "eternity is immutable in unity." Thereby Plato not only reduces the eternity to the unity that it is in itself, but also relates the life of existence to the One itself. This life is what we seek; its permanence is eternity. Indeed that which remains in that manner, and which remains the same thing, that is, the actualization of that life which remains turned towards, and united with the One, that whose existence and life are not deceptive, that truly is eternity. (For intelligible or) true existence is to have no time when it does not exist, no time when it exists in a different manner; it is therefore to exist in an immutable manner without any diversity, without being first in one, and then in another state. To conceive of (existence), therefore, we must neither imagine intervals in its existence, nor suppose that it develops or acquires, nor believe that it contains any succession; consequently we could neither distinguish within it, or assert within it either before or after. If it contain neither "before" nor "after," if the truest thing that can be affirmed of it be that it is, if it exist as "being" and life, here again is eternity revealed. When we say that existence exists always, and that there is not one time in which it is, and another in which it is not, we speak thus only for the sake of greater clearness; for when we use the word "always," we do not take it in an absolute sense; but if we use it to show that existence is incorruptible, it might well mislead the mind in leading it to issue out from the unity (characteristic of eternity) to make it run994 through the manifold (which is foreign to eternity). "Always" further indicates that existence is never defective. It might perhaps be better to say simply "existence." But though the word "existence" suffices to designate "being," as several philosophers have confused "being" with generation, it was necessary to clear up the meaning of existence by adding the term "always." Indeed, though we are referring only to one and the same thing by "existence" and "existing always," just as when we say "philosopher," and "the true philosopher," nevertheless, as there are false philosophers, it has been necessary to add to the term "philosophers" the adjective "true." Likewise, it has been necessary to add the term "always" to that of "existing," and that of "existing" to that of "always;" that is the derivation of the expression "existing always," and consequently (by contraction), "aion," or, eternity. Therefore the idea "always" must be united to that of "existing," so as to designate the "real being."
THE CREATOR, BEING OUTSIDE OF TIME, PRECEDES THE UNIVERSAL ONLY AS ITS CAUSE.
"Always" must therefore be applied to the power which contains no interval in its existence, which has need of nothing outside of what it possesses, because it possesses everything, because it is every being, and thus lacks nothing. Such a nature could not be complete in one respect, but incomplete in another. Even if what is in time should appear complete, as a body that suffices the soul appears complete, though it be complete only for the soul; that which is in time needs the future, and consequently is incomplete in respect to the time it stands in need of; when it succeeds in enjoying the time to which it aspires, and succeeds in becoming united thereto, even though it995 still remain imperfect it still is called perfect by verbal similarity. But the existence whose characteristic it is not to need the future, not to be related to any other timewhether capable of being measured, or indefinite, and still to be indefinitethe existence that already possesses all it should possess is the very existence that our intelligence seeks out; it does not derive its existence from any particular quality, but exists before any quantity. As it is not any kind of quantity, it could not admit within itself any kind of quantity. Otherwise, as its life would be divided, it would itself cease to be absolutely indivisible; but existence must be as indivisible in its life as in its nature ("being"). (Plato's expression,446) "the Creator was good" does indeed refer to the notion of the universe, and indicates that, in the Principle superior to the universe, nothing began to exist at any particular time. Never, therefore, did the universe begin to exist within time, because though its Author existed "before" it, it was only in the sense that its author was the cause of its existence. But, after having used the word "was," to express this thought, Plato immediately corrects himself, and he demonstrates that this word does not apply to the Things that possess eternity.
TO STUDY TIME WE HAVE TO DESCEND FROM THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD.
6. (7). Speaking thus of eternity, it is not anything foreign to us, and we do not need to consult the testimony of anybody but ourselves. For indeed, how could we understand anything that we could not perceive? How could we perceive something that would be foreign to us? We ourselves, therefore, must participate in eternity. But how can we do so, since we are in time? To understand how one can simultaneously be in time and in eternity, it will be necessary to996 study time. We must therefore descend from eternity to study time. To find eternity, we have been obliged to rise to the intelligible world; now we are obliged to descend therefrom to treat of time; not indeed descending therefrom entirely, but only so far as time itself descended therefrom.
B. TIME.
THE OPINIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHERS ABOUT TIME MUST BE STUDIED.
If those blessed ancient philosophers had not already uttered their views about time, we would only need to add to the idea of eternity what we have to say of the idea of time, and to set forth our opinion on the subject, trying to make it correspond with the already expressed notion of eternity. But we now must examine the most reasonable opinions that have been advanced about time, and observe how far our own opinion may conform thereto.
TIME CONSIDERED EITHER AS MOTION; AS SOMETHING MOVABLE; OR SOMETHING OF MOTION.
To begin with, we may divide the generally accepted opinions about time into three classes: time as movement, as something movable, or as some part of movement. It would be too contrary to the notion of time to try to define it as rest, as being at rest, or as some part of rest; for time is incompatible with identity (and consequently with rest, and with what is at rest). Those who consider time as movement, claim that it is either any kind of movement, or the movement of the universe. Those who consider it as something movable are thinking of the sphere of the universe; while those who consider time as some part of movement997 consider it either as the interval of movement, or as its measure, or as some consequence of movement in general, or regular movement.
POLEMIC AGAINST THE STOICS; TIME IS NOT MOVEMENT.
7. (8). Time cannot (as the Stoics claim,447) be movement. Neither can we gather together all movements, so as to form but a single one, nor can we consider the regular movement only; for these two kinds of motion are within time. If we were to suppose that there was a movement that did not operate within time, such a movement would still be far removed from being time, since, under this hypothesis, the movement itself is entirely different from that in which the movement occurs. Amidst the many reasons which, in past and present, have been advanced to refute this opinion, a single one suffices: namely, that movement can cease and stop, while time never suspends its flight. To the objection that the movement of the universe never stops, we may answer that this movement, if it consist in the circular movement (of the stars, according to Hestius of Perinthus; or of the sun, according to Eratosthenes447) operates within a definite time, at the end of which it returns to the same point of the heavens, but it does not accomplish this within the same space of time taken up in fulfilling the half of its course. One of these movements is only half of the other, and the second is double. Besides, both, the one that runs through half of space, and the one that runs through the whole of it, are movements of the universe. Besides, it has been noticed that the movement of the exterior sphere is the swiftest. This distinction supports our view, for it implies that the movement of this sphere, and the time used to operate it, are different entities; the most998 rapid movement is the one that takes up the least time, and runs through the greatest amount of space; the slowest movements are those that employ the longest time, and run through only a part of that space.448
POLEMIC AGAINST THE PYTHAGOREANS: TIME IS NOT WHAT IS MOVABLE.
On the other hand, if time be not the movement of the sphere, evidently it is far less (than that which is movable, as thought the Pythagoreans,449) or (as Pythagoras thought), the sphere (of heaven) itself, as some have thought, because it moves. (This fact alone is sufficient to refute the opinion that confuses time with that which is movable).
POLEMIC AGAINST THE STOIC ZENO: TIME IS NO INTERVAL OF MOVEMENT.
Is time then some part of movement? (Zeno450) calls it the interval of movement; but the interval is not the same for all movements, even if the latter were of similar nature; for movements that operate within space may be swifter or slower. It is possible that the intervals of the most rapid and of the slowest movement might be measured by some third interval, which might far more reasonably be considered time. But which of these three intervals shall be called time? Rather, which of all the intervals, infinite in number as they are, shall time be? If time be considered the interval of the regular movement, it will not be the particular interval of every regular movement; otherwise, as there are several regular movements, there would be several kinds of time. If time be defined as the interval of movement of the universe, that is, the interval contained within this movement, it will be nothing else than this movement itself.
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PERSISTENT MOVEMENT AND ITS INTERVAL ARE NOT TIME, BUT ARE WITHIN IT.
Besides, this movement is a definite quantity. Either this quantity will be measured by the extension of the space traversed, and the interval will consist in that extension; but that extension is space, and not time. Or we shall say that movement has a certain interval because it is continuous, and that instead of stopping immediately it always becomes prolonged; but this continuity is nothing else than the magnitude (that is, the duration) of the movement. Even though after consideration of a movement it be estimated as great, as might be said of a "great heat"this does not yet furnish anything in which time might appear and manifest; we have here only a sequence of movements which succeed one another like waves, and only the observed interval between them; now the sequence of movements forms a number, such as two or three; and the interval is an extension. Thus the magnitude of the movement will be a number, say, such as ten; or an interval that manifests in the extension traversed by the movement. Now the notion of time is not revealed herein, but we find only a quantity that is produced within time. Otherwise, time, instead of being everywhere, will exist only in the movement as an attribute in a substrate, which amounts to saying that time is movement; for the interval (of the movement) is not outside of movement, and is only a non-instantaneous movement. If then time be a non-instantaneous movement, just as we often say that some particular instantaneous fact occurs within time, we shall be forced to ask the difference between what is and what is not instantaneous. Do these things differ in relation to time? Then the persisting movement and its interval are not time, but within time.
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POLEMIC AGAINST STRATO: TIME IS NOT MOTION AND REST.
Somebody might object that time is indeed the interval of movement, but that it is not the characteristic interval of movement itself, being only the interval in which movement exerts its extension, following along with it. All these terms lack definition. This (extension) is nothing else than the time within which the movement occurs. But that is precisely the question at issue, from the very start. It is as if a person who had been asked to define time should answer "time is the interval of the movement produced within time." What then is this interval called time, when considered outside of the interval characteristic of movement? If the interval characteristic of time be made to consist in movement, where shall the duration of rest be posited? Indeed, for one object to be in motion implies that another (corresponding object) is at rest; now the time of these objects is the same, though for one it be the time of movement, and for the other the time of rest (as thought Strato451). What then is the nature of this interval? It cannot be an interval of space, since space is exterior (to the movements that occur within it).
POLEMIC AGAINST ARISTOTLE: TIME IS NOT THE NUMBER AND MEASURE OF MOVEMENT.
8. (9). Let us now examine in what sense it may be said (by Aristotle452) that time is the number and measure of movement, which definition seems more reasonable, because of the continuity of movement. To begin with, following the method adopted with the definition of time as "the interval of movement," we might ask whether time be the measure and number of any kind of movement.453 For how indeed could we give a numerical valuation of unequal or irregular1001 movement. What system of numbering or measurement shall we use for this? If the same measure be applied to slow or to swift movement, in their case measure and number will be the same as the number ten applied equally to horses and oxen; and further, such measure might also be applied to dry and wet substances. If time be a measure of this kind, we clearly see that it is the measure of movements, but we do not discover what it may be in itself. If the number ten can be conceived as a number, after making abstraction of the horses it served to measure, if therefore a measure possess its own individuality, even while no longer measuring anything, the case must be similar with time, inasmuch as it is a measure. If then time be a number in itself, in what does it differ from the number ten, or from any other number composed of unities? As it is a continuous measure, and as it is a quantity, it might, for instance, turn out to be something like a foot-rule. It would then be a magnitude, as, for instance, a line, which follows the movement; but how will this line be able to measure what it follows? Why would it measure one thing rather than another? It seems more reasonable to consider this measure, not as the measure of every kind of movement, but only as the measure of the movement it follows.452 Then that measure is continuous, so far as the movement it follows itself continue to exist. In this case, we should not consider measure as something exterior, and separated from movement, but as united to the measured movement. What then will measure? Is it the movement that will be measured, and the extension that will measure it? Which of these two things will time be? Will it be the measuring movement, or the measuring extension? Time will be either the movement measured by extension, or the measuring extension; or some third thing which makes use of extension, as one makes use of a1002 foot-rule, to measure the quantity of movement. But in all these cases, we must, as has already been noticed, suppose that movement is uniform; for unless the movement be uniform, one and universal, the theory that movement is a measure of any kind whatever will become almost impossible. If time be "measured movement," that is, measured by quantitybesides granting that it at all needs to be measuredmovement must not be measured by itself, but by something different. On the other hand, if movement have a measure different from itself, and if, consequently, we need a continuous measure to measure it, the result would be that extension itself would need measure, so that movement, being measured, may have a quantity which is determined by that of the thing according to which it is measured. Consequently, under this hypothesis, time would be the number of the extension which follows movement, and not extension itself which follows movement.
NOR CAN TIME BE A NUMBERED NUMBER (AS ARISTOTLE CLAIMED452).
What is this number? Is it composed of unities? How does it measure? That would still have to be explained. Now let us suppose that we had discovered how it measures; we would still not have discovered the time that measures, but a time that was such or such an amount. Now that is not the same thing as time; there is a difference between time and some particular quantity of time. Before asserting that time has such or such a quantity, we have to discover the nature of that which has that quantity. We may grant that time is the number which measures movement, while remaining exterior thereto, as "ten" is in "ten horses" without being conceived with them (as Aristotle claimed, that it was not a numbering, but a numbered1003 number). But in this case, we still have to discover the nature of this number that, before numbering, is what it is, as would be "ten" considered in itself.454 It may be said that it is that number which, by following number, measures according to the priority and posteriority of that movement.452 Nor do we yet perceive the nature of that number which measures by priority and posteriority. In any case, whatever measures by priority or posteriority, or by a present moment,455 or by anything else, certainly does measure according to time. Thus this number (?) which measures movement according to priority or posteriority, must touch time, and, to measure movement, be related thereto. Prior and posterior necessarily designate either different parts of space, as for instance the beginning of a stadium, or parts of time. What is called priority is time that ends with the present; what is called posteriority, is the time that begins at the present. Time therefore is something different from the number that measures movement according to priority or posteriority,I do not say, any kind of movement, but still regular movement. Besides, why should we have time by applying number either to what measures, or to what is measured? For in this case these two may be identical. If movement exist along with the priority and posteriority which relate thereto, why will we not have time without number? This would amount to saying that extension has such a quantity only in case of the existence of somebody who recognizes that it possesses that quantity. Since (Aristotle456) says that time is infinite, and that it is such effectually, how can it contain number without our taking a portion of time to measure it? From that would result that time existed before it was measured. But why could time not exist before the existence of a soul to measure it? (Aristotle) might have answered that it was begotten by the soul. The1004 mere fact that the soul measures time need not necessarily imply that the soul produced the time; time, along with its suitable quantity, would exist even if nobody measured it. If however it be said that it is the soul that makes use of extension to measure time, we will answer that this is of no importance to determine the notion of time.
POLEMIC AGAINST EPICURUS: TIME IS NOT AN ACCIDENT OR CONSEQUENCE OF MOVEMENT.
9. (10). When (Epicurus457) says that time is a consequence of movement, he is not explaining the nature of time; this would demand a preliminary definition of the consequence of movement. Besides, this alleged consequence of movementgranting the possibility of such a consequencemust be prior, simultaneous, or posterior. For, in whatever way we conceive of it, it is within time. Consequently, if the consequence of movement be time, the result would be that time is a consequence of movement in time (which is nonsense).
PLOTINOS CAN GO NO FURTHER IN REFUTING ENDLESS DEFINITIONS OF TIME.
Now, as our purpose is to discover, not what time is not, but what it really is, we notice that this question has been treated at great length by many thinkers before us; and if we were to undertake to consider all existing opinions on the subject, we would be obliged to write a veritable history of the subject. We have here, however, gone to the limit of our ability in treating it without specializing in it. As has been seen, it is easy enough to refute the opinion that time is the measure of the movement of the universe, and to raise against this opinion the objections that we have raised against the definition of time as the1005 measure of movement in general, opposing thereto the irregularity of movement, and the other points from which suitable arguments may be drawn. We are therefore free to devote ourselves to an explanation of what time really is.
THE NATURE OF TIME WILL BE REVEALED BY ITS ORIGIN.
10. (11). To accomplish this we shall have to return to the nature which, as we pointed out above, was essential to eternity; that immutable life, wholly realized all at once, infinite and perfect, subsisting in, and referring to unity. Time was not yet, or at least, it did not yet exist for the intelligible entities. Only, it was yet to be born of them,458 because (as was the world), time, by both its reason and nature, was posterior to the (intelligible entities459). Are we trying to understand how time issued from among intelligible entities while these were resting within themselves? Here it would be useless to call upon the Muses, for they did not yet exist. Still this might perhaps not be useless; for (in a certain sense, that time had already begun, then, so far as they existed within the sense-world) they existed already. In any case, the birth of time will be plain enough if we consider it only as it is born and manifested. Thus much can be said about it.
TIME AROSE AS MEASUREMENT OF THE ACTIVITY OF THE UNIVERSAL SOUL.
Before priority and posteriority, time, which did not yet exist, brooded within existence itself. But an active nature (the universal Soul), which desired to be mistress of herself, to possess herself, and ceaselessly to add to the present, entered into motion, as did time,1006 along with (the Soul). We achieve a representation of the time that is the image of eternity, by the length that we must go through with to reach what follows, and is posterior, towards one moment, and then towards another.460
LIKE TIME, SPACE IS THE RESULT OF THE PROCESSION OF THE UNIVERSAL SOUL.
As the universal Soul contained an activity that agitated her, and impelled her to transport into another world what she still saw on high, she was willing to retain all things that were present at the same time. (Time arose not by a single fiat, but as the result of a process. This occurred within the universal Soul, but may well be first illustrated by the more familiar process within) Reason, which distributes unity, not indeed That which remains within itself, but that which is exterior to itself. Though this process seem to be a strengthening one, reason developing out of the seed in which it brooded unto manifoldness, it is really a weakening (or destructive one), inasmuch as it weakened manifoldness by division, and weakened reason by causing it to extend. The case was similar with the universal Soul. When she produced the sense-world, the latter was animated by a movement which was only an image of intelligible movement. (While trying to strengthen) this image-movement to the extent of the intelligible movement, she herself (weakened), instead of remaining exclusively eternal, became temporal and (involuntarily) subjected what she had produced to the conditions of time, transferring entirely into time not only the universe, but also all its revolutions. Indeed, as the world moves within the universal Soul, which is its location, it also moves within the time that this Soul bears within herself.461 Manifesting her power in a varied and successive manner,1007 by her mode of action, the universal Soul begat succession. Indeed, she passes from one conception to another, and consequently to what did not exist before, since this conception was not effective, and since the present life of the soul does not resemble her former life. Her life is varied, and from the variety of her life results the variety of time.462
TIME IS THE LIFE OF THE SOUL CONSIDERED IN THE MOVEMENT BY WHICH SHE PASSES FROM ONE ACTUALIZATION TO ANOTHER.
Thus, the extension of the life of the soul produces time, and the perpetual progression of her life produces the perpetuity of time, and her former life constitutes the past. We may therefore properly define time as the life of the soul considered in the movement by which she passes from one actualization to another.
WHAT ETERNITY IS TO INTELLIGENCE, TIME IS TO THE UNIVERSAL SOUL.
We have already decided that eternity is life characterized by rest, identity, immutability and infinity (in intelligence). It is, further, (admitted that) this our world is the image of the superior World (of intelligence). We have also come to the conclusion that time is the image of eternity. Consequently, corresponding to the Life characteristic of Intelligence, this world must contain another life which bears the same name, and which belongs to that power of the universal Soul. Instead of the movement of Intelligence, we will have the movement characteristic of a part of the soul (as the universal Soul ceaselessly passes from one thought to another). Corresponding to the permanence, identity, and immutability (of Intelligence), we will have the mobility of a principle1008 which ceaselessly passes from one actualization to another. Corresponding to the unity and the absence of all extension, we will have a mere image of unity, an image which exists only by virtue of continuity. Corresponding to an infinity already entirely present, we will have a progression towards infinity which perpetually tends towards what follows. Corresponding to what exists entirely at the same time, we will have what exists by parts, and what will never exist entire at the same time. The soul's existence will have to be ceaseless acquiring of existence; if it is to reveal an image of the complete, universal and infinite existence of the soul; that is the reason its existence is able to represent the intelligible existence.
TIME IS AS INTERIOR TO THE SOUL AS ETERNITY IS TO EXISTENCE.
Time, therefore, is not something external to the soul, any more than eternity is exterior to existence. It is neither a consequence nor a result of it, any more than eternity is a consequence of existence. It appears within the soul, is in her and with her, as eternity is in and with existence.
TIME IS THE LENGTH OF THE LIFE OF THE UNIVERSAL SOUL.
11. (12). The result of the preceding considerations is that time must be conceived of as the length of the life characteristic of the universal Soul; that her course is composed of changes that are equal, uniform, and insensible, so that that course implies a continuity of action. Now let us for a moment suppose that the power of the Soul should cease to act, and to enjoy the life she at present possesses without interruption or limit, because this life is the activity characteristic of an eternal Soul, an action by which the Soul does not1009 return upon herself, and does not concentrate on herself, though enabling her to beget and produce. Now supposing that the Soul should cease to act, that she should apply her superior part to the intelligible world, and to eternity, and that she should there remain calmly unitedwhat then would remain, unless eternity? For what room for succession would that allow, if all things were immovable in unity? How could she contain priority, posteriority, or more or less duration of time? How could the Soul apply herself to some object other than that which occupies her? Further, one could not then even say that she applied herself to the subject that occupied her; she would have to be separated therefrom in order to apply herself thereto. Neither would the universal Sphere exist, since it does not exist before time, because it exists and moves within time. Besides, even if this Sphere were at rest during the activity of the Soul, we could measure the duration of her rest because this rest is posterior to the rest of eternity. Since time is annihilated so soon as the Soul ceases to act, and concentrates in unity, time must be produced by the beginning of the Soul's motion towards sense-objects, by the Soul's life. Consequently (Plato463) says that time is born with the universe, because the Soul produced time with the universe; for it is this very action of the Soul which has produced this universe. This action constitutes time, and the universe is within time. Plato does indeed call the movements of the stars, time; but evidently only figuratively, as (Plato) subsequently says that the stars were created to indicate the divisions of time, and to permit us to measure it easily.
TIME IS NOT BEGOTTEN BY MOVEMENT, BUT ONLY INDICATED THEREBY.
Indeed, as it was not possible to determine the time itself of the Soul, and to measure within themselves the1010 parts of an invisible and uncognizable duration, especially for men who did not know how to count, the (world) Soul created day and night so that their succession might be the basis of counting as far as two, by the aid of this variety. Plato464 indicates that as the source of the notion of number. Later, observing the space of time which elapses from one dawn to another, we were able to discover an interval of time determined by an uniform movement, so far as we direct our gaze thereupon, and as we use it as a measure by which to measure time. The expression "to measure time" is premeditated, because time, considered in itself, is not a measure. How indeed could time measure, and what would time, while measuring, say? Would time say of anything, "Here is an extension as large as myself?" What indeed could be the nature of the entity that would speak of "myself"? Would it be that according to which quantity is measured? In this case, time would have to be something by itself, to measure without itself being a measure. The movement of the universe is measured according to time, but it is not the nature of time to be the measure of movement; it is such only accidentally; it indicates the quantity of movement, because it is prior to it, and differs from it. On the other hand, in the case of a movement produced within a determinate time, and if a number be added thereto frequently enough, we succeed in reaching the knowledge of how much time has elapsed. It is therefore correct to say that the movement of the revolution operated by the universal Sphere measures time so far as possible, by its quantity indicating the corresponding quantity of time, since it can neither be grasped nor conceived otherwise. Thus what is measured, that is, what is indicated by the revolution of the universal Sphere, is time. It is not begotten, but only indicated by movement.
1011
MOVEMENT IS SAID TO BE MEASURED BY SPACE, BECAUSE OF ITS INDETERMINATION.
The measure of movement, therefore, seems to be what is measured by a definite movement, but which is other than this movement. There is a difference, indeed, between that which is measured, and that which measures; but that which is measured is measured only by accident. That would amount to saying that what is measured by a foot-rule is an extension, without defining what extension in itself is. In the same way, because of the inability to define movement more clearly because of its indeterminate nature, we say that movement is that which is measured by space; for, by observation of the space traversed by movement, we can judge of the quantity of the movement.
TIME IS MEASURED BY MOVEMENT, AND IN THAT SENSE IT IS THE MEASURE OF MOVEMENT.
12. (13). The revolution of the universal Sphere leads us therefore to the recognition of time, within which it occurs. Not only is time that in which (all things "become," that is, grow), but time has to be what it is even before all things, being that within which everything moves, or rests with order and uniformity. This is discovered and manifested to our intelligence, but not produced by regular movement and rest, especially by movement. Better than rest, indeed, does movement lead us to a conception of time, and it is either to appreciate the duration of movement than that of rest. That is what led philosophers to define time as the measure "of" movement, instead of saying, what probably lay within their intention, that time is measured "by" movement. Above all, we must not consider that definition as adequate, adding to it that which the measured entity is in itself, not limiting ourselves to express what applies to it only incidentally.1012 Neither did we ever discern that such was their meaning, and we were unable to understand their teachings as they evidently posited the measure in the measured entity. No doubt that which hindered us from understanding them was that they were addressing their teachings to learned (thinkers), or well prepared listeners, and therefore, in their writings, they failed to explain the nature of time considered in itself, whether it be measure or something measured.
PLATO DOES MAKE SOME STATEMENTS THAT ALLOW OF BEING JUSTIFIED.
Plato himself, indeed, does say, not that the nature of time is to be a measure or something measured, but that to make it known there is, in the circular movement of the universe, a very short element (the interval of a day), whose object is to demonstrate the smallest portion of time, through which we are enabled to discover the nature and quantity of time. In order to indicate to us its nature ("being"), (Plato438) says that it was born with the heavens, and that it is the mobile image of eternity. Time is mobile because it has no more permanence than the life of the universal Soul, because it passes on and flows away therewith; it is born with the heavens, because it is one and the same life that simultaneously produces the heavens and time. If, granting its possibility, the life of the Soul were reduced to the unity (of the Intelligence), there would be an immediate cessation of time, which exists only in this life, and the heavens, which exist only through this life.
TIME AS THE PRIOR AND POSTERIOR OF THE MOVEMENT OF THIS LIFE WOULD BE ABSURD.
The theory that time is the priority and posteriority of this (earthly) movement, and of this inferior life,1013 is ridiculous in that it would imply on one hand that (the priority and posteriority of this sense-life) are something; and on the other, refusing to recognize as something real a truer movement, which includes both priority and posteriority. It would, indeed, amount to attributing to an inanimate movement the privilege of containing within itself priority with posteriority, that is, time; while refusing it to the movement (of the Soul), whose movement of the universal Sphere is no more than an image. Still it is from the movement (of the Soul) that originally emanated priority and posteriority, because this movement is efficient by itself. By producing all its actualizations it begets succession, and, at the same time that it begets succession, it produces the passing from one actualization to another.
THE PRIMARY MOVEMENT OF INTELLIGENCE THE INFORMING POWER OF TIME.
(Some objector might ask) why we reduce the movement of the universe to the movement of the containing Soul, and admit that she is within time, while we exclude from time the (universal) Soul's movement, which subsists within her, and perpetually passes from one actualization to another? The reason is that above the activity of the Soul there exists nothing but eternity, which shares neither her movement nor her extension. Thus the primary movement (of Intelligence) finds its goal in time, begets it, and by its activity informs its duration.
WHY TIME IS PRESENT EVERYWHERE; POLEMIC AGAINST ANTIPHANES AND CRITOLAUS.
How then is time present everywhere? The life of the Soul is present in all parts of the world, as the life of our soul is present in all parts of our body. It may indeed be objected,465 that time constitutes neither1014 a hypostatic substance, nor a real existence, being, in respect to existence, a deception, just as we usually say that the expressions "He was" and "He will be" are a deception in respect to the divinity; for then He will be and was just as is that, in which, according to his assertion, he is going to be.
To answer these objections, we shall have to follow a different method. Here it suffices to recall what was said above, namely, that by seeing how far a man in motion has advanced, we can ascertain the quantity of the movement; and that, when we discern movement by walking, we simultaneously concede that, before the walking, movement in that man was indicated by a definite quantity, since it caused his body to progress by some particular quantity. As the body was moved during a definite quantity of time, its quantity can be expressed by some particular quantity of movementfor this is the movement that causes itand to its suitable quantity of time. Then this movement will be applied to the movement of the soul, which, by her uniform action, produces the interval of time.
THE MOVEMENT OF THE SOUL IS ATTRIBUTED TO THE PRIMARY MOVEMENT.
To what shall the movement of the (universal) Soul be attributed? To whatever we may choose to attribute it. This will always be some indivisible principle, such as primary Motion, which within its duration contains all the others, and is contained by none other;466 for it cannot be contained by anything; it is therefore genuinely primary. The same obtains with the universal Soul.
APPROVAL OF ARISTOTLE: TIME IS ALSO WITHIN US.
Is time also within us?467 It is uniformly present in the universal Soul, and in the individual souls that are1015 all united together.468 Time, therefore, is not parcelled out among the souls, any more than eternity is parcelled out among the (Entities in the intelligible world) which, in this respect, are all mutually uniform.
FOOTNOTES
1 Arist. Physics, iii. 7.
2 Or, the finished, the boundary, the Gnostic Horos.
3 Plato, Philebus, 24; Cary, 37.
4 Plato, Timaeus, p. 52; Cary, 26.
5 See vi. 3.13.
6 See Plato, Philebus, Cary, 40; see ii. 4.11.
7 See vi. 3.27.
8 See ii. 4.10.
9 Timaeus, 39; Cary, 14; see iii. 7.11.
10 Parmenides, 144; Cary, 37.
11 Possibly a reference to Numenius' book thereon.
12 Aristotle, Met. i. 5; Jamblichus, de Vita. Pyth. 28.150; and 29.162; found in their oath; also Numenius, 60.
13 See vi. 2.7.
14 See vi. 6.5.
15 As thought Plato and Aristotle combined, see Ravaisson, Essay, ii. 407.
16 Atheneus, xii. 546; see i. 6.4.
17 Plato, Timaeus, 39e, Cary, 15.
18 See iii. 8.7.
19 As thought the Pythagoreans; see Sextus Empiricus, Hypotyposes Pyrrh. 3.18, p. 165.
20 Olympiodorus, Comm. I Alcibiades, x. p. 95; Arist. Met., i. 5; Sextus Emp., H. P., iii. 152; Porphyry; Vit. Pyth., 48.
21 As said Theon of Smyrna, of the Pythagoreans, ii. p. 23; Jamblichus, Vit. Porph. 28.150; 29.162.
22 See i. 8.2.
23 Met. x. 2; iv. 2; v.
24 Peripatetic commentators on Aristotle's Metaphysics, which was used as a text-book in Plotinos's school.
25 See end of Sec. 13.
26 See vi. 1.6.
27 See Aristotle, Categories, ii. 6.
28 As Aristotle thought, Met. x. 2.
29 See vi. 9.2.
30 Met. x. 1.
31 The Numenian secret name of the divinity, fr. 20.
32 Met. xiii. 7.
33 Aristotle, Met. x. 2.
34 Aristotle, Metaph. xiii. 7.
35 See iv. 8.3.
36 See iv. 4.5.
37 See v. 7.3.
38 See vi. 3.13.
39 See vi. 9.1.
40 See Timaeus, 35; Cary, 12. Jamblichus, On the Soul, 2; Macrobius, Dream of Scipio, i. 5.
41 See Jamblichus, About Common Knowledge of Mathematics.
42 See Sec. 2.
43 Macrobius, Dream of Scipio, 1.5.
44 Parmenides quoted in Plato's Theataetus, 180 E. Jowett, iii. 383.
45 Plato, Timaeus, 56; Cary, 30.
46 In the Timaeus, 39; Cary, 14.
47 Parmenides, quoted by Plato, in the Sophists, 244; Cary, 61.
48 In Plato's Theataetus, 180; Jowett Tr. iii. 383.
49 Evidently Porphyry had advanced new objections that demanded an addition to the former book on the theory of vision; see iv. 5.
50 As thought the Stoics.
51 Like Aristotle, de Sensu et Sensili, 2.
52 iv. 5.
53 These ten disjointed reflections on happiness remind us of Porphyry's questioning habit, without which, Plotinos said, he might have had nothing to write; see Biography, 13.
54 As Epicurus thought the divinities alone enjoyed perfect happiness, Diog. Laert. x. 121.
55 See Aristotle, Nic. Ethics, 1.10.
56 See Cicero, de Finibus, ii. 2729.
57 See iii. 7.
58 Plutarch, Dogm. Philos. i. 17; Stob. Eclog. i. 18.
59 Arist. Topic. iv. 2; de Gener. et Cor. i. 10; Ravaisson, EMA, i. 422.
60 As did Alexander of Aphrodisias, in his treatise on "Mixture;" Ravaisson, EMA, ii. 297.
61 Stob. Eclog. i. 18.
62 See Plutarch, "Whether Wickedness Renders One Unhappy."
63 As said Numenius, 44.
64 See vi. 7. This is another proof of the chronological order, as vi. 7 follows this book.
65 Bouillet explains that in this book Plotinos summated all that Plato had to say of the Ideas and of their dependence on the Good, in the Timaeus, Philebus, Phaedrus, the Republic, the Banquet, and the Alcibiades; correcting this summary by the reflections of Aristotle, in Met. xii. But Plotinos advances beyond both Plato and Aristotle in going beyond Intelligence to the supreme Good. (See Sec. 37.) This treatise might well have been written at the instigation of Porphyry, who desired to understand Plotinos's views on this great subject.
66 The famous Philonic distinction between "ho theos," and "theos."
67 Plato, Timaeus, p. 45, Cary, 19.
68 See iii. 2.
69 See iii. 2.1.
70 Plato's Timaeus, pp. 3040, Cary, 1015.
71 An Aristotelian idea, from Met. vii. 1.
72 Aristotle, Met. vii. 17.
73 Met. vii. 1.
74 Met. vii. 7.
75 Aristotle, Met. v. 8.
76 Met. 1.3.
77 See ii. 9.3.
78 Aristotle, de Anima, ii. 2; Met. vii. 17.
79 Porphyry, Of the Faculties of the Soul, fr. 5.
80 See ii. 5.3.
81 Aristotle, de Anima, i. 3; ii. 24.
82 Plato, I Alcibiades, p. 130, Cary, 52.
83 See i. 1.3.
84 Bouillet explains this as follows: Discursive reason, which constitutes the real man, begets sensibility, which constitutes the animal; see i. 1.7.
85 See iii. 4.36.
86 See iii. 4.6.
87 These demons are higher powers of the human soul.
88 See iv. 3.18.
89 Plato, Timaeus, p. 76, Cary, 54.
90 p. 39, Cary, 15.
91 Plato, Timaeus, p. 77, Cary, 55.
92 See iv. 4.22.
93 Lucretius, v. 1095.
94 Diogenes Laertes, iii. 74.
95 Plato, Timaeus, p. 80, Cary, 61.
96 See iv. 3.18.
97 Plato, Phaedrus, p. 248, Cary, 60; see i. 3.4.
98 See v. 7.
99 See v. 1.9.
100 See i. 8.6, 7.
101 Rep. vi. p. 509, Cary, 19.
102 See v. 1.7.
103 See v. 1.5.
104 See v. 1.7.
105 Plato, Rep. vi. p. 509, Cary, 19.
106 See v. 1.6.
107 See iv. 8.3.
108 See v. 1.4.
109 See v. 1.6.
110 Arist. Nic. Eth. 1.1.
111 See Arist., Met. i. 5.
112 According to Plato's Banquet, p. 206, Cary, 31.
113 See iv. 5.7.
114 See 1.6.
115 Plato, Phaedrus, p. 249, Cary, 63.
116 See v. 1.2.
117 See vi. 7.25.
118 Plato, Philebus, p. 60, Cary, 141; Gorgias, p. 474, Cary, 66.
119 p. 61, Cary, 144.
120 See Met. xii.
121 Met xii. 7.
122 Plato, Rep. vi., p. 505, Cary, 17.
123 According to the proverb, like seeks its like, mentioned by Plato, in his Banquet; p. 195, Cary, 21.
124 Plato, Gorgias, p. 507, Cary, 136.
125 See i. 8.5.
126 Plato, Timaeus, p. 52, Cary, 26.
127 See below, Sec. 32.
128 Plato, Rep. vi., p. 506, Cary 17.
129 As said Plato, Republic vi., p. 508, Cary, 19.
130 See iii. 5.9.
131 In his Philebus, p. 65, Cary, 155.
132 As Plato said, in his Banquet, p. 184, Cary, 12.
133 See i. 6.5.
134 See i. 6.7.
135 As says Plato, in his Banquet, p. 210, Cary, 35.
136 As Plato says, in his Phaedrus, p. 250, Cary, 65.
137 As Plato says, in his Banquet, p. 183, Cary, 11.
138 See i. 6.9.
139 See i. 6.8.
140 As Plato said, in his Banquet, p. 211, Cary, 35.
141 See iii. 5.9.
142 Rep. vi., p. 505, Cary, 16.
143 See iii. 3.6.
144 As thought Plato, in the Banquet, p. 210, Cary, 35.
145 Arist. Met. xii. 9; see v. 1.9.
146 Met. xii. 7.
147 Met. xii. 9.
148 See iv. 6.3.
149 Met. xii. 8.
150 Plato, Rep. vi. p. 509, Cary, 19.
151 Met. xii. 7.
152 See v. 3.10.
153 See vi. 2.7.
154 See v. 3.11.
155 See iii. 9.6.
156 See vi. 5.11.
157 See v. 3.13.
158 Arist. Met. xii. 7.
159 As thought Plato, Rep. vi., p. 508, Cary, 19.
160 See iv. 3.1.
161 Letter ii. 312; Cary, p. 482.
162 See i. 6, end.
163 Numenius, fr. 32.
164 See Numenius, fr. 48.
165 Banquet, p. 211, Cary, 35.
166 As Aristotle asks, Eth. Nic. iii.
167 Arist. Nic. Eth. iii. 1.
168 Eud. Eth. ii. 6.
169 Nic. Eth. iii. 2.
170 Eud. Mor. ii. 9.
171 Nic. Eth. iii. 2.
172 Nic. Eth. iii. 6.
173 Plato, Alcinous, 31; this is opposed by Aristotle, Nic. Eth. iii. 2.6.
174 Aristotle, Eud. Eth. ii. 10.
175 Aristotle, Mor. Magn. i. 32; Nic. Eth. iii. 6.
176 Aristotle, Nic. Eth. iii. 4.
177 Arist. de Anim. iii. 10.
178 de Anim. iii. 9.
179 Magn. Mor. i. 17.
180 de Anim. iii. 9.
181 This Stoic term had already been noticed and ridiculed by Numenius, 2.8, 13; 3.4, 5; Guthrie, Numenius, p. 141. He taught that it was a casual consequence of the synthetic power of the soul (52). Its relation to free-will and responsibility, here considered, had been with Numenius the foundation of the ridicule heaped on Lacydes.
182 Nic. Eth. x. 8.
183 Nic. Eth. x. 7.
184 Plato, Republic, x. p. 617; Cary, 15.
185 In his Phaedo, p. 83; Cary, 74.
186 Such as Strato the Peripatetic, and the Epicureans.
187 Plato, Rep. x. p. 596c; Cary, 1.
188 See Jamblichus's Letter to Macedonius, on Destiny, 5.
189 See iii. 9, end.
190 Numenius, 32.
191 See vi. 7.2.
192 Aris. Met. ix. 1; xii. 9; Nic. Eth. x. 8; Plato Timaeus, p. 52; Cary, 26; Plotinos, Enn. ii. 5.3.
193 This etymology of "providence" applies in English as well as in Greek; see iii. 2.1.
194 Plato, Laws, iv., p. 716; Cary, 8.
195 Arist. Met. xii. 7.
196 See iii. 8.9.
197 In his Cratylos, p. 419; Cary, 76.
198 See iii. 9, end.
199 As said Plato in the Timaeus, p. 42; Cary, 18; see Numenius, 10, 32.
200 In this book Plotinos uses synonymously the "Heaven," the "World," the "Universal Organism or Animal," the "All" (or universe), and the "Whole" (or Totality). This book as it were completes the former one on the Ideas and the Divinity, thus studying the three principles (Soul, Intelligence and Good) cosmologically. We thus have here another proof of the chronological order. In it Plotinos defends Plato's doctrine against Aristotle's objection in de Anima i. 3.
201 As thought Heraclitus, Diog. Laert. ix. 8; Plato, Timaeus, p. 31; Cary, 11; Arist. Heaven, 1, 8, 9.
202 Such as Heraclitus.
203 In the Cratylus, p. 402; Cary, 41.
204 Rep. vi., p. 498; Cary, 11.
205 See Apuleius, de Mundo, p. 708; Ravaisson, E.M.A. ii. 150; Plato, Epinomis, c. 5.
206 Which would render it unfit for fusion with the Soul, Arist., Meteorology, i. 4; Plato, Tim., p. 58; Cary, 33.
207 See ii. 9.3; iii. 2.1; iv. 3.9.
208 Phaedo, p. 109; Cary, 134; that is, the universal Soul is here distinguished into the celestial Soul, and the inferior Soul, which is nature, the generative power.
209 The inferior soul, or nature.
210 See ii. 3.915.
211 See i. 1.710.
212 As is the vegetative soul, which makes only the animal part of us; see i. 1.710.
213 In his Timaeus, p. 31; Cary, 11.
214 Timaeus, p. 56; Cary, 30.
215 See i. 8.9.
216 Plato, Epinomis, p. 984; Cary, 8.
217 In the Timaeus, p. 31, 51; Cary 11, 24, 25.
218 See ii. 7.
219 Who in his Timaeus says, p. 39; Cary, 14.
220 See ii. 2.
221 As thought Heraclitus and the Stoics, who thought that the stars fed themselves from the exhalations of the earth and the waters; see Seneca, Nat. Quest. vi. 16.
222 See ii. 1.5.
223 See iii. 7; Plotinos may have already sketched the outline of this book (number 45), and amplified it only later.
224 See ii. 9.6, or 33; another proof of the chronological order.
225 In his Timaeus, p. 69; Cary, 44.
226 As the Stoics think, Plutarch, Plac. Phil. iv. 11.
227 As Aristotle would say, de Anima, iii. 3.
228 Aristotle, de Sensu, 6.
229 v. 3.
230 Porphyry, Principles, 24.
231 Arist., Mem. et Rec., 2.
232 Porphyry, Principles, 25.
233 Aristotle, Mem. et Rec., 2.
234 Porphyry, Treatise, Psych.
235 Locke's famous "tabula rasa."
236 Substance, Quantity, Quality, Relation, When, Where, Action-and-Reaction, to Have, and Location. Aristotle's treatment thereof in his Categories, and Metaphysics.
237 Met. v. 7.
238 Or, substance, "ousia."
239 Cat. i. 1, 2; or, mere label in common.
240 Aristotle, Met. vii. 3, distinguished many different senses of Being; at least four principal ones: what it seems, or the universal, the kind, or the subject. The subject is that of which all the rest is an attribute, but which is not the attribute of anything. Being must be the first subject. In one sense this is matter; in another, form; and in the third place, the concretion of form and matter.
241 See ii. 4.616, for intelligible matter, and ii. 4.25 for sense-matter.
242 Arist., Met. vii. 3.
243 Arist., Cat. 2.5.25.
244 Arist., Cat. ii. 5.15.
245 Arist., Met. vii. 1; Cat. ii. 5.
246 Categ. ii. 5.1, 2.
247 Cat. ii. 5.16, 17.
248 Cat. ii. 6.1, 2.
249 Met. v. 13.
250 Met. xiii. 6.
251 Met. xiii. 3.
252 Categ. ii. 6.1823.
253 See vi. 6.
254 Categ. ii. 6.4.
255 Arist., Hermeneia, 4.
256 See iii. 7.8.
257 Categ. ii. 6.26.
258 Categ. ii. 7.1; Met. v. 15.
259 Categ. ii. 7.1719.
260 See Categ. viii.
261 Arist., Categ. ii. 8.3, 7, 8, 13, 14.
262 See ii. 6.3.
263 See ii. 6.3.
264 See ii. 6.1.
265 These are: 1, capacity and disposition; 2, physical power or impotence; 3, affective qualities; 4, the figure and exterior form.
266 Met. v. 14.
267 Categ. ii. 8.
268 See i. 6.2.
269 Categ. ii. 8.15.
270 Among whom Plotinos is not; see vi. 1.10.
271 The reader is warned that the single Greek word "paschein" is continually played upon in meanings "experiencing," "suffering," "reacting," or "passion."
272 Met. xi. 9.
273 That is, "to move" and "to cut" express an action as perfect as "having moved" and "having cut."
274 As Aristotle says, Categ. ii. 7.1.
275 Plotinos proposes to divide verbs not as transitive and intransitive, but as verbs expressing a completed action or state, (as to think), and those expressing successive action, (as, to walk). The French language makes this distinction by using with these latter the auxiliary "tre." Each of these two classes are subdivided into some verbs expressing an absolute action, by which the subject alone is modified; and into other verbs expressing relative action, referring to, or modifying an exterior object. These alone are used to form the passive voice, and Plotinos does not want them classified apart.
276 In Greek the three words are derived from the same root.
277 See i. v.
278 See iii. 6.1.
279 Categ. iii. 14.
280 For this movement did not constitute reaction in the mover.
281 That is, the Greek word for "suffering."
282 A Greek pun, "kathexis."
283 A Greek pun, "hexis" also translated "habit," and "habitude."
284 See Chaignet, Hist. of Greek Psychology, and Simplicius, Commentary on Categories.
285 See iv. 7.14. This is an Aristotelian distinction.
286 See ii. 4.1.
287 By verbal similarity, or homonymy, a pun.
288 See ii. 4.1.
289 See ii. 5.5.
290 For Plato placed all reality in the Ideas.
291 Logically, their conception of matter breaks down.
292 Cicero, Academics, i. 11.
293 See ii. 4.10.
294 See Enn. ii. 4, 5; iii. 6. Another proof of the chronological order.
295 Plotinos was here in error; Aristotle ignored them, because he did not admit existence.
296 This refers to the Hylicists, who considered the universe as founded on earth, water, air or fire; or, Anaxagoras, who introduced the category of mind.
297 Plotinos's own categories are developed from the thought of Plato, found in his "Sophists," for the intelligible being; and yet he harks back to Aristotle's Categories and Metaphysics, for his classification of the sense-world.
298 See vi. 4, 6, 9.
299 In his "Sophist." p. 248 e-250; Cary, 7276.
300 In vi. 3.
301 See vi. 3.6.
302 See vi. 3.3.
303 See iii. 2.16.
304 That is, the higher part, the principal power of the soul; see ii. 3.17, 18.
305 Here "being" and "essence" have had to be inverted.
306 Verbal similarity, homonymy, or pun.
307 See Plato's Sophists, p. 250 c; Cary, 75.
308 Sophists, p. 254 d; Cary, 86.
309 As said Aristotle, Met. iv. 2.
310 Plato, Sophist, p. 245; Cary, 63.
311 See vi. 9.1.
312 See vi. 4.
313 Arist., Met. xiv. 6.
314 Aristotle. Met. xiv. 6.
315 See ii. 6.2.
316 See vi. 7.36.
317 As said Aristotle. Eth. Nic. i. 6.2.
318 Against Aristotle.
319 See vi. 1.14.
320 See iii. 7.11.
321 To ti n einai.
322 See i. 6.
323 See v. 8.
324 Counting identity and difference as a composite one? See note 11.
325 See iv. 9.5.
326 See iv. 8.3.
327 See iii. 2.16.
328 See iv. 8.8.
329 See iii. 8.7.
330 See iii. 8.2.
331 See iii. 2.2.
332 See iii. 9.1.
333 See 3.9.1; Timaeus, p. 39; Cary, 14.
334 See ii. 9.1.
335 See v. 3.4.
336 Plato, Philebus, p. 18; Cary, 23.
337 Plato, Philebus, p. 17 e; Cary, 21.
338 See iii. 4.1.
339 See iv. 8.37.
340 See iv. 8.8.
341 See iv. 4.29.
342 Here Plotinos purposely mentions Numenius's name for the divinity (fr. 20.6), and disagrees with it, erecting above it a supreme Unity. This, however, was only Platonic, Rep. vi. 19, 509 b., so that Plotinos should not be credited with it as is done by the various histories of philosophy. Even Numenius held the unity, fr. 14.
343 This means, by mere verbal similarity, "homonymy," or, punning.
344 As said Plato, in his Philebus, p. 18, Cary, 23.
345 See i. 1.7.
346 See Bouillet, vol. 1, p. 380.
347 See iii. 6.15.
348 See sect. 16.
349 See ii. 1.2.
350 Or, mortal nature, or, decay; see i. 8.4; ii. 4.56.
351 See vi. 2.7, 8.
352 See ii. 4.6.
353 See vi. 1.13, 14.
354 In vi. 3.11, and vi. 1.13, 14, he however subsumes time and place under relation.
355 According to Aristotle, Met. vii. 3.
356 Aristotle, Met. viii. 5.6.
357 Aristotle, Categ. ii. 5.
358 See ii. 5.4.
359 Met. vii. 11.
360 Met. vii. 17.
361 See ii. 4.35.
362 See iii. 6.
363 Categ. ii. 5.
364 See iii. 7.8.
365 See sect. 11.
366 Arist. Met. vii. 1.
367 See vi. 1.26.
368 See ii. 4.10.
369 See Met. vii. 3.
370 See vi. 1.2, 3.
371 See iii. 8.7.
372 Matter is begotten by nature, which is the inferior power of the universal Soul, iii. 4.1.; and the form derives from Reason, which is the superior power of the same Soul, ii. 3.17.
373 Met. v. 8.
374 Being an accident, Met. v. 30, see434.
375 See iii. 6.12.
376 See Categ. ii. 5.12.
377 Plotinos is here defending Plato's valuation of the universal, against Aristotle, in Met. vii. 13.
378 Arist. de Anima, ii. 1.
379 See sect. 8.
380 Plotinos follows Aristotle in his definition of quantity, but subsumes time and place under relation. Plot., vi. 1.4; Arist. Categ. ii. 6.1, 2.
381 Arist. Met. v. 13.
382 See vi. 3.5; iii. 6.17.
383 Categ. ii. 6.
384 Quoted by Plato in his Hippias, p. 289, Cary, 20.
385 See Categ. 2.6.
386 See vi. 1.5.
387 See sect. 11.
388 See vi. 6.
389 Met. v. 6.
390 Categ. iii. 6.26.
391 Met. v. 14.
392 Categ. ii. 6.26.
393 In speaking of quality, Categ. ii. 8.30.
394 Following the Latin version of Ficinus.
395 Bouillet remarks that Plotinos intends to demonstrate this by explaining the term "similarity" not only of identical quality, but also of two beings of which one is the image of the other, as the portrait is the image of the corporeal form, the former that of the "seminal reason," and the latter that of the Idea.
396 By this Plotinos means the essence, or intelligible form, vi. 7.2.
397 See vi. 7.36.
398 See iii. 6.4.
399 In his Banquet, p. 186188; Cary, 14, 15.
400 See v. 9.11.
401 See i. 2.1.
402 See vi. 7.5.
403 See iii. 6.4.
404 Categ. ii. 8.3, 7, 8, 13, 14.
405 See i. 1.2.
406 Arist. Categ. ii. 8.813.
407 Met. v. 14.
408 Met. vii. 12.
409 Met. v. 14.
410 Categ. ii. 8.
411 Arist. Categ. iii. 10.
412 See vi. 1.17.
413 Met. v. 10.
414 Categ. iii. 11.
415 Categ. iii. 14.
416 Categ. ii. 7.
417 By a pun, this "change" is used as synonymous with the "alteration" used further on.
418 Arist. de Gen. i. 4.
419 Alteration is change in the category of quality, Arist. de Gen. i. 4; Physics, vii. 2.
420 Arist. Metaph. ix. 6; xi. 9.
421 Met. xi. 9.
422 See ii. 5.1, 2.
423 See ii. 5.2.
424 See ii. 5.2.
425 Categ. iii. 14.
426 Arist. Met. xi. 9.
427 See ii. 7.
428 Arist. de Gen. i. 5.
429 Arist. de Gen. i. 10.
430 Here we have Numenius's innate motion of the intelligible, fr. 30.21.
431 See vi. 1.1522.
432 Namely, time, vi. 1.13; place, vi. 1.14; possession, vi. 1.23; location, vi. 1.24.
433 For relation, see vi. 1.69.
434 For Aristotle says that an accident is something which exists in an object without being one of the distinctive characteristics of its essence.
435 In this book Plotinos studies time and eternity comparatively; first considering Plato's views in the Timaeus, and then the views of Pythagoras (1), Epicurus (9), the Stoics (7), and Aristotle (4, 8, 12).
436 The bracketed numbers are those of the Teubner edition; the unbracketed, those of the Didot edition.
437 See ii. 9.6.
438 As thought Plato, in his Timaeus, p. 37, Cary, 14.
439 Stobaeus. Ecl. Phys. i. 248.
440 A category, see vi. 2.7.
441 See vi. 2.7.
442 Or, with Mueller, "therefore, in a permanent future."
443 De Caelo, i. 9.
444 That is, with this divinity that intelligible existence is.
445 Arist. Met. iii. 2.
446 In the Timaeus, p. 29, Cary 10.
447 Stob. Ecl. Physic. ix. 40.
448 Porphyry, Principles, 32, end.
449 Especially Archytas, Simplicius, Comm. in Phys. Aristot. 165; Stob. Ecl. Physic. Heeren, 248250.
450 Stobaeus, 254.
451 See Stobaeus, 250.
452 Aristotle, Physica, iv. 12.
453 Mueller: "Whether this may be predicated of the totality of the movement."
454 See vi. 6.410.
455 As Aristotle, Phys. iv. 11, claimed.
456 In Physica, iii. 7.
457 Stobaeus, Ecl. Phys. ix. 40.
458 When collectively considered as "A-pollo," following Numenius, 42, 67, Plotinos, v. 5.6.
459 See ii. 9.3.
460 See iii. 7.1, Introd.
461 See iii. 6.16, 17.
462 Porphyry, Principles, 32.
463 In the Timaeus, p. 38, Cary, 14.
464 In his Timaeus, p. 39, Cary, 14, 15.
465 As by Antiphanes and Critolaus, Stobaeus, Eclog. Phys. ix. 40, p. 252, Heeren.
466 See iii. 7.2.
467 As thought Aristotle, de Mem. et Remin. ii. 12.
468 See iv. 9.
Transcriber's Notes
Punctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant preference was found in this four-volume set; otherwise they were not changed.
Simple typographical errors were corrected. Inconsistent capitalization has not been changed.
Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.
Infrequent spelling of "Plotinus" changed to the predominant "Plotinos."
Several opening or closing parentheses and quotation marks are unmatched; Transcriber has not attempted to determine where they belong.
Cover created by Transcriber and placed into the Public Domain.
Page 678: A line containing "How then could one," appears to have been partly duplicated in the original. The duplicate text, which has been removed here, was: "Essence sence possess self-existence. How then could".
Page 690, footnote 53 (originally 1): "he might have had noth-" does not complete on the next line and has been changed here to "he might have had nothing".
Page 700: The two opening parentheses in '(from its "whatness" (or, essence72).' share the one closing parenthesis; unchanged.
Page 744: unmatched closing quotation mark removed after "a being is suited by its like".
Page 804: Closing parenthesis added after "single (unitary".
Page 823: "resistance corporeal nature15)." has no matching opening parenthesis; unchanged here.
Page 930: Phrase beginning "(each constituting a particular intelligence" appears to share its closing parenthesis with the phrase "(and thus exists in itself)."
Page 935: Closing parenthesis in phrase "composite as mixtures)," does not have a matching opening parenthesis; unchanged.
Page 984: Footnote 395 (originally 53), "corporeal form, the former that of" originally was "corporeal form, the latter that of".
Footnote Issues
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